

PUBLISHER'S NOTE.

It is, perhaps, not without interest, in publishing the second volume of the History of Julius Cæsar, written by the Emperor Napoleon III., to call to memory the names of Sovereigns and Princes who have employed themselves upon the same subject.

The King of France, Charles VIII., showed an especial admiration for the *Commentaries* of Cæsar, and the celebrated monk, Robert Gaguin, presented to him, in 1480, the translation he had made in French of the eight books of the War in Gaul. We are informed of this in the edition of the *translation* by the learned monk, printed in 1500. This edition, in large 4to, is from the press of Antoine Verard. (See J. Ch. Brunet, *Manuel du Libraire et de l'Amateur de Livres*, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 518, and the *Biographie Universelle*, article *Charles VIII.*)

Charles V., who professed a great admiration for Cæsar, left a copy of the *Commentaries* filled with marginal notes, written with his own hand. It was at his instigation that the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferdinand Gonzaga, sent a scientific mission into France to study Cæsar's campaigns on the localities. The

forty plans which were made by the members of this commission, and among which that of Alise is found, were published in 1575, in the edition of James Strada.

The Sultan Soliman II., contemporary of Charles V., whom he had taken for his model, sent through all Europe to procure as many copies of Cæsar's *Commentaries* as could be found, which he ordered to be collated, and caused a translation to be made into the Turkish language for his own daily reading.

The King of France, Henri IV., translated the two first books of Cæsar's *Commentaries*. The manuscript of this translation was deposited in the Bibliothèque du Roi, and M. des Noyers took it thence to deliver it to Louis XIII., who, in his turn, translated the two last books of the *Commentaries*. These two translations were joined together, and printed at the Louvre in 1630.

Louis XIV. translated the first book of the *Commentaries*. His translation was printed at Paris in 1651, in folio, with figures. This work has not been reprinted; it is now very rare. The reader may consult on this subject the *Méthode d'étudier l'Histoire* of the Abbé Lenglet-Dufresnoy, tom. II., p. 481; and J. Ch. Brunet, *Manuel du Libraire et de l'Amateur de Livres*, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 519.

The great Condé, who had studied with care the campaigns of Cæsar, encouraged the translation of the *Commentaries* undertaken by Nicolas Perrot d'Ablau-

court; it was the translation most esteemed and the most in vogue during the last century.

Christina, Queen of Sweden, had composed *Reflections on the Life and Actions of Cæsar*, as we are informed by J. Arckenholz in his work entitled *Mémoires concernant Christine, Reine de Suède*, Amsterdam, 1751–1760, tom. IV., No. 6, p. 4.

Louis Philippe Joseph d'Orléans, surnamed *Egalité*, was a great reader of the *Commentaries*. He caused a map of Cæsar's campaigns in Gaul to be made.

Lastly, *the Emperor Napoleon I.*, at St. Helena, dictated a *Précis des Guerres de César* to Comte Marchand, who published it in Paris in 1836, in 8vo.

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JULIUS CÆSAR.

BOOK III.

THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE "COMMENTARIES."

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.

I. THERE are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom. Such had been the Gauls.

The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise. Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176),

two expeditions started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now *Western Hungary*); the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country lying between those mountains and the Po. (¹) The invaders soon transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took the name of *Cisalpine Gaul*. More than two centuries afterwards, the descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the Capitol. (²) Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube, (³) ravaging Northern Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple of Delphi. (⁴) Others, arriving at Byzantium, (⁵) pass into Asia, establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount Taurus, since called *Gallo-Greece*, or *Galatia*, and maintain in it a sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus. (⁶)

These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364 to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once the defeat of her armies

(¹) Justin, XXIV. 4.—Titus Livius, V. 48.

(²) Polybius, II. 17–19.—Titus Livius, V. 35.

(³) Pausanias, X. 19–23.—Diodorus Siculus, *Eclog.*, XXII. 13.

(⁴) Strabo, IV., p. 156, edit. Dubner and Müller.—Justin, XXXII. 3.

(⁵) Polybius, IV. 46.

(⁶) Justin, XXV. 2.—Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 16.—Pausanias, VII. 6, § 5.

placed her existence in danger. It was, as it were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of colonies.

Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, which have already been spoken of in the first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive, crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic, when Hannibal's invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the inhabitants of those countries, who helped to increase the numbers of his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy, they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years. The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time, Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia (565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).

II. In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of Marseilles, which was
Wars of the Romans beyond the Alps. attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian tribes of the Maritime Alps, (¹) for the first

(¹) Polybius, XXXIII. 7, 8 — Titus Livius, *Epitome*, XLVII.

time carried their arms to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche, and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve stadia (2·22 kils.), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable them to pass through Gaul into Spain (¹). Nevertheless, the legions pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards, (²) the proconsul C. Sextius Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of Aix (*Aquæ Sextiæ*). (³)

The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated into the interior. The Ædui were at war with the Allobroges and the Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former, and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue (*Sulgas*), not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus, grandson of Paulus Æmilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus, king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of *Allobrogicus*. (⁴) The Arverni pre-

(¹) Strabo, IV., p. 169.

(²) Titus Livius, *Epitome*, LX.

(³) Titus Livius, *Epitome*, LXI.

(⁴) Strabo, IV., pp. 154, 159.—Titus Livius, *Epitome*, LXI.—Florus, III. 2.—Velleius Paterculus, II. 10.

tended to be descendants of the Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans; ⁽¹⁾ they remained independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute. ⁽²⁾

In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius, which gave its name to the Roman province called *Narbonensis*. ⁽³⁾

The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century of the foundation of Rome it seems to have recommenced with greater intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones, ⁽⁴⁾ after ravaging Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhætia, and penetrated by the valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried there terror and desolation. The Belgæ alone offered a vigorous resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M. Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in

⁽¹⁾ Lucan, I. 424.

⁽²⁾ Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, I. 45.—Strabo, IV., p. 158.

⁽³⁾ Titus Livius, *Epitome*, LXII.—Eutropius, IV. 10.—Velleius Paterculus, I. 15.

⁽⁴⁾ Strabo, VII., p. 243.

647; ⁽¹⁾ lastly, in the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Cæpio ⁽²⁾ and Cn. Manlius Maximus. The two last each lost his army. ⁽³⁾ The very existence of Rome was threatened.

Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653), destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.

The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones; sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it were, the rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea. Sallust ⁽⁴⁾ ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Cæpio and Cn. Manlius, and Cicero ⁽⁵⁾ designates under the same name the barbarians who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.

From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of increasing their power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus, and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The vanquished peoples

⁽¹⁾ This victory was gained by the Tigurini, a people of Helvetia, on the territory of the Allobroges. According to the *Epitome* of Titus Livius (LXV.), the battle took place in the district of the Nitiobriges, a people inhabiting the banks of the Garonne, which is not very probable.

⁽²⁾ After pillaging the temple of Toulouse.

⁽³⁾ Titus Livius, *Epitome*, LXVII.—Tacitus, *Germania*, 37.

⁽⁴⁾ *Jugurtha*, 114.

⁽⁵⁾ *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 13.

were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline's conspiracy; fear led them to denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their revelations. ⁽¹⁾

The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne, ⁽²⁾ which was devoted to the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C. Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after, the latter finally defeated and subdued them. "Until the time of Cæsar," says Cicero, "our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls, thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Cæsar alone resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion." ⁽³⁾

III. It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples established on either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. "The

Continual Pre-occupation of the Romans in regard to the Gauls.

⁽¹⁾ *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 13.

⁽²⁾ The fugitives from Vienne founded the town which subsequently took the name of *Lugdunum*, in a place called *Condate*, which is synonymous with confluence. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 50.)

⁽³⁾ *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 13.

Romans," says Sallust, "had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight." ⁽¹⁾ On his part, Cicero expresses himself thus: "From the beginning of our Republic, all our wise men have looked upon Gaul as *the most redoubtable enemy of Rome*. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us until now from combating them all." ⁽²⁾

In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such circumstances. ⁽³⁾ In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy *en masse* ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was forbidden to touch except in that eventuality. ⁽⁴⁾ Accordingly, when, in 705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless. ⁽⁵⁾

War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a desperate struggle,

⁽¹⁾ *Jugurtha*, 114.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 13.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, I. 19.

⁽⁴⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 41.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 41.

⁽⁵⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 41.

and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This explains, at the same time, both Cæsar's ardour and the enthusiasm excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia, and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation. If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the North rushing eagerly upon Italy?

And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul. Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen, ⁽¹⁾ and even twenty, ⁽²⁾ for Cæsar's victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices during sixty days. ⁽³⁾

(1) Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 41.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 41.

(2) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 41.

(3) Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 11.—Dio Cassius, XL. 50.

When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly estimating the causes which have produced them.

The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the civil war belongs not to Cæsar, but to Pompey. And although the former had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course. We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as Cicero says, ⁽¹⁾ "he had already done enough for his glory, if he had not done enough for the Republic;" and the same orator adds: "Why would Cæsar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he retained by the agreeableness of the country, by

(1) Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 14.

the beauty of the towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable than the multiplicity of Cæsar's victories? Can he find limits farther off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours? Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Cæsar, it is not their policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the affection of the people." (¹)

Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy, claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.

If Cæsar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to Italy,

(¹) Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 12.

and distributed it in such a manner that he could re-assemble it quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul, sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Cæsar, on the contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of the expedition against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from the Sambre as far as the Saône. ⁽¹⁾ He keeps within the limit of his government without making any preparation which indicates hostile intentions, ⁽²⁾ wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by justice rather than by arms. ⁽³⁾ In fact, he has collected so little money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily renounce their pay. ⁽⁴⁾ Cæsar offers Pompey an unconditional reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power which Cæsar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of the country.

⁽¹⁾ It is stated in the "Commentaries" that Cæsar placed in winter quarters four legions among the Belgæ, and the same number among the Ædui. (*De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 54.)—"Cæsar had with him but 5,000 men and 300 horse. He had left the rest of his army beyond the Alps." (Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 36, and Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 34.)

⁽²⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 35.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 55.

⁽⁴⁾ Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 68.

IV. In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. Plan followed in the Relation of the War in Gaul. "Cæsar," he says, "has written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art, his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and luminous brevity." ⁽¹⁾ Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the following terms: "These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Cæsar has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it was composed." ⁽²⁾

If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as little as possible from the "Commentaries," but without restricting ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative of Cæsar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and developed those which required elucidation. In order to indi-

(1) In Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 56.—Cicero, *Brutus*, 75.

(2) Preface of Hirtius to Book VIII. of the "Commentaries"

cate in a more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we have employed the modern names, especially in cases where ancient geography did not furnish corresponding names.

The investigation of the battle-fields and siege operations has led to the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments. The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text, will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Cæsar in describing the countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.

CHAPTER II.

STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.

(See Plate I.)

Geographical Description. I. TRANSALPINE Gaul had for its boundaries the ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. This portion of Europe, so well marked out by nature, comprised what is now France, nearly the whole of Switzerland, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium, and the south of Holland. It had the form of an irregular pentagon, and the country of the Carnutes (the *Orléanais*) was considered to be its centre. (')

An uninterrupted chain of heights divided Gaul, as it divides modern France, from north to south, into two parts. This line commences at the Monts Corbières, at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, is continued by the Southern Cévennes and by the mountains of the Vivarais, Lyonnais, and Beaujolais (called the Northern Cévennes), and declines continually with the mountains of the Charolais and the Côte-d'Or, until it reaches the plateau of Langres; after quitting this plateau, it leaves to the east the Monts Faucilles, which unite it to the Vosges, and, inclining towards the north-west, it follows, across the mountains of the Meuse, the western crests of the Argonne and

(') *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 13.

the Ardennes, and terminates, in decreasing undulations, towards Cape Griz-Nez, in the Pas-de-Calais.

This long and tortuous ridge, more or less interrupted, which may be called the backbone of the country, is the great line of the watershed. It separates two slopes. On the eastern slope flow the Rhine and the Rhone, in opposite directions, the first towards the Northern Sea, the second towards the Mediterranean; on the western slope rise the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, which go to throw themselves into the ocean. These rivers flow at the bottom of vast basins, the bounds of which, as is well known, are indicated by the lines of elevations connecting the sources of all the tributaries of the principal stream.

The basin of the Rhine is separated from that of the Rhone by the *Monts Faucilles*, the southern extremity of the *Vosges*, called *Le trouée de Belfort*, the *Jura*, the *Jorat* (the heights which surround the Lake of Geneva on the north), and the lofty chain of the *Helvetic Alps*. In its upper part, it embraces nearly all Switzerland, of which the Rhine forms the northern boundary, in its course, from east to west, from the Lake of Constance to *Bâle*. Near this town the river turns abruptly towards the north. The basin widens, limited to the east by the mountains which separate it from the Danube and the Weser; to the west, by the northern part of the great line of watershed (the mountains of the Meuse, the Argonne, and the western Ardennes). It is intersected, from Mayence to Bonn, by chains nearly parallel to the course of the river, which separate its tributaries. From Bonn to the point where the Rhine divides into two

arms, the basin opens still more; it is flat, and has no longer a definite boundary. The southern arm bore already, in the time of Cæsar, the name of *Waal* (Vahalis), and united with the Meuse⁽¹⁾ below Nimeguen. To the west of the basin of the Rhine, the Scheldt forms a secondary basin.

The basin of the Rhone, in which is comprised that of the Saône, is sharply bounded on the north by the southern extremity of the Vosges and the *Monts Faucilles*; on the west, by the plateau of Langres, the *Côte-d'Or*, and the *Cévennes*; on the east, by the *Jura*, the *Jorat*, and the *Alps*. The Rhone crosses the *Valais* and the Lake of Geneva, follows an irregular course as far as Lyons, and runs thence from north to south to the Mediterranean. Among the most important of its secondary basins, we may reckon those of the *Aude*, the *Hérault*, and the *Var*.

The three great basins of the western slope are comprised between the line of watershed of Gaul and the ocean. They are separated from each other by two chains branching from this line, and running from the south-east to the north-west. The basin of the *Seine*, which includes that of the *Somme*, is separated from the basin of the *Loire* by a line of heights which branches from the *Côte-d'Or* under the name of the mountains of the *Morvan*, and is continued by the very low hills of *Le Perche* to the extremity of *Normandy*. A series of heights, extending from north to south, from the hills of *Le Perche* to *Nantes*, enclose the basin of the *Loire* to the west, and leave outside the secondary basins of *Brittany*.

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 10

The basin of the Loire is separated from that of the Garonne by a long chain starting from Mont Lozère, comprising the mountains of Auvergne, those of the Limousin, the hills of Poitou, and the plateau of Gâtine, and ending in flat country towards the coasts of La Vendée.

The basin of the Garonne, situated to the south of that of the Loire, extends to the Pyrenees. It comprises the secondary basins of the Adour and the Charente.

The vast country we have thus described is protected on the north, west, and south by two seas, and by the Pyrenees. On the east, where it is exposed to invasions, Nature, not satisfied with the defences she had given it in the Rhine and the Alps, has further retrenched it behind three groups of interior mountains—first, the Vosges; second, the Jura; third, the mountains of Forez, the mountains of Auvergne, and the Cévennes.

The Vosges run parallel to the Rhine, and are like a rampart in the rear of that river.

The Jura, separated from the Vosges by *the Gap (trouée) of Belfort*, rises like a barrier in the interval left between the Rhine and the Rhone, preventing, as far as Lyons, the waters of this latter river from uniting with those of the Saône.

The Cévennes and the mountains of Auvergne and Forez form, in the southern centre of Gaul, a sort of citadel, of which the Rhone might be considered as the advanced fosse. The ridges of this group of mountains start from a common centre, take opposite directions, and form the valleys whence flow, to the

north, the Allier and the Loire; to the west, the Dordogne, the Lot, the Aveyron, and the Tarn; to the south, the Ardèche, the Gard, and the Hérault.

The valleys, watered by navigable rivers, presented—thanks to the fruitfulness of their soil and to their easy access—natural ways of communication, favourable both to commerce and to war. To the north, the valley of the Meuse; to the east, the valley of the Rhine, conducting to that of the Saône, and thence to that of the Rhone, were the grand routes which armies followed to invade the south. Strabo, therefore, remarks justly that Sequania (*Franche-Comté*) has always been the road of the Germanic invasions from Gaul into Italy. ⁽¹⁾ From east to west the principal chain of the watershed might easily be crossed in its less elevated parts, such as the plateau of Langres and the mountains of Charolais, which have since furnished a passage to the Central Canal. Lastly, to penetrate from Italy into Gaul, the great lines of invasion were the valley of the Rhone and the valley of the Garonne, by which the mountainous mass of the Cévennes, Auvergne, and Forez is turned.

Gaul presented the same contrast of climates which we observe between the north and south of France. While the Roman province enjoyed a mild temperature and an extreme fertility, ⁽²⁾ the central and northern part was covered with vast forests, which rendered the climate colder than it is at present; ⁽³⁾ yet the

⁽¹⁾ Strabo, IV. 3, p. 160.

⁽²⁾ The Narbonnese reminded the Romans of the climate and productions of Italy (Strabo, IV. 1, p. 147.)

⁽³⁾ Pomponius Mela, who compiled in the first century, from old authors, an abridgment of Geography, says that Gaul was rich in wheat and pastures,

centre produced in abundance wheat, rye, millet, and barley. ⁽¹⁾ The greatest of all these forests was that of the Ardennes. It extended, beginning from the Rhine, over a space of two hundred miles, on one side to the frontier of the Remi, crossing the country of the Treviri; and, on another side, to the Scheldt, across the country of the Nervii. ⁽²⁾ The "Commentaries" speak also of forests existing among the Carnutes, ⁽³⁾ in the neighbourhood of the Saône, ⁽⁴⁾ among the Menapii ⁽⁵⁾ and the Morini, ⁽⁶⁾ and among the Eburones. ⁽⁷⁾ In the north the breeding of cattle was the principal occupation, ⁽⁸⁾ and the pastures of Bel-

and covered with immense forests: "Terra est frumenti præcipue ac pabuli ferax, et amœna lucis immanibus." (*De Situ Orbis*, III. 2.)—*De Bello Gallico*, I. 16—The winter was very early in the north of Gaul. (*De Bello Gallico*, IV. 20.) Hence the proverbial expression at Rome of *hiems Gallica*. (Petronius, *Satur.* 19.—Strabo, IV, pp. 147–161.)—See the "Memoire on the Forests of Gaul" read before the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, by M. Alfred Maury.

⁽¹⁾ Strabo, IV., p. 147.—Diodorus Siculus, V. 26.

⁽²⁾ Cæsar, after having said (V. 3) that the forest of the Ardennes extended from the Rhine to the frontier of the Remi, *ad initum Remorum*, adds (VI. 29) that it extended also towards the Nervii, *ad Nervios*. Nevertheless, according to chapter 33 of book VI., we believe that this forest extended, across the country of the Nervii, to the Scheldt. How otherwise could Cæsar have assigned to the forest of the Ardennes a length of 500 miles, if it ended at the eastern frontier of the Nervii? This number is, in any case, exaggerated, for from the Rhine (at Coblenz) to the Scheldt, towards Ghent and Antwerp, it is but 300 kilomètres, or 200 miles.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 5.

⁽⁴⁾ "Citra flumen Ararim reliqui sese fugæ mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdidierunt." (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 12.)

⁽⁵⁾ "Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti." (*De Bello Gallico*, VI. 5.)

⁽⁶⁾ "(Morini et Menapii) silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque contulerunt." (*De Bello Gallico*, III. 28.)

⁽⁷⁾ "(Sugambri) primos Eburonum fines adeunt non silvæ morantur." (*De Bello Gallico*, VI. 35.)

⁽⁸⁾ Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.

gic Gaul produced a race of excellent horses. ⁽¹⁾ In the centre and in the south the richness of the soil was augmented by productive mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, and lead. ⁽²⁾

The country was, without any doubt, intersected by carriage roads, since the Gauls possessed a great number of all sorts of wagons, ⁽³⁾ since there still remain traces of Celtic roads, and since Cæsar makes known the existence of bridges on the Aisne, ⁽⁴⁾ the Rhone, ⁽⁵⁾ the Loire, ⁽⁶⁾ the Allier, ⁽⁷⁾ and the Seine. ⁽⁸⁾

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the population; yet we may presume, from the contingents furnished by the different states, that it amounted to more than seven millions of souls. ⁽⁹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 2.

⁽²⁾ Strabo, pp. 121, 155, 170, edit. Didot

⁽³⁾ "Carpenta Gallorum." (Florus, I. 13.)—"Plurima Gallica (verba) valuerunt, ut reda ac petorritum." (Quintilian, *De Institutione Oratoria*, lib. I., cap. v. 57.)—"Pettorritum enim est non ex Græcia dimidiatum, sed totum transalpius, nam est vox Gallica. Id scriptum est in libro M. Varronis quarto decimo *Rerum Divinarum*; quo in loco Varro, quum de petorrito dixisset, esse id verbum Gallicum dixit." (Aulus Gellius, XV. 30.)—"Pettorritum et Gallicum vehiculum est, et nomen ejus dictum esse existimant a numero quatuor rotarum. Alii Osce, quod hi quoque *petora* quatuor vocent. Alii Græce, sed αἰολικῶς dictum." (Festus, voc. *Pettorritum*, p. 206, edit. Muller.)—"Belgica esseda, Gallicana vehicula. Nam Belga civitas est Galliæ in qua hujusmodi vehiculi repertus est usus" (Servius, *Commentaries on the Georgics* of Virgil, lib. III. v. 204.—Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 33, and *passim*.)

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II. 5.

⁽⁵⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 7.

⁽⁶⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 11.

⁽⁷⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 34, 53.

⁽⁸⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 53.

⁽⁹⁾ The reckoning of these contingents is the most positive element for estimating the state of the population. We find in the "Commentaries" three valuable statements. 1st, the numerical state of the Helvetian immigration in 696 (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 29); 2nd, that of the Belgic troops, in the campaign of 697 (*De Bello Gallico*, II. 4); 3rd, the census of the Gaulish army which, in 702, attempted to raise the siege of Alesia (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 75.)

II. Gaul, according to Cæsar, was divided into three great regions, distinct by language, manners, and laws: to the north, Belgic

Political Divisions.

Of 368,000 men, composing the agglomeration of the Helvetii and their allies, 92,000 were able to bear arms; that is, about a quarter of the population. In the campaign of 697, the Belgic coalition counted 296,000 combatants, and, in 702, at the time of the blockade of Alesia, the effective force of a great part of Gaul amounted to 281,000 men. But, in order not to count twice the different contingents of the same states, we suppress from the enumeration of the year 702 the contingents of the countries already mentioned in the census of 697, which reduces the effective force to 201,000 men. Yet this number cannot represent the total of men fit for war; it comprises only the troops which could easily be sent out of the territory, and which were more numerous accordingly as the people to which they belonged were nearer to the theatre of military operations. Thus Cæsar informs us that the Bellovaci, who could bring into the field 100,000 men, only furnished 60,000 picked men in 697, and 10,000 in 702. The contingent of the Atrebatæ, which had been 15,000 men in 697, was reduced to 4,000 in 702; that of the Nervii, of 50,000 in the former year, sank to 5,000; and that of the Morini similarly from 25,000 to 5,000. From these circumstances we may be allowed to infer that the Gauls armed three-fifths of their male population when the enemy was near their territory, and only one-fifth, or even one-sixth, when he was more distant.

If, then, we would form an idea of the total number of men able to carry arms in Gaul, we must augment the contingents really furnished, sometimes by two-fifths, sometimes in a higher proportion, according to the distances which separated them from the seat of war. By this calculation, the levies of 697 represent 513,600 men capable of carrying arms, and those of 702, at least 573,600, we add together these two numbers, because, as stated above, each army comprises different populations, which gives 1,087,200 men, to whom we must add 92,000 Helvetii; moreover, it is indispensable to take into account the contributive capability of the populations which are not mentioned in the "Commentaries" among the belligerents at the two epochs indicated above, such as the Pictones, the Carnutes, the Andes, the Remi, the Treviri, the Lingones, the Leuci, the Unelli, the Redones, the Ambivareti, and the peoples of Armorica and Aquitaine. By an approximate estimate of their population according to the extent of their territory, we shall obtain the number of 625,000 men. Adding together these four numbers, to obtain the total number of men capable of bearing arms, we shall get $513,600 + 573,600 + 92,000 + 625,000 = 1,804,200$ men. Quadrupling this number to get, according to the proportion applied to the Helvetii, the total of the population, we shall have 7,216,800 inhabitants for Gaul, the Roman province not included. In fact, Diodorus Siculus, who wrote in the first century of our era, says (lib. V., c. 25) that the population of the different nations of Gaul varies from 200,000 to 50,000 men,

Gaul, between the Seine, the Marne, and the Rhine; in the centre, Celtic Gaul, between the Garonne and the Seine, extending from the ocean to the Alps, and comprising Helvetia; to the south, Aquitaine, between the Garonne and the Pyrenees. (¹) (*See Plate 2.*) We must, nevertheless, comprise in Gaul the Roman province, or the Narbonnese, which began at Geneva, on the left bank of the Rhone, and extended in the south as far as Toulouse. It answered, as nearly as possible, to the limits of the countries known in modern times as Savoy, Dauphiné, Provence, Lower Languedoc, and Roussillon. The populations who inhabited it were of different origins: there were found there Aquitanians, Belgæ, Ligures, Celts, who had all long undergone the influence of Greek civilisation, and especially establishments founded by the Phocæans on the coasts of the Mediterranean. (²)

which would make a mean of 125,000 men. If we take the word *ἀνδρες* in the sense of inhabitants, and if we admit with Tacitus that there were in Gaul sixty-four different nations, we should have the number of 8,000,000 inhabitants, very near the preceding

(¹) Pliny expresses himself thus "The country comprised under the name of *Gallia Comata* is divided into three peoples, generally separated by rivers. From the Scheldt to the Seine is Belgic Gaul, from the Seine to the Garonne, Celtic, called also *Lyonnese*, from thence to the Pyrenees is Aquitaine." (*Hist Nat*, IV. xxxi. 105.)

(²) PEOPLES COMPOSING THE ROMAN PROVINCE:

The Albici (the south of the department of the Lower Alps, and the north of the Var). (*De Bello Civil*, I 34; II. 2.)

The Allobroges, probably of Celtic origin, inhabited the north-west of Savoy, and the greater part of the department of the Isère.

The Helvi, inhabitants of the ancient Vivarais (the southern part of the department of the Ardèche), separated from the Arverni by the Cévennes. (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 8.)

The Ruteni of the Province (*Ruteni Provinciales*), a fraction of the Celtic nation of the Ruteni, incorporated into the Roman province, and whose territory extended over a part of the department of the Tarn.

These three great regions were subdivided into many states, called *civitates*—an expression which, in the “Commentaries,” is synonymous with *nations* ⁽¹⁾—that is, each of these states had its organisation and its own government. Among the peoples mentioned by Cæsar, we may reckon twenty-seven in Belgic Gaul, forty-three in Celtic, and twelve in Aquitaine: in all, eighty-two in Gaul proper, and seven in the Narbonnese. Other authors, admitting, no doubt, smaller subdivisions, carry this number to three or four hundred; ⁽²⁾ but it appears that under Tiberius there were only sixty-four states in Gaul. ⁽³⁾ Perhaps, in this number, they reckoned only the sovereign, and not the dependent, states.

PEOPLES COMPOSING THE ROMAN PROVINCE (*continued*)

The Sallvies, or *Salluvii* (the Bouches-du-Rhône, and western part of the Var). (*De Bello Civil*, I 35, edit. Nipperdey)

The Vocontii (departments of the Drôme and Upper Alps, southern part of the Isère, and the northern part of the Ardèche)

The Volceæ occupied all Lower Languedoc, from the Garonne to the Rhone. They had emigrated from the north of Gaul. They were subdivided into the Volceæ Tectosages, who had Tolosa (*Toulouse*) for their principal town; and the Volceæ Arecomici.

The Deciates (western part of the department of the Maritime Alps).

The Oxybii (eastern part of the department of the Var). } Not mentioned by Cæsar.

The Sordones, of the same race as the Aquitanians, inhabiting the Eastern Pyrenees and the Aude. }

The Caturiges. } Independent peoples on the upper channels of the Du-
The Centrones. } rance and the Isère, and in the mountains of the
The Graioceli. } Tarentaise.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, III. 10.

⁽²⁾ Four hundred, according to Appian (*Civil War*, II. 150); three hundred and five, according to Flavius Josephus (*Wars of the Jews*, II. xxviii. 5); three hundred, according to Plutarch (*Cæsar*, 15); about a hundred and forty, according to Pliny (*Hist. Nat.*, III. 5; IV. 31-33).

⁽³⁾ “Nevertheless, it was said at Rome that it was not only the Treviri and the Ædui who revolted, but the sixty-four states of Gaul.” (Tacitus, *Annal.*, III. 44.)—The revolt in question was that of Sacrovir, under Tiberius.

1. *Belgic Gaul.* The Belgæ were considered more warlike than the other Gauls, ⁽¹⁾ because, strangers to the civilisation of the Roman province and hostile to commerce, they had not experienced the effeminating influence of luxury. Proud of having escaped the Gaulish enervation, they claimed with arrogance an origin which united them with the Germans their neighbours, with whom, nevertheless, they were continually at war. ⁽²⁾ They boasted of having defended their territory against the Cimbri and the Teutones, at the time of the invasion of Gaul. The memory of the lofty deeds of their ancestors inspired them with a great confidence in themselves, and excited their warlike spirit. ⁽³⁾

(1) Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot.

(2) Although of Germanic origin, like the Nervii, and glorying in it (Tacitus, *Germania*, 28), the Treviri were often at war with the Germans. (Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 63.)

(3) PEOPLES OF BELGIC GAUL:

The Aduatuci, who occupied a part of the province of Namur

The Ambiani, a people of the department of the Somme. Their chief town was Samarobriva (*Amiens*).

The Ambivareti, established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the south of the marsh of Peel.

The Atrebatæ, the people of the ancient Artois, and of a part of French Flanders. Their principal *oppidum* was Nemetocenna (*Arras*)

The Bellovaci, occupying the greater part of the department of the Oise (the ancient Beauvaisis), and who extended, probably, to the sea. (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, IV. 17.)

The Caletes, whose territory answered to the ancient Pays de Caux (the western and central part of the department of the Seine-Inférieure).

The Leuci, who occupied the southern part of the department of the Meuse, the greater part of that of the Meurthe, and the department of the Vosges.

The Mediomatres. They extended from the upper course of the Meuse, to the Rhine (department of the Moselle, and part of the departments of the Meuse, the Meurthe, the Upper Rhine, and the Lower Rhine).

The most powerful nations among the Belgæ were the Bellovaci, ⁽¹⁾ who could arm a hundred thousand

PEOPLES OF BELGIC GAUL (*continued*).

The Menapii, who occupied the territory comprised between the Rhine and the mouths of the Scheldt.

The Morini, who inhabited the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, and extended to near the mouths of the Scheldt.

The Nervii, established between the Sambre and the Scheldt (French and Belgic Hainaut, provinces of Southern Brabant, of Antwerp, and part of Eastern Flanders) The writers posterior to Cæsar mention Bagacum (*Bavay*) as their principal town

<i>The Ceutones,</i>	} Clients (or dependents) of the Nervi, whose territories appear to have been situated on the left of the Meuse, from Mézières to near Hasselt.
<i>The Geaduni,</i>	
<i>The Grudii,</i>	
<i>The Pleumoxii,</i>	
<i>The Levaci,</i>	

The Remi, whose territory embraced the greater part of the departments of the Marne and the Ardennes, a fraction of the departments of the Aisne and the Meuse, and of the province of Luxemburg Their principal town was Durocoronum (*Rheims*)

The Suessiones, the people of the ancient Soissonais, whose territory comprised the greater part of the department of the Aisne. Principal oppidum, Noviodunum (*Soissons*)

The Treviri, separated from Germany by the Rhine, and occupying the whole lower basin of the Moselle (Rhenish Luxemburg, Prussia, and Bavaria). The Treviri had for clients—

The Condrusi, established to the south of the Meuse, in the ancient Condruz, and who reached almost to Aix-la-Chapelle.

The Eburones, occupying part of the provinces of Liège and Limburg, and reaching to the Rhine through the ancient duchy of Juliers.

<i>The Ceresi,</i>	} whose territories extended on the east of the Meuse, to the north of the Remi and the Treviri.
<i>The Pæmani,</i>	
<i>The Segni,</i>	

The Triboces, established on both banks of the Rhine, occupied the central part of the Grand Duchy of Baden and the north of the department of the Lower Rhine, perhaps already invaded, on the left bank. Their presence on the left bank of the Rhine appears from Cæsar's account. (*De Bello Gallico*, IV. 10)

The Velocasses, whose territory embraced the ancient Vexin, and who occupied part of the departments of the Seine-Inférieure and the Eure.

The Veromandui, occupying the ancient Vermandois, the northern part of the Aisne, and the eastern part of the Somme.

⁽¹⁾ "Qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque præstabant." (*De Bello Gallico*, II 4, and VIII 6.)

men, and whose territory extended to the sea, ⁽¹⁾ the Nervii, the Remi, and the Treviri.

2. *Celtic Gaul.* ⁽²⁾ The central part of Gaul, desig-

⁽¹⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, IV xxxi. 17.

⁽²⁾ PEOPLES OF CELTIC GAUL:

The Arverni extended over a vast region, comprising the present departments of the Puy-de-Dôme and Cantal, and part of those of the Allier and the Upper Loire. Geogovia was their principal town. The Arverni had for clients—

The Cadurci Eleutheri, whose territory answered to the ancient Quercy (department of the Lot) [This epithet of Eleutheri, which is found in Cæsar (*De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 75), leads us to believe that in southern Quercy there existed Cadurci placed under the dominion of Rome.]

The Gabali, who occupied the ancient Gévaudan (the department of the Lozère).

The Vellavi, whose territory answered to the ancient Velay (department of the Upper Loire).

The Aulerci formed an extensive nation, which was subdivided into three great tribes, established over the country from the lower course of the Seine to the Mayenne.

1. *The Aulerci Cenomanni*, a faction of whom was, as early as the sixth century of Rome, established in Cisalpine Gaul, between the Oglio and the Adige, and who occupied in Gaul the greater part of the territory now forming the department of the Sarthe;
2. *The Aulerci Diablintes*, the northern and central parts of the department of the Mayenne.
3. *The Aulerci Eburonices*, the central and southern part of the department of the Eure.

The Bituriges, a nation which had more than twenty towns. Avaricum (*Bourges*) was the principal. Their territory embraced the ancient Berry (departments of the Cher, the Indre, and part of the Allier).

The Carnutes occupied the greatest part of the present departments of Eure-et-Loir, Loir-et-Cher, and Loiret. Genabum (*Gien*) was one of their most important towns.

The Ædui occupied the modern departments of Saône-et-Loire and the Nièvre, and a part of those of the Côte-d'Or and the Allier. Their principal oppidum was Bibracte (*Mont-Beuvray*), the place of which was subsequently taken by Augustodunum (*Autun*). Cabillonum (*Chalon-sur-Saône*), Matisco (*Mâcon*), and Noviodunum, afterwards called Nivernum (*Nevers*), were also reckoned among their most important places. The Ædui had for clients—

The Ambarri, a small tribe situated between the Saône, the Rhone, and the Ain (department of the Ain)

nated by the Greek writers under the name of *Celtica*, and the inhabitants of which constituted in the eyes

PEOPLES OF CELTIC GAUL (*continued*).

The Ambliarètes, a people occupying a district around Ambierle (arrondissement of Roanne, department of the Loire). (?)

The Auleri Brannovices, a tribe which dwelt between the Saône and the Loire, occupied the ancient country of Brionnais.

The Blannovii, who occupied a territory round Blanot (Saône-et-Loire). (?)

The Boni, a fraction of a great nomadic nation of this name, of Celtic origin, authorised by Cæsar to establish themselves on the territory of the Ædui, between the Loire and the Allier.

The Segusiavii, who occupied the ancient Forez (departments of the Rhône and the Loire), and extended to the left bank of the Saône.

The Essunni, established in the department of the Orne.

The Helvetii, who were subdivided into four tribes or *pagi*; their territory occupied the part of Switzerland which extends from the north shore of the Léman to the Lake of Constance.

The Lemovices, whose territory answered to the Limousin (departments of the Upper Vienne and the greater part of the Corrèze and the Creuse).

The Lingones, whose territory embraced the greatest part of the department of the Haute-Marne and a fraction of the departments of the Aube, the Yonne, and the Côte-d'Or.

The Mandubii, established between the Ædui and the Lingones (department of the Côte-d'Or), occupied the ancient country of Auxois. *Alesia* (*Alise*) was their principal *oppidum*.

The Meldæ occupied the north of the department of the Seine-et-Marne and a small part of the department of the Oise.

The Nitiobriges occupied the greatest part of the department of the Lot-et-Garonne and a fraction of the Tarn-et-Garonne.

The Parisii, whose territory embraced the department of the Seine and a great part of the department of the Seine-et-Oise. Their principal town was Lutetia (*Paris*).

The Petrocorii, established in the ancient Périgord (department of the Dordogne)

The Rauraci, whose origin is perhaps German, established on both banks of the Rhine, towards the elbow which that river forms at Bâle.

The Ruteni occupied the ancient province of Rouergue (department of the Aveyron).

The Senones, established between the Loire and the Marne. Their principal town was Agedincum (*Sens*). Their territory comprised a part of the departments of the Yonne, the Marne, the Loiret, Seine-et-Marne, and the Aube.

The Sequani, whose territory embraced the ancient Franche-Comté (Jura,

of the Romans the Gauls properly so named (*Galli*), was the most extensive and most populous. Among the most important nations of Celtic Gaul were reckoned the Arverni, the Ædui, the Sequani, and the

PEOPLES OF CELTIC GAUL (*continued*).

Doubs, Haute-Saône, and part of the Haut-Rhin). Principal town, Vesontio (*Besançon*).

The Turones, who occupied Touraine (department of Indre-et-Loire).

The peoples whom Cæsar calls *maritime*, or *Armorican*, were—

The Ambibari, established at the point where the departments of La Manche and Ille-et-Vilaine join.

The Ambiliates, whose territory comprised the part of the department of Maine-et-Loire situated to the south of the Loire.

The Andes, occupying Anjou (department of Maine-et-Loire and a fraction of the department of the Sarthe)

The Curiosolitæ, occupying the greatest part of the department of the Côtes-du-Nord.

The Lemovices Armorici, fixed to the south of the Loire, in the southern part of the department of the Loire-Inférieure and the west of that of Maine-et-Loire.

The Lexovii, occupying the department of Calvados, and a fraction of that of the Eure.

The Namnetes, who occupied, in the department of the Loire-Inférieure, the right bank of the Loire.

The Osismi, whose territory answered to the department of Finistère.

The Pictones, occupying Poitou (departments of La Vendée, the Deux-Sèvres, and the Vienne).

The Redones, whose territory embraced the greatest part of the department of Ille-et-Vilaine.

The Santones, occupying Saintonge, Aunis, and Angoumois (departments of the Charente and the Charente-Inférieure, and a part of the department of the Gironde)

The Unelli, the people of the ancient Cotentin (department of La Manche).

The Veneti, whose territory included the department of Morbihan.

To these maritime peoples we must add—

The Caletes,
The Essuvi, } mentioned above.
The Morini, }

We may also join to the Celtic populations—

The Nantuates,
The Seduni, } Alpine tribes, established on the upper course of the
The Veragri, } Rhone, in the Valais and the Chablais.

Helvetii. Tacitus informs us that the Helvetii had once occupied a part of Germany. ⁽¹⁾

These three first peoples often disputed the supremacy of Gaul. As to the Helvetii, proud of their independence, they acknowledged no authority superior to their own. In the centre and south of Celtic Gaul dwelt peoples who had also a certain importance. On the west and north-west were various maritime populations designated under the generic name of *Armoricans*, an epithet which had, in the Celtic tongue, the meaning of maritime. Small Alpine tribes inhabited the valleys of the upper course of the Rhone, at the eastern extremity of Lake Léman; a country which now forms the Valais.

3. *Aquitaine*. ⁽²⁾ Aquitaine commenced on the left

⁽¹⁾ Tacitus, *Germania*, 28.

⁽²⁾ PEOPLES OF AQUITAINE:

The Ausci, who occupied the central part of the department of the Gers, the most powerful of the nations of Aquitaine, according to Pomponius Mela (III 2).

The Bigerriones occupied Bigorre (department of the Hautes-Pyrénées).

The Cocosates, established on the coasts of the Gulf of Gascony, in the Landes (the southern part of the department of the Gironde and the northern of the department of the Landes).

The Elusates occupied the north-west part of the department of the Gers and part of that of Lot-et-Garonne.

The Gates, at the confluence of the Gers and the Garonne

The Garumni, in the south of the department of the Haute-Garonne.

The Pitianes, probably towards Pau and Orthez

The Sibuzates appear to have occupied the ancient country of Soule (Basses-Pyrénées).

The Sotiates occupied the south-west part of the department of Lot-et-Garonne and a part of the departments of the Landes and the Gers.

The Tanbelli occupied all the territory bordering upon the head of the Gulf of Gascony (departments of the Landes and the Basses Pyrénées).

The Tarusates, established on the Adour, in the ancient Tursan (the southern part of the department of the Landes).

bank of the Garonne: it was inhabited by several small tribes, and contained none of those agglomerations which were found among the Celts and the Belgæ. The Aquitanians, who had originally occupied a vast territory to the north of the Pyrenees, having been pushed backward by the Celts, had but a rather limited portion of it in the time of Cæsar.

The three regions which composed Gaul were not only, as already stated, divided into a great number of states, but each state (*civitas*) was farther subdivided into *pagi*, ⁽¹⁾ representing, perhaps, the same thing as the tribe among the Arabs. The proof of the distinct character of these agglomerations is found in the fact that in the army each of them had its separate place, under the command of its own chieftains. The smallest subdivision was called *vicus*. ⁽²⁾ Such, at least, are the denominations employed in the "Commentaries," but which were certainly not those of the Celtic language. In each state there existed principal towns, called indifferently by Cæsar *urbs* or *oppidum*; ⁽³⁾ yet this last name was given by preference

PEOPLES OF AQUITAINE (*continued*).

The Vasates or *Vocates*, established in the country of Bazas (the south-east part of the department of the Gironde).

The Bituriges Vivisci, the most northern of the peoples of Aquitaine (department of the Gironde).

The Convenes (a confederacy of small tribes established in the valleys of the Hautes-Pyrénées and the southern part of the department of the Haute-Garonne).

} Not mentioned by
Cæsar.

⁽¹⁾ "Pagus, pars civitatis." (*De Bello Gallico*, I 12)

⁽²⁾ Cæsar mentions in different passages the existence of *vici* among the Helvetii (I. 5), the Allobroges *trans Rhodanum* (I. 11), the Remi (II. 7), the Morini (III. 29), the Menapii (IV. 4), the Eburones (VI. 43), the Boii (VII. 14), the Carnutes (VIII. 5), and the Veragri (III. 1)

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico* VII. 15, 25, 68.

to considerable towns, difficult of access and carefully fortified, placed on heights or surrounded by marshes. ⁽¹⁾ It was to these *oppida* that, in case of attack, the Gauls transported their grain, their provisions, and their riches. ⁽²⁾ Their habitations, established often in the forests or on the bank of a river, were constructed of wood, and tolerably spacious. ⁽³⁾

III. The Gauls were tall in stature, their skin was white, their eyes blue, their hair fair or chestnut, which they dyed, in order to make the colour more brilliant. ⁽⁴⁾ They let their beard grow; the nobles alone shaved, and preserved long moustaches. ⁽⁵⁾ Trousers or breeches, very wide among the Belgæ, but narrower among the southern

Manners.

⁽¹⁾ The "Commentaries" name twenty-one *oppida*: Alesia, Avaricum, Bibracte, Bibrax, Bratuspantium, Cabillonum, Genabum, Genava, Geigovia, Gorgobina, Lutetia, Lemonum, Melodunum, Noviodunum Æduorum, Noviodunum Biturigum, Noviodunum Suessionum, Uxellodunum, Vellaunodunum, Vesontio, the *oppidum* Aduatucorum, and the *oppidum* Sotiatum.

⁽²⁾ "Oppidum dictum quod ibi homines opes suas conferunt." (Paulus Diaconus, p. 184, edit. Muller.)

⁽³⁾ The Gauls lived in houses, or rather in huts, constructed of wood and with hurdles, tolerably spacious and of a circular form, covered with a high roof. (Strabo, IV. 163, edit. Didot.)—The Gauls, to avoid the heat, almost always built their habitations in the neighbourhood of woods and rivers. (Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 30.)

⁽⁴⁾ See a very curious passage in Solinus, chap. 25, on the practice of tattooing among the Gauls.

⁽⁵⁾ Diodorus Siculus (V. 28) says that the Gauls were of tall stature, had white flesh, and were lymphatic in constitution. Some shaved; the majority had beards of moderate size.—According to Titus Livius, the Gauls possessed a tall stature (*procera corpora*), flowing hair of an auburn colour (*promissa et rutilata comæ*), a white complexion (*candida corpora*). (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 17, 21, and Ammianus Marcellinus, XV. 22.) The latter adds that the Gauls had generally a threatening and terrible tone of voice, which is also stated by Diodorus Siculus (V. 31).—The skeletons found in the excavations at Saint-Etienne-au-Temple are 1·80m. to 1·90m. in length.

Gauls, and a shirt with sleeves, descending to the middle of the thighs, composed their principal dress. ⁽¹⁾ They were clothed with a mantle or *saric*, ⁽²⁾ magnificently embroidered with gold or silver among the rich, ⁽³⁾ and held about the neck by means of a metal brooch. The lowest classes of the people used instead an animal's skin. The Aquitanians covered themselves, probably according to the Iberic custom, with cloth of coarse wool unshorn. ⁽⁴⁾

The Gauls wore collars, earrings, bracelets, and rings for the arms, of gold or copper, according to their rank; necklaces of amber, and rings, which they placed on the third finger. ⁽⁵⁾

They were naturally agriculturists, and we may suppose that the institution of private property existed among them, because, on the one hand, all the citizens paid the tax, except the Druids, ⁽⁶⁾ and, on the other, the latter were judges of questions of boundaries. ⁽⁷⁾ They were not unacquainted with certain manufactures. In some countries they fabricated serges, which were in great repute, and cloths or felts; ⁽⁸⁾ in others they worked the mines with skill,

⁽¹⁾ Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.

⁽²⁾ Isidorus Hispalensis, *Origines*, I. 19, 24.

⁽³⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V. 30.

⁽⁴⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V. 33

⁽⁵⁾ Pliny, XXXIII. 24.—Gold was very abundant in Gaul, silver was much less common. The rich wore bracelets, rings on the leg, and collars, of the purest gold and tolerably massive; they had even breastplates of gold (Diodorus Siculus, V. 27).—A great number of these rings and circles of gold, of very good workmanship, have been found in the Gaulish burying-places. The Museum of Saint-Germain contains bracelets and earrings of chased gold, found, in 1863, in a tumulus situated near Châtillon-sur-Seine.

⁽⁶⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 14.

⁽⁷⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 13.

⁽⁸⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, VIII. xlviii. lxxiii., p. 127, edit. Sillig.

and employed themselves in the fabrication of metals. The Bituriges worked in iron, and were acquainted with the art of tinning. ⁽¹⁾ The artificers of Alesia plated copper with leaf-silver, to ornament horses' bits and trappings. ⁽²⁾

The Gauls fed especially on the flesh of swine, and their ordinary drinks were milk, ale, and mead. ⁽³⁾ They were reproached with being inclined to drunkenness. ⁽⁴⁾

They were frank and open in temper, and hospitable towards strangers, ⁽⁵⁾ but vain and quarrelsome; ⁽⁶⁾ fickle in their sentiments, and fond of novelties, they took sudden resolutions, regretting one day what they had rejected with disdain the day before; ⁽⁷⁾ inclined

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 22 —Pliny, XXXIV. xvii., p. 162, edit. Sillig.

⁽²⁾ "Deinde et argentum incoquere simili modo cœpere, equorum maxime ornamentis, jumentorumque ac jugorum, in Alesia oppido." (Pliny, XXXIV. xvii., p. 162 —Florus, III. 2.)

⁽³⁾ Milk and the flesh of wild or domestic animals, especially swine's flesh fresh or salted, formed the principal food of the Gauls (Strabo, IV., p. 163.) —Beer and mead were the principal drink of the Gauls. (Posidonius quoted by Athenæus, IV., p. 151, *Fragmenta Historicorum Græc.*, III. 260.)—This statement is made also by Diodorus Siculus (V. 26), who informs us that this beer was made with barley.

⁽⁴⁾ Cicero already remarked the propensity of the Gauls to drunkenness (*Orat. pro Fonteio*), and Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12) also addresses the same reproach to them, which is again stated in Diodorus Siculus (V. 26).

⁽⁵⁾ "The Gauls, in their great hospitality, invited the stranger to their meal as soon as he presented himself, and it was only after drinking and eating with them that they inquired his name and country." (Diodorus Siculus, V. 28.)

⁽⁶⁾ Strabo (IV., p. 162) says that the Gauls were of a frank character and good-hearted (literally, without malice) —Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12), who wrote at the end of the fifth century, represents the Gauls as excessively vain.—Strabo (IV., p. 165) assures us that they were much inclined to disputes and quarrels.

⁽⁷⁾ Cæsar often speaks of the fickleness of temper of this people, which, during a long period, gave great trouble to the Roman people. "Omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere, et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari." (*De Bello Gallico*, III. 10.)—Lampridius, in his *Life of Alexander Severus*, 59, ex-

to war and eager for adventures, they showed themselves hot in the attack, but quickly discouraged in defeat. (¹) Their language was very concise and figurative; (²) in writing, they employed Greek letters.

The men were not exempt from a shameful vice, which we might have believed less common in this country than among the peoples of the East. (³) The women united an extraordinary beauty with remarkable courage and great physical force. (⁴)

The Gauls, according to the tradition preserved by the Druids, boasted of being descended from the god of the earth, or from Pluto (*Dis*), according to the expression of Cæsar. (⁵) It was for this reason that they took night for their starting-point in all their divisions of time. Among their other customs, they had one which was singular: they considered it as a thing unbecoming to appear in public with their children,

presses himself thus: "But the Gauls, those tempers hard to deal with, and who regret all they have ceased to possess, often furnished grave cares to the emperors"—"*Gallorum subita et repentina consilia.*" (*De Bello Gallico*, III. 8.) (¹) *De Bello Gallico*, III. 19.

(²) Diodorus Siculus (V. 31) says that the language of the Gauls was very concise and very figurative, and that the Gauls made great use of hyperbole in blaming and praising.

(³) Diodorus Siculus, V. 32. — Strabo, IV., p. 165 — Athenæus, XIII., p. 603.

(⁴) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 47 and 48 — Among the Gauls, the women were equal to the men, not only in size, but also in courage. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 32.) — The Gaulish women were tall and strong. — Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12) writes: "Several foreigners together could not wrestle against a single Gaul, if they quarrelled with him, especially if he called for help to his wife, who even exceeds the husband in her strength and in her haggard eyes. She would become especially formidable if, swelling her throat and gnashing her teeth, she agitated her arms, robust and white as snow, ready to act with feet or fists, to give blows as vigorous as if they came from a catapult."

(⁵) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 18. "Ab Dite patre prognatos."

until the latter had reached the age for carrying arms. ⁽¹⁾

When he married, the man took from his fortune a part equal to the dowry of the wife. This sum, placed as a common fund, was allowed to accumulate with interest, and the whole reverted to the survivor. The husband had the right of life and death over his wife and children. ⁽²⁾ When the decease of a man of wealth excited any suspicion, his wives, as well as his slaves, were put to the torture, and burnt if they were found guilty.

The extravagance of their funerals presented a contrast to the simplicity of their life. All that the defunct had cherished during his life, was thrown into the flames after his death; and even, before the Roman conquest, they joined with it his favourite slaves and clients. ⁽³⁾

In the time of Cæsar, the greater part of the peoples of Gaul were armed with long iron swords, two-edged (*σπάθη*), sheathed in scabbards similarly of iron, suspended to the side by chains. These swords were generally made to strike with the edge rather than to stab. ⁽⁴⁾ The Gauls had also spears, the iron of which,

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 18.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 19.

⁽³⁾ The Gauls, like most of the barbarian people, looked upon the other life as resembling the present. And with this sentiment, at the funeral, they threw into the funereal pile, letters addressed to the dead, which they imagined he read. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 28.)

⁽⁴⁾ Titus Livius tells us (XXXVIII. 17) that the Gauls had long swords (*prælongi gladii*) and great bucklers (*vasta scuta*). In another passage (XXII. 46) he remarks that the swords of the Gauls were long and without point (*prælongi ac sine mucromibus*).—Their bucklers were long, narrow, and flat (*scuta longa, cæterum ad amplitudinem corporum parum lata et ea ipsa plana*). (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 21.)—"Et Biturix longisque leves Suessones in armis." (Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I. 422.)—Diodorus Siculus (V. 30) says that the Gauls had

very long and very broad, presented sometimes an undulated form (*materis*, *σαύμιον*).⁽¹⁾ They also made use of light javelins without *amentum*,⁽²⁾ of the bow, and of the sling. Their helmets were of metal, more or less precious, ornamented with the horns of animals, and with a crest representing some figures of birds or savage beasts, the whole surmounted by a high and bushy tuft of feathers.⁽³⁾ They carried a great buckler, a breastplate of iron or bronze, or a coat of mail—the latter a Gaulish invention.⁽⁴⁾ The Leuci and the Remi were celebrated for throwing the javelin.⁽⁵⁾ The Lingones had party-coloured breastplates.⁽⁶⁾ The Gaulish cavalry was superior to the

iron coats of mail. He adds “Instead of glaive (*ξίφος*), they have long swords (*σπάθη*), which they carry suspended to their right side by chains of iron or bronze. Some bind their tunics with gilt or silvered girdles. They have spears (*λόγχη* or *λογχίς*) having an iron blade a cubit long, and sometimes more. The breadth is almost two palms, for the blade of these *saumions* (the Gaulish dart) is not less than that of our glaive, and it is a little longer. Of these blades, some are forged straight, others present undulated curves, so that they not only cut in striking, but in addition they tear the wound when they are drawn out ”

(1) Strabo, IV., p 163, edit. Didot —Pseudo-Cicero (*Ad Herennium*, IV. 32) writes *materis*

(2) The *amentum* was a small strap of leather which served to throw the javelin and doubled its distance of carriage, as recent trials have proved. In the *De Bello Gallico*, V 48, there is mention of a Gaul throwing the javelin with the *amentum*; but this Gaul was in the Roman service, which explains his having more perfect aims. Strabo says that the Gauls used javelins like the Roman *velites*, but that they threw them with the hand, and not by means of a strap (Strabo, edit. Didot, II. 65.)

(3) Diodorus Siculus, V 30.

(4) Diodorus Siculus, V. 30 —Varro, *De Lingua Latina*, V. 116.—The Museum of Zurich possesses a Gaulish breastplate formed of long plates of iron. The Louvre and the Museum of Saint-Germain possess Gaulish breastplates in bronze

(5) “Optimus excusso Lucus Remusque iacerto ” (Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I. 424.)

(6) “Pugnaces pictis cohibebant Lingonas armis.” (Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I 398.)

infantry; ⁽¹⁾ it was composed of the nobles, followed by their clients; ⁽²⁾ yet the Aquitanians, celebrated for their agility, enjoyed a certain reputation as good infantry. ⁽³⁾ In general, the Gauls were very ready at imitating the tactics of their enemies. ⁽⁴⁾ The habit of working mines gave them a remarkable dexterity in all underground operations, applicable to the attack and defence of fortified posts. ⁽⁵⁾ Their armies dragged after them a multitude of wagons and baggage, even in the less important expeditions. ⁽⁶⁾

Although they had reached, especially in the south of Gaul, a tolerably advanced degree of civilisation, they preserved very barbarous customs: they killed their prisoners. "When their army is ranged in battle," says Diodorus, "some of them are often seen advancing from the ranks to challenge the bravest of their enemies to single combat. If their challenge is accepted, they chaunt a war-song, in which they boast of the great deeds of their forefathers, exalting their own valour and insulting their adversary. After the victory, they cut off their enemy's head, hang it to their horse's neck, and carry it off with songs of triumph. They keep these hideous trophies in their

⁽¹⁾ Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit Didot.

⁽²⁾ Pausanias (*Phocid*, XIX. 10, 11), speaking of the ancient Gauls, who had penetrated to Delphi, says that "each horseman had with him two esquires, who were also mounted on horses; when the cavalry was engaged in combat, these esquires were posted behind the main body of the army, either to replace the horsemen who were killed, or to give their horse to their companion if he lost his own, or to take his place in case he were wounded, while the other esquire carried him out of the battle."

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Civilis*, I. 39.

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, III. 20 and VII. 22.

⁽⁵⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, III. 21 and VII. 22.

⁽⁶⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 14.

house, and the highest nobles preserve them with great care, bathed with oil of cedar, in coffers, which they show with pride to their guests." (¹)

When a great danger threatened the country, the chiefs convoked an armed council, to which the men were bound to repair, at the place and day indicated, to deliberate. The law required that the man who arrived last should be massacred without pity before the eyes of the assembly. As a means of intercommunication, men were placed at certain intervals through the country, and these, repeating the cry from one to another, transmitted rapidly news of importance to great distances. They often, also, stopped travellers on the roads, and compelled them to answer their questions. (²)

The Gauls were very superstitious. (³) Persuaded that in the eyes of the gods the life of a man can only be redeemed by that of his fellow, they made a vow, in diseases and dangers, to immolate human beings by the ministry of the Druids. These sacrifices had even a public character. (⁴) They sometimes constructed human figures of osier of colossal magnitude, which they filled with living men; to these they set fire, and the victims perished in the flames. These victims were generally taken from among the criminals, as be-

(¹) Diodorus Siculus, V 29.—See the bas-reliefs from Entremonts in the Museum of Aix, representing Gaulish horsemen, whose horses have human heads suspended to the pommel.

(²) Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 5, VII 3

(³) Titus Livius (V 46) represents the Gauls as very religious

(⁴) The existence of human sacrifices among the Gauls is attested by a great number of authors. (Cicero, *Orat. pro Fonteio*, xiv. 31.—Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I 38 —Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I. 444; III 399, *et seq.*—Solinus, 21.—Plutarch, *De Superstitione*, p. 171.—Strabo, IV, p. 164, edit Didot.)

ing more agreeable to the gods; but if there were no criminals to be had, the innocent themselves were sacrificed.

Cæsar, who, according to the custom of his countrymen, gave to the divinities of foreign peoples the names of those of Rome, tells us that the Gauls honoured Mercury above all others. They raised statues to him, regarded him as the inventor of the arts, the guide of travellers, and the protector of commerce. (¹) They also offered worship to divinities which the "Commentaries" assimilate to Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva, without informing us of their Celtic names. From Lucan, (²) we learn the names of three Gaulish divinities, Teutates (in whom, no doubt, we must recognise the Mercury of the "Commentaries"), Hesus or Esus, and Taranis. Cæsar makes the remark that the Gauls had pretty much the same ideas with regard to their gods as other nations. Apollo cured the sick, Minerva taught the elements of the arts, Jupiter was the master of heaven, Mars the arbiter of war. Often, before fighting, they made a vow to consecrate to this god the spoils of the enemy, and, after the victory, they put to death all their prisoners. The rest of the booty was piled up in the consecrated places, and nobody would be so impious as to take anything away from it. The Gauls rendered also, as we learn from inscriptions and passages in different authors, worship to rivers, fountains, trees, and forests: they adored the Rhine as a god, and made a goddess of the Ardenne. (³)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 17.

(²) *Pharsalia*, I., lines 445, 446.

(³) "So, in spite of their love of money, the Gauls never touched the piles of

IV. There were in Gaul, says Cæsar, only two classes who enjoyed public consideration and honours, ⁽¹⁾ the Druids and the knights. ^{Institutions.} As to the people, deprived of all rights, oppressed with debts, crushed with taxes, exposed to the violences of the great, their condition was little better than that of slaves. The Druids, ministers of religion, presided over the sacrifices, and preserved the deposit of religious doctrines. The youth, greedy of instruction, pressed around them. The dispensers of rewards and punishments, they were the judges of almost all disputes, public or private. To private individuals, or even to magistrates, who rebelled against their decisions, they interdicted the sacrifices, a sort of excommunication which sequestered from society those who were struck by it, placed them in the rank of criminals, removed them from all honours, and deprived them even of the protection of the law. The Druids had a single head, and the power of this head was absolute. At his death, the next in dignity succeeded him; if there were several with equal titles, these priests had recourse to election, and sometimes even to a decision by force of arms. They assembled every year in the country of the Carnutes, in a consecrated place, there to judge disputes. Their doctrine, it was said, came from the isle of Britain, where, in the time of Cæsar, they still went to draw it as at its source. ⁽²⁾

gold deposited in the temples and sacred woods, so great was their horror of sacrilege." (Diodorus Siculus, V. 27.)

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, VI 13, *et seq.*

(2) "The Gauls have poets who celebrate in rhythmic words, on a sort of lyre, the high deeds of heroes, or who turn to derision disgraceful actions."

The Druids were exempt from military service and from taxes. ⁽¹⁾ These privileges drew many disciples, whose novitiate, which lasted sometimes twenty years, consisted in learning by heart a great number of verses containing their religious precepts. It was forbidden to transcribe them. This custom had the double object of preventing the divulgation of their doctrine and of exercising the memory. Their principal dogma was the immortality of the soul and its transmigration into other bodies. A belief which banished the fear of death appeared to them fitted to excite courage. They explained also the movement of the planets, the greatness of the universe, the laws of nature, and the omnipotence of the immortal gods.

(Diodorus Siculus, V. 31.) And he adds. "They have philosophers and theologians, who are held in great honour, and are named *Druids* (according to certain texts, *Saronides*). They have diviners, whose predictions are held in great respect. These consult the future by the aid of auguries and the entrails of the victims; and, in solemn circumstances, they have recourse to strange and incredible rites. They immolate a man by striking him with a sword above the diaphragm, and they draw presages from the manner in which he falls, in which he struggles, or in which the blood flows. The authority of the Druids and bards is not less powerful in peace than in war. Friends and enemies consult them, and submit to their decision; it has often been sufficient to arrest two armies on the point of engaging."—Strabo (VI., p. 164, edit. Didot) relates nearly the same facts. He makes a distinction also between the bards, the priests, and the Druids.

⁽¹⁾ Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 9) speaks as follows of the ancient Druids. "The men of that country (Gaul), having become gradually polished, caused the useful studies to flourish which the bards, the *euhages* (prophets), and the Druids had begun to cultivate. The bards sang, in heroic verse, to the sound of their lyres, the lofty deeds of men; the *euhages* tried, by meditation, to explain the order and marvels of nature. In the midst of these were distinguished the Druids, who, united in a society, occupied themselves with profound and sublime questions, raised themselves above human affairs, and sustained the immortality of the soul." These details, which Ammianus Marcellinus borrows from the Greek historian Timagenes, a contemporary of Cæsar, and from other authors, show that the sacerdotal caste comprised three classes.—1, the bards; 2, the prophets; 3, the Druids, properly so called.

"We may conceive," says the eminent ~~a~~ man of the *Histoire des Gaulois*, "what despotism must each was exercised over a superstitious nation by this ~~can~~ whose men, depositaries of all knowledge, authors and in~~old~~ preters of all law, divine or human, remunerators, judges, and executioners." (¹)

The knights, when required by the necessities of war, and that happened almost yearly, were all bound to take up arms. Each, according to his birth and fortune, was accompanied by a greater or less number of attendants or clients. Those who were called *ambacti* (²) performed in war the part of esquires. (³) In Aquitaine, these followers were named *soldures*; they shared the good as well as the evil fortune of the chief to whom they were attached, and, when he died, not one of them would survive him. Their number was considerable: we shall see a king of the Sotiates possess no less than six hundred of them. (⁴)

The states were governed either by an assembly, which the Romans called a senate, or by a supreme magistrate, annual or for life, bearing the title of king, (⁵) prince, (⁶) or *vergobret*. (⁷)

(¹) Amédée Thierry, II. 1

(²) See Paulus Diaconus, p. 4, edit Muller.

(³) Diodorus Siculus, V. 29.

(⁴) *De Bello Gallico*, III. 22

(⁵) Cæsar mentions the names of ten kings 1. Catamantaloëdes, among the Sequani (I. 3); 2. Divitiacus and Galba, among the Suessones (II. 4, 13), 3. Commius, among the Atrebatas (IV. 21, 27, 35; V. 22; VI. 6, VII. 75, 76, 79; VIII. 6, 7, 10, 21, 23, 47, 48), 4. Catuvolcus, among the Eburones (V. 24, 26; VI. 31), 5. Tasgetius, among the Carnutes (V. 25, 29); 6. Cavarinus, among the Treveri (V. 54, VI. 5); 7. Ambiorix, among the Eburones (V. 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 41, VI. 5, 6, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 47, VIII. 24, 25), 8. Moritasgus, among the Senones (V. 54), 9. Teutomatus, among the Nitobriges (VII. 31, 46).

(⁶) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 88, VIII. 12.

(⁷) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 16.

The different tribes formed alliances among themselves, either permanent or occasional; the permanent alliances were founded, some on a community of territorial interests, ⁽¹⁾ others on affinities of races, ⁽²⁾ or on treaties, ⁽³⁾ or, lastly, on the right of patronage. ⁽⁴⁾ The occasional alliances were the results of the necessity of union against a common danger. ⁽⁵⁾

In Gaul, not only each state and each tribe (*pugus*), but even each family, was divided into two parties (*factiones*); at the head of these parties were chiefs, taken from among the most considerable and influential of the knights. Cæsar calls them *principes*. ⁽⁶⁾ All those who accepted their supremacy became their clients; and, although the *principes* did not exercise a regular magistracy, their authority was very extensive. This organisation had existed from a remote

⁽¹⁾ Thus the *Civitates Armoricæ* (V. 53; VII. 75; VIII. 31); Belgium (V. 12, 24, 25; VIII. 46, 49, 54); the Aulerci Cenomanni and the Aulerci Eburonices (II. 34; III. 17, VII. 4, 75; VIII. 7). See the interesting memoir by M^r Valentine Smith.

⁽²⁾ Ambarni, necessarii et consanguinei Æduorum (I. 11); Suessiones fratres consanguineosque Remorum, qui eodem jure et iisdem legibus utuntur (II. 3). Suessiones qui Remis erant adtributi (VIII. 6).

⁽³⁾ *In fide*, thus the Ædui with the Bellovaci (II. 14); with the Senones (VI. 4); with the Bituriges (VII. 5).

⁽⁴⁾ Ebuonum et Condusorum, qui sunt Trevirorum clientes (IV. 6); Carnutes . . . usi deprecatoribus Remis, quorum erant in clientela (VI. 4); imperant Æduis atque eorum clientibus Segusiavis, Ambluaretis, Aulercis, Biannovicibus, Brannovis (VII. 75).

⁽⁵⁾ The known federations of this kind are—1, that of the Belgæ against the Romans, in the year 57 before Jesus Christ (*De Bello Gallico*, II. 4); 2, that of the Veneti with the neighbouring tribes, in the year 56 (*De Bello Gallico*, III. 9); 3, that of the Treviri, the Nervii, the Aduatuci, and the Menapii, in the year 53 (*De Bello Gallico*, VI. 2); 4, that of the peoples who invested Camulogenus with the supreme power, in 52 (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 57); 5, the great federation which placed all the forces of Gaul under the command of Vercingetorix (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 63).

⁽⁶⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 11.

antiquity; its object was to offer to each man of the people a protection against the great, since each was thus placed under the patronage of a chief, whose duty it was to take his cause in hand, and who would have lost all credit if he had allowed one of his clients to be oppressed. ⁽¹⁾ We see in the "Commentaries" that this class of the *principes* enjoyed very great influence. On their decisions depended all important resolutions; ⁽²⁾ and their meeting formed the assembly of the whole of Gaul (*concilium totius Gallie*). ⁽³⁾ In it everything was decided by majority of votes. ⁽⁴⁾

Affairs of the state were allowed to be treated only in these assemblies. It appertained to the magistrates alone to publish or conceal events, according as they judged expedient; and it was a sacred duty for any one who learnt, either from without or from public rumour, any news which concerned the *civitas*, to give information of it to the magistrate, without revealing it to any other person. This measure had for its object to prevent rash or ignorant men from being led into error by false reports, and from rushing, under this first impression, into extravagant resolutions.

In the same manner as each state was divided into two rival factions, so was the whole of Gaul (with the exception of Belgic Gaul and Helvetia) divided into two great parties, ⁽⁵⁾ which exercised over the others a sort of sovereignty (*principatus*); ⁽⁶⁾ and when, in

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 11.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 3, 54; VI. 11; VII. 75; VIII. 22

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 30

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 63.

⁽⁵⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 11.

⁽⁶⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 12.

extraordinary circumstances, the whole of Gaul acknowledged the pre-eminence of one particular state, the chief of the privileged state took the name of *princeps totius Galliæ*, as had been the case with the Arvernian Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix. (')

This supremacy, nevertheless, was not permanent; it passed from one nation to another, and was the object of continual ambitions and sanguinary conflicts. The Druids, it is true, had succeeded in establishing a religious centre, but there existed no political centre. In spite of certain federative ties, each state had been more engaged in the consideration of its own individuality than in that of the country in general. This egoistic carelessness of their collective interests, this jealous rivalry among the different tribes, paralysed the efforts of a few eminent men who were desirous of founding a nationality, and the Gauls soon furnished the enemy with an easy means of dividing and combating them. The Emperor Napoleon I. was thus right in saying: "The principal cause of the weakness of Gaul was the spirit of isolation and locality which characterised the population; at this epoch the Gauls had no national spirit or even provincial spirit; they were governed by a spirit of town. It is the same spirit which has since forged chains for Italy. Nothing is more opposed to national spirit, to general ideas of liberty, than the particular spirit of family or of town. From this parcelling it resulted that the Gauls had no army of the line kept up and exercised; and therefore no art and no military science. Every nation which should lose sight of the import-

(') *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 4.

ance of an army of the line perpetually on foot, and which should trust to levies or national armies, would experience the fate of the Gauls, without even having the glory of opposing the same resistance, which was the effect of the barbarism of the time and of the ground, covered with forests, marshes, and bogs, and without roads, which rendered it difficult to conquer and easy to defend.”⁽¹⁾ Before Cæsar came into Gaul, the Ædui and the Arverni were at the head of the two contending parties, each labouring to carry the day against his rival. Soon these latter united with the Sequani, who, jealous of the superiority of the Ædui, the allies of the Roman people, invoked the support of Ariovistus and the Germans. By dint of sacrifices and promises, they had succeeded in bringing them into their territory. With this aid the Sequani had gained the victory in several combats.⁽²⁾ The Ædui had lost their nobility, a part of their territory, nearly all their clients, and, after giving up as hostages their children and their chiefs, they had bound themselves by oath never to attack the Sequani, who had at length obtained the supremacy of all Gaul. It was under these circumstances that Divitiacus had gone to Rome to implore the succour of the Republic, but he had failed;⁽³⁾ the Senate was

(1) *Précis des Guerres de César*, by the Emperor Napoleon I., p. 53, Paris, 1836.

(2) The hostility which prevailed between the Sequani and the Ædui was further augmented, according to Strabo, by the following cause: “These two tribes, separated by the Arar (the *Saône*), both claimed the right of tolls” (Strabo, p. 160, edit. Didot.)

(3) “Divitiacus, introduced to the Senate, explained the subject of his mission. He was offered a seat, but refused that honour, and pronounced his discourse leaning on his buckler” (Eumenius, *Panegyric of Constantine*, cap. 3.)

too much engaged with intestine quarrels to assume an energetic attitude towards the Germans. The arrival of Cæsar was destined to change the face of things, and restore to the allies of Rome their old preponderance. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 12.

CHAPTER III.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.

(Year of Rome 696.)

(BOOK I. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

I. CÆSAR, as we have seen, had received from the Senate and people a command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and Illyria.⁽¹⁾ Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old design, were preparing to invade the Roman province. This intelligence caused a great sensation.

The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature, and for some years they meditated quitting it to repair into the south of Gaul.

(1) The limits of Illyria, in the time of Cæsar, are hardly known; yet it appears that this province comprised the modern Istria and part of Carniola. Aquileia was its capital, situated at the head of the gulf of the Adriatic Sea, not far from the Isonzo. In fact, Strabo (I., p 178) says that Aquileia was situated without the frontiers of the Veneti, in whose territory this town was included under Augustus. On another side, Titus Livius (XXXIX. 55) informs us that the colony of Aquileia had been founded in Istria; and Herodotus (I. 196), as well as Appian, reckons the Istians among the peoples of Illyria.

As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish themselves in the country of the Santones (the *Saintonge*), situated on the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential personages—one of the country of the Sequani, the other of that of the Ædui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected the greatest possible number of wagons and beasts of burden; and, in order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns, their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with them. Each furnished himself with meal ⁽¹⁾ for three months; and after persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci, ⁽²⁾ the Tulingi, and the Latobriges, ⁽³⁾ to imitate their example and follow

(1) "Molita cibaria." (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 5.)

(2) Inhabitants of the country of Bâle. The Rauraci inhabited the diocese of Bâle, which was called *Augusta Rauracorum*.

(3) Inhabitants of the south of the Grand Duchy of Baden. The town of Stulingen, near Schaffhausen, is believed to derive its name from the Tulingi.

them, and having drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the day of the equinox).⁽¹⁾

There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended by a narrow and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the Jura (the *Pas-de-l'Ecluse*), and where the wagons could with difficulty pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province, after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river was fordable in several places.⁽²⁾ At Geneva, the extreme limit of the territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have but doubtful sympathies for the Romans.⁽³⁾

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, I 3, 4, and 5.—Scholars have taken great pains to determine the concordance between the ante-Julian calendar and the Julian calendar, unfortunately, the results at which they have arrived are very imperfect. We have asked M. Le Verrier to solve this difficult problem, and we owe to his courtesy the tables placed at the end of this volume. (*Appendix A.*)

(2) The bed of the Rhone has changed at several points since the time of Cæsar; at present, according to the report of those who live on its banks, there are no fords except between Russin, on the right bank, and the mill of Vert, on the left bank. (*See Plate 3*)

(3) *De Bello Gallico*. I. 6

II. Cæsar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman province, left Cæsar's Arrival at Geneva. Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached Geneva in eight days. ⁽¹⁾ As he had in the province only a single legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible, and then destroyed the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand a passage through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country. Cæsar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April (8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, between Lake Léman and the Jura. ⁽²⁾ If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new levies, we see that Cæsar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry. ⁽³⁾

III. The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura,

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 18.

⁽²⁾ This part of the Jura on the left bank of the Rhone is called the *Mont du Vuache*.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 8.

Description of the Retrenchment of the Rhone. following the sinuosities of the river, is 29½ kilomètres, or 19,000 Roman paces (*millia passuum decem novem*). (¹) It is on the space comprised between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called in the "Commentaries" *muris fossaque*. This could not be a continuous work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines, and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it would have been useless to fortify them. Cæsar, pressed for time, can only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells us. (²) The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern villages of Rusin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these places they cut the upper part of the slope into a perpendicular, and afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which presented an impassable barrier. Behind

(¹) M. Queypo, in his learned work on the weights and measures of the ancients, assigns to the Roman foot, subdivided into twelve inches, a length of 0.29630 m. The Roman pace was five feet, so that the mile was equivalent to a length of 1481.50 m.

(²) Dio Cassius says that "Cæsar fortified with retrenchments and walls the most important points." (XXXVIII. 31.)

and along this line, at certain distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable. (*See Plate 3.*) (¹)

(¹) The retrenchments which Cæsar calls *muris fossaque* could not be a wall, in the usual acceptation of the word: first, because a wall would have been but a weak obstacle; further, because the materials were not found on the spot, and lastly, because if so great a quantity of stones had been collected on the bank of the Rhone, we should still find traces of them. I have therefore sought another explanation, and thought that *muris* might be understood of a natural escarpment rendered steeper by a slight work. Penetrated with this idea, I sent Baron Stoffel, the commandant of artillery, to inspect the localities, and the result of his researches has fully confirmed my suppositions. The following is a summary of his report —

Considered in its *ensemble*, from Geneva to the Pas-de-l'Ecluse, the Rhone presents the appearance of an immense fossæ from 100 to 120 mètres broad, with abrupt and very elevated scarp and counter-scarp. The parts where it does not present this character are few, and of relatively small extent. They are the only ones where operations for passing the river could be attempted—the only ones, consequently, which Cæsar would have need to fortify on the left bank.

1. From Geneva to the confluence of the Aive and the Rhone, an extent of $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilomètres. Breadth of the river, 90 to 100 mètres.—The left bank is flat in the whole of this extent. The right bank has escarpments almost vertical, the height of which varies from 15 to 35 mètres (*See Plate 3*, mean profile between Geneva and the Aive.) No attempt at passage could have taken place, neither at Geneva, nor between that town and the Arve.

2. From the Aive to the plateau of Aire-la-Ville, extent $12\frac{1}{2}$ kilomètres.—After leaving the confluence of the Arve, the heights of the right bank of the Rhone increase in elevation; the escarpments become formidable.—The left bank is bordered with similar escarpments, and the river runs thus between high and abrupt banks, everywhere impassable. It preserves this character to a kilomètre above the ravine of Avril, near Peney. The profiles *a a* and *b b* give an idea of the escarpments of the banks from the Arve to the ravine of Avril. (*See Plate 3*)—The heights which, on the right bank of the Rhone, extend from Vernier to Peney, sink gradually from one of these villages towards the other, and they form to the east of the ravine of Avril a plateau, the mean elevation of which above the bed of the river is only 20 mètres. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of Aire-la-Ville. Length, 1,700 mètres; breadth, 700 mètres, mean elevation above the bed of the Rhone, 20 to 25 mètres. The heights of Peney are well disposed for the establishment of an army, and the plateau of Aire-la-Ville would permit an army, the Rhone once passed, to deploy easily. But, in spite of these advantages, it is certain that the Helvetii attempted no operation on this side, for the Rhone flows at

This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days' labour, was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear Cæsar's

the foot of a slope of the height of from 14 to 16 mètres and an inclination of at least 45 degrees.

3 From the plateau of Aire-la-Ville to the point of Epeisses, extent 6 kilomètres —Down the river from the escarpments of Peney, the heights of the right bank (heights of Russin) form with those of the left bank an immense amphitheatre, nearly circular, the arena of which would be the ground represented green on Plate 3 (diameter, $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilomètres). From the heights of Russin we can descend into the plain to the water of the river. The Rhone, in this part, has never been deep or rapid. The left bank is little elevated, entirely flat opposite the mill of Vert, and the slope of the heights which command it is far from impracticable.

Thus, it was here possible for the Helvetii to effect the passage of the river, and climb the heights of the left bank, if they had not been fortified or guarded. This operation presented least difficulty in the part *t t o*. And we can hardly doubt that the Romans fortified it to add to the natural obstacles, which were insufficient in this extent (*See the profile c c*)

An attentive examination of the locality, the discovery of certain irregularities of ground, which we may be allowed to consider as vestiges, lead us to explain in the following manner the expression *murum fossamque perducit*.

Cæsar took advantage of the mean heights at the foot of which the Rhone flows, to cause to be made, on the slope towards the river, and beginning with the crest, a longitudinal trench, of such a depth that the main wall had an elevation of 16 feet. The earth arising from the excavation was thrown down the side of the slope, and the crest was furnished with palisades. (*See the profile of the retrenchment*) It was, properly speaking, a fosse, the scarp of which was higher than the counter-scarp

The hills on the left bank, which rise opposite Russin, are accessible, especially in an extent of 900 mètres, reckoning from the point where the ravine which descends to Aire-la-Ville opens upon the river. They form there, among other peculiarities of the ground, a terrace 8 mètres in breadth, rising from 13 to 14 mètres above the plain, and descending to this by a tolerably uniform *talus* of 45 degrees.

The Romans would be able to prevent the access by means of the trench just described. They, no doubt, continued it to the point *o*, where the terrace ceases, and the heights become impracticable. It would then have been from 800 to 900 mètres long.

If we continue to descend the Rhone, we meet, on the left bank, first with the perpendicular escarpments of Cartigny, which are 70 or 80 mètres in height, and then abrupt beaches to near Avully. Below Cartigny, the Rhone surrounds a little plain, very slightly inclined towards the river, and presenting a

reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would oppose it with all his means.

Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took

projection of land (*vr*) from 5 to 6 mètres high, with a *talus* of less than 45 degrees. The bank being of small elevation, the Helvetii might have landed there. To prevent this, the Romans opened, in the *talus* which fronted the Rhone, a trench similar to the preceding. it was 250 mètres long.

The heights of Avully and Epeisses leave between them and the river a tolerably vast space, composed of two distinct parts. The first is formed of gentle slopes from Avully to a projection of land, *q p*; the other part is a plain comprised between this projection of land and the left bank of the river. On the right bank a torrent-like river, the London, debouches into flat ground named La Plaine. The Helvetii might have made their preparations for passing the Rhone there, and directed their efforts towards the western point of La Plaine, in face of the low and flat land comprised between the left bank and the escarpment *q p*. In this part the left bank is only from 1½ to 2 mètres high. Moreover, the slopes of Avully are not difficult to climb, and therefore the Romans must have sought to bar the passage in this direction. (*See the broken profile d e f*) The escarpment *q p*, from its position and height, is easy to fortify. Its length is 700 mètres; its mean elevation above the plain, 18. It presents to the river a *talus* of less than 45 degrees. The Romans made in this *talus*, along the crest, a trench, forming wall and fosse. Its length was 700 mètres.

4. From the point of Epeisses to the escarpments of Etournel, extent 6 kilomètres.—From Epeisses to Chancy the Rhone flows in a straight line, and presents the appearance of a vast fosse, 100 mètres wide, the walls of which have an inclination of more than 45 degrees. (*See the profile g g.*)

At 200 mètres above Chancy, at *k*, the character of the banks changes suddenly. The heights on the right sink towards the river in tolerably gentle slopes, through an extent of 2,300 mètres, reckoning from *k* to the escarpments of Etournel. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of Chancy. It presents to the Rhone, from *k* to *z*, in a length of 1,400 mètres, an irregular crest, distant from 50 to 60 mètres from the river, and commanding it by about 20 mètres. The side towards the Rhone, from *k* to *z*, presents slopes which are very practicable. (*See the profile h h.*)

The position of Chancy was certainly the theatre of the most serious attempts on the part of the Helvetii. Encamped on the heights of the right bank, they could easily descend to the Rhone, and there make their preparations for passing, on an extent of 1,500 mètres. The river once crossed, they had only before them, from *k* to *z*, slopes which were practicable to debouch on the plateau of Chancy.

The Romans had then to bar the gap *k z* by joining the impassable escarpments which terminate in *k* with those which commence at *z*, and which are

part in their enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country without

also inaccessible. To effect this, they opened from one of these points to the other, in the upper part of the slope at the foot of which the Rhone flows, a longitudinal trench *kz*, similar to that already spoken of. It was 1,400 mètres in length.

5. From the escarpments of Etournel to the Pas-de-l'Ecluse, an extent of 6 kilomètres.—At the escarpments of Etournel, the Rhone removes from the heights on the right, and only returns to them towards the hamlet of the Isles, 2 kilomètres farther down. These heights form a vast semi-elliptical amphitheatre, embracing a plain slightly inclined towards the river. It is marked by a green tint on Plate 3. People can descend from all sides and approach the Rhone, the bank of which is flat. Opposite, the left bank presents insurmountable obstacles until below Cognny, at *s*. But below this point, from *s* to *y*, the bank is flat, and the heights situated behind are accessible on an extent of 2 kilomètres.

The Helvetii, established on the heights of Pougny and Colonges, could descend to the Rhone, and cross it between Etournel and the hamlet of Les Isles. The Romans had thus to unite the escarpments which terminate at Cognny with the impracticable slopes of the mountain of Le Vuache. Here again we shall see that they took advantage of the peculiarities of the ground.

At the village of Cognny, the heights form a triangular plateau, *s u x*, of which the point *s* advances like a promontory towards the Rhone, which it commands perpendicularly by at least 20 mètres. A projection of land, *s u*, bounds it in front, and separates it from a plain which extends to the river. The escarpment produced by this projection of land presents to the Rhone a slope of about 45 degrees. It rises over the plain about 14 mètres towards its extremity *s*, but diminishes gradually in height, until it is only 2 to 3 mètres in height near the point *u*. (*See the profile n n*) The Romans hollowed, on the slope of the escarpment from *s* to *u*, a length of 800 mètres, a trench forming wall and fosse. The plateau of Cognny, situated in the rear, offered a favorable position for the defence of this retrenchment. (*See the profile p p*) They prolonged their works towards the west as far as *y*, beyond that, the heights presented sufficient natural obstacles. We may thus estimate that, from Cognny to the mountain of Le Vuache, the Romans executed from 1,600 to 1,700 mètres of retrenchments.

To sum up: the works executed on five principal points, between Geneva and the Jura, represent a total length of about 5,000 mètres, that is, less than the sixth part of the development of the course of the Rhone.

Admitting that Cæsar had at his disposal 10,000 men, we may suppose that he distributed them in the following manner:—3,000 men on the heights of Avully, his head-quarters; 2,500 at Geneva, 1,000 on the plateau of Aire-la-

opposition, they resolved to open themselves a passage by force. Several times—sometimes by day, and sometimes by night—they crossed the Rhone, some

Ville, 2,000 at Chancy; and 1,500 on the plateau of Cologny. These 10,000 men might be concentrated: in two hours, on the heights between Aire-la-Ville and Cartigny, in three hours, on the heights of Avully; in three hours and a half, on the plateau of Chancy, in three hours and a half, these troops, with the exception of those encamped at Geneva, might be brought together between Cologny and the fort of L'Ecluse. It would require five hours to carry the detachment from Geneva thither.

The detachments mentioned above, with the exception of that of Geneva, were established in what Cæsar calls the *castella*. These were constructed on the heights, in the proximity of the retrenchments which had to be defended—namely, at Aire-la-Ville, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. They consisted probably of earthen redoubts, capable of containing a certain number of troops. They are represented by squares in Plate 3.

Cæsar could reconnoitre every instant the march and designs of the Helvetii, the heights of the left bank of the Rhone presenting a great number of positions where it was easy to place advantageously posts of observation. Commandant Stoffel has pointed out six, which are marked on Plate 3. As it will be observed, the Helvetii, in crossing the Rhone, could not be disturbed by darts thrown from the top of the retrenchments, for these darts would not carry to the left bank of the river. Now there exists at present, between this bank and the foot of the heights in which these trenches were cut, flat ground of more or less extent. Admitting, then, that the Rhone flowed nineteen centuries ago in the same bed as at the present day, we may ask if the Romans did not construct, in these low parts near the bank, ordinary retrenchments, composed of a fosse and rampart. The excavations undertaken by the Commandant Stoffel have revealed everywhere, in these plains, the existence of ground formed by alluvium, which would lead us to believe that the Rhone once covered them. However, even if at that epoch these little plains had been already uncovered, either wholly or in part, we can hardly suppose that Cæsar would have raised works there, since the heights situated in the rear permitted him, with less labour, to create a more redoubtable defence—that of the trenches opened along the crests. As we see, the obstacle presented to the assailants began only with these trenches, at the top of the slopes.

As to the vestiges which still appear to exist, they may be described as follows. The slopes which the Romans fortified at Chancy, from *k* to *z*, and at Cologny, from *s* to *y*, present, in the upper parts, in some places, undulations of ground, the form of which denotes the work of man. On the slope of Chancy, for instance, the ground presents a projection, *ii* (see the profile *hh*), very distinctly marked, and having the remarkable peculiarity that it is about 11 feet high and 8 to 9 feet broad. Now, is it not evident that, if one of the fosses

by fording, others with the aid of boats joined together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment (*operis munitione*), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers who hastened to the threatened points (*concurso et telis*), they abandoned the attack. ⁽¹⁾

IV. The only road which now remained was that which lay across the country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l'Ecluse); but this narrow defile could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants. The Helvetii charged

The Helvetii begin their March towards the Saône. Cæsar unites his Troops

which have been described should get filled up, either naturally, by the action of time, or by the processes of agriculture, it would take absolutely the form *z z*, with the dimensions just indicated? It would not, therefore, be rash to consider these peculiarities of the ground, such as *z z*, as traces of the Roman trenches.

We must further mention the projection of land *v v*, situated below Cartigny. Its form is so regular, and so sharply defined, from the crest to the foot of the *talus*, that it is difficult not to see in it the vestiges of a work made by men's hands.

It is easy to estimate approximately the time which it would have taken Cæsar's troops to construct the 5,000 mètres of trenches which extended, at separate intervals, from Geneva to the Jura.

Let us consider, to fix our ideas, a ground *A D V*, inclined at 45 degrees, in which is to be made the trench *A B C D*. The great wall *A B C* had 16 Roman feet in elevation. we will suppose that *A B* was inclined at 5 on 1, and that the small wall *D C* was 6 feet high.

The amount of rubbish removed would be as follows —Section *A B C D* = 64 square feet, or, reducing it into square mètres, *A B C D* = 5 square mètres 60 centimètres.

The mètre in length of the earth thrown out would give thus 5¹/₆₀ cubic mètres.

If we consider the facility of labour in the trench, since the earth has only to be thrown down the slope, we shall see that two men can dig three mètres in length of this trench in two days. Therefore, admitting that the 10,000 men at Cæsar's disposal had only been employed a quarter at a time, from two to three days would have been sufficient for the execution of the complete work.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 8.

the Æduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix, to solicit it for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their convention, they exchanged hostages. ⁽¹⁾

When Cæsar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the lands of the Sequani and the Ædui on their way to the Santones, he resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province. ⁽²⁾

But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts, therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of Illyria, ⁽³⁾ the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the 7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps (*see Plate 4*) the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul. ⁽⁴⁾ The Centrones, the Grai-

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 9.—The country of the Sequani comprised the Jura, and reached to the Pas-de-l'Écluse. (*See Plate 2, Map of Gaul*)

⁽²⁾ It has been considered to have been an error of Cæsar to place the Santones in the proximity of the Tolosates. modern researches have proved that the two peoples were not more than thirty or forty leagues from each other.

⁽³⁾ Several authors have stated wrongly that Cæsar went into Illyria; he informs us himself (*De Bello Gallico*, III. 7) that he went thither for the first time in the winter of 698.

⁽⁴⁾ We believe, with General de Gœler, from the itinerary marked on the Peutingerian table, that the troops of Cæsar passed by Altinum (*Altino*), Mantua, Cremona, Lans Pompei (*Lodi Vecchio*), Pavia, and Turin; but, after quit-

celi, and the Caturiges (see *page 24, note*), posted on the heights, ⁽¹⁾ attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows them in several engagements, and from Ocelum (*Usseau*), ⁽²⁾ the extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilomètres a day. He next penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone. ⁽³⁾

ting this last place, we consider that they followed the route of Fenestrella and Ocelum. Thence they directed their march across the Cottian Alps, by Cesena and Brigantium (*Briançon*), then, following the road indicated by the Theodosian table, which appears to have passed along the banks of the Romanche, they proceeded to Cularo (*Grenoble*), on the frontier of the Vocontii, by Stabatio (*Chahotte* or *Le Monestier*, Hautes-Alpes), Duotuncum (*Villards-d'Arenne*), Mellosecum (*Misoen* or *Bourg-d'Oysans*, Isère), and Catorissium (*Bourg-d'Oysans* or *Chaource*, Isère).

⁽¹⁾ "Locis superioribus occupatis" (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 10.)

⁽²⁾ There is difference of opinion as to the site of Ocelum. The following remark has been communicated to me by M. E. Celesia, who is preparing a work on ancient Italy: *Ocelum* only meant, in the ancient Celtic or Iberian language, *principal passage*. We know that, in the Pyrenees, these passages were called *ports*. There existed places of the name of *Ocelum*, in the Alps, in Gaul, and as far as Spain. (Ptolemy, II. 6.)—The itineraries found in the baths of Vicairello indicate, between Turin and Susa, an *Ocelum*, which appears to us to have been that of which Cæsar speaks; there was a place similarly named in Mauienne, on the left bank of the Arc, at an equal distance from the source of that river and the town of Saint-Jean: it is now *Usseglio*. There was another in the valley of the Lanzo, on the left bank of the Gara, from which appears to be derived the name of Garaceli or Graiceli; it was called *Ocelum Lanciensium*. The Ocelum of Cæsar, according to M. Celesia, who adopts the opinion of D'Anville, was called *Ocelum ad Clusonem fluvium*; it was situated in the valley of the Prigelatto, on the road leading from Pignerol to the defile of Fenestrella. This place has continued to preserve its primitive name of *Ocelum*, *Occelum*, *Oxelum*, *Uxelum* (*Charta Adeladis*, an. 1064), whence by corruption its modern name of *Usseau*. According to this hypothesis, Cæsar would have passed from the valley of Chiusone into that of Prigelatto, and thence, by Mount Genève, to Briançon, in order to arrive among the Vocontii.—Polyænus (*Stratag.*, VIII. xxiii. 2) relates that Cæsar took advantage of a mist to escape the mountaineers.

⁽³⁾ "Segusiavi sunt trans Rhodanum primi." (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 10.) It is to be supposed that there existed a bridge on the Rhone, near Lyons.

These operations took two months; ⁽¹⁾ the same time had been employed by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saône, and beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l'Ecluse, followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence crossing the plains of Ambérieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saône, the left bank of which they occupied from Trévoux to Villefranche. (*See Plate 4.*) The slowness of their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from 8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass one abreast,

(1) Cæsar had deferred his reply till the Ides of April (April the 8th). If it were then decided to bring the legions from Aquileia, the time necessary to bring them would have been as follows:

6 days employed by the couriers to proceed from Geneva to Aquileia.

This time does not appear to us too short, since Cæsar had employed 8 days to go from Rome to Geneva, and that the distance from Geneva to Aquileia is only 1,000 kilomètres, while it is 1,200 from Geneva to Rome;

8 days to assemble the legions—in 581, it required only eleven days to enroll four legions (Titus Livius, XLIII. 45);

28 days from Aquileia to Ocelum (*Usseau*) (681 kilom.), reckoning 24 kilomètres for a day's march;

6 days' halts;

7 days from Ocelum to Grenoble (174 kilom.) (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 10);

5 days from Grenoble to Lyons (126 kilom.)

60

According to this reckoning, Cæsar required 60 days, reckoning from the moment when he decided on this course, to transport his legions from Aquileia to Lyons; that is to say, if he sent, as is probable, couriers on the 8th of April, the day he refused the passage to the Helvetii, the head of his column arrived at Lyons towards the 7th of June.

would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it. ⁽¹⁾ Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into

⁽¹⁾ To estimate the volume and weight represented by the provisions for three months for *three hundred and sixty-eight thousand* persons of both sexes and of all ages, let us allow that the ration of food was small, and consisted, we may say, only in a reserve of meal, *trum mensium molita cibaria*, at an average of $\frac{1}{4}$ of a pound ($\frac{1}{2}$ of a pound of meal gives about a pound of bread); at this rate, the Helvetii must have carried with them 24,840,000 pounds, or 12,420,000 kilogrammes of meal. Let us allow also that they had great four-wheeled carriages, capable each of carrying 2,000 kilogrammes, and drawn by four horses. The 100 kilogrammes of unrefined meal make 2 cubic hectolitres; therefore, 2,000 kilogrammes of meal make 4 cubic mètres, so that this would lead us to suppose no more than 4 cubic mètres as the average load for the four-wheeled carriage. On our good roads in France, levelled and paved, three horses are sufficient to draw, at a walking pace, during ten hours, a four-wheeled carriage carrying 4,000 kilogrammes. It is more than 1,800 kilogrammes per collar

We suppose that the horses of the emigrants drew only 500 kilogrammes in excess of the dead weight, which would give about 6,000 carriages and 24,000 draught animals to transport the three months' provisions.

But these emigrants were not only provided with food, for they had also certainly baggage. It appears to us no exaggeration to suppose that each individual carried, besides his food, fifteen kilogrammes of baggage on an average. We are thus led to add to the 6,000 provision carriages about 2,500 other carriages for the baggage, which would make a total of 8,500 carriages, drawn by 34,000 draught animals. We use the word animals instead of horses, as at least a part of the teams would, no doubt, be composed of oxen, the number of which would diminish daily, for the emigrants would be led to use the flesh of these animals for their own food.

Such a column of 8,500 carriages, supposing them to march in file, one carriage at a time, on a single road, could not occupy less than *thirty-two* leagues in length, if we reckon fifteen mètres to each carriage. This remark explains the enormous difficulties the emigration would encounter, and the slowness of its movements: we need, then, no longer be astonished at the twenty days which it took three-quarters of the column to pass the Saône.

We have not comprised the provisions of grain for the animals themselves; yet it is difficult to believe that the Helvetii, so provident for their own wants, had neglected to provide for those of their beasts, and that they had reckoned exclusively for their food on the forage they might find on the road.

Italy, he hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that river.

He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it, from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen to their prayers. (¹)

V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the Sequani, (²) flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges, crossed the

Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 11.

(²) It is an error to translate *Arar, quod per fines Æduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit*, by the words, "the Saône, which forms the common boundary line of the Ædui and the Sequani." Cæsar always understands by *fines*, territory, and not boundary line. He expresses himself very differently when he speaks of a river separating territories. (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 6, 33; VII, 5.) The expression *per fines* thus confirms the supposition that the territories of these two peoples extended on both sides of the Saône. (See Plate 2.)

river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp towards midnight (*de tertia vigilia*) (see note 1 on page 69) with three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans, towards six o'clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This disaster fell upon the Tigurini (*the inhabitants of the Cantons of Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne*), one of the four tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which, in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L. Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke. (¹)

After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 12 —The excavations, carried on in 1862, between Trévoux and Riotier, on the plateaux of La Bruyère and Saint-Barnard, leave no doubt of the place of this defeat. They revealed the existence of numerous sepulchres, as well Gallo-Roman as Celtic. The tumuli furnished vases of coarse clay, and many fragments of arms in silex, ornaments in bronze, iron arrow-heads, fragments of sockets. These sepulchres are some by incineration, others by inhumation. In the first, the cremation had nowhere been complete, which proves that they had been burnt hastily, and excludes all notion of an ordinary cemetery. Two common fosses were divided each into two compartments, one of which contained cinders, the other human skeletons, thrown in pell-mell, skeletons of men, women, and children. Lastly, numerous country ovens line, as it were, the road followed by the Helvetii. These ovens, very common at the foot of the abrupt hills of Trévoux, Saint-Didier, Frans, Jassans, and Mizérieux, are found again on the left bank of the Ain and as far as the neighbourhood of Ambionay.

other part of the enemy's army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty days' labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should give him hostages. "The Helvetii," replied Divico, "have learned from their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought to know that." This proud reply closed the interview.

Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones, by directing their march towards the

sources of the Dheune and the Bourbince. (*See Plate 4.*) This broken country, moreover, permitted them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun, vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing over the Col d'Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at Decize. (¹)

Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him

(¹) Cæsar declares, on two different occasions, the fixed design of the Helvetii to establish themselves in the country of the Santones (I. 9 and 11), and Titus Livius confirms this fact in these words "Cæsar Helvetios, gentem vagam, domuit, quæ, sedem quærens, in provinciam Cæsaris Narbonem iter facere volebat" (*Epitome*, CIII.) Had they, for the execution of this project, the choice between several roads (the word "road" being taken here in the general sense)? Some authors, not considering the topography of France, have believed that, to go to the Santones, the Helvetii should have marched by the shortest line, from east to west, and passed the Loire towards Roanne. But they would have had first to pass, in places almost impassable, the mountains which separate the Saône from the Loire, and, had they arrived there, they would have found their road barred by another chain of mountains, that of Le Forez, which separates the Loire from the Allier.

The only means of going from the Lower Saône into Saintonge consists in travelling at first to the north-west towards the sources of the Bourbince, where is found the greatest depression of the chain of mountains which separates the Saône from the Loire, and marching subsequently to the west, to descend towards the latter river. This is so true, that at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La Rochelle, did not pass by Roanne, but took the direction to the north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire. We understand, in exploring this mountainous country, why Cæsar was obliged to confine himself to pursuing the Helvetii, without being ever able to attack them. We cannot find a single point where he could have gained upon them by rapidity of movement, or where he could execute any manœuvre whatever.

all his cavalry to watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with the enemy's cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at most (about eight kilometres), opposing the devastations they committed on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion inflict a defeat upon them.

The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness; wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised. The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them, Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name of *vergobret*; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan contingent, had, in the last

combat, by retreating with his men, led to the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus, a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment. Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of power among them.

The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near Issy-l'Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme, at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part, began his march at two o'clock in the morning (*de quarta vigilia*), (¹) preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his

(¹) The Romans used little precision in the division of time. Forcellini (*Lex.*,

scouts was P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.

voice *Hora*) refers to Pliny and Censorinus. He remarks that the day—that is, the time between the rising and setting of the sun—was divided into twelve parts, *at all seasons of the year*, and the night the same, from which it would result that in summer the hours of the day were longer than in winter, and *versa* for the nights.—Galenus (*De San. Tuend.*, VI 7) observed that at Rome the longest days were equal to fifteen equinoctial hours. Now, these fifteen hours only reckoning for twelve, it happened that towards the solstice each hour was more than a quarter longer than towards the equinox. This remark was not new, for it is found in Plautus. One of his personages says to a drunkard: “Thou wilt drink four good harvests of Massic wine in an hour!” “Add,” replied the drunkard, “in an hour of winter.” (Plautus, *Pseudolus*, v. 1,302, edit Ratschl.)—Vegetius says that the soldier ought to make twenty miles in five hours, and notes that he speaks of hours in summer, which at Rome, according to the foregoing calculation, would be equivalent to six hours and a quarter towards the equinox. (Vegetius, *Mil.*, I 9)

Pliny (*Hist. Nat.*, VII. 60) remarks that, “at the time when the Twelve Tables were compiled, the only divisions of time known were the rising and setting of the sun; and that, according to the statement of Varro, the first public solar dial was erected near the rostra, on a column, by M. Valerius Messala, who brought it from Catania in 491, thirty years after the one ascribed to Papirius; and that it was in 595 that Scipio Nasica, the colleague of M. Popilius Lænas, divided the hours of night and day, by means of a clepsydra or water-clock, which he consecrated under a covered building.”

Censorinus (*De Die Natali*, xxii, a book dated in the year 991 of Rome, or 338 A.D.) repeats, with some additions, the details given by Pliny. “There is,” he says, “the *natural* day and the *civil* day. The first is the time which passes between the rising and setting of the sun; on the contrary, the night begins with the setting and ends with the rising of the sun. The *civil* day comprises a revolution of the heaven—that is, a true day and a true night, so that when one says that a person has lived thirty days, we must understand that he has lived the same number of nights.

“We know that the day and the night are each divided into twelve hours. The Romans were three hundred years before they were acquainted with hours. The word *hour* is not found in the Twelve Tables. They said in those times, ‘before or after mid-day.’ Others divided the day, as well as the night, into four parts—a practice which is preserved in the armies, where they divide the night into four watches.” Upon these and other data, M. Le Verrier has had the goodness to draw up a table, which will be found at the end of the volume, and which indicates the increase or decrease of the hours with the seasons, and the relationship of the Roman *watches* with our modern hours. (*See Appendix B.*)

At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At this news, Cæsar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of Cæsar near the enemy's camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It was broad daylight when Cæsar learnt that his troops had made themselves masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been blinded by a groundless terror.

Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l'Evêque, Mount Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilomètres to the west of that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to contradict the notion that Labienus and Cæsar may have, one occupied the summit, the other approached the enemy's camp within 1,500 paces, without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle. (')

VI. That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the Alène. Since the passage of the Saône, they had marched about a fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve kilomètres a day. ⁽¹⁾ According to our reckoning, it must have been the end of the month of June. Cæsar followed the Helvetii at the usual distance, and established his camp at three miles' distance from theirs, on the Cressonne, near Ternant.

Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte

Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two days, ⁽²⁾ and as, moreover, Bibracte (*Mont Beuvray*), ⁽³⁾ the greatest and richest

⁽¹⁾ They reckon from Villefianche to Remilly about 170 kilomètres.

⁽²⁾ Each soldier received twenty-five pounds of wheat every fortnight.

⁽³⁾ It is generally admitted that Bibracte stood on the site of Autun, on account of the inscription discovered at Autun in the seventeenth century, and now preserved in the cabinet of antiquities at the Bibliothèque Impériale. Another opinion, which identifies Bibracte with Mont Beuvray (a mountain presenting a great surface, situated thirteen kilomètres to the west of Autun), had nevertheless already found, long ago, some supporters. It will be remarked first that the Gauls chose for the site of their towns, when they could, places difficult of access. in broken countries, these were steep mountains (as Gergovia, Alesia, Uxellodunum, &c.), in flat countries, they were grounds surrounded by marshes (such as Avaricum). The Ædui, according to this, would not have built their principal town on the site of Autun, situated at the foot of the mountains. It was believed that a plateau so elevated as that of Mont Beuvray (its highest point is 810 mètres above the sea) could not have been occupied by a great town. Yet the existence of eight or ten roads, which lead to this plateau, deserted for so many centuries, and some of which are in a state of preservation truly astonishing, ought to have led to a contrary opinion. Let us add that recent excavations leave no further room for doubt. They have brought to light, over an extent of 120 hectares, foundations of Gaulish towers, some round, others square; of mosaics, of foundations of Gallo-Roman walls, gates, hewn stones, heaps of roof tiles, a prodigious quantity of broken amphoræ, a semicircular theatre, &c. . . . Everything, in fact, leads us to place Bibracte on Mont Beuvray: the striking resemblance of the two names, the designation of *ῥοούριον*, which Strabo gives to Bibracte, and even the vague and persistent tradition which, prevailing among the inhabitants of the district, points to Mont Beuvray as a centre of superstitious regard.

town of the Ædui, was not more than eighteen miles (twenty-seven kilomètres) distant, Cæsar, to provision his army, turned from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to Bibracte. (*See Plate 4.*) The enemy was informed of this circumstance by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion ⁽¹⁾ of the auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.

Cæsar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill—that which rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the Petit-Marié (*see Plate 5*)—and sent his cavalry, to impede the enemies in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He ranged, half way up the slope of the hill, his four legions of veterans, in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (*sarcinæ*) ⁽²⁾ with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Cæsar was making these dispositions, the Helvetii, who came

⁽¹⁾ The cavalry was divided into *turmæ*, and the *turma* into three decuries of ten men each.

⁽²⁾ The word *sarcinæ*, the original sense of which is baggage or burthens, was employed sometimes to signify the bundles carried by the soldiers (*De Bello Gallico*, II, 17), sometimes for the heavy baggage (*De Bello Civili*, I, 81). Here we must take *sarcinæ* as comprising both. This is proved by the circumstance that the six legions of the Roman army were on the hill. Now, if Cæsar had sent the heavy baggage forward, towards Bibracte, as General de Gœler believes, he would have sent with it, as an escort, the two legions of the new levy, as he did, the year following, in the campaign against the Nervii. (*De Bello Gallico*, II. 19.)

followed by all their wagons, collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first line. ⁽¹⁾

Cæsar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his own, ⁽²⁾ harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the *pilum*, ⁽³⁾ break the enemy's phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their movements: their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same *pilum*, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn, deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers,

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I 24 —In the phalanx, the men of the first rank covered themselves with their bucklers, overlapping one another before them, while those of the other ranks held them horizontally over their heads, arranged like the tiles of a roof.

⁽²⁾ According to Plutarch (*Cæsar*, 20), he said, "I will mount on horseback when the enemy shall have taken flight."

⁽³⁾ The *pilum* was a sort of javelin thrown by the hand: its total length was from 1.70 to 2 mètres, its head was a slender flexible blade from 0.60 to 1 mètre long, weighing from 300 to 600 grammes, terminating in a point slightly swelling, which sometimes formed a barbed point.

The shaft, sometimes round, sometimes square, had a diameter of from 25 to 32 millimètres. It was fixed to the head by ferules, or by pegs, or by means of a socket.

Such are the characteristics presented by the fragments of *pila* found at Alise. They answer in general to the descriptions we find in Polybius (VI. 23), in Dionysius (V. 46), and in Plutarch (*Marius*). *Pila* made on the model of those found at Alise, and weighing with their shaft from 700 grammes to 1.200 kilog., have been thrown to a distance of 30 and 40 mètres: we may therefore fix at about 25 mètres the average distance to which the *pilum* carried.

and fight without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000 paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halting attack their right flank. ⁽¹⁾ The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the combat. Cæsar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front (*conversa signa bipartito intulerunt*) in his third line, and opposes it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist, the Helvetii who had already been repulsed. ⁽²⁾

This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire, as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back. Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The barbarians, having made a rampart of

⁽¹⁾ *Latere aperto*, the right side, since the buckler was carried on the left arm. We read, indeed, in Titus Livius: "Et cum in latus dextrum, quod patebat, Numidæ jacularentur, translatis in dextrum scutis," &c. (XXII. 50.)

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 33) says on this subject that "the Helvetii were not all on the field of battle, on account of their great number, and of the haste with which the first had made the attack. Suddenly those who had remained in the rear came to attack the Romans, when they were already occupied in pursuing the enemy. Cæsar ordered his cavalry to continue the pursuit; with his legions, he turned against the new assailants."

their wagons, some threw from above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels, wounded them with long pikes (*mataræ ac tragulæ*). The women and children, too, shared desperately in the combat. ⁽¹⁾ At the end of an obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.

This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre (*see Plate 4*): they had, no doubt, passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in pursuit of the enemy. ⁽²⁾

VII. The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 20.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 26.—Till now the field of battle where Cæsar defeated the Helvetii has not been identified. The site which we have adopted, between Luzy and Chides, satisfies all the requirements of the text of the "Commentaries." Different authors have proposed several other localities, but the first cause of error in their reckonings consists in identifying Bibracte with Autun, which we cannot admit; and further, not one of these localities fulfils the necessary topographical conditions. In our opinion, we must not seek the place of engagement to the east of Bibracte, for the Helvetii, to go from the Lower Saône to the Santones, must have passed to the west, and not to the east, of that town. Cussy-la-Colonne, where the field of battle is most generally placed, does not, therefore, suit at all; and, moreover, Cussy-la-Colonne is too near to the territory of the Lingones to require four days for the Helvetii to arrive there after the battle.

Pursuit of the Helvetii

Cæsar to treat for their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as Cæsar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms, and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni (*Soleure, Argovie, Lucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne*) fled, either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and the frontiers of Germany.

On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Cæsar ordered the peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold as slaves. As to the others, Cæsar accepted their submission: he compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish them with wheat. (¹) These meas-

(¹) "He drove back this people into their country as a shepherd drives back his flock into the fold." (Florus, II x. 3.)

ures had for their object not to leave Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw thither the Germans of the other side of the Rhine, who would thus become borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the Ædui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in all their rights and privileges.

In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other, that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000 Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000 Boii—together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition to fight. According to the census ordered by Cæsar, the number of those who returned home was 110,000. (¹) The emigration was thus reduced to less than one-third.

The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Cæsar's march, in the following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from this region. We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we suppose him to have

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 29.

been encamped during the events upon the recital of which we are now going to enter.

VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle of Bibracte were about

Observations.

equal, for Cæsar had six legions—the 10th, which he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and 9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and 12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000 auxiliaries, (¹) we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost one-fourth near the Saône.

In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout, doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it impossible for it to act.

(¹) Cæsar pursued the Helvetii, taking for auxiliaries about 20,000 Gaulish mountaineers (Appian, *De Rebus Gallicis*, IV. 15, edit. Schweigh)

CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.

(Year of Rome 696.)

(BOOK I. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

Seat of the Suevi
and other German
Tribes. I. ON the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly. Cæsar gave his consent.

After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine, from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men for agriculture, taking each other's place alternately: the labourers fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong his residence on the

same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these failed, they were fed upon grass.⁽¹⁾ Masters of themselves from infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons, bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses, though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle, often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving.⁽²⁾ The belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them the contempt for life.⁽³⁾ They boasted of being surrounded by immense solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported, indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded, for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed them in relation with for-

⁽¹⁾ Appian, *De Bello Celt.*, IV. i. 3

⁽²⁾ Tacitus (*Germania*, iv. 32) speaks of this custom of the German horsemen of fighting on foot. Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) ascribes this practice to the Bastarni (the Moldavians).

⁽³⁾ Appian, *De Bello Celt.*, IV. i. 3

eign merchants, and because, neighbours to the Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners. ⁽¹⁾

Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis forests. (*See Plate 2.*) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is, the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians. It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine 'long days' march. ⁽²⁾ The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula from that of the Danube.

The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of Wurtemberg. ⁽³⁾ To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (*partly in Bohemia and partly*

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 1, 2, 3 — General de Gœler, in our opinion, extends the territory of the Ubii much too far to the south.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 25 — This statement agrees well enough with the length of the Black Forest and the Odenwald, which is sixty leagues.

⁽³⁾ It is difficult to fix with precision the localities inhabited at this period by the German peoples, for they were nearly all nomadic, and were continually pressing one upon another. Cæsar, in his fourth book *De Bello Gallico* (cap. 1), asserts that the Suevi never occupied the same territory more than one year.

in the north-west of Austria; (¹) to the north, the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the west, the Marcomanni (the upper and middle course of the Main) and the Sedusii (between the Main and the Neckar); to the south, the Harudes (on the north of the Lake of Constance), the Tulingi, and the Latobriges (the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden).

On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (*the territory of Bâle and part of the Brisgau*); the Triboces (*part of Alsace and of the Grand Duchy of Baden*): on the right bank were the Nemetes (*opposite Spire*); the Vangiones (*opposite Worms*); the Ubii, from the Odenwald to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe. Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north, towards the mouth of the Rhine. (*See Plate 2.*)

II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made the following complaints against Ariovistus:—"The German king," they said, "had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the

The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance.

(¹) Strabo (VII., p. 244) relates, after Posidonius, that the Boii had inhabited first the Hercynian forest; elsewhere he says (V. 177) that the Boii established themselves among the Taurisci, a people dwelling near Noricum. The same author (VII. 243) places the solitudes inhabited by the Boii to the east of Vindelicia (*Southern Bavaria and Western Austria*). Lastly, he says (IV. 471) that the Rhætii and the Vindelicii are the neighbours of the Helvetii and the Boii. The Nemetes and the Vangiones subsequently passed over to the left bank of the Rhine, towards Worms and Spire, and the Ubii towards Cologne.

limited powers to the governor of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required exceptional laws. (¹) The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud:—

“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui; the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter under a roof.” (²)

III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened Cæsar’s decision.

March of Cæsar
upon Besançon

In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing to cross the Rhine. (³) Cæsar, wishing to prevent the

(¹) In the speech which Dio Cassius puts in the mouth of Cæsar before entering on the campaign against Ariovistus, he dilates upon the right which the governor of the Roman province has to act according to circumstances, and to take only his own advice. This speech is naturally amplified and arranged by Dio Cassius, but the principal arguments must be true. (Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 41.—*De Bello Gallico*, I. 33, 34, 35.)

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 36.

(³) Since this information was given to Cæsar by the Treviri, it is certain that the Suevi assembled on the Rhine, opposite or not far from the country of the Treviri, and, in all probability, towards Mayence, where the valley of the Maine presents a magnificent and easy opening upon the Rhine.

junction of these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey, and Dancevoir, led to Langres. ⁽¹⁾ (*See Plate 4.*) After three long days' marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three days' march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of it, and placed a garrison there. ⁽²⁾

The following description, given in the "Commen-

⁽¹⁾ Between Tanlay and Gland, the Roman way is still called the *Route de César*. (*See the map of the Etat-Major.*)

⁽²⁾ To explain this rapid movement upon Besançon, we must suppose that Cæsar, at the moment when he received news of the march of Ariovistus, believed him to be as near Besançon as he was himself. In fact, Cæsar might fear that during the time the news had taken to reach him, the German king, who had already advanced three days' journey out of his territory, might have arrived in the neighbourhood of Mulhausen or Cernay. Now Cæsar was at Arc-en-Barrois, 130 kilomètres from Besançon, and the distance from this latter town to Cernay is 125 kilomètres.

taries," is still applicable to the present town. "It was so well fortified by nature, that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred feet, ⁽¹⁾ which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and connects it with the *oppidum*." ⁽²⁾

During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous cavalry.

IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect. Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in war, come from

Panic in the Roman Army.

⁽¹⁾ The "Commentaries" give here the erroneous number DC: the breadth of the isthmus which the Doubs forms at Besançon cannot have undergone any sensible variation; it is at present 480 mètres, or 1,620 Roman feet. The copyists have, no doubt, omitted an M before DC.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, I. 88.

Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the innumerable solicitations of influential people. ⁽¹⁾ This panic had begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the illegality of the enterprise. ⁽²⁾

Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated the German race in the revolt of the slaves; ⁽³⁾ that

⁽¹⁾ " . . . qui ex urbe, amicitiae causa, Cæsarem secuti, non magnum in re militari usum habebant." (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 39)—We see in the subsequent wars Appian repaying to Cæsar to obtain appointments of military tribunes, and Cicero recommending for the same grade several persons, among others, M. Curtius, Orfius, and Trebatius. "I have asked him for a tribuneship for M. Curtius." (*Epist. ad Quint.*, II. 15; *Epist. Famil.*, VII. 5, a letter to Cæsar.) Trebatius, though a bad soldier, was treated with kindness, and at once appointed a military tribune. "I wonder that you despise the advantages of the tribuneship, especially since they have allowed you to dispense with the fatigues of military service." (Cicero, *Epist. Famil.*, VII. 8.)—"Resign yourself to the military service, and remain" (Cicero, *Epist. Famil.*, VII. 11)—Trebatius appeared little satisfied, complained of the severity of the service, and, when Cæsar passed into Britain, he prudently remained on the Continent.

⁽²⁾ DIO CASSIUS, XXXVIII. 36.

⁽³⁾ This shows that then, in Italy, a great number of slaves were Germans.

the Helvetii had often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is already ripe in the fields (*jamyue esse in agris frumenta matura*). As to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns (*signa laturi*). (') Words like these would not shake him; the soldier despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty. If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the 10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the greatest confidence in it.

This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise

(') This Latin phrase indicated the putting the troops in march.

and of those whose services he affected to disdain,—this proud assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the war, as that appertained only to the general. (¹)

V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information concerning the roads from
March towards the Valley of the Rhine Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar's war in Gaul, more difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier communications. (*See Plate 4.*)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I 41.

Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres), ('') which is represented by a semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).

Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day's march, the

(') There has been much discussion on the meaning of the words *millium amplius quinquaginta circuitu*. Some pretend that the number of fifty miles means the whole distance, and that thus Cæsar would have taken seven days to travel fifty miles, which would make about seven kilomètres a day: this supposition is inadmissible. Others pretend, on the contrary, that we must add fifty miles to the direct distance. This last interpretation is refuted by a passage in the "Commentaries" (*De Bello Civili*, I 64) We read there, *Ac tantum fuit in militibus studii, ut, millium vi ad iter addito circuito*, &c. This shows that when Cæsar means to speak of a turn of road, to be added to the total length of the route, he is careful to indicate it. We consider it more simple, therefore, to admit that the fifty miles are only a part of the distance performed during the seven days' march; that is, that after making a circular *détour* of fifty miles, which required three or four days, Cæsar had still to march some time before he met the enemy, following the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine. The study of the ground completely justifies this view, for it was sufficient for Cæsar to make a circuit of fifty miles (or seventy-five kilomètres) to turn the mass of mountains which extends from Besançon to Montbéliard.

Roman army would have travelled over 140 kilometres in seven days, and would have arrived on the Thur, near Cérnay. (By the road indicated, the distance from Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilometres.) At this moment, Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilometres from the Romans, to the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word "that he consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him." Cæsar did not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following. (¹) In the interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus, who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides, they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter, unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular saying of one of the soldiers: "Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to make us prætorians, and he makes us knights." (²)

(¹) It is probable that, during the negotiations, Ariovistus had approached nearer to the Roman camp, in order to facilitate intercommunication; for, if he had remained at a distance of thirty-six kilometres from Cæsar, we should be obliged to admit that the German army, which subsequently advanced towards the Roman camp, in a single day, to within nine kilometres, had made a march of twenty-five kilometres at least, which is not probable when we consider that it dragged after it wagons and women and children.

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 42.

VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly equal distance from either camp. (1) This was the place of meeting of the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen. When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the

(1) *Planities erat magna, et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis* (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 43)—This phrase would be sufficient itself to prove that the encounter of the two armies took place in the plains of Upper Alsace. We may ask how, in spite of a text so explicit, different writers should have placed the field of battle in the mountains of the Jura, where there is nowhere to be found a plain of any extent. It is only at Mulhausen, to the north of the Doller, that the vast plain of the valley of the Rhine opens.

Cæsar employs three times the word *tumulus* to designate the eminence on which his interview with Ariovistus took place, and he never calls it *collis*. Is it not evident from this that we must consider this *tumulus* as a rounded knoll, insulated in the plain? Now it is to be considered that the plain which extends to the north of the Doller, between the Vosges and the Rhine, contains a rather large number of small rounded eminences, to which the word *collis* would not apply, and which the word *knoll* or *tumulus* perfectly describes. The most remarkable of these are situated, one near Feldkirch, the other between Wittenheim and Ensisheim. We may suppose that the interview took place on one of these knolls, marked 231 on Plate 6.

General de Goeler has adopted as the place of the interview an eminence which rises on the left bank of the Little Doller, to the north of the village of Aspach-le-Bas. Cæsar would have called this eminence *collis*, for it is rather extensive, and, by its elongated form, but not rounded, does not at all represent to the eye what is commonly called a *knoll* or *tumulus*; moreover, contrary to the text, this elevation is not, properly speaking, in the plain. It is only separated from the hills situated to the south by a brook, and the plain begins only from its northern slope.

abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: "He had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety; the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price, he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may undertake."

Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: "It was not one of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of

conquest be invoked, the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free, since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her own laws."

During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar's lieutenants. Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of hospitality. They had hardly entered

the camp of Ariovistus, when he ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were spies. (¹)

VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp, and took another position at the Movements of the two Aïmes. foot of the Vosges (*sub monte*), at a distance of 6,000 paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the Lauch. (*See Plate 6.*) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut off Cæsar's communication with Sequania and the Ædunan country, but he left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the Lingones. (²) (*See the Map of Gaul, 2.*) The two armies thus encamped at a short distance from each other. During the five following days, Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle at the head of his camp (*pro castris suas copias produxit*), but was not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000 horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to circumstances, the horsemen

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 47.

(²) It is not unworthy of remark that Cæsar's communications with the Leuci and the Lingones remained open. We have seen that, in his address to the troops at Besançon, he reckoned on obtaining from these peoples a part of his supplies.

fell back upon the footmen, or the latter advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up with the horses, running and holding by the mane. ⁽¹⁾

Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them, chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works. Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.

Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his tactics (*instituto suo*) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and placed them in order of battle (*paulum a majoribus castris progressus, aciem instruxit*). In spite of this advanced position (*ne tum*

⁽¹⁾ Tacitus (*Germania*, VI. 32) and Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) speak of this method of fighting employed by the Germans.

quidem), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not be conquerors if they fought before the new moon. (¹)

VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the
Battle against
the Germans two camps, Cæsar placed all his auxilia-
 ries in view of the enemy, in advance of
 the smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he led them up to the enemy's camp (*usque ad castra hostium accessit*). This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain, (²) drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 50.—The predictions of these priestesses, who pretended to know the future by the noise of waters and by the vortexes made by the streams in rivers, forbade their giving battle before the new moon. (Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 21)

(²) "Having skirmished opposite their retrenchments and the hills on which

intervals — Harudes, Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.⁽¹⁾

Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor.⁽²⁾ He led the attack in person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great that the Romans, not having time to use the *pilum*, throw it away, and fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of three or four hundred men,⁽³⁾ and cov-
they were encamped, he exasperated and excited them to such a degree of rage, that they descended and fought desperately." (Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 21)

(1) General de Gœler adopts this same field of battle, but he differs from us in placing the Romans with their back to the Rhine. It would be impossible to understand in this case how, after their defeat, the Germans would have been able to fly towards that river, Cæsar cutting off their retreat; or how Ariovistus, reckoning upon the arrival of the Suevi, should have put Cæsar between him and the re-enforcements he expected.

(2) As the legions were six in number, the above phrase proves that in this campaign Cæsar had one quæstor and five lieutenants. (See *Appendix D*)

(3) Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.—We have adopted the version of Dio Cas-

er their bare heads with their bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they still remain standing. (¹) Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and striking the enemies from above. (²) The short and sharp-pointed swords of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the Germans. (³) Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness with which they kept their ranks. (⁴) Ariovistus's left did not resist long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat. Soon Ariovistus's right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle. (⁵) They descended, no doubt, the valley of the

sus, as we cannot admit with Orosius that an army of more than 100,000 men could have formed only a single phalanx

(¹) Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.

(²) Orosius expresses himself thus: "United in one phalanx, and their heads protected by their bucklers, they attempted, thus covered, to break the Roman lines; but some Romans, not less agile than bold, rushed upon this sort of tortoise, grappled with the German soldiers body to body, tore from them their shields, with which they were covered as with scales, and stabbed them through the shoulders." (Orosius, VI. 7)

(³) Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.

(⁴) Appian, *De Bello Celt*, IV. 1, 3.

(⁵) The manuscripts followed by the early editors of the "Commentaries" gave some the number of 50 miles, others that of 5 miles. We believe that

Ill as far as Rhinau, thus retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (*See Plate 4.*) Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a boat ⁽¹⁾ he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and Appian, ⁽²⁾ 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit. Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by victory when he recovered, first Proculus, loaded with a triple chain, and who had thrice

Cæsar wrote 50 miles. This is proved by the very words he employs, *neque prius fugere destiterunt* which could not be applied to a flight of merely a few miles. Moreover, the testimony of old writers confirms the number of 50 miles. Paulus Orosius relates that the carnage extended over a space of 40 miles; Plutarch, over 300 or 400 stadia, that is, 35 or 50 miles, according to the editions; and J. Celsus (Petitarch) (*De Vita J. Cæsaris*, I., p. 40, edit. Lemaire) says, *usque ad ripam Rheni fuga perpetua fuit*, a phrase in which the word *perpetua* is significative.

Modern writers, supposing erroneously that Cæsar had indicated the distance, that is, the shortest line from the field of battle to the Rhine, have discussed lengthily the number to be adopted. They have overlooked the fact that the Latin text states, not exactly the distance from the field of battle to the Rhine, but the length of the line of retreat from the battle-field to the river. This line may have been oblique towards the Rhine, for it is probable that the retreat of the Germans lay down the valley of the Ill, which they had previously ascended. We must therefore seek towards Rhinau the point where they attempted to re-pass the river.

⁽¹⁾ According to Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 50), Ariovistus, followed by his cavalry, succeeded in escaping. Having reached the right bank, he collected the fugitives; but he died shortly afterwards (*De Bello Gallico*, V. 29), perhaps of his wounds.

⁽²⁾ Appian, *De Bello Celt.*, IV. 1, 3 — Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 21.

seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.

The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable number of the fugitives.

Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the season required—at the beginning of September—and left them under the command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in Cisalpine Gaul. (¹)

IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign:—

Observations

1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches to that military position as a point of support and of supply.

2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into cavalry.

3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (*alarii*), by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a greater number of legions.

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, I. 53.—The war against Ariovistus became the subject of a poem by P. Terentius Varro Atacinus (*De Bello Sequanico*) (Piscian, X, p. 877, P.)

4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P. Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.

The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the following manner:—

Rendezvous of the Helvetii on the banks of the Rhone (the day of the equinox)	March 24.
Cæsar refuses them a passage through the province	April 8.
Arrival at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône of the legions from Italy and Illyria	June 7.
Defeat of the Tigurini on the Saône	June 10.
Passage of the Saône by Cæsar	June 12.
About fifteen days' march (<i>De Bello Gallico</i> , I. 15)	From June 13 to June 27.
Manœuvre of Labienus to surprise the Helvetii	June 28.
Battle of Bibracte	June 29.
Cæsar remains three days interring the dead; marches on the fourth; employs six days in his march from the field of battle to the country of the Lingones, and there overtakes the Helvetii in their retreat,	
	From June 30 to July 8.
Negotiations with Ariovistus (a month),	
	From July 8 to August 8.
Departure of Cæsar (from Tonnerre, to meet Ariovistus)	August 10.

Arrival of Cæsar at Besançon . . . August 16.
 Abode of Cæsar at Besançon,

From August 16 to August 22.

Departure from Besançon ("the harvest is ripe," *De Bello Gallico*, I. 40) August 22.

March of seven days from Besançon
 to the Rhine . From August 22 to August 28.

Interview (five days afterwards) . September 2.

Manœuvres (about eight days),
 From September 3 to September 10.

Battle of the Thur (fought before the
 new moon, which took place on the
 18th of September) September 10.

CHAPTER V.

WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ.

(Year of Rome 697)

(BOOK II. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

I. THE brilliant successes gained by Cæsar over the Helvetii and the Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger, but at the same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania. The irritation was very great among the Belgæ. They feared that their turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.

Cæsar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of spring, (¹)

(¹) "Inita æstate." (*De Bello Gallico*, II. 2.)—Æstas, according to Forcellini, signifies the period comprised between the two equinoxes of spring and autumn.

sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant Q. Pedius. ⁽¹⁾ It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount Pœrinus (*Great St. Bernard*), after having traversed the country of the Salassi (*Valley of Aosta*), and that this latter people offered at first to assist Cæsar's troops in their passage by levelling the roads and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this defection that, towards the end of the year 697, Cæsar, as we shall see farther on, sent Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy. ⁽²⁾

As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person, probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and an army was assembling. Cæsar then decided upon immediately entering into campaign.

His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit

⁽¹⁾ See his biography, *Appendix D.*

⁽²⁾ Strabo, IV. 171, V. 174.

a mean of 5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was, in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Æduan troops under the command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Cæsar amounted to at least 60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines, drivers, and valets, who, according to the instance cited by Orosius, amounted to a considerable number. (¹)

After securing provisions, Cæsar started from Besançon, probably in the second fortnight in May, crossed the Saône at Seveux (see Plate 4), crossed the territory of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilomètres, the distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François. (²)

The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road (*qui proximi Galliæ ex Belgis sunt*). Astonished at his sudden appearance, they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every kind of succour. They in-

(¹) "In the year 642, the consul C. Manlius and the proconsul Q. Cæpio were defeated by the Cimbri and the Teutones, and there perished 80,000 Romans and allies and 40,000 valets (*colones et lxxæ*). Of all the army, ten men only escaped." (Orosius, V. 16.) These data are no doubt exaggerated, for Titus Livius (XXXVI 38) pretends that Orosius took his information from Valerius of Antium, who habitually magnified his numbers.

(²) This route, the most direct from Besançon to the territory of the Remi, is still marked by the numerous vestiges of the Roman road which joined Vesontio with Durolacon (Besançon with Rheims).

formed Cæsar that all the Belgæ were in arms, and that the Germans on that side the Rhine had joined the coalition; for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with them by community of origin, laws, and interests. "The Belgæ," they added, "proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly, each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents:—The Bellovacî, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii, 7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Vellocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000; the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæresi, and Pæmani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000; in all, about 296,000 men." (¹)

II. Cæsar could judge, from this information, the for-

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, II 4.

Cæsar's Camp at
Berry-au-Bac

midable character of the league which he had now to combat. His first care was to try to divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus, in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Ædui with the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the Æduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his presence, and the children of the *principes* to be brought to him as hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him, he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the extremity of the territory of the Remi (*quod est in extremis Remorum finibus*), ⁽¹⁾ and encamp there in a strong position, to await the enemy's attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the village of Berry-au-Bac. (*See Plate 7.*) He marched in great haste towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. (*See Plate 8.*) This hill, called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 mètres) above the valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to the level of

(1) The word *fines*, in Cæsar, always signifies territory. We must therefore understand by *extremi fines* the part of the territory farthest removed from the centre, and not the extreme frontier, as certain translators have thought. The Aisne crossed the northern part of the country of the Remi, and did not form its boundary. (*See Plate 2.*)

the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Cæsar ordered a work to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of the bridge, where he established a post (*see Plates 8 and 9*),⁽¹⁾ and he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a retrenchment twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide.⁽²⁾

Meanwhile the Belgæ, after having concentrated their forces in the country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman camp (*see Plate 7*), was a town of the Remi called Bibrax (*Vieux-Laon*).⁽³⁾ The Belgæ attacked

(1) The retrenchments of this tête-du-pont, especially the side parallel to the Aisne, are still visible at Berry-au-Bac. The gardens of several of the inhabitants are made upon the rampart itself, and the fosse appears at the outside of the village in the form of a cistern. The excavations have displayed distinctly the profile of the fosse.

(2) The excavations undertaken in 1862, by bringing to light the fosses of the camp, showed that they were 18 feet wide, with a depth of 9 or 10. (*See Plates 8 and 9*.) If, then, we admit that the platform of earth of the parapet was 10 feet wide, it would have measured 8 feet in height, which, with the palisade of 4 feet, would give the crest of the parapet a command of 22 feet above the bottom of the fosse.

(3) The following localities have been suggested for Bibrax: *Bièvre, Bruyères, Neufchâtel, Beauneux*, and the mountain called *Vieux-Laon*. Now that the camp of Cæsar has been discovered on the hill of Mauchamp, there is only room to hesitate between *Beauneux* and *Vieux-Laon*, as they are the only localities

it vigorously, and it was defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts, attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants, throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Cæsar that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour. Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides. This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time round Bibrax, laying waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses, they marched towards Cæsar, and halted at less than two miles from his camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilomètres).

The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in his eyes an

among those just mentioned which, as the text requires, are eight miles distant from the Roman camp. But Beauneux will not suit, for the reason that even if the Aisne had passed, at the time of the Gallic war, at the foot of the heights on which the town is situated, we cannot understand how the re-enforcements sent by Cæsar could have crossed the river and penetrated into the place, which the Belgian army must certainly have invested on all sides. This fact is, on the contrary, easily understood when we apply it to the mountain of Vieux-Laon, which presents towards the south impregnable escarpments. The Belgæ would have surrounded it on all parts except on the south, and it was no doubt by that side that, during the night, Cæsar's re-enforcements would enter the town.

incontestible superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of the Belgæ, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated plain to the north of the camp. Once certain that his troops did not yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgæ might have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To meet this danger, Cæsar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 mètres) in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established redoubts, in which were placed military machines. ⁽¹⁾

III. Having made these dispositions, and having left in the camp his two newly-raised legions, to serve as a reserve in case of need, Cæsar placed the six others in array of battle, the right resting on the retrenchments. The enemy

Battle on the Aisne

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II. 7.—(Plate 9 gives the plan of the camp, which has been found entire, and that of the redoubts with the fosses, as they have been exposed to view by the excavations, but we have found it impossible to explain the outline of the redoubts.)

also drew out his troops and deployed them in face of the Romans. The two armies remained in observation, each waiting till the other passed the marsh of the Miette, as the favourable moment for attack. Meanwhile, as they remained thus stationary, the cavalry were fighting on both sides. After a successful charge, Cæsar, perceiving that the enemies persisted in not entering the marshes, withdrew his legions. The Belgæ immediately left their position to move towards the Aisne, below the point where the Miette entered it. Their object was to cross the river between Gernicourt and Pontavert, where there were fords, with part of their troops, to carry, if they could, the redoubt commanded by the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus, and to cut the bridge, or, at least, to intercept the convoys of provisions, and ravage the country of the Remi, to the south of the Aisne, whence the Romans drew their supplies.

The barbarians were already approaching the river, when Sabinus perceived them from the heights of Berry-au-Bac; ⁽¹⁾ he immediately gave information to Cæsar, who, with all his cavalry, the light-armed Numidians, the slingers, and the archers, passed the bridge, and, descending the left bank, marched to meet the enemies towards the place threatened. When he arrived there, some of them had already passed the Aisne. An obstinate struggle takes place. Surprised in their passage, the Belgæ, after having experienced considerable loss, advance intrepidly over the corpses to cross the river, but are repulsed by a

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, II. 12.—Sabinus evidently commanded on both sides the river

shower of missiles; those who had reached the left bank are surrounded by the cavalry and massacred. ⁽¹⁾

IV. The Belgæ having failed in taking the *oppidum* of Bibrax, in drawing the Romans upon disadvantageous ground, in crossing the river, and suffering, also, from want of provisions, decided on returning home, to be ready to assemble again to succour the country which might be first invaded by the Roman army. The principal cause of this decision was the news of the threatened invasion of the country of the Bellovaci by Divitiacus and the Ædui: the Bellovaci refused to lose a single instant in hurrying to the defence of their hearths. Towards ten o'clock in the evening, the Belgæ withdrew in such disorder that their departure resembled a flight. Cæsar was informed immediately by his spies, but, fearing that this retreat might conceal a snare, he retained his legions, and even his cavalry, in the camp. At break of day, better informed by his scouts, he sent all his cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenants Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, ⁽²⁾ and ordered Labienus, with three legions, to follow them. These troops fell upon the fugitives, and slew as many as the length of the day would permit. At sunset they gave up the pursuit, and, in obedience to the orders they had received, returned to the camp. ⁽³⁾

The coalition of the Belgæ, so renowned for their valour, was thus dissolved. Nevertheless, it was of

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II. 12.—Sabinus evidently commanded on both sides the river.

⁽²⁾ See the biographies of Cæsar's lieutenants, *Appendix D*.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II 11

importance to the Roman general, in order to secure the pacification of the country, to go and reduce to subjection in their homes the peoples who had dared to enter into league against him. The nearest were the Suessiones, whose territory bordered upon that of the Remi.

V. The day after the flight of the enemy, before they had recovered from their fright, Cæsar broke up his camp, crossed the Aisne, descended its left bank, invaded the country of the Suessiones, arrived after a long day's march (45 kilometres) before Noviodunum (*Soissons*) (*see Plate 7*), and, informed that this town had a weak garrison, he attempted the same day to carry it by assault; he failed, through the breadth of the fosses and the height of the walls. He then retrenched his camp, ordered covered galleries to be advanced (*vineas agere*,⁽¹⁾ and all things necessary for a siege to be collected. Nevertheless, the crowd of fugitive Suessiones threw themselves into the town during the following night. The galleries having been pushed rapidly towards the walls, the foundations of a terrace⁽²⁾

(¹) The *vineæ* were small huts constructed of light timber work covered with hurdles and hides of animals (Vegetius, Lib. IV. c. 16.) See the figures on the Trajan column.

In a regular siege the *vineæ* were constructed out of reach of the missiles, and they were then pushed in file one behind the other up to the wall of the place attacked, a process which was termed *agere vineas*, they thus formed long covered galleries which, sometimes placed at right angles to the wall and sometimes parallel, performed the same part as the branches and parallels in modern sieges.

(²) The terrace (*agger*) was an embankment, made of any materials, for the purpose of establishing either platforms to command the ramparts of a besieged town, or viaducts to conduct the towers and machines against the walls,

to pass the fosse (*aggere jacto*) were established, and towers were constructed. The Gauls, astonished at the greatness and novelty of these works, so promptly executed, offered to surrender. They obtained safety of life at the prayer of the Remi.

Cæsar received as hostages the principal chiefs of the country, and even the two sons of King Galba, exacted the surrender of all their arms, and accepted the submission of the Suessiones. He then conducted his army into the country of the Bellovaci, who had shut themselves up, with all they possessed, in the *oppidum* of Bratuspantium (*Breteuil*).⁽¹⁾ The army was only at about five miles' distance from it, when all the aged men, issuing from the town, came, with extended hands, to implore the generosity of the Roman general; when he had arrived under the walls of the place, and while he was establishing his camp, he saw the women and children also demanding peace as suppliants from the top of the walls.

Divitiacus, in the name of the Ædui, interceded in their favour. After the retreat of the Belgæ and the disbanding of his troops, he had returned to the pres-

when the approaches to the place presented slopes which were too difficult to climb. These terraces were used also sometimes to fill up the fosse. The *agger* was most commonly made of trunks of trees, crossed and heaped up like the timber in a funeral pile.—(Thucydides, *Siege of Plataea*.—Lucan, *Pharsalia*—Vitruvius, book XI, *Trajan Column*)

⁽¹⁾ Antiquaries hesitate between Beauvais, Montdidier, or Breteuil. We adopt Breteuil as the most probable, according to the dissertation on Bratuspantium, by M l'Abbé Devic, curé of Mouchy-le-Châtel. In fact, the distance from Breteuil to Amiens is just twenty-five miles, as indicated in the "Commentaries." We must add, however, that M l'Abbé Devic does not place Bratuspantium at Breteuil itself, but close to that town, in the space now comprised between the communes of Vaudeuil, Caply, Beauvoir, and their dependencies.—Paris, 1843, and Arias, 1865.

ence of Cæsar. The latter, who had, at the prayer of the Remi, just shown himself clement towards the Suessiones, displayed, at the solicitation of the Ædui, the same indulgence towards the Bellovaci. Thus obeying the same political idea of increasing among the Belgæ the influence of the peoples allied to Rome, he pardoned them; but, as their nation was the most powerful in Belgic Gaul, he required from them all their arms and 600 hostages. The Bellovaci declared that the promoters of the war, seeing the misfortune they had drawn upon their country, had fled into the isle of Britain.

It is curious to remark the relations which existed at this epoch between part of Gaul and England. We know, in fact, from the "Commentaries," that a certain Divitiacus, an Æduan chieftain, the most powerful in all Gaul, had formerly extended his power into the isle of Britain, and we have just seen that the chiefs in the last struggle against the Romans had found a refuge in the British isles.

Cæsar next marched from Bratuspantium against the Ambiani, who surrendered without resistance. (')

VI. The Roman army was now to encounter more formidable adversaries. The Nervii occupied a vast territory, one extremity of which touched upon that of the Ambiani. This wild and intrepid people bitterly reproached the other Belgæ for having submitted to foreigners and abjured the virtues of their fathers. They had resolved not to send deputies, nor to accept peace on any condi-

March against the
Nervii

tion. Foreseeing the approaching invasion of the Roman army, the Nervii had drawn into alliance with them two neighbouring peoples, the Atrebatæ and the Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to risk with them the fortune of war: the Aduatuci, also, were already on the way to join the coalition. The women, and all those whose age rendered them unfit for fighting, had been placed in safety, in a spot defended by a marsh, and inaccessible to an army, no doubt at Mons. ⁽¹⁾

After the submission of the Ambiani, Cæsar left Amiens to proceed to the country of the Nervii; and after three days' march on their territory, he arrived probably at Bavay (*Bagacum*), which is considered to have been their principal town. There he learnt by prisoners that he was no more than ten miles (fifteen kilomètres) distant from the Sambre, and that the enemy awaited him posted on the opposite bank of the river. ⁽²⁾ He thus found himself on the left bank, and the Nervii were assembled on the right bank. ⁽³⁾ (*See Plate 7.*)

In accordance with the informations he had received, Cæsar sent out a reconnoitring party of scouts and centurions, charged with the selection of a spot fa-

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II 14, 15, 16. Mons is, in fact, seated on a hill completely surrounded by low meadows, traversed by the sinuous courses of the Haime and the Trouille.

⁽²⁾ According to scholars, the frontier between the Nervii and the Ambiani lay towards Fins and Bapaume. Supposing the three days' march of the Roman army to be reckoned from this point, it would have arrived, in three days, of twenty-five kilomètres each, at Bavay.

⁽³⁾ If Cæsar had arrived on the right bank of the Sambre, as several authors have pretended, he would already have found that river at Landrecies, and would have had no need to learn, on the third day of his march, that he was only fifteen kilomètres from it.

vourable for the establishment of a camp. A certain number of the Belgæ, who had recently submitted, and other Gauls, followed him, and accompanied him in his march. Some of them, as was known subsequently by the prisoners, having observed during the preceding days the usual order of march of the army, deserted during the night to the Nervii, and informed them that behind each of the legions there was a long column of baggage; that the legion which arrived first at the camp being separated by a great space from the others, it would be easy to attack the soldiers, still charged with their bundles (*sarcinæ*); that this legion once routed and its baggage captured, the others would not dare to offer any resistance. This plan of attack was the more readily embraced by the Belgæ, as the nature of the locality favoured its execution. The Nervii, in fact, always weak in cavalry (their whole force was composed of infantry), were accustomed, in order to impede more easily the cavalry of their neighbours, to notch and bend horizontally young trees, the numerous branches of which, interlaced and mingled with brambles and brushwood, formed thick hedges, a veritable wall which nothing could pass through, impenetrable even to the eye. ⁽¹⁾ As this kind of obstacle was very embarrassing to the march of the Roman army, the Nervii resolved to hide themselves in the woods which then covered the heights of Haumont, to watch there the moment when it would debouch on the opposite

⁽¹⁾ It is worthy of remark, that still at the present day the fields in the neighbourhood of the Sambre are surrounded with hedges very similar to those here described. Strabo (II., p. 161) also mentions these hedges.

heights of the Sambre, to wait till they perceived the file of baggage, and then immediately to rush upon the troops which preceded. ⁽¹⁾ (*See Plate 10.*)

VII. The centurions sent to reconnoitre had selected for the establishment of the camp the Battle on the Sambre. heights of Neuf-Mesnil. These descend in a uniform slope to the very banks of the river. Those of Boussières, to which they join, end, on the contrary, at the Sambre, in sufficiently bold escarpments, the elevation of which varies from five to fifteen mètres, and which, inaccessible near Boussières, may be climbed a little lower, opposite the wood of Quesnoy. The Sambre, in all this extent, was no more than about three feet deep. On the right bank, the heights of Haumont, opposite those of Neuf-Mesnil, descend on all sides in gentle and regular slopes to the level of the river. In the lower part, they were bare for a breadth of about 200 Roman paces (300 mètres), reckoning from the Sambre; and then the woods began, which covered the upper parts. It was in these woods, impenetrable to the sight, that the Belgæ remained concealed. They were there drawn up in order of battle: on the right, the Atrebates; in the centre, the Veromandui; on the left, the Nervii; these latter facing the escarpments of the Sambre. On the open part, along the river, they had placed some posts of cavalry. (*See Plate 10.*)

Cæsar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgæ were encamped, directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry preceded

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II. 17.

him, but the order of march was different from that which had been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two legions recently raised, who closed the march.

The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open ground. Meanwhile, the six legions debouched. Arrived on the place chosen for the camp, they began to retrench, and shared the labour among them. Some proceeded to dig the fosses, while others spread themselves over the country in search of timber and turf. They had hardly begun their work, when the Belgæ, perceiving the first portion of the baggage (which was the moment fixed for the attack), suddenly issue from the forest with all their forces, in the order of battle they had adopted, rush upon the cavalry and put it to rout, and run towards the Sambre with such incredible rapidity that they seem to be everywhere at once—at the edge of the wood, in the river, and in the midst of the Roman troops; then, with the same celerity, climbing the hill, they rush towards the camp, where the soldiers are at work at the retrenchments. The Roman army is taken off its guard.

Cæsar had to provide against everything at the same time. It was necessary to raise the purple standard as the signal for hastening to arms, ⁽¹⁾ to

⁽¹⁾ "The signal for battle is a purple mantle, which is displayed before the general's tent." (Plutarch, *Fabius Maximus*, 24)

sound the trumpets to recall the soldiers employed in the works, to bring in those who were at a distance, form the lines, harangue the troops, give the word of order. ⁽¹⁾ In this critical situation, the experience of the soldiers, acquired in so many combats, and the presence of the lieutenants with each legion, helped to supply the place of the general, and to enable each to take, by his own impulse, the dispositions he thought best. The impetuosity of the enemy is such that the soldiers have time neither to put on the ensigns, ⁽²⁾ nor to take the covering from their bucklers, nor even to put on their helmets. Each, abandoning his labours, runs to range himself in the utmost haste under the first standard which presents itself.

The army, constrained by necessity, was drawn up on the slope of the hill, much more in obedience to the nature of the ground and the exigencies of the moment than according to military rules. The legions, separated from one another by thick hedges, which intercepted their view, could not lend each other mutual succour; they formed an irregular and interrupted line: the 9th and 10th legions were placed on the left of the camp, the 8th and 11th in the centre, the 7th and 12th on the right. In this general confusion, in which it became as difficult to carry succour to the points threatened as to obey one single command, everything was ruled by accident.

⁽¹⁾ *Signum dare*, "to give the word of order" In fact, we read in Suetonius: "Primo etiam imperii die signum excubanti tribuno dedit. *Optimam matrem*" (*Nero*, 9; *Caligula*, 56 — Tacitus, *Histor.*, III. 22.)

⁽²⁾ The soldiers wore either the skins of wild beasts, or plumes or other ornaments, to mark their grades. "Excussit cristas galeis." (Lucan, *Pharsalia*, line 158.)

Cæsar, after taking the measures most urgent, rushes towards the troops which chance presents first to him, takes them as he finds them in his way, harangues them, and, when he comes to the 10th legion, he recalls to its memory, in a few words, its ancient valour. As the enemy was already within reach of the missiles, he orders the attack; then, proceeding towards another point to encourage his troops, he finds them already engaged.

The soldiers of the 9th and 10th legions throw the *pilum*, and fall, sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, fatigued by their rapid advance, out of breath, and pierced with wounds, are soon driven back from the hill they have just climbed. These two legions, led no doubt by Labienus, drive them into the Sambre, slay a great number, cross the river at their heels, and pursue them up the slopes of the right bank. The enemy, then thinking to take advantage of the commanding position, form again, and renew the combat; but the Romans repulse them anew, and, continuing their victorious march, take possession of the Gaulish camp. In the centre, the 8th and 11th legions, attacked by the Veromandui, had driven them back upon the banks of the Sambre, to the foot of the heights, where the combat still continued.

While on the left and in the centre victory declared for the Romans, on the right wing, the 7th and 12th legions were in danger of being overwhelmed under the efforts of the whole army of the Nervii, composed of 60,000 men. These intrepid warriors, led by their chief, Boduognatus, had dashed across the Sambre in face of the escarpments of the left bank;

they had boldly climbed these, and thrown themselves, in close rank, upon the two legions of the right wing. These legions were placed in a position the more critical, as the victorious movements of the left and centre, by stripping almost entirely of troops that part of the field of battle, had left them without support. The Nervii take advantage of these circumstances: some move towards the summit of the heights to seize the camp, others outflank the two legions on the right wing (*aperto latere*).

As chance would have it, at this same moment, the cavalry and light-armed foot, who had been repulsed at the first attack, regained pell-mell the camp; finding themselves unexpectedly in face of the enemy, they are confounded, and take to flight again in another direction. The valets of the army, who, from the Decuman gate and the summit of the hill, had seen the Romans cross the river victoriously, and had issued forth in hope of plunder, look back; perceiving the Nervii in the camp, they fly precipitately. The tumult is further increased by the cries of the baggage-drivers, who rush about in terror. Among the auxiliaries in the Roman army, there was a body of Treviran cavalry, who enjoyed among the Gauls a reputation for valour. When they saw the camp invaded, the legions pressed and almost surrounded, the valets, the cavalry, the slingers, the Numidians, separated, dispersed, and flying on all sides, they believed that all was lost, took the road for their own country, and proclaimed everywhere in their march that the Roman army was destroyed.

Cæsar had repaired from the left wing to the other

points of the line. When he arrived at the right wing, he had found the 7th and 12th legions hotly engaged, the ensigns of the cohorts of the 12th legion collected on the same point, the soldiers pressed together and mutually embarrassing each other, all the centurions of the 4th cohort and the standard-bearer killed; the standard lost; in the other cohorts most of the centurions were either killed or wounded, and among the latter was the primipilus Sextius Baculus, a man of rare bravery, who was destined soon afterwards to save the legion of Galba in the Valais. The soldiers who still resisted were exhausted, and those of the last ranks were quitting the ranks to avoid the missiles; new troops of enemies continually climbed the hill, some advancing to the front against the Romans, the others turning them on the two wings. In this extreme danger, Cæsar judges that he can hope for succour only from himself: having arrived without buckler, he seizes that of a legionary of the last ranks and rushes to the first line; there, calling the centurions by their names and exciting the soldiers, he draws the 12th legion forward, and causes more interval to be made between the files of the companies in order to facilitate the handling of their swords. His example and encouraging words restore hope to the combatants and revive their courage. Each man, under the eyes of his general, shows new energy, and this heroic devotedness begins to cool the impetuosity of the enemy. Not far thence, the 7th legion was pressed by a multitude of assailants. Cæsar orders the tribunes gradually to bring the two legions back to back, so that each presented its front to the enemy

in opposite directions. Fearing no longer to be taken in the rear, they resist with firmness, and fight with new ardour. While Cæsar is thus occupied, the two legions of the rear-guard, which formed the escort of the baggage (the 13th and 14th), informed of what was taking place, arrive in haste, and appear in view of the enemy at the top of the hill. On his part, T. Labienus, who, at the head of the 9th and 10th legions, had made himself master of the enemy's camp on the heights of Haumont, discovers what is passing in the Roman camp. He judges, by the flight of the cavalry and servants, the greatness of the danger with which Cæsar is threatened, and sends the 10th legion to his succour, which, re-passing the Sambre, and climbing the slopes of Neuf-Mesnil, runs in haste to fall upon the rear of the Nervii.

On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed; and the cavalry, ⁽¹⁾ to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn; the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own *pila*. "How can we, then, be astonished," says Cæsar, "that such

(1) Except the Treviran cavalry, who had withdrawn.

men dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for their courage?" They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune of Cæsar had narrowly escaped wreck.

After this struggle, in which, according to the "Commentaries," the race and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no hopes of safety, surrendered. (¹) In dwelling on the misfortune of their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Cæsar, to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence. (²)

VIII. This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Cæsar detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones. He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the course of the Sambre, to meet the Adu-

Siege of the *Oppidum* of the Aduatuci

(¹) According to Titus Livius (*Epitome*, CIV.), 1,000 armed men succeeded in escaping

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, II. 28.

atuci, who, as we have seen above, were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.

As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii, they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and retired, with all they possessed, into one *oppidum*, remarkably fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated ⁽¹⁾ answers sufficiently to this description. (*See Plate 11.*)

(¹) According to the researches which have been carried on by the Commandant Locquessye in the country supposed to have been formerly occupied by the Aduatuci, two localities only, Mount Falhize and the part of the mountain of Namur on which the citadel is built, appear to agree with the site of the *oppidum* of the Aduatuci. But Mount Falhize is not surrounded with rocks on all sides, as the Latin text requires. The countervallation would have had a development of more than 15,000 feet, and it would have twice crossed the Meuse, which is difficult to admit. We therefore adopt, as the site of the *oppidum* of the Aduatuci, the citadel of Namur.

Another locality, Sautour, near Philippeville, would answer completely to Cæsar's description, but the compass of Sautour, which includes only three hectares, is too small to have contained 60,000 individuals. The site of the citadel of Namur is already in our eyes very small.

On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was surrounded by a counter-vallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of 15,000 feet, (¹) with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their *oppidum*. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine, placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive. But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace, demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession of their arms. Cæsar refused this condition, but declared that, if they surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed, like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms into the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained quiet.

(¹) We translate *quindecim milium* by 15,000 feet; the word *pedum*, employed in the preceding sentence, being understood in the text. When Cæsar intends to speak of *paces*, he almost always uses the word *passus*.

The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Cæsar ordered them to leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems most easy of access. Fires, prepared by Cæsar, soon announce the attack. The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were sold publicly to the number of 53,000. (¹)

IX. Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of September), Cæsar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome, the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings. (²)

These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the barbarian peoples so high an opin-

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, II. 33.

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, II. 35 — Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 20. — Cicero, *Epist. Famil.*, I. 9, 17, 18.

ion of the Roman power, that the nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Cæsar, offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities where Crassus had been making war. (¹) They were probably *échelonnés* in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and Angers.

X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius

Expedition of Galba
into the Valais.

Galba, with a part of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni (*peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper Valais*), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges, Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his legions

(¹) This passage has generally been wrongly interpreted. The text has, *Quæ civitates propinquæ his locis erant ubi bellum gesserat.* (*De Bello Gallico*, II. 35.) We must add the name of Crassus, overlooked by the copyists; for if Anjou and Touraine are near Brittany and Normandy, where Crassus had been fighting, they are very far from the Sambre and the Meuse, where Cæsar had carried the war.

in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (*Martigny*). This town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (*the Drance*). Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.

Several days had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (*gæsa*). The legionaries line the rampart, and retort. Having to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the points that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audac-

ity, were filling up the fosse and tearing down the palisades ; already the Romans were reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus, the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the missiles, and take breath ; then, when the signal is given, rushing on all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain. (¹) In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, III. 6.

CHAPTER VI.

(Year of Rome 698.)

(BOOK III. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

WAR OF THE VENETI—VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI—SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE—MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.

I. WHILE Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli, ⁽¹⁾ M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean. The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus.

(1) Some manuscripts read *Esuvios*, but we adopt *Unellos*, because the geographical position of the country of the Unelli agrees better with the relation of the campaign.

Their example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be restored.

Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great: they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast; they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.

Their determination once taken, they fortified their *oppida*, and transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed

by the river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (*See Plate 12.*) They allied themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Scheldt, ⁽¹⁾ and demanded succour from the isle of Britain. ⁽²⁾

In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter, possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean. ⁽³⁾

II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new ris-
ings, Cæsar divided his army so as to oc-
cupy the country militarily. The lieu-

War against the
Veneti.

⁽¹⁾ They leagued with the Osismi (*the people of the department of Finistère*), the Lexovii (*department of Calvados*), the Namnetes (*Loire-Inférieure*), the Ambiliates (*on the left bank of the Loire, to the south of Angers*), the Morini (*the Boulonnais and bishopric of Saint-Omer*), the Diablintes (*Western Manne*), and the Menapii (*between the Rhine and the mouths of the Scheldt*). (*De Bello Gallico*, III. 9.)

⁽²⁾ Orosius (VI. 8) confirms this fact as stated in the *Commentaries*.

⁽³⁾ "The Veneti fought at sea against Cæsar, they had made their dispositions to prevent his passage into the isle of Britain, because they were in possession of the commerce of that country." (Strabo, IV. iv., p. 162, edit. Didot.)

tenant T. Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri, with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli, the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus, ⁽¹⁾ who had arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys, ⁽²⁾ received the command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted. His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest of the land army.

The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against the Veneti. ⁽³⁾

We may admit that Cæsar started from the neigh-

⁽¹⁾ We must not confound him with M. Junius Brutus, the assassin of Cæsar. Decimus Junius Brutus was the adopted son of A. Postumius Albinus (See Drumann, IV. 9, and *Appendix D.*)

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 40.

⁽³⁾ We suppose, in this enumeration, that the legion of Galba, cantoned the preceding winter among the Allobroges, had rejoined the army.

bourhood of Nantes, and directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine. Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain possession of the principal *oppida* where the inhabitants took refuge. Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double obstacle to a siege.

The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for terraces (*aggere ac molibus*), and forming approaches towards the place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide; but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the *oppidum*, this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful in the attack. (¹)

With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded in taking several of these *oppida*. But all their labours were thrown away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they evacuated the *oppi-*

(¹) I borrow this interpretation of the Roman works from the very instructive book of General de Gœler.

dum, embarked with all their goods on board their numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring *oppida*, the situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.

The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner. Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (*See Plate 12.*)

The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen, they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides, and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.

The enemy's ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams (*transtra*), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen, or because they regarded the ordinary sails as

insufficient to support, with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their construction they resisted the ships' beaks, and by their elevation they were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the grappling-irons (*copulæ*). ⁽¹⁾

III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was at length enabled to set sail. ⁽²⁾ It quitted the Loire, and

Naval Combat
against the Veneti.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, III. 13 — Strabo, IV., p. 162.

⁽²⁾ The fleet of the Veneti, superior to that of the Romans in number, in the magnitude of their vessels, and in their rigging and sails, must have issued from the river Auray by the Morbihan entrance to the gulf, and met Brutus to fight him, instead of waiting for him at the head of the bay, where retreat would be impossible. This follows from Cæsar's account: *ex portu profectæ, nostris adversæ constitèrunt*. According to the memoir by M. le Comte de Grandpré, a post-captain, inserted in the *Recueil de la Société des Antiquaires de France*, tom II., 1820, the wind must have been east or north-east, for it was towards the end of the summer. It appears that these winds usually prevail at that period, and that, when they have blown during the morning, there is a dead calm towards the middle of the day: it is just what happened in this combat; the calm came, probably, towards midday. It was necessary, indeed, that the wind should be between the north and the east, to allow, on one hand, the Roman fleet to leave the Loire and sail towards the Point Saint-Jacques, and on the other, to permit the fleet of the Veneti to quit the river Auray. These latter, in this position, could, in case of defeat, take refuge in the Bay of Quiberon, or fly to the open sea, where the Romans would not have dared to follow them.

With winds blowing from below, it matters not from what point, the Romans could not have gone in search of their enemies, or the latter come to meet them. Supposing that, in one tide, the Roman fleet had arrived at the mouth of the Loire towards five o'clock in the morning, it might have been towards ten o'clock, the moment when the battle commenced, between Hædik and Sarzeau. Supposing similarly that, as early as five o'clock in the morning, the movement

directed its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (*See Plate 12.*) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped, which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean. Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy's poops, which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly, the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss, ⁽¹⁾ when, to remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy

of the Roman fleet had been announced to the Veneti, they could, in five hours, have issued from the river Auray, defied by the entrance of the Morbihan, rallied and advanced in order of battle to meet the Romans in the part of the sea above described.

As to the place where Cæsar encamped, it is very probable, as we have said, that it was on the heights of Saint-Gildas; for from thence he could see the dispositions of the enemy, and perceive far off the approach of his fleet. In case of check, the Roman galleys found, under his protection, a place of refuge in the Vilaine. Thus, he had his rear secured; rested upon the towns of the coast which he had taken; could recall to him, if necessary, Titurius Sabinus; and lastly, could cross the Vilaine, to place that river between him and his enemies. Placed, on the contrary, on the other side of the Bay of Quiberon, he would have been too much enclosed in an enemy's country, and would have had none of the advantages offered by the position of Saint-Gildas

(1) Dio Cassius, XXXIX 41.

with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in 492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks (*falces*) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses (*non absimili forma muralium falcium*).⁽¹⁾ The *falx* was an iron with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which, suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy's vessels. The Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the night.

The battle, which began at ten o'clock in the morn-

(1) We see, in fact, in Vegetius, that the word *falces* was applied to the head of a battering-ram, armed with a point, and with a hook to detach the stones from the walls "Quæ (trabes) aut adunco præfigitur ferro, et falx vocatur ab eo quod incurva est, ut de muro extrahat lapides" (Vegetius, IV. 14)

ing, had lasted till sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without the means of defending any longer their *oppida*, they surrendered themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.

Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the insurrection. ⁽¹⁾

IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus gained a
Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli. decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined, a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, III. 17.

parts of Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops. Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier. (¹) (*See Plate 13.*) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north, the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000 paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle, without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But, not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence

(¹) This position is at the distance of seven kilomètres to the east of Avranches. The vestiges still visible of Chastellier are probably those of a camp made at a later period than this Gallic war, but we think that Sabinus had established his camp on the same site.

of being a deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality, the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately submitted.

Cæsar and Sabinus received intelligence at the same time, one of the victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against the Veneti. (¹)

V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached,
Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus as we have seen, with twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which, according to the "Commentaries," formed the third part of Gaul. (²) He believed that he could

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, III. 19.

(²) Cæsar, after having said, in the first book of his "Commentaries," that

not display too much prudence in a country where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries, and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but, suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (*in convalle*), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the battle re-commenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans. Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the *oppidum* of the Sotiates (the town of *Sos*), attempted to carry it by assault; but the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers,

Aquitaine was one of the three parts of Gaul, states here that it formed the third part by its extent and population, which is not correct.

they made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation, Adiatunnus, ⁽¹⁾ supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty men of the class called *soldures*, attempted a sally from another side of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and, after a severe struggle, drove him back into the *oppidum*; nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an *oppidum* fortified by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council, which was of the same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the

⁽¹⁾ Nicholas of Damascus (in *Athenæus*, *Deypn.*, VI. 249) writes in this manner the name of King *Adiatomus*, and adds that the *solduri* were clothed in royal vestments.

camp and formed in two lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate, the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more easy. ⁽¹⁾ He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in

⁽¹⁾ This combat is remarkable as being the only one in the whole war in Gaul in which the Romans attack a fortified Gaulish camp.

the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus, redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight. The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp very late in the night.

At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of Aquitaine ⁽¹⁾ submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission. ⁽²⁾

VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in caverns ⁽³⁾ or under the tent. ⁽⁴⁾ Taught by the example of their neighbours, they avoided engaging in

March against the
Morini and the Me-
napii

⁽¹⁾ Of this number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Ptiani, the Vasates, the Tarusates, the Elusates, the Gaites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibusates, and the Cocosates.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, III. 27.

⁽³⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* III. x. 6.

⁽⁴⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 44.

pitched battles, and withdrew into the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to retire. (¹) He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently vanquished. (²)

VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively

Observations. against the peoples on the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already,

at that time, entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain, for he not only de-

(¹) Cæsar never entirely subjugated the north-west of Gaul. (See Sallust, cited by Ammianus Marcellinus, XV., 15.) Still, under the reign of Augustus, in 724 and 726, there were triumphs over the Morini.

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, III. 29.

stroys the only important fleet that could be brought against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the mouth of the Scheldt.

It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations, named *præfecti fabrorum*. They rendered him the most signal services. Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,⁽¹⁾ who prepared the material of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,⁽²⁾ who, in spite of the bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his genius during the wars in Gaul.

⁽¹⁾ "In prætura, in consulatu præfectum fabrum detulit" (Cicero, *Orat. pro Balbo*, 28.)

⁽²⁾ Mamurra, a Roman knight, born at Formiæ. (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, XXXVI. 7.)

CHAPTER VII.

(Year of Rome 699.)

(BOOK IV. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI—FIRST
PASSAGE OF THE RHINE—FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN—
CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.

I. THE Usipetes and the Tencteri, German peoples

Caesar's March
against the Usi-
petes and the
Tencteri.

driven out of their place by the Suevi, had wandered during three years in different countries of Germany, when, during the winter of 698 to 699, they resolved to pass the Rhine. They invaded the territory of the Menapii (established on the two banks), surprised them, massacred them, crossed the river not far from its mouth (towards Cleves⁽¹⁾ and Xanten) (*see Plate 14*), and,

(¹) From Xanten to Nimeguen, for a length of fifty kilomètres, extends a line of heights which form a barrier along the left bank of the Rhine. All appearances would lead us to believe that the river flowed, in Caesar's time, close at the foot of these heights; but now it has removed from them, and at Emmerich, for instance, is at a distance of eight kilomètres. This chain, the eastern slope of which is scarped, presents only two passes. one by a large opening at Xanten itself, to the north of the mountain called the Furstenberg; the other by a gorge of easy access, opening at Qualburg, near Cleves. These two passes were so well defined as the entries to Gaul in these regions, that, after the conquest, the Romans closed them by fortifying the Furstenberg (*Castra vetera*), and founding, on the two islands formed by the Rhine opposite these enties, *Colonia Trajana*, now Xanten, and *Quadriburgium*, now Qualburg. The existence of these isles facilitated at that time the passage of the Rhine, and, in all probability, it was opposite these two localities just named that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the river to penetrate into Gaul

after taking possession of the whole country, lived the rest of the winter on the provisions they found there.

Cæsar saw the necessity of being on his guard against the impression which this invasion would produce on the minds of the Gauls. It was to be feared they would be tempted to revolt, with the assistance of the Germans who had just crossed the Rhine.

To meet this danger, Cæsar crossed the mountains earlier than usual (*maturius quam consuerat*), and joined the army in the countries of the Auleri and the Lexovii, between the Loire and the Seine, where it had wintered. His apprehensions were but too well founded. Several peoples of Gaul had invited the Germans to leave the banks of the Rhine and penetrate farther into the interior. Eager to respond to this appeal, the latter soon spread themselves far over the country, and already some of them had arrived at the countries of the Eburones and the Condrusi, the latter clients of the Treviri. On receiving news of this, Cæsar called together the Gaulish chiefs who had invited the Germans, feigned ignorance of their conduct, addressed kind words to them, obtained cavalry from them, and, after securing his provisions, began his march against this new irruption of barbarians. He foresaw a formidable war, for the number of the Teneteri and Usipetes amounted to no less than 430,000 individuals—men, women, and children. If we admit that among these peoples the proportion of the number of men capable of bearing arms was the same as in the emigration of the Helvetii, that is, one-fourth of the total population, we see that the

Romans had to combat more than 100,000 enemies. ⁽¹⁾

Without knowing exactly the road taken by Cæsar, we may suppose that he promptly concentrated his army on the lower Seine to carry it towards the north, at Amiens, where he had convoked the Gaulish chiefs who had sought the support of the Germans. He followed, from Amiens, the road which passes by Cambrai, Bavay, Charleroy, Tongres, and Maestricht, where he crossed the Meuse. (*See Plate 14.*) He was only a few days' march from the Germans, when deputies came to propose, in rather haughty language, an arrangement:—"Driven from their country, they have not taken the initiative in the war; but they

⁽¹⁾ The account of this campaign is very obscure in the "Commentaries." Florus and Dio Cassius add to the obscurities: the first, by placing the scene of the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri towards the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, the second, by writing that Cæsar came up with the Germans in the country of the Treviri. Several authors have given to the account of these two historians more credit than to that of Cæsar himself, and they give of this campaign an explanation quite different from ours. General de Gœler, among others, supposes that the whole emigration of the Germans had advanced as far as the country of the Condrusi, where Cæsar came up with them, and that he had driven them from west to east, into the angle formed by the Moselle and the Rhine. From researches which were kindly undertaken by M. de Cohausen, major in the Prussian army, and which have given the same result as those of MM. Stoffel and De Locqueyssie, we consider this explanation of the campaign as inadmissible. It would be enough, to justify this assertion, to consider that the country situated between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the south of Aix-la-Chapelle, is too much broken and too barren to have allowed the German emigration, composed of 430,000 individuals, men, women, and children, with wagons, to move and subsist in it. Moreover, it contains no trace of ancient roads, and if Cæsar had taken this direction, he must necessarily have crossed the forest of the Ardennes, a circumstance of which he would not have failed to inform us. Besides, is it not more probable that, on the news of the approach of Cæsar, instead of directing their march towards the Ubii, who were not favourable to them, the Germans, at first spread over a vast territory, would have concentrated themselves towards the most distant part of the fertile country on which they had seized—that of the Menapii?

will not seek to avoid it. The Germans have learnt from their ancestors, whoever may be the aggressor, to have recourse to arms, and never to prayers. They may be useful allies to the Romans, if lands are given to them, or if they are allowed to retain those they have conquered. Moreover, with the exception of the Suevi, to whom the gods themselves are not equal, they know no people capable of resisting them." Cæsar imposed upon them, as a first condition, to quit Gaul; observing, "Those who have not been able to defend their own lands, have no right to claim the lands of others;" and he offered them a settlement among the Ubii, who were imploring his support against the Suevi. The deputies promised to bring an answer to this proposal in three days; meanwhile, they begged him to suspend his march. Cæsar considered that this demand was only a subterfuge to gain time to recall the cavalry, which had been sent a few days before to collect plunder and provisions among the Ambivariti,⁽¹⁾ beyond the Meuse. He rejected their proposal, and continued his advance.

At the appointed time, Cæsar, having passed the locality where Venloo now stands, was no longer more than twelve miles from the enemy; and the deputies returned as they had promised. They met the army in march, and earnestly entreated it should go no farther. When they found they could not prevail, they begged at least that the cavalry, which formed the vanguard, should not engage in action, and that they should be allowed a delay of three

(1) The Ambivariti were established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the west of Ruremonde, and to the south of the marshes of Peel.

days, in order to send deputies to the Ubii; if the latter bound themselves by oath to receive them, they would accept Cæsar's conditions. The latter was not the dupe of this new stratagem, yet he promised them to advance that day no more than four miles, for the purpose of finding water. He invited them, further, to send a more numerous deputation next day. His cavalry received the order not to provoke a combat, but to confine itself, in case of being attacked, to remaining firm, and await the arrival of the legions.

When they learnt that Cæsar was approaching the Meuse and the Rhine, the Usipetes and Tencteri had concentrated their forces towards the confluence of those two rivers, in the most remote part of the country of the Menapii, and had established themselves on the river Niers, in the plains of Goch. Cæsar, on his side, after leaving Venloo, had borne to the right to march to the encounter of the enemy. Since, to the north of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other water-course but the Niers, he was evidently obliged to advance to that river to find water: he was four miles from it when he met, at Straelen, the German deputation.

The vanguard, consisting of 5,000 cavalry, marched without distrust, reckoning on the truce which had been concluded. Suddenly, 800 horsemen (all at the disposal of the Germans, since the greater part of their cavalry had passed the Meuse) appeared bearing down upon Cæsar's cavalry from the greatest distance at which they could be seen. In an instant the ranks of the latter are thrown into disorder. They have succeeded in forming again, when the German horse-

men, according to their custom, spring to the ground, stab the horses in the bellies, and overthrow their riders, who fly in terror till they come in sight of the legions. Seventy-four of the cavalry perished, among whom was the Aquitanian Piso, a man of high birth and great courage, whose grandfather had wielded the sovereign power in his country, and had obtained from the Senate the title of "Friend." His brother, in the attempt to save him, shared his fate.

This attack was a flagrant violation of the truce, and Cæsar resolved to enter into no further negotiation with so faithless an enemy. Struck with the impression produced by this single combat on the fickle minds of the Gauls, he was unwilling to leave them time for reflection, but decided on delaying battle no longer; besides, it would have been folly to give the Germans leisure to wait the return of their cavalry. Next morning their chiefs came to the camp in great numbers, to offer their justification for the previous day's attack in defiance of the convention, but their real object was to obtain by deception a prolongation of the truce. Cæsar, satisfied at seeing them deliver themselves into his power of their own accord, judged right to make use of reprisals, and ordered them to be arrested. The Roman army, then encamped on the Niers, was only eight miles distant from the Germans. (¹)

II. Cæsar drew all the troops out of his camp, formed the infantry in three lines, (²) and placed the

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, IV 13.

(²) "*Acie triplici instituta.*" Some authors have translated these words by

Rout of the Usipetes
and the Tencteri

cavalry, still intimidated by the late combat, in the rear guard. After marching rapidly over the short distance which separated him from the Germans, he came upon them totally unexpected. Struck with terror at the sudden appearance of the army, and disconcerted by the absence of their chiefs, they had the time neither to deliberate nor to take their arms, and hesitated for a moment between flight and resistance. (¹) While their cries and disorder announce their terror, the Romans, provoked by their perfidious conduct on the previous day, rush upon the camp. As many of the Germans as are quick enough to gain their arms attempt to defend themselves, and combat among the baggage and wagons. But the women and children fly on every side. Cæsar sends the cavalry to pursue them. As soon as the barbarians, who still resisted, hear behind them the cries of the fugitives, and see the massacre of their companions, they throw down their arms, abandon their ensigns, and rush headlong out of the camp. They only cease their flight when they reach the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, where some are massacred and others are swallowed up in the river. (²) This victory, which did not cost the Romans

“the army was formed in three columns;” but Cæsar, operating in a country which was totally uncovered and flat, and aiming at surprising a great mass of enemies, must have marched in order of battle, which did not prevent each cohort from being in column.

(¹) Attacked unexpectedly in the afternoon, while they were sleeping. (Dio Cassius, XXXIX 48.)

(²) The study of the deserted beds of the Rhine leads us to believe that the confluence of the Waal and the Meuse, which is at present near Gorkum, was then much more to the east, towards Fort Saint-André. In that case, Cæsar made no mistake in reckoning eighty miles from the junction of the Waal and the Meuse to the mouth of the latter river.

a single man, delivered them from a formidable war. Cæsar restored their liberty to the chiefs he had retained; but they, fearing the vengeance of the Gauls, whose lands they had ravaged, preferred remaining with him. ⁽¹⁾

III. After so brilliant a success, Cæsar, to secure the results, considered it a measure of importance to cross the Rhine, and so seek the Germans in their homes. For this purpose, he must choose the point of passage where the right bank was inhabited by a friendly people, the Ubii. The study of this and the following campaigns leads us to believe that this was Bonn. ⁽²⁾ From the field

First Passage of the Rhine

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 14, 15

⁽²⁾ The following reasons have led us to adopt Bonn as the point where Cæsar crossed the Rhine:—

We learn from the “Commentaries” that in 699 he debouched in the country of the Ubi, and that two years later it was a little above (*paulum supra*) the first bridge that he established another, which joined the territory of the Treviri with that of the Ubii. Now everything leads to the belief that, in the first passage as in the second, the bridge was thrown across between the frontiers of the same peoples; for we cannot admit, with some authors, that the words *paulum supra* apply to a distance of several leagues. As to those who suppose that the passage was effected at Andernach, because, changing with Florus the Meuse (*Mosa*) into Moselle, they place the scene of the defeat of the Germans at the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, we have given the reasons for rejecting this opinion. We have endeavoured to prove, in fact, that the battle against the Usipetes and the Tencteri had for its theatre the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine; and since, in crossing this latter river, Cæsar passed from the country of the Treviri into that of the Ubii, we must perceive that after his victory he must necessarily have proceeded up the valley of the Rhine to go from the territory of the Menapii to the Treviri, as far up as the territory of the Ubii, established on the right bank.

This being admitted, it remains to fix, within the limits assigned to these two last peoples, the most probable point of passage. Hitherto, Cologne has been adopted; but, to answer to the data of the “Commentaries,” Cologne appears to us to be much too far to the north. In fact, in the campaign of 701, Cæsar, having started from the banks of the Rhine, traversed the forest of the

of battle, then, he proceeded up the valley of the Rhine; he followed a direction indicated by the following localities: Gueldres, Crefeld, Neuss, Cologne, and Bonn. (*See Plate 14.*) Above all, it was Cæsar's intention to put a stop to the rage of the Germans for invading Gaul, to inspire them with fears for their own safety, and to prove to them that the Roman army dared and could cross a great river. He had, moreover, a plausible motive for penetrating into Germany—the refusal of the Sicambri to deliver up to him the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them after the battle. The Sicambri had replied to his demand, that the empire of the Roman people ended with the Rhine, Aïdennes from east to west, passed near the Segni and the Condrusi, since they implored him to spare their territory, and directed his march upon Tongres. If he had started from Cologne, he would not have crossed the countries in question. Moreover, in this same year, 2,000 Sicambrian cavalry crossed the Rhine thirty miles below the bridge of the Roman army. Now, if this bridge had been constructed at Cologne, the point of passage of the Sicambri, thirty miles below, would have been at a very great distance from Tongres, where, nevertheless, they seem to have arrived very quickly.

On the contrary, everything is explained if we adopt Bonn as the point of passage. To go from Bonn to Tongres, Cæsar proceeded, as the text has it, across the forest of the Aïdennes; he passed through the country of the Segni and Condrusi, or very near them; and the Sicambri, crossing the Rhine thirty miles below Bonn, took the shortest line from the Rhine to Tongres. Moreover, we cannot place Cæsar's point of passage either lower or higher than Bonn. Lower, that is, towards the north, the different incidents related in the "Commentaries" are without possible application to the theatre of the events: higher, towards the south, the Rhine flows upon a rocky bed, where the piles could not have been driven in, and presents, between the mountains which border it, no favourable point of passage. We may add that Cæsar would have been much too far removed from the country of the Sicambri, the chastisement of whom was the avowed motive of his expedition.

Another fact deserves to be taken into consideration. that, less than fifty years after Cæsar's campaigns, Drusus, in order to proceed against the Sicambri—that is, against the same people whom Cæsar intended to combat—crossed the Rhine at Bonn. (*Florus, IV. 12.*)

and that beyond it Cæsar had no further claims. At the same time, the Ubii, who alone of the peoples beyond the Rhine had sought his alliance, claimed his protection against the Suevi, who were threatening them more seriously than ever. It would be a sufficient guarantee for their safety, they said, to show himself on the right bank of the Rhine, so great was the renown of the Roman army among even the most remote of the German nations, since the defeat of Ariovistus and the recent victory; and they offered him boats for passing the river. Cæsar declined this offer. It did not appear to him worthy of the dignity of himself or of the Roman people to have recourse to barbarians, and he judged it unsafe to transport the army in boats. Therefore, in spite of the obstacles presented by a wide, deep, and rapid river, he decided on throwing a bridge across it.

It was the first time that a regular army attempted to cross the Rhine. The bridge was constructed in the following manner. (*See Plate 15.*) Two trees (probably in their rough state), a foot and a half in thickness, cut to a point at one of their extremities, and of a length proportionate to the depth of the river, were bound together with cross-beams at intervals of two feet from each other; let down into the water, and stuck into the ground by means of machines placed in boats coupled together, they were driven in by blows of a rammer, not vertically, like ordinary piles, but obliquely, giving them an inclination in the direction of the current. Opposite them, and at a distance of forty feet below, another couple of piles were placed, arranged in the same manner, but inclined in

a contrary direction, in order to resist the violence of the river. In the interval left between the two piles of each couple, a great beam was lodged, called the *head-piece*, of two feet square; these two couples (*hæc utraque*) were bound together on each side, beginning from the upper extremity, by two wooden ties (*fibulæ*), so that they could neither draw from nor towards each other, and presented, according to the "Commentaries," a whole of a solidity so great, that the force of the water, so far from injuring it, bound all its parts tighter together. ⁽¹⁾ This system formed one row of piles of the bridge; and as many of them were established as were required by the breadth of the river. The Rhine at Bonn being about 430 mètres wide, the bridge must have been composed of fifty-six arches, supposing each of these to have been twenty-six Roman feet in length (7·70 mètres). Consequently, there were fifty-four rows of piles. The floor was formed of planks reaching from one head-piece to the other, on which were placed transversely smaller planks, which were covered with hurdles. Besides this, they drove in obliquely, below each row of piles, a pile which, placed in form of a buttress (*quæ pro ariete subjectæ*), and bound in with it, increased the resist-

⁽¹⁾ The following passage has given room for different interpretations.—

"Hæc utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum junctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur, quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem ievinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura, ut, quo major vis aquæ se incitavisset, hoc auctius illicata tenerentur." (*De Bello Gallico*, IV. 17.)

It has not been hitherto observed that the words *hæc utraque* relate to the two couples of one row of piles, and not to the two piles of the same couple. Moreover, the words *quibus disclusis*, &c., relate to these same two couples, and not, as has been supposed, to *fibulæ*.

ance to the current. Other piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above the rows of piles, so as to form stockades, intended to stop trunks of trees and boats which the barbarians might have thrown down in order to break the bridge.

These works were completed in ten days, including the time employed for the transport of the materials. Cæsar crossed the river with his army, left a strong guard at each extremity of the bridge, and marched towards the territory of the Sicambri, proceeding, no doubt, up the valley of the Sieg and the Agger. (*See Plate 14.*) During his march, deputies from different peoples came to solicit his alliance. He gave them a friendly reception, and exacted hostages. As to the Sicambri, at the beginning of the erection of the bridge, they had fled to the deserts and forests, terrified by the reports of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them.

Cæsar remained only eighteen days beyond the Rhine. During this time he ravaged the territory of the Sicambri, returned to that of the Ubii, and promised them succour if they were attacked by the Suevi. The latter having withdrawn to the centre of their country, he renounced the prospect of combating them, and considered that he had thus accomplished his design.

It is evident, from what precedes, that Cæsar's aim was not to make the conquest of Germany, but to strike a great blow which should disgust the barbarians with their frequent excursions across the Rhine. No doubt he hoped to meet with the Suevi, and give them battle; but learning that they had assembled at

a great distance from the Rhine, he thought it more prudent not to venture into an unknown country covered with forests, but returned into Gaul, and caused the bridge to be broken.

It was not enough for Cæsar to have intimidated the Germans; he formed a still bolder project, that of crossing the sea, to go and demand a reckoning of the Britons for the succour which, in almost all his wars, and particularly in that of the Veneti, they had sent to the Gauls. (¹)

IV. The Romans had but imperfect information relating to Britain, which they owed to certain Greek writers, such as Pytheas of Marseilles, who had visited the Northern Sea in the fourth century before our era, and Timæus of Tauro-menium. The Gauls who visited Britain for the sake of traffic, knew hardly more than the southern and south-eastern coasts. Nevertheless, a short time before the arrival of the Romans, one of the populations of Belgic Gaul, the Suessiones, then governed by Divitiacus, had extended their domination into this island. (²)

It was only after having landed in Britain that Cæsar was able to form a tolerably exact idea of its form and extent. "Britain," he says, "has the form of a triangle, the base of which, about 500 miles in extent, faces Gaul. The side which faces Spain, that is, the west, presents a length of about 700 miles. In this direction the island is separated from Hibernia (*Ireland*) by an arm of the sea, the breadth of which

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 20.

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, II 4.

is apparently the same as the arm of the sea which separates Britain from Gaul; and he adds that "the surface of Hibernia represents about one half the surface of Britain. The third part of the triangle formed by this latter island is eastward turned to the north, and 800 miles long; it faces no land; only one of the angles of this side looks towards Germany." ⁽¹⁾ These imperfect estimates, which were to give place in the following century to others less inaccurate, ⁽²⁾ led the great captain to ascribe to the whole of Britain twenty times 100,000 paces in circuit. He further gathered some information still more vague on the small islands in the vicinity of Britain. "One of them," he writes, "is called Mona (*the Isle of Man*), and is situated in the middle of the strait which separates Britain from Hibernia." The Hebrides, the Shetland islands (*Acmodæ* of the ancients), and the Orcades, which were only known to the Romans at the commencement of our era, ⁽³⁾ were confounded, in the minds of Cæsar and his contemporaries, with the archipelago of the Feroe isles and Scandinavia. Caledonia (*Scotland*) appeared only in an obscure distance.

Cæsar represents the climate of Britain as less cold and more temperate than that of Gaul. With the exception of the beech (*fagus*) and the fir (*abies*), the same timbers were found in the forests of this island as on the neighbouring continent. ⁽⁴⁾ They grew wheat there, and bred numerous herds of cattle. ⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 13.

⁽²⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, IV. 30, § 16.

⁽³⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, IV. 30, § 16.—Tacitus, *Agricola*, 10.

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 12

⁽⁵⁾ Strabo, IV., p. 199.

“The soil, if it is not favourable to the culture of the olive, the vine, and other products of warm climates,” writes Tacitus, (¹) “produces in their place grain and fruits in abundance. Although they grow quickly, they are slow in ripening.”

Britain contained a numerous population. The interior was inhabited by peoples who believed themselves to be *autochthones*, and the southern and eastern coasts by a race who had emigrated from Belgic Gaul, and crossed the Channel and the Northern Sea, attracted by the prospect of plunder. After having made war on the natives, they had established themselves in the island, and became agriculturalists. (²) Cæsar adds that nearly all these tribes which had come from the continent had preserved the names of the *civitates* from whence they had issued. And, in fact, among the peoples of Britain named by geographers in the ages subsequent to the conquest of Gaul, we meet, on the banks of the Thames and the Severn, with the names of Belgæ and Atrebates.

The most powerful of the populations of Belgic origin were found in Cantium (*Kent*), which was placed, by its commercial relations, in more habitual intercourse with Gaul. (³) The “Commentaries” mention only a small number of British nations. These are the Trinobantes (the people of *Essex* and *Middlesex*), who proved the most faithful to the Romans, (⁴) and whose principal *oppidum* was probably already, in the time of Cæsar, Londinium (*London*), mentioned

(¹) *Agricola*, 12.

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 12.

(³) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 13 and 14.

(⁴) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 20.

by Tacitus; ⁽¹⁾ the Cenimagni ⁽²⁾ (*Suffolk*, to the north of the Trinobantes); the Segontiaci (the greater part of *Hampshire* and *Berkshire*, southern counties); the Bibroci (inhabiting a region then thickly wooded, over which extended the celebrated forest of Anderida); ⁽³⁾ their territory comprised a small part of *Hampshire* and *Berkshire*, and embraced the counties of *Surrey* and *Sussex* and the most western part of *Kent*; the Ancalites (a more uncertain position, in the north of *Berkshire* and the western part of *Mid-dlesex*); the Cassii (*Hertfordshire* and *Bedfordshire*, central counties). Each of these little nations was governed by a chieftain or king. ⁽⁴⁾

The Belgæ of Britain possessed the same manners as the Gauls, but their social condition was less advanced. Strabo ⁽⁵⁾ gives this proof, that, having milk in abundance, the Britons did not know how to make cheese, an art, on the contrary, carried to great perfection in certain parts of Gaul. The national character of the two populations, British and Gaulish, presented a great analogy:—"The same boldness in seeking danger, the same eagerness to fly from it when it is before them," writes Tacitus; "although the courage of the Britons has more of pride in it." ⁽⁶⁾ This resemblance of the two races showed itself also in their exterior forms. Yet, according to Strabo, the

⁽¹⁾ *Annales*, XIV 33

⁽²⁾ Although the greater number of manuscripts read *Ceninagni*, some authors have made two names of it, the *Iceni* and the *Cangi*.

⁽³⁾ The *Anderida Silva*, 120 miles in length by 30 in breadth, extended over the counties of *Sussex* and *Kent*, in what is now called the *Weald* (See Camden, *Britannia*, edit. Gibson, I., col. 151, 195, 258, edit. of 1753)

⁽⁴⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V. 21.—Tacitus, *Agricola*, 12.

⁽⁵⁾ IV., p. 200.

⁽⁶⁾ *Agricola*, 11.

stature of the Britons was taller than that of the Gauls, and their hair was less red. Their dwellings were but wretched huts made of stubble and wood; ⁽¹⁾ they stored up their wheat in subterranean repositories; their *oppida* were situated in the middle of forests, defended by a rampart and a fosse, and served for places of refuge in case of attack. ⁽²⁾

The tribes of the interior of the island lived in a state of greater barbarism than those of the maritime districts. Clothed in the skins of animals, they fed upon milk and flesh. ⁽³⁾ Strabo even represents them as cannibals; and assures us that the custom existed among them of eating the bodies of their dead relatives. ⁽⁴⁾ The men wore their hair very long, and a moustache; they rubbed their skin with woad, which gave them a blue colour, and rendered their aspect as combatants singularly hideous. ⁽⁵⁾ The women also coloured themselves in the same manner for certain religious ceremonies, in which they appeared naked. ⁽⁶⁾ Such was the barbarism of the Britons of the interior, that the women were sometimes common to ten or twelve men, a promiscuousness which was especially customary amongst the nearest relatives. As to the children who were born of these incestuous unions, they were considered to belong to the first who had received into his house the mother while still a girl. ⁽⁷⁾ The Britons of the Cape Belerium (*Cornwall*) were very hospitable, and the trade they

⁽¹⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V. 21.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 14.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 14.

⁽⁷⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 14

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 21

⁽⁴⁾ Strabo, IV, p 200.

⁽⁶⁾ Pliny, *Hist Nat.*, XXII. 1.

carried on with foreign merchants had softened their manners. ⁽¹⁾

The abundance of metals in Britain, especially of tin, or *plumbum album*, which the Phœnicians went to seek there from a very remote antiquity, ⁽²⁾ furnished the inhabitants with numerous means of exchange. At all events, they were not acquainted with money, and only made use of pieces of copper, gold, or iron, the value of which was determined by weighing. They did not know how to make bronze, but received it from abroad. ⁽³⁾

The religion of the Britons, on which Cæsar gives us no information, must have differed little from that of the Gauls, since Druidism passed for having been imported from Britain into Gaul. ⁽⁴⁾ Tacitus, in fact, tells us that the same worship and the same superstitions were found in Britain as among the Gauls. ⁽⁵⁾ Strabo speaks, on the authority of Artemidorus, of an island neighbouring to Britain, where they celebrated, in honour of two divinities, assimilated by the latter to Ceres and Proserpine, rites which resembled those of the mysteries of Samothrace. ⁽⁶⁾ Under the influence of certain superstitious ideas, the Britons abstained from the flesh of several animals, such as the hare, the hen, and the goose. which, nevertheless, they domesticated as ornamental objects. ⁽⁷⁾

The Britons, though living in an island, appear to have possessed no shipping in the time of Cæsar.

⁽¹⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V 22.

⁽²⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V 22 — Strabo, IV., p 200.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 12.

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI 13.

⁽⁵⁾ *Agricola*, 11.

⁽⁶⁾ Strabo, IV., p. 199.

⁽⁷⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 12.

They were foreign ships which came to the neighbourhood of Cape Belerium to fetch the tin, which the inhabitants worked with as much skill as profit. ⁽¹⁾ About a century after Cæsar, the boats of the Britons were still only frames of wicker-work covered with leather. ⁽²⁾ The inhabitants of Britain were less ignorant in the art of war than in that of navigation. Protected by small bucklers, ⁽³⁾ and armed with long swords, which they handled with skill, but which became useless in close combat, they never combated in masses: they advanced in small detachments, which supported each other reciprocally. ⁽⁴⁾ Their principal force was in their infantry; ⁽⁵⁾ yet they employed a great number of war-chariots armed with scythes. ⁽⁶⁾ They began by driving about rapidly on all sides, and hurling darts, seeking thus to spread disorder in the enemy's ranks by the mere terror caused by the impetuosity of the horses and the noise of the wheels; then they returned into the intervals of their cavalry, leaped to the ground, and fought on foot mixed with the horsemen. During this time the drivers withdrew gradually from the scene of action, and posted themselves with the chariots so as to be ready in case of need to receive the combatants. ⁽⁷⁾ The Britons thus united the movableness of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry; daily exercise had made them

⁽¹⁾ Diodorus Siculus, V. 22.

⁽²⁾ Pliny, *Hist Nat*, IV. 30, § 16.

⁽³⁾ Tacitus, *Agricola*, 36.

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 16

⁽⁵⁾ Tacitus, *Agricola*, 12.

⁽⁶⁾ Frontinus, *Stratagem.*, II. 3, 18.—Diodorus Siculus, V. 21.—Strabo, IV., p. 200.

⁽⁷⁾ The account on page 213 confirms this interpretation, which is conformable to that of General Gœler.

so dexterous that they maintained their horses at full speed on steep slopes, drew them in or turned them at will, ran upon the shaft, held under the yoke, and thence threw themselves rapidly into their chariots. ⁽¹⁾ In war they used their dogs as auxiliaries, which the Gauls procured from Britain for the same purpose. These dogs were excellent for the chase. ⁽²⁾

In short, the Britons were less civilised than the Gauls. If we except the art of working certain metals, their manufactures were limited to the fabrication of the coarsest and most indispensable objects; and it was from Gaul they obtained collars, vessels of amber and glass, and ornaments of ivory for the bridles of their horses. ⁽³⁾

It was known also that pearls were in the Scottish sea, and people easily believed that it concealed immense treasures.

These details relating to Britain were not collected until after the Roman expeditions, for that country was previously the subject of the most mysterious tales; and when Cæsar resolved on its conquest, this bold enterprise excited people's minds to the highest degree by the ever-powerful charm of the unknown. As to him, in crossing the Channel, he obeyed the same thought which had carried him across the Rhine: he wished to give the barbarians a high notion of Roman greatness, and prevent them from lending support to the insurrections in Gaul.

V. Although the summer approached its end, the

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 32 and 33.

⁽²⁾ Strabo, IV, p. 200.

⁽³⁾ Strabo, IV., p. 201.

First Expedition to
Britain

difficulties of a descent upon Britain did not stop him. Even supposing, indeed, that the season should not permit him to obtain any decisive result by the expedition, he looked upon it as an advantage to gain a footing in that island, and to make himself acquainted with the locality, and with the ports and points for disembarking. None of the persons whom he examined could or would give him any information, either on the extent of the country, or on the number and manners of its inhabitants, or on their manner of making war, or on the ports capable of receiving a large fleet.

Desirous of obtaining some light on these different points before attempting the expedition, Cæsar sent C. Volusenus, in a galley, with orders to explore everything, and return as quickly as possible with the result of his observations. He proceeded in person with his army into the country of the Morini, from whence the passage into Britain was shortest. There was on that coast a port favourably situated for fitting out an expedition against this island, the *Portus Itius*, or, as we shall endeavour to prove farther on, the port of Boulogne. The ships of all the neighbouring regions, and the fleet constructed in the previous year for the war against the Veneti, were collected there.

The news of his project having been carried into Britain by the merchants, the deputies of several nations in the island came with offers of submission. Cæsar received them with kindness; and on their return he sent with them Commius, whom he had previously made king of the Atrebates. This man, whose courage, prudence, and devotion he appreciated, en-

joyed great credit among the Britons. He directed him to visit the greatest possible number of tribes, to keep them in good feelings, and to announce his speedy arrival.

While Cæsar remained among the Morini, waiting the completion of the preparations for his expedition, he received a deputation which came in the name of a great part of the inhabitants to justify their past conduct. He accepted their explanations readily, unwilling to leave enemies behind him. Moreover, the season was too far advanced to allow of combating the Morini, and their entire subjection was not a matter of sufficient importance to divert him from his enterprise against Britain: he was satisfied with exacting numerous hostages. Meanwhile Volusenus returned, at the end of five days, to report the result of his mission: as he had not ventured to land, he had only performed it imperfectly.

The forces destined for the expedition consisted of two legions, the 7th and the 10th, commanded probably by Galba and Labienus, and of a detachment of cavalry, which made about 12,000 legionaries and 450 horses.

Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta received the command of the troops left on the continent to occupy the territory of the Menapii and that of the country of the Morini which had not submitted. The lieutenant P. Sulpicius Rufus was charged with the guard of the port with a sufficient force.

They had succeeded in collecting eighty transport ships, judged capable of containing the two legions of the expedition, with all their baggage, and a cer-

tain number of galleys, which were distributed among the quæstor, the lieutenants, and the prefects. Eighteen other vessels, destined for the cavalry, were detained by contrary winds in a little port (that of *Ambleteuse*) situated eight miles to the north of Boulogne. ⁽¹⁾ (*See Plate 16.*)

Having made these dispositions, Cæsar, taking advantage of a favourable wind, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August (we shall endeavour to justify this date farther on), towards midnight, after giving orders to the cavalry to proceed to the port above (*Ambleteuse*); he reached the coast of Britain at the fourth hour of the day (ten o'clock in the forenoon), opposite the cliffs of Dover. The cavalry, which had embarked but slowly, had not been able to join him.

From his ship Cæsar perceived the cliffs covered with armed men. At this spot the sea was so close to these cliffs that a dart thrown from the heights could reach the beach. ⁽²⁾ The place appeared to him

⁽¹⁾ From what will be seen further on, each transport ship, on its return, contained 150 men. Eighty ships could thus transport 12,000 men, but since, reduced to sixty-eight, they were enough to carry back the whole army to the continent, they can only have carried 10,200 men, which was probably the effective force of the two legions. The eighteen ships appropriated to the cavalry might transport 450 horses, at the rate of twenty-five horses each ship.

⁽²⁾ The port of Dover extended formerly from the site of the present town, between the cliffs which border the valley of the Dour or of Charlton. (*See Plate 17.*) Indeed, from the facts furnished by ancient authors, and a geological examination of the ground, it appears certain that once the sea penetrated into the land, and formed a creek which occupied nearly the whole of the valley of Charlton. The words of Cæsar are thus justified: "Cujus loci hæc erat natura, atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in littus telum adjici posset." (IV. 23.)

The proofs of the above assertion result from several facts related in different notices on the town of Dover. It is there said that in 1784 Sir Thomas

in no respect convenient for landing. This description agrees with that which Q. Cicero gave to his brother, of "coasts surmounted by immense rocks." ⁽¹⁾ (*See Plate 17.*) Cæsar cast anchor, and waited in vain until the fifth hour (half-past three) (see the Concordance of Hours, *Appendix B*), for the arrival of the vessels which were delayed. In the interval, he called together his lieutenants and the tribunes of the soldiers, communicated to them his plans as well as the information brought by Volusenus, and urged upon them the instantaneous execution of his orders on a simple sign, as maritime war required, in which the manœuvres must be as rapid as they are varied. It is probable that Cæsar had till then kept secret the point of landing.

When he had dismissed them, towards half-past three o'clock, the wind and tide having become favourable at the same time, he gave the signal for rais-

Hyde Page caused a shaft to be sunk at a hundred yards from the shore, to ascertain the depth of the basin at a remote period; it proved that the ancient bed of the sea had been formerly thirty English feet below the present level of the high tide. In 1826, in sinking a well at a place called *Dolphin Lane*, they found, at a depth of twenty-one feet, a bed of mud resembling that of the present port, mixed with the bones of animals and fragments of leaves and roots. Similar detritus have been discovered in several parts of the valley. An ancient chronicler, named Darell, relates that "Wilbred, King of Kent, built in 700 the church of St Martin, the ruins of which are still visible near the market-place, on the spot where formerly ships cast anchor."

The town built under the Emperors Adrian and Septimus Severus occupied a part of the port, which had already been covered with sand, yet the sea still entered a considerable distance inland. (*See Plate 17.*)

It would appear to have been about the year 950 that the old port was entirely blocked up with the maritime and fluvial alluvium which have been increasing till our day, and which at different periods have rendered it necessary to construct the dykes and quays which have given the port its present form.

⁽¹⁾ "Constat enim aditus insulæ esse munitos mirificis molibus." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 16.)

ing their anchors, and, after proceeding about seven miles to the east, as far as the extremity of the cliffs, and having, according to Dio Cassius, doubled a lofty promontory, ⁽¹⁾ the point of the South Foreland (*see Plate 16*), he stopped before the open and level shore which extends from the castle of Walmer to Deal.

From the heights of Dover it was easy for the Britons to trace the movement of the fleet; guessing that it was making for the point where the cliffs ended, they hastened thither, preceded by their cavalry and their chariots, which they used constantly in their battles. They arrived in time to oppose the landing, which had to be risked under the most difficult circumstances. The ships, on account of their magnitude, could only cast anchor in the deep water; the soldiers, on an unknown coast, with their hands embarrassed, their bodies loaded with the weight of their arms, were obliged to throw themselves into the waves, find a footing, and combat. The enemy, on the contrary, with the free use of their limbs, acquainted with the ground, and posted on the edge of the water, or a little way in advance in the sea, threw their missiles with confidence, and pushed forward their docile and well-disciplined horses into the midst of the waves. Thus the Romans, disconcerted by this concurrence of unforeseen circumstances, and strangers to this kind of combat, did not carry to it their usual ardour and zeal.

In this situation, Cæsar detached from the line of transport ships the galleys — lighter ships, and of a form which was new to the barbarians—and directed

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX 51.

them by force of rowing upon the enemy's uncovered flank (that is, on his right side), in order to drive him from his position by means of slings, arrows, and darts thrown from the machines. This manœuvre was of great assistance; for the Britons, struck with the look of the galleys, the movement of the oars, and the novel effect of the machines, halted and drew back a little. Still the Romans hesitated, on account of the depth of the water, to leap out of the ships, when the standard-bearer of the 10th legion, invoking the gods with a loud voice, and exhorting his comrades to defend the eagle, leaps into the sea and induces them to follow. (1) This example is imitated by the legionaries embarked in the nearest ships, and the combat begins. It was obstinate. The Romans being unable to keep their ranks, or gain a solid footing, or rally round their ensigns, the confusion was extreme; all those who leapt out of the ships to gain the land singly, were surrounded by the barbarian cavalry, to whom the shallows were known, and, when they were collected in mass, the enemy, taking them on the uncovered flank, overwhelmed them with missiles. On seeing this, Cæsar caused the galleys' boats and the small vessels which served to light the fleet to be filled with soldiers, and sent them wherever the danger required. Soon the Romans, having succeeded in establishing themselves on firm ground, formed their ranks, rushed upon the enemy, and put him to flight; but a long pursuit was impossible for want of cavalry, which, through contrary winds in the passage, had

(1) The Emperor Julian (p. 70, edit. Lasius) makes Cæsar say that he had been the first to leap down from the ship.

not been able to reach Britain. In this alone fortune failed Cæsar.

In this combat, in which, no doubt, many acts of courage remained unknown, a legionary, whose name, Cæsius Scæva, has been preserved by Valerius Maximus, distinguished himself in a very remarkable manner. Having thrown himself into a boat with four men, he had reached a rock, ⁽¹⁾ whence, with his comrades, he threw missiles against the enemy; but the ebb rendered the space between the rock and the land fordable. The barbarians then rushed to them in a crowd. His companions took refuge in their boat; he, firm to his post, made an heroic defence, and killed several of his enemies; at last, having his thigh transpierced with an arrow, his face bruised by the blow of a stone, his helmet broken to pieces, his buckler covered with holes, he trusted himself to the mercy of the waves, and swam back towards his companions. When he saw his general, instead of boasting of his conduct, he sought his pardon for returning without his buckler. It was, in fact, a disgrace among the ancients to lose that defensive arm; but Cæsar loaded him with praise, and rewarded him with the grade of a centurion.

The landing having been effected, the Romans established their camp near the sea, and, as everything leads us to believe, on the height of Walmer. The galleys were hauled on the strand, and the transport ships left at anchor not far from the shore.

⁽¹⁾ It is in the text, *in scopulum vicinum insulæ*, which must be translated by "a rock near the isle of Britain," and not, as certain authors have interpreted it, "a rock isolated from the continent." (Valerius Maximus, III. ii. 23.)—In fact, these rocks, called *Malms*, are distinctly seen at low water opposite the arsenal and marine barracks at Deal.

The enemies, who had rallied after their defeat, decided on peace. They joined with their deputies; sent, to solicit it, some of the Morini, with whom they lived on friendly terms, ⁽¹⁾ and Commius, the king of the Atrebates, who had been previously sent on a mission to Britain. The barbarians had seized his person the moment he landed, and loaded him with fetters. After the combat, they set him at liberty, and came to ask pardon for this offence, throwing the fault upon the multitude. Cæsar reproached them with having received him as an enemy, after they had, of their own motion, sent deputies to him on the continent to treat of peace. Nevertheless, he pardoned them, but required hostages; part of these were delivered to him immediately, and the rest promised within a few days. Meanwhile they returned to their homes, and from all sides the chiefs came to implore the protection of the conqueror.

Peace seemed to be established. The army had been four days in Britain, and the eighteen ships which carried the cavalry, quitting the upper port with a light breeze, approached the coast, and were already in view of the camp, when suddenly a violent tempest arose which drove them out of their course. Some were carried back to the point whence they had started, whilst others were driven towards the south of the island, where they cast anchor; but, beaten by the waves, they were obliged, in the midst of a stormy night, to put to sea and regain the continent.

This night, between the 30th and 31st of August, coincided with full moon; the Romans were ignorant

(1) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 51.

of the fact that this was the period of the highest tides on the ocean. The water soon submerged the galleys which had been drawn upon the dry beach, and the transport ships which had remained at anchor, yielding to the tempest, were broken on the coast or disabled. The consternation became general; the Romans were in want of everything at once, both of the means of transport, of materials for repairing their ships, and even of provisions; for Cæsar, not intending to winter in Britain, had carried thither no supplies.

At the moment of this disaster, the chiefs of the Britains had again assembled to carry out the conditions imposed upon them; but, informed of the critical position of the Romans, and judging the small number of the invaders by the diminutive proportions of their camp, which was the more contracted as the legions had embarked without baggage⁽¹⁾ they determined on again resorting to arms. The opportunity seemed favourable for intercepting provisions, and prolonging the struggle till winter, in the firm conviction that, if they annihilated the Romans and cut them off from all retreat, nobody would dare in future to carry the war into Britain.

A new league is forming. The barbarian chiefs depart one after another from the Roman camp, and secretly recall the men they had sent away. Cæsar as yet was ignorant of their design; but their delay in delivering the rest of the hostages, and the disaster which had befallen his fleet, soon led him to anti-

⁽¹⁾ Cæsar himself had only carried three servants with him, as Cotta relates. (Athenæus, *Deipnosophist.*, VI. 105.)

cipate what would happen. He therefore took his measures to meet all eventualities. Every day the two legions repaired in turn to the country to reap; the fleet was repaired with the timber and copper of the ships which had suffered most, and the materials of which they were in want were brought over from the continent. Thanks to the extreme zeal of the soldiers, all the ships were set afloat again, with the exception of twelve, which reduced the fleet to sixty-eight vessels instead of eighty, its number when it left Gaul.

During the execution of these works, Britons came backwards and forwards to the camp freely, and nothing predicted the approach of hostilities; but one day, when the seventh legion, according to custom, had proceeded to no great distance from the camp to cut wheat, the soldiers on guard before the gates suddenly came to announce that a thick cloud of dust arose in the direction taken by the legion. Cæsar, suspecting some attack from the barbarians, assembles the cohorts on guard, orders two others to replace them, and the rest of the troops to arm and follow him without delay, and hurries forward in the direction indicated. What had happened was this. The Britons, foreseeing that the Romans would repair to the only spot which remained to reap (*pars una erat reliqua*), had concealed themselves the previous night in the forests. After waiting till the soldiers of the 7th legion had laid aside their arms and begun to cut the grain, they had fallen upon them unexpectedly, and, while the legionaries in disorder were forming, they had surrounded them with their cavalry and chariots.

This strange manner of combating had thrown the soldiers of the 7th legion into disorder. Closely surrounded, and resisting with difficulty under a shower of missiles, they would perhaps have succumbed, when Cæsar appeared at the head of his cohorts; his presence restored confidence to his own men and checked the enemy. Nevertheless, he did not judge it prudent to risk a battle, and, after remaining a certain length of time in position, he withdrew his troops. The 7th legion had experienced considerable loss. (¹) Continual rains, during some days, rendered all operations impossible; but eventually the barbarians, believing that the moment had arrived to recover their liberty, assembled from all parts, and marched against the camp.

Deprived of cavalry, Cæsar foresaw well that it would go the same with this combat as with the preceding, and that the enemy, when repulsed, would escape easily by flight; nevertheless, as he had at his disposal thirty horses brought into Britain by Commius, he believed that he could use them with advantage; (²) he drew up his legions in battle at the head of the camp, and ordered them to march forward. The enemy did not sustain the shock long, and dispersed; the legionaries pursued them as quickly and as far as their arms permitted; they returned to the camp, after having made a great slaughter, and ravaged everything within a vast circuit.

The same day, the barbarians sent deputies to ask

(¹) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 53.

(²) At the battle of Arcole, in 1796, twenty-five horsemen had a great influence on the issue of the day (*Mémoires de Montholon, dictées de Sainte-Hélène*, II 9.)

for peace. Cæsar doubled the number of hostages he had required before, and ordered them to be brought to him on the continent. In all Britain, two states only obeyed this order.

As the equinox approached, he was unwilling to expose vessels ill repaired to a navigation in winter. He took advantage of favourable weather, set sail a little after midnight, and regained Gaul with all his ships without the least loss. Two transport vessels only were unable to enter the port of Boulogne with the fleet, and were carried a little lower towards the south. They had on board about 300 soldiers, who, once landed, marched to rejoin the army. In their way, the Morini, seduced by the prospect of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and soon, increasing to the number of 6,000, succeeded in surrounding them. The Romans formed in a circle; in vain their assailants offered them their lives if they would surrender. They defended themselves valiantly during more than four hours, until the arrival of all the cavalry, which Cæsar sent to their succour. Seized with terror, the Morini threw down their arms, and were nearly all massacred. ⁽¹⁾

VI. On the day after the return of the army to the continent, Labienus received orders to reduce, with the two legions brought back from Britain, the revolted Morini, whom the marshes, dried up by the summer heats, no longer sheltered from attack, as they had done the year before. On another side, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L.

Chastisement of the
Morini and Menapii.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 36 and 37.

Cotta rejoined Cæsar, after laying waste and burning the territory of the Menapii, who had taken refuge in the depths of their forests. The army was established in winter quarters among the Belgæ. The Senate, when it received the news of these successes, decreed twenty days of thanksgiving. (¹)

VII. Before he left for Italy, Cæsar ordered his lieutenants to repair the old ships, and to construct during the winter a greater number, of which he fixed the form and dimensions. That it might be easier to load them and draw them on land, he recommended them to be made a little lower than those which were in use in Italy; this disposition presented no inconvenience, for he had remarked that the waves of the channel rose to a less elevation than those of the Mediterranean, which he attributed wrongly to the frequency of the motions of the tide and ebb. He desired also to have greater breadth in the vessels, on account of the baggage and beasts of burden he had to transport, and ordered them to be arranged so as to be able to employ oars, the use of which was facilitated by the small elevation of the side-planks. According to Dio Cassius, these ships held the mean between the light vessels of the Romans and the transport ships of the Gauls. (²) He procured from Spain all the rigging necessary for the equipment of these vessels.

Having given these instructions, Cæsar went into Italy to hold the assembly of Citerior Gaul, and aft-

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, IV 38

(²) Dio Cassius, XL. 1.—See Strabo, IV., p. 162, edit. Didot.

erwards started for Illyria, on the news that the Pirustes (*peoples of the Carnic Alps*) were laying the frontier waste. Immediately on his arrival, by prompt and energetic measures, he put a stop to these disorders, and re-established tranquillity. (¹)

VIII. We have indicated, in the preceding pages, Boulogne as the port at which Cæsar embarked, and Deal as the point where he landed in Britain. Before explaining our reasons, it will not be useless to state that in this first expedition, as well as in the second, the account of which will follow, the places of embarking and landing were the same. In the first place, the terms used in the "Commentaries" lead us to suppose it; next, as we will endeavour to prove, he could only start from Boulogne; and lastly, according to the relation of Dio Cassius, he landed on both occasions at the same spot. (²) It is, then, convenient to treat here the question for both expeditions, and to anticipate in regard to certain facts.

Writers of great repute have placed the Portus Itius, some at Wissant, others at Calais, Etaples, or Mardyke; but the Emperor Napoleon I., in his *Précis des Guerres de César*, has not hesitated in preferring Boulogne. It will be easy for us to prove in effect that the port of Boulogne is the *Portus Itius*, which alone answers the necessities of the text, and at the same time satisfies the requirements of a considerable expedition. (³)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. I.

(²) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 56; XL. 1.

(³) This opinion has been already supported by learned archæologists. I will

To proceed logically, let us suppose the absence of all kind of data. The only means to approach the truth would then be to adopt, as the place where Cæsar embarked, the port mentioned most anciently by historians; for, in all probability, the point of the coast rendered famous by the first expeditions to Britain would have been chosen in preference for subsequent voyages. Now, as early as the reign of Augustus, Agrippa caused a road to be constructed, which went from Lyons to the ocean, across the country of the Bellovaci and the Ambiani, ⁽¹⁾ and was to end at Gesoriacum (*Boulogne*), since the Itinerary of Antoninus traces it thus. ⁽²⁾ It was at Boulogne that Caligula caused a pharos to be raised, ⁽³⁾ and that Claudius embarked for Britain. ⁽⁴⁾ It was thence that Lupicinus, under the Emperor Julian, ⁽⁵⁾ and Theodosius, under the Emperor Valentinian, ⁽⁶⁾ Cor-

cite especially M. Mariette, Mr. Thomas Lewin, who has written a very interesting account of Cæsar's invasions of England; and lastly, M. l'Abbé Hauguier, archivist of Boulogne, who has collected the best documents on this question

⁽¹⁾ Strabo, IV. 6, p 173

⁽²⁾ According to the Itinerary of Antoninus, the road started from Bagacum (*Bavay*), and passed by Pons-Scaldis (*Escout-Pont*), Turnacum (*Tournay*), Viroviacum (*Werwick*), Castellum (*Montcassel, Cassel*), Taivenna (*Thérouanne*), and thence to Gesoriacum (*Boulogne*). According to Mariette, medals found on the road demonstrate that it had been made in the time of Agrippa; moreover, according to the same Itinerary of Antoninus, a Roman road started from Bavay, and, by Tongres, ended at the Rhine at Bonn. (See *Jahrbucher des Vereins von Alterthums Freunden*, Heft 37, Bonn, 1864. Now, admitting that there had been already under Augustus a road which united Boulogne with Bonn, we understand the expression of Florus, who explains that Drusus amended this road by constructing bridges on the numerous water-courses which it crossed, *Bonniam et Gesoriacum pontibus junxit*. (Florus, IV. 12.)

⁽³⁾ Suetonius, *Caligula*, 46.—The remains of the pharos of Caligula were still visible a century ago

⁽⁴⁾ Suetonius, *Claudius*, 17

⁽⁵⁾ Ammianus Marcellinus, XX. 1.

⁽⁶⁾ Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 7, 8.

stantius Chlorus, ⁽¹⁾ and lastly, in 893, the Danes, ⁽²⁾ set sail. This port, then, was known and frequented a short time after Cæsar, and continued to be used during the following centuries, while Wissant and Calais are only mentioned by historians three or four centuries later. Lastly, at Boulogne, Roman antiquities are found in abundance; none exist at Calais or Wissant. Cæsar's camp, of which certain authors speak as situated near Wissant, is only a small modern redoubt, incapable of containing more than 200 men.

To this first presumption in favour of Boulogne we may add another: the ancient authors speak only of a single port on the coast of Gaul nearest to Britain; therefore, they very probably give different names to the same place, among which names figures that of *Gesoriacum*. Florus ⁽³⁾ calls the place where Cæsar embarked the port of the Morini. Strabo ⁽⁴⁾ says that this port was called *Itius*; Pomponius Mela, who lived less than a century after Cæsar, cites *Gesoriacum* as the port of the Morini best known; ⁽⁵⁾ Pliny expresses himself in analogous terms. ⁽⁶⁾

Let us now show that the port of Boulogne agrees with the conditions specified in the "Commentaries."

1. Cæsar, in his first expedition, repaired to the coun-

⁽¹⁾ Eumenius, *Panegyric of Constantine Cæsar*, 14.

⁽²⁾ Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, cited by Mr. Lewin.

⁽³⁾ "Qui tertia vigilia Morino solvisset a portu." (Florus, III. 10.)

⁽⁴⁾ Strabo, IV. 5, p. 166.

⁽⁵⁾ "Ultimos Gallicarum gentium Morinos, nec portu quam Gesoriacum vocant quicquam notius habet" (Pomponius Mela, III. 2.)—"Μοριῶν Γησοριακὸν ἐπίνειον." (Ptolemy, II. ix. 3.)

⁽⁶⁾ "Hæc [Britannia] abest a Gesoriaco Morinorum gentis litore proximo tractu quinquaginta M." (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, IV. 30.)

try of the *Morini*, whence the passage from Gaul to Britain is shortest. Now, Boulogne is actually situated on the territory of that people which, occupying the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, was the nearest to England.

2. In his second expedition, Cæsar embarked at the port *Itius*, which he had found to offer the most convenient passage for proceeding to Britain, distant from the continent about thirty Roman miles. Now, even at the present day, it is from Boulogne that the passage is easiest to arrive in England, because the favourable winds are more frequent than at Wissant and Calais. As to the distance of about thirty miles (forty-four kilomètres), Cæsar gives it evidently as representing the distance from Britain to the *Portus Itius*: it is exactly the distance from Boulogne to Dover, whereas Wissant and Calais are farther from Dover, the one twenty, the other twenty-three Roman miles.

3. To the north, at eight miles' distance from the *Portus Itius*, existed another port, where the cavalry embarked. Boulogne is the only port on this coast at eight miles from which, towards the north, we meet with another, that of Ambleteuse. The distance of eight miles is exact, not as a bird flies, but following the course of the hills. To the north of Wissant, on the contrary, there is only Sangatte or Calais. Now Sangatte is six Roman miles from Wissant, and Calais eleven.

4. The eighteen ships of the upper port were prevented by contrary winds from rallying the fleet at the principal port. We understand easily that these

ships, detained at Ambleteuse by winds from the south-west or west-south-west, which prevail frequently in the Channel, were unable to rally the fleet at Boulogne. As to the two ships of burthen, which, at the return of the first expedition, could not make land in the same port as the fleet, but were dragged by the current more to the south, nothing is said in the "Commentaries" which would show that they entered a port; it is probable, indeed, that they were driven upon the shore. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that they may have landed in the little fishers' ports of Hardelot and Camiers. (*See Plate 15.*)

We see from what precedes that the port of Boulogne agrees with the text of the "Commentaries." But the peremptory reason why, in our opinion, the port where Cæsar embarked is certainly that of Boulogne, is, that it would have been impossible to prepare elsewhere an expedition against England, Boulogne being the only place which united the conditions indispensable for collecting the fleet and embarking the troops. In fact, it required a port capable of containing either eighty transport ships and galleys, as in the first expedition, or 800 ships, as in the second; and extensive enough to allow the ships to approach the banks and embark the troops in a single tide. Now these conditions could only be fulfilled where a river sufficiently deep, flowing into the sea, formed a natural port; and, on the part of the coasts nearest to England, we find only at Boulogne a river, the Liane, which presents all these advantages. Moreover, it must not be forgotten, all the coast has been buried in sand. It appears that it is

not more than a century and a half that the natural basin of Boulogne has been partly filled; and, according to tradition and geological observations, the coast advanced more than two kilomètres, forming two jetties, between which the high tide filled the valley of the Liane to a distance of four kilomètres inland.

None of the ports situated to the north of Boulogne could serve as the basis of Cæsar's expedition, for none could receive so great a number of vessels, and we cannot suppose that Cæsar would have left them on the open coast, during more than a month, exposed to the tempests of the ocean, which were so fatal to him on the coasts of Britain.

Boulogne was the only point of the coast where Cæsar could place in safety his dépôts, his supplies, and his spare stores. The heights which command the port offered advantageous positions for establishing his camps, (¹) and the little river Liane allowed him to bring with ease the timber and provisions he required. At Calais he would have found nothing but flats and marshes, at Wissant nothing but sands, as indicated by etymology of the word (*white sand*).

It is worthy of remark, that the reasons which determined Cæsar to start from Boulogne were the same which decided the choice of Napoleon I. in 1804. In spite of the difference in the times and in the armies, the nautical and practical conditions had undergone no change. "The Emperor chose Boulogne," says M. Thiers, "because that port had long been

(¹) The camp of Labienus, during the second expedition, was, no doubt, established on the site now occupied by the high town. From thence it commanded the surrounding country, the sea, and the lower course of the Liane.

pointed out as the best point of departure of an expedition directed against England; he chose Boulogne, because its port is formed by the little river Liane, which allowed him, with some labour, to place in safety from 1,200 to 1,300 vessels."

We may point out, as another similarity, that certain flat boats, constructed by order of the Emperor, had nearly the same dimensions as those employed by Cæsar. "There required," says the historian of the 'Consulate and the Empire,' "boats which would not need more, when they were laden, than seven or eight feet of water to float, and which would go with oars, so as to pass, either in calm or fog, and strand without breaking on the flat English shores. The great gun-boats carried four pieces of large bore, and were rigged like brigs, that is, with two masts, manœuvred by twenty-four sailors, and capable of carrying a company of a hundred men, with its staff, and its arms and munitions. . . . These boats offered a vexatious inconvenience, that of falling to the leeward, that is, yielding to the currents. This was the result of their clumsy build, which presented more hold to the water than their masts to the wind." (¹)

Cæsar's ships experienced the same inconvenience, and, drawn away by the currents in his second expedition, they went to the leeward rather far in the north.

We have seen that Cæsar's transport boats were flat-bottomed, that they could go either with sails or oars, carry if necessary 150 men, and be loaded and drawn on dry ground with promptness (*ad celeritatem*

(¹) *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, tom. IV., l. 17.

onerandi subductionesque). They had thus a great analogy with the flat-bottomed boats of 1804. But there is more, for the Emperor Napoleon had found it expedient to imitate the Roman galleys. "He had seen the necessity," says M. Thiers, "of constructing boats still lighter and more movable than the preceding, drawing only two or three feet of water, and calculated for landing anywhere. They were large boats, narrow, sixty feet long, having a movable deck which could be laid or withdrawn at will, and were distinguished from the others by the name of pinaces. These large boats were provided with sixty oars, carried at need a light sail, and moved with extreme swiftness. When sixty soldiers, practised in handling the oar as well as the sailors, set them in motion, they glided over the sea like the light boats dropped from the sides of our great vessels, and surprised the eye by the rapidity of their course."

The point of landing has been equally the subject of a host of contrary suppositions. St. Leonards, near Hastings, Richborough (*Rutupiæ*), near Sandwich, Lymne, near Hythe, and Deal, have all been proposed.

The first of these localities, we think, must be rejected, for it answers none of the conditions of the relation given in the "Commentaries," which inform us that, in the second expedition, the fleet sailed with a gentle wind from the south-west. Now, this is the least favourable of all winds for taking the direction of Hastings, when starting from the coasts of the department of the Pas-de-Calais. In this same passage, Cæsar, after having been drawn away from his course during four hours of the night, perceived, at day-

break, that he had left Britain to his left. This fact cannot possibly be explained if he had intended to land at St. Leonards. As to Richborough, this locality is much too far to the north. Why should Cæsar have gone so far as Sandwich, since he could have landed at Walmer and Deal? Lymne, or rather Romney Marsh, will suit no better. This shore is altogether unfit for a landing-place, and none of the details furnished by the "Commentaries" can be made to suit it. ⁽¹⁾

There remains Deal; but before describing this place, we must examine if, on his first passage, when Cæsar sailed, after remaining five days opposite the

⁽¹⁾ What is now called *Romney Marsh* is the northern part of a vast plain, bounded on the east and south by the sea, and on the west and north by the line of heights at the foot of which the military canal has been cut. It is difficult to determine what was the aspect of Romney Marsh in the time of Cæsar. Nevertheless, the small elevation of the plain above the level of the sea, as well as the nature of the soil, lead us to conclude that the sea covered it formerly up to the foot of the heights of Lymne, except at least in the part called *Dymchurch-Wall*. This is a long tongue of land, on which are now raised three forts and nine batteries, and which, considering its height above the rest of the plain, has certainly never been covered by the sea. These facts appear to be confirmed by an ancient chart in the Cottonian collection in the British Museum.

Mr. Lewin appears to have represented as accurately as possible the appearance of Romney Marsh in the time of Cæsar, in the plate which accompanies his work. The part not covered by the sea extended, no doubt, as he represents it, from the bay of Romney to near Hythe, where it terminated in a bank of pebbles of considerable extent. But it appears to us that it would have been difficult for the Roman army to land on a bank of pebbles at the very foot of the rather steep heights of Lymne. Mr. Lewin places the Roman army, in the first expedition, at the foot of the heights, on the bank of pebbles itself, surrounded on almost all sides by the sea. In the second expedition, he supposes it to have been on the heights, at the village of Lymne; and, to explain how Cæsar joined his fleet to the camp by retrenchments common to both, he admits that this fleet was drawn on land as far as the slope of the heights, and shut up in a square space of 300 mètres each side, because we find there the ruins of an ancient castle called *Stutfall Castle*. All this is hardly admissible.

cliffs of Dover, the current of which he took advantage carried him towards the north or towards the south. (*See Page 177.*) Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr. Airy, have studied this question; but they agree neither on the place where Cæsar embarked, nor on that where he landed. We may, nevertheless, arrive at a solution of this problem by seeking the day on which Cæsar landed. The year of the expedition is known by the consulate of Pompey and Crassus—it was the year 699. The month in which the departure took place is known by the following data, derived from the “*Commentaries*,” the fine season was near its end, *exigua parte aestatis reliqua* (IV. 20); the wheat had been reaped everywhere, except in one single spot, *omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento, una pars erat reliqua* (IV. 32); the equinox was near at hand, *propinqua die æquinocitii* (IV. 36). These data point sufficiently clearly to the month of August. Lastly, we have, relative to the day of landing, the following indications:—After four days past since his arrival in Britain there arose suddenly so violent a tempest That same night it was full moon, which is the period of the highest tides of the ocean, *Post diem quartam, quam est in Britanniam ventum* (¹)

(¹) Word for word, this expression signifies that the ships set sail four days after the arrival of the Romans in England. The Latin language often employed the ordinal number instead of the cardinal number. Thus, the historian Eutropius says, “*Carthage was destroyed 700 years after it was founded, Carthago septingentesimo anno quam condita erat deleta est*” Are we, in the phrase *post diem quartum*, to reckon the day of the arrival?—Virgil says, speaking of the seventeenth day, *septima post decimam*.—Cicero uses the expression *post sexennium* in the sense of *in six years*. It is evident that Virgil counts seven days after the tenth. If the tenth was comprised in this number, the

tanta tempestas subita coorta est Eadem nocte accidit, ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit.

According to this, we consider that the tempest took place after four days, counted from the day of landing; that the full moon fell on the following night; and lastly, that this period coincided not with the highest *tide*, but with the highest *tides* of the ocean. Thus we believe that it would be sufficient for ascertaining the exact day of landing, to take the sixth day which preceded the full moon of the month of August, 699; now this phenomenon, according to astronomical tables, happened on the 31st, towards three o'clock in the morning. On the eve, that is, on the 30th, the tempest had occurred; four full days had passed since the landing; this takes us back to the 25th. Cæsar then landed on the 25th of August. Mr. Airy, it is true, has interpreted the text altogether differently from our explanation: he believes that the expression *post diem quartum* may be taken in Latin for the third day; on another hand, he doubts if Cæsar had in his army almanacks by which he could know the exact day of the full moon; lastly, as the highest tide takes place a day and a half after the full moon, he affirms that Cæsar, placing these two phenomena at the same moment, must have been mistaken, either in the day of the full moon, or in that of the highest tide; and he concludes from this that the

expression *septima post decimam* would signify simply the *sixteenth day*. On his part, Cicero understands clearly the six years as a lapse of time which was to pass, starting from the moment in which he speaks. Thus, the *post diem quartum* of Cæsar must be understood in the sense of four days accomplished, without reckoning the day of landing.

landing may have taken place on the second, third, or fourth day before the full moon.

Our reasoning has another basis. Let us first state that at that time the science of astronomy permitted people to know certain epochs of the moon, since, more than a hundred years before, during the war against Perseus, a tribune of the army of Paulus Æmilius announced on the previous day to his soldiers an eclipse of the moon, in order to counteract the effect of their superstitious fears. (') Let us remark also, that Cæsar, who subsequently reformed the calendar, was well informed in the astronomical knowledge of his time, already carried to a very high point of advance by Hipparchus, and that he took especial interest in it, since he discovered, by means of water-clocks, that the nights were shorter in Britain than in Italy.

Everything, then, authorises us in the belief that Cæsar, when he embarked for an unknown country, where he might have to make night marches, must have taken precautions for knowing the course of the moon, and furnished himself with calendars. But we have put the question independently of these considerations, by seeking among the days which preceded the full moon of the end of August, 699, which was the one in which the shifting of the currents of which Cæsar speaks could have been produced at the hour indicated in the "Commentaries."

Supposing, then, the fleet of Cæsar at anchor at a distance of half a mile opposite Dover, as it experienced the effect of the shifting of the currents towards

(') Titus Livius, XLIV. 37.

half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, the question becomes reduced to that of determining the day of the end of the month of August when this phenomenon took place at the above hour. We know that in the Channel the sea produces, in rising and falling, two alternate currents, one directed from the west to the east, called *flux* (*flot*), or current of the rising tide; the other directed from the east to the west, named *reflux* (*jusant*), or current of the falling tide. In the sea opposite Dover, at a distance of half a mile from the coast, the flux begins usually to be sensible two hours before high tide at Dover, and the reflux four hours after.

So that, if we find a day before the full moon of the 31st of August, 699, on which it was high tide at Dover, either at half-past five in the afternoon or at midday, that will be the day of landing; and further, we shall know whether the current carried Cæsar towards the east or towards the west. Now, we may admit, according to astronomical data, that the tides of the days which preceded the full moon of the 31st of August, 699, were sensibly the same as those of the days which preceded the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857; and, as it was the sixth day before the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857, that it was high tide at Dover towards half-past five in the afternoon (*see the Annuaire des Marées des Côtes de France for the year 1857*, ⁽¹⁾) we are led to conclude that the same phenomenon was produced also at Dover on the

(¹) We must now go back to the fourteenth day before the full moon, that is, to the 17th of August, 699, to find a day on which high tide took place at Dover towards midday.

sixth day before the 31st of August, 699; and that it was on the 25th of August that Cæsar arrived in Britain, his fleet being carried forward by the current of the rising tide.

This last conclusion, by obliging us to seek the point of landing to the north of Dover, constitutes the strongest theoretic presumption in favour of Deal. Let us now examine if Deal satisfies the requirements of the Latin text.

The cliffs which border the coasts of England towards the southern part of the county of Kent form, from Folkestone to the castle of Walmer, a vast quarter of a circle, convex towards the sea, abrupt on nearly all points; they present several bays or creeks, as at Folkestone, at Dover, at St. Margaret's, and at Oldstairs, and, diminishing by degrees in elevation, terminate at the castle of Walmer. From this point, proceeding towards the north, the coast is flat, and favourable for landing on an extent of several leagues.

The country situated to the west of Walmer and Deal is itself flat as far as the view can reach, or presents only gentle undulations of ground. We may add that it produces, in great quantities, wheat of excellent quality, and that the nature of the soil leads us to believe that it was the same at a remote period. These different conditions rendered the shore of Walmer and Deal the best place of landing for the Roman army.

Its situation, moreover, agrees fully with the narrative of the "Commentaries." In the first expedition, the Roman fleet, starting from the cliffs of Dover and doubling the point of the South Foreland, may have

made the passage of seven miles in an hour; it would thus have come to anchor opposite the present village of Walmer. The Britons, starting from Dover, might have made a march of eight kilomètres quickly enough to oppose the landing of the Romans. (*See Plate 16.*)

The combat which followed was certainly fought on the part of the shore which extends from Walmer Castle to Deal. At present the whole extent of this coast is covered with buildings, so that it is impossible to say what was its exact form nineteen centuries ago; but, from a view of the locality, we can understand without difficulty the different circumstances of the combat described in Book IV. of the "Commentaries."

Four days completed after the arrival of Cæsar in Britain, a tempest dispersed the eighteen ships which, after quitting Ambleteuse, had arrived just within sight of the Roman camp. All the sailors of the Channel who have been consulted believe it possible that the same hurricane, according to the text, might have driven one part of the ships towards the South Foreland and the other part towards the coast of Boulogne and Ambleteuse. The conformation of the ground itself indicates the site of the Roman camp on the height where the village of Walmer rises. It was situated there at a distance of 1,000 or 1,200 mètres from the beach, in a position which commanded the surrounding country. And it is thus easy to understand, from the aspect of the locality, the details relative to the episode of the 7th legion, surprised while it was mowing. (¹) It might be objected that at Deal

(¹) Mr. Lewin has stated that the country between Deal and Sandwich pro-

the Roman camp was not near to a water-course, but they could dig wells, which is the only method by which the numerous population of Deal at the present day obtain water.

From all that has just been said, the following facts appear to us to be established in regard to the first expedition. Cæsar, after causing all his flotilla to go out of the port the day before, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August, towards midnight, from the coast of Boulogne, and arrived opposite Dover towards six o'clock in the morning. He remained at anchor until half-past three in the afternoon, and then, having wind and tide in his favour, he moved a distance of seven miles and arrived near Deal, probably between Deal and Walmer Castle, at half-past four. As in the month of August twilight lasts till after half-past seven, and its effect may be prolonged by the moon, which at that hour was in the middle of the heaven, Cæsar had still four hours left for landing, driving back the Britons, and establishing himself on the British soil. As the sea began to ebb towards half-past five, this explains the anecdote of Cæsius Scæva told by Valerius Maximus; for, towards seven o'clock, the rocks called the *Malms* might be left uncovered by the ebb of the tide.

After four entire days, reckoned from the moment of landing, that is, on the 30th of August, the tempest arose, and full moon occurred in the following night.

duces no wheat. This assertion is tolerably true for the tongue of marshy land which separates those two localities; but what does it signify, since wheat grows in great quantities in all the part of the county of Kent situated to the west of the coast which extends from the South Foreland to Deal and Sandwich?

This first expedition, which Cæsar had undertaken too late in the season, and with too few troops, could not lead to great results. He himself declares that he only sought to make an appearance in Britain. In fact, he did not remove from the coast, and he left the island towards the 17th of September, having remained there only twenty-three days. ⁽¹⁾

IX. We recapitulate as follows the probable dates of the campaign of 699 :—

*Résumé of the Dates
of the Campaign of
699.*

Cæsar crosses the mountains <i>earlier than usual</i> .	April 10.
His arrival at the army between the Loire and the Seine	April 22.
Abode with the army, and informations	From April 22 to May 10.

⁽¹⁾ It is almost impossible to fix with certainty the day when Cæsar quitted Britain, we know only that it was a short time before the equinox (*propinqua die æquinoxi*), which, according to the calculations of M. Le Verrier, fell on the 26th of September, and that the fleet started a little after midnight. If we admit a passage of nine hours, with a favourable wind (*ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus*), as on the return of the second expedition, Cæsar would have arrived at Boulogne towards nine o'clock in the morning. As the fleet could not enter the port until the tide was in, it is sufficient, to know approximatively the date of Cæsar's return, to seek what day in the month of September, 699, there was high tide at that hour at Boulogne. Now, in this port, the tide is always at its height towards nine o'clock in the morning two or three days before full moon and before new moon; therefore, since the full moon of the month of September, 699, took place on the 14th, it must have been about the 11th or 12th of September that Cæsar returned to Gaul. As to the two ships which were driven farther down, Mr Lewin (*Invasion of Britain by J Cæsar*) explains this accident in a very judicious manner. He states that we read in the tide-tables of the English Admiralty the following recommendation: "In approaching Boulogne when the tide is flowing in, great attention must be paid, because the current, which, on the English side, drags a ship towards the east, on the Boulogne side drags them, on the contrary, towards the Somme." Nothing, then, is more natural than that the two Roman transport ships should be driven ashore to the south of Boulogne.

March to between the Meuse and the Rhine	From May 11 to May 28.
Victory over the Usipetes and Tencteri	June 4.
Arrival at Bonn for the passage of the Rhine	June 11.
Construction of the bridge of piles (10 days)	From June 12 to June 21.
The campaign beyond the Rhine (18 days)	From June 22 to July 9.
March from Bonn to Boulogne,	From July 11 to July 28.
Preparations for the expedition to Britain	From July 28 to August 24.
Departure	Night between Aug. 24 and Aug. 25.
Landing	August 25.
The tempest	August 30.
Duration of the abode in Britain (18 days).	From August 25 to Sept. 12.
Return to Gaul	Sept. 12.
Autumnal equinox	Sept. 26.

CHAPTER VIII.

(Year of Rome 700)

(BOOK V. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI—SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.

I. CÆSAR, after having appeased the troubles of Illyria, and passed some time in Italy, Inspection of the Fleet March against the Treviri. rejoined the army in the country of the Belgæ, at the beginning of June in the year 700. Immediately on his arrival, he visited all his quarters, and the naval arsenal established, according to Strabo, at the mouth of the Seine.⁽¹⁾ He found his fleet ready for sea. In spite of the scarcity of necessary materials, the soldiers had laboured in building it with the greatest zeal. He rewarded them with commendations, complimented those who had directed the works, and appointed for the general rendezvous the Portus Itius (*Boulogne*).

The concentration of the fleet required a considerable length of time, of which Cæsar took advantage to prevent the effects of the agitation which had shown itself among the Treviri. These populations, rebelling against his orders, and suspected of having called the Germans from beyond the Rhine, did not send their representatives to the assemblies. Cæsar march-

⁽¹⁾ "It was there (the mouth of the Seine) that Cæsar established his naval arsenal, when he passed over to that island (Britain)" (Strabo, II 160)

ed against them with four legions, without baggage, and 800 cavalry, and left troops in sufficient number to protect the fleet.

The Treviri possessed, in addition to a considerable infantry, a more numerous cavalry than any other people in Gaul. They were divided into two factions, whose chiefs, Indutiomarus and his son-in-law Cingetorix, disputed the chief power. The latter was no sooner informed of the approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus, on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several chiefs (*principes*), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcilable enemy. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 3, 4.

II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet, perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of the Meldæ, ⁽¹⁾ which a tempest had driven back to their point of departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total amounted to 800 sail. ⁽²⁾ The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul and in Spain; ⁽³⁾ but the expeditionary body was composed only of five legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus re-

Departure for the
Isle of Britain.

⁽¹⁾ The Meldæ dwelt on the Maine, in the country around Meaux; and as we have seen, according to Strabo, that Cæsar had established his naval arsenal at the mouth of the Seine, there is nothing extraordinary in the circumstance that some of the ships were built near Meaux. But it is not reasonable to suppose, with some writers, that the Meldæ dwelt at the mouth of the Scheldt, and believe that Cæsar had left important shipyards in an enemy's country, and out of reach of protection.

⁽²⁾ The five legions which Cæsar led into Britain made, at about 5,000 men each, 25,000 men. There were, in addition to these, 2,000 cavalry. If we suppose, as in the first expedition, twenty-five horses per ship, it would require eighty to contain the cavalry. In the preceding year, eighty transport ships had been sufficient for two legions, without baggage—200 ought to have been enough for five legions; but as the "Commentaries" give us to understand that these vessels were narrower, and that the troops had their baggage, it may be believed that they required double the number of ships, that is, 400, for the transport of the five legions, which would make about sixty-two men in a ship. There would remain 160 transport ships for the Gaulish and Roman chiefs, the valets, and the provisions. The twenty-eight galleys were, no doubt, the true ships of war, destined to protect the fleet and the landing.

⁽³⁾ According to a passage in the "Commentaries" (Book V. 26), there was in the Roman army a body of Spanish cavalry.

ceived orders to remain on the coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the principal citizens of each people (*principes ex omnibus civitatibus*), and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.

It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain. The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.

On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had left Britain to his left. (*See Plate 16.*) But then came on the shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the reflux (*jusant*), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on several points at once, ⁽¹⁾ without any appearance of the enemy. Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights. ⁽²⁾

III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good position, near the
March into the Interior of the Country. sea. ⁽³⁾ The fleet, left at anchor near the shore, on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired him with no uneasiness. ⁽⁴⁾ As soon as he knew where the enemy was posted, he

⁽¹⁾ DIO CASSIUS, XL. 1.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 8

⁽³⁾ This appears to us to be evident, since we shall see subsequently Cæsar inclosed his fleet within the retrenchments contiguous to his camp.

⁽⁴⁾ As in the first expedition the disaster which happened to his fleet must have proved to Cæsar the danger to which the vessels were exposed on the coast, the above reflection indicates that, in his second expedition, he chose a better anchorage, at a few kilometres farther to the north

began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten cohorts (¹) and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a stream of water now called the Little Stour. (²)

(¹) Ten cohorts formed a legion, but Cæsar does not employ this last expression, because, no doubt, he drew from each of his legions two cohorts, which he left for the guard of the camp. In this manner he preserved the tactical number of five legions, which was more advantageous, and caused each legion to participate in the honour of combating.

(²) If from the sea-shore, near Deal, where we suppose that the Romans established their camp, we describe, with a radius of twelve miles, an arc of a circle, we cut towards the west, the villages of Kingston and Barham, and more to the north, the village of Littlebourne, a stream called the Little Stour, which rises near Lyminge, flows from south to north across a rather irregular country, and falls into the Great Stour. This stream is incontestably the *flumen* of the "Commentaries." There is the less room for error, as we find no other stream in the part of the county of Kent comprised between the coast of Deal and the Great Stour, and as this latter runs too far from Deal to answer to the text. Although the Little Stour is not, between Barham and Kingston, more than from three to four mètres broad, we need not be astonished at the denomination of *flumen* given to it by Cæsar, for he employs the same expression to designate simple rivulets, such as the Ose and the Oserain (*De Bello Gallico*, VII 69, *Alesia*)

But did Cæsar reach the Little Stour towards Barham and Kingston or towards Littlebourne? The doubt is allowable. We believe, nevertheless, that the country of Barham and Kingston agrees best with the idea we form from reading the "Commentaries." The heights on the left bank of the Little Stour are not so broken as to prevent chariots and cavalry from manœuvring on them, and the Britons might have occupied, as the text requires, a commanding position, *locus superior*, on the banks which end at the river in gentle slopes.

This stream, considering its little depth, does not form any real obstacle. Now it appears, in fact, to result from the recital of the "Commentaries," that the engagement at it was not of a serious character, and that Cæsar's cavalry passed it without difficulty. This last fact forms an objection to the Great Stour, which several authors, and among others General de Gœler, take for the *flumen* of the text; it is sufficiently broad and sufficiently steep-banked towards Sturry, where they place the scene of the action, to render the passage difficult for cavalry. Moreover, Sturry is fifteen, and not twelve miles from the coast of Deal.

These caused their cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream, seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but, repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in former times in their intestine wars. ⁽¹⁾ Numerous *abatis* of felled trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their *oppidum*; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country, and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp. ⁽²⁾

IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and
Destruction of a part
of the Fleet.
cavalry into three bodies, and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q. Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a vio-

⁽¹⁾ It is evident that this place must not be sought at more than a few kilometres from the Little Stour; for it must be remembered that the Romans had landed the day before, that they had made a night march of twelve miles, and that they had just given battle. Unfortunately, the country situated to the west of Kingston is so much broken and wooded, that it is impossible to choose one site rather than another to make a British *oppidum*. Perhaps it might be placed towards Burstled or Upper Hardres.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V. 9.

lent tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them in the camp by a new retrenchment.⁽¹⁾ The soldiers employed ten entire days in this work, without interruption, even during the night.⁽²⁾

V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial defences, Cæsar left in the

(1) It has appeared to us interesting to explain how Cæsar could join the fleet to the camp.

The Roman camp must have been on flat ground, to allow of the possibility of diawing up the ships of the fleet. Supposing that the mean size of each ship was twenty-five mètres long by six mètres broad, and that the 800 ships composing the fleet had been placed at two mètres from each other, on five lines separated by a distance of three mètres, the fleet would have covered a rectangle of 1,280 mètres by 140, joined with the camp by other trenches. It is, of course, understood that the lightest boats would form the line farthest from the sea.

(2) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 11

Cæsar resumes
the offensive

camp the same troops as before, and returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river which was about eighty miles distant from the coast.⁽¹⁾ This chief had heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord, agreed in giving him the command.

The enemy's cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in this action.

(¹) This is the expression of Cæsar, but it is certain that this number does not indicate the shortest distance from the Thames to the Straits. Cæsar, no doubt, meant to tell us the length of the route he took from the sea to the Thames.

The description of this battle, as given in the "Commentaries," has been differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.

This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence. (¹)

The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated, harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they

(¹) On the chariots of the Britons consult Strabo (IV., p. 166), and Dio Cassius (LXXVI. 12). Cæsar spoke of many thousand cavalry and war-chariots, in the third book of a Memoir addressed to Cicero, but which is lost. (Junius Philargyrus, *Comm. on the Georgics of Virgil*, III., p. 204.)

approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length. (¹)

VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus, passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (*See Plate 16.*) Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up on the opposite bank. (²) It was defended by a pal-

March towards the Thames.

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 17.

(²) There remains not the slightest vestige in the county of Kent which might help us in tracing the march of the Roman army. The camp of Holwood, near Keston, which the English maps call *Cæsar's Camp*, does not belong to the period of which we are treating. On St. George's Hill, near Walton-on-the-Thames, no camp ever existed.

Unfortunately, it is no more possible to ascertain the exact place where Cæsar crossed the Thames by a ford. We are convinced of this by the researches of all kinds made by the officers Stoffel and Hamelin. The boatmen of the Thames all assured them that between Shepperton and London there are now reckoned eight or nine places fordable; the most favourable is that at Sunbury. At Kingston, where General de Gœler places the passage, nothing leads us to

isade of sharp pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy's position and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and, although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the "Commentaries" do not mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe. ⁽¹⁾

suppose that a ford ever existed. The same thing must be said of Coway Stakes. At Halliford, in spite of the termination of the word, the inhabitants have no tradition of an ancient ford. The only thing which appears to us evident is, that the Roman army did not pass below Teddington. We know that this village, the name of which comes from *Tide-end-town*, marks the last point of the Thames where the tide is felt. We cannot believe that Cæsar would expose himself to be surprised during his passage by an increase of the volume of water.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, V 18 — Polyænus expresses himself thus "Cæsar, when he was in the isle of Britain, sought to pass a great river. Cassivellanus, King of the Britons, opposed the passage with a numerous cavalry and many chariots. Cæsar had a very great elephant, an animal which the Britons had never seen; he armed it with iron flakes, and placed on its back a great tower filled with archers and slingers, all men of skill, and caused it to advance into the river. The Britons were struck with astonishment at the view of such an enormous animal, which was unknown to them. And is it necessary to say that their horses were frightened at it, since we know that, even among the Greeks, the presence of an elephant causes the horses to flee? Much more were those of the barbarians unable to support the view of an elephant armed and loaded with a tower from which flew stones and arrows. Britons, horses, and chariots, all equally took flight, and the Romans, by means of the terror caused by a single animal, passed the river without danger." (*Strateg.*, VIII. 23, § 5)

VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about 4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six *essedarii* to the chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660 carriages.) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.

Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain, sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.

The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagi, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (*see p. 168*), to follow their example. The deputies of these different peoples informed Cæsar that the *oppidum* of Cassivellaunus (*St. Albans*) stood at a short distance, defended by marshes and woods, and containing a great number

of men and cattle. ⁽¹⁾ Although this formidable position had been further fortified by the hands of men, Cæsar led his legions thither, and attacked it on two points without hesitation. After a feeble resistance, the barbarians, in their attempt to escape, were slain or captured in great numbers.

Nevertheless, Cæsar was operating too far from his point of departure not to tempt Cassivellaunus to deprive him of the possibility of returning to the continent, by seizing upon his fleet. In effect, Cassivellaunus had ordered the four kings of the different parts of Cantium (*Kent*), Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax, to collect all their troops, and attack unexpectedly the camp in which the Roman ships were inclosed. They hastened thither; but the cohorts did not leave them time to attack; they made a sortie, killed a great number of barbarians, captured one of their principal chiefs, Lugotorix, and re-entered their camp without loss. On the news of this defeat, Cassivellaunus, discouraged by so many reverses and the defection of several peoples, employed Commius to offer his submission. ⁽²⁾

VIII. Summer approached its end (they were in the last days of August). Cæsar, aware that there no longer remained sufficient time to be employed with advantage, prepared for his

Re-embarkment of
the Army

⁽¹⁾ After having crossed the Thames, Cæsar invaded the territory of Cassivellaunus, and directed his march upon the *oppidum* of that chief. Certain commentators place this *oppidum* to the west of Wendover (see *Plate 15*), others at St Albans, the ancient *Verulamium*. All we can possibly say is, that the brief indications of the "Commentaries" seem to agree best with the latter locality.

⁽²⁾ *De Bel'o Gallico*, V 22

departure; he wished, moreover, to pass the winter on the continent, fearing sudden revolts on the part of the Gauls. He therefore caused hostages to be delivered to him, fixed the tribute to be paid annually by Britain to the Roman people, and expressly prohibited Cassivellaunus from all acts of hostility against Mandubratius and the Trinobantes.

After receiving the hostages, Cæsar hastened to return in person to the coast, and ordered his army to follow him afterwards; he found the ships repaired, and caused them to be put afloat. His great number of prisoners, and the loss of several of his ships, obliged him to pass the army across the channel in two convoys. It is remarkable that, of so many ships employed several times in the passage this year or the year before, not one of those which carried the troops was lost; but, on the contrary, the greater part of the ships which returned empty, after having landed the soldiers of the first transport, and those built by Labienus, to the number of sixty, did not reach their destination; they were nearly all thrown back upon the coast of the continent. Cæsar, who had resolved to leave Britain only with the last convoy, waited for them some time in vain. The approach of the equinox led him to fear that the period favourable for navigation would pass by, and he decided on overloading his ships with soldiers, sailed in a moment of calm at the beginning of the second watch (nine o'clock), and, after a favourable passage, landed at daybreak. (¹)

This second expedition, though more successful

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 23.

than the first, did not bring as its result the complete submission of the isle of Britain. According to Cæsar, the Romans did not even obtain any booty; yet Strabo speaks of a considerable booty, ⁽¹⁾ and another author confirms this fact by relating that Cæsar formed out of the spoils of the enemy a cuirass ornamented with pearls, which he consecrated to Venus.⁽²⁾

IX. Several indications enable us again to fix precisely the period of the second expedition
 Observations to Britain. We know, from a letter from Quintus to his brother Cicero, that Cæsar was at the end of May at Lodi (we admit the 22nd of May). ⁽³⁾ He might therefore have arrived towards the 2nd of June on the shores of the ocean, where he inspected his fleet. During the interval before it assembled at the Portus Itius, he proceeded to the country of the Treviri, where he did not remain long; for, towards the middle of the summer (*ne æstatem in Treviris consumere cogeretur*), he started for Boulogne, where he arrived at the end of June. The winds from the north-west retained him there twenty-five days, that is, till towards the end of July. On another hand, Cicero wrote to Atticus on the 26th of July: "I see, from my brother's letters, that he must already be in

⁽¹⁾ Strabo, p. 167.

⁽²⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, IX, 116.—Solinus, LIII. 28.

⁽³⁾ "I have received, on the 4th of the nones of June (the 1st of June, according to the concordance here adopted, see *Appendix A*), your letter dated from Placentia; that of the following day, dated from Lodi, arrived on the very day of the nones (4th of June)." It was accompanied with a letter from Cæsar, expressing his satisfaction at the arrival of Quintus. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 15.)

Britain." (1) In reply to another letter of Quintus, dated on the 4th of the Ides of August (the 8th of August), he rejoices at having received on the day of the Ides of September (9th of September), the news of his arrival in that island. (2) These data fix the departure of the expedition to the end of July, for the letters took from twenty to thirty days to pass from Britain to Rome. (3) When the army moved from the coasts, the news was naturally much longer on the way; and in the month of October, Cicero wrote to his brother, "Here are fifty days passed without the arrival of letter or sign of life from you, or Cæsar, or even from where you are." (4) Having ascertained the month of July for that of his departure, we have next to find the day on which that departure took place.

Cæsar sailed at sunset, that is, towards eight o'clock (*solis occasu naves solvit, leni Africo provectus*). The wind having ceased at midnight, he was drawn by the currents towards the north; and when day broke, at four o'clock in the morning, he saw on his left the cliffs of the South Foreland; but then, the current

(1) Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 15. This letter was closed on the 5th of the calends of August, answering to the 26th of July.

(2) "I have received, on the day of the ides of September (the 9th of September), your fourth letter, dated from Britain on the 4th of the ides of August (8th of August)" (*Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 1.)

(3) "The 11th of the calends of October (16th of September) your courier arrived; he has taken twenty days on the road my uneasiness was mortal." (*Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 1.)—"Cæsar has written to me from Britain a letter, dated on the calends of September (28th of August), which I received on the 4th of the calends of October. It appears that affairs are not going on ill with him. Cæsar adds, to prevent me from being surprised at not hearing from you, that you were not with him when he came to the coast (23rd of September)." (4) Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 3

changing with the tide, by force of rowing he made land towards midday, as in the preceding summer, near Deal.

To determine the day on which Cæsar landed, it is necessary, in the first place, to know to what part the Roman fleet was carried during the night. It is evident, first, that it was borne towards the north-east by the current of the rising tide or flux, for otherwise we could not understand how Cæsar, at sunrise, could have perceived Britain on his left. We may add that it wandered from its way till it came to the latitude of the Northern Sea, which is situated to the east of Deal, and at about ten maritime miles from the coast. (*See Plate 14.*) In fact, according to the text, the fleet took advantage of the current contrary to that which had carried it away, and consequently of the reflux or current of the ebbing tide, to reach the coast. Now, we are obliged by this fact to conclude that it had been carried northward at least to the latitude of Deal; for, if it had only arrived to the south of that latitude, the reflux would necessarily have thrown it back into the Straits. Lastly, to cause the fleet by force of rowing and aided by the reflux to require eight hours to effect the last part of its passage to Deal, it must, according to the best information obtained from sailors, have been, at sunrise, ten miles from the coast.

This being granted, it is evidently sufficient, for determining the day of landing, to resolve this question: on what day of the month of July in the year 700 the current of the descending tide began to be perceived *at sunrise, that is, towards four o'clock in the morning,*

in the part of the sea at ten miles to the east of Deal? or otherwise, if we consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after the hour of high tide at Dover, (') what day of the month of July in the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o'clock at night?

By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to determine the day of Cæsar's first landing in Britain, and remarking that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July, 700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700, that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to Cicero's letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.

This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar, immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had taken fifteen hours. In

(') At ten miles to the east of Deal it is high tide half an hour later than at Dover, and the reflux begins there four hours after the hour of high tide.

the return, it only took nine hours, since Cæsar started at nine o'clock in the evening (*secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia*), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (*prima luce*), which, in the middle of September, is at six o'clock in the morning. ⁽¹⁾

The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who expresses himself thus: "On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar; the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October (21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are bringing back." ⁽²⁾ This information accords with the date of the equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to the "Commentaries," was close at hand (*quod equinoctium suberat*). Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.

X. Departure of Cæsar from Lodi ⁽³⁾.

May 22.

Presumed Dates of
the Second Cam-
paign in Britain.

Arrival at the army, in the
country of the Belgæ (in

12 days)

June 2.

Inspection of the fleet and of the winter

⁽¹⁾ Those who refuse to admit Boulogne and Deal for the points of Cæsar's embarking and landing, pretend that so long a time was not necessary to effect so short a passage. But a fleet requires a longer time to navigate the more numerous it is; resembling in that an army, which marches much more slowly than a single man.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 17.

⁽³⁾ To find the time required, we must suppose that, by some delay or by the absence of regular couriers, Cæsar's letter to Cicero had been thirteen days on the road between Lodi and Rome.

- quarters; junction of the four legions
in the country of the Remi, on the
Meuse, towards Sedan . From June 2 to June 7.
- Passage from Sedan to the country of
the Treviri (80 kilomètres, 3 days),
From June 8 to June 10.
- Occurrences among the Treviri,
From June 10 to June 15.
- Passage from Treviri to Boulogne (330
kil., 12 days) . . . From June 15 to June 26.
- Delay of 25 days at Boulogne,
From June 26 to July 20.
- Embarkment July 20.
- Landing July 21.
- Combat July 22.
- Cæsar returns to his fleet July 23.
- Ten days of reparations, From July 24 to August 2.
- New march against the Britons . . . August 3.
- Combat August 4.
- March towards the Thames (from the
Little Stour to Sunbury, 140 kilomè-
tres) From August 5 to August 11.
- March from the Thames to the *oppidum*
of Cassivellaunus, From August 12 to August 15.
- Time employed in negotiations and re-
ceiving hostages (8 days),
From August 16 to August 23.
- Return of Cæsar (in person) towards
the sea-coast. The 28th of August,
on his arrival at the fleet, he writes
to Cicero.—(*Epist. ad Quintum*, III.
1.) August 28.

March of his army to the coast,

From August 24 to Sept. 10.

Embarkation of the last convoy . . . Sept. 21.

XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (*Amiens*) the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent. ⁽¹⁾ The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (*to Saint Pol*), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (*at Charleroy*), with Quintus Cicero; ⁽²⁾ a third to the Essuvii (*at Sées, in Normandy*), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T. Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri (*at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe*). ⁽³⁾ He placed three

⁽¹⁾ Much uncertainty exists in regard to the distribution of the legions, yet the location of two of the winter quarters appears to us certain, Samarobriva (*Amiens*) and Aduatuca (*Tongres*). If now, from a point situate near to the Sambre, from Bavay as the centre, we describe a circle, we shall see that Cæsar's winter quarters, except those of Normandy, were all comprised in a radius of 100 miles, or 148 kilomètres. The researches which Major Cohausen kindly made for me, and those of MM. Stoffel and Locqueyssie, have enabled me to determine approximately the winter quarters.

⁽²⁾ The brother of the orator.

⁽³⁾ The Commandant of Artillery, De Locqueyssie, has found on the Ourthe,

in Belgium, ⁽¹⁾ one at Samarobriva itself (*Amiens*), under the orders of Trebonius; the second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor, at twenty-five miles from Amiens (*Montdidier*); the third under L. Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (*at Champlieu*). The legion last raised ⁽²⁾ among the Transpadans repaired with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (*Tongres*). ⁽³⁾ This distribution of the army appeared to

near the village of Lavacherie (*Duchy of Luxemburg*), the remains of a Roman camp with triangular fosses, and in a position which appears to agree with the date of the "Commentaries."

⁽¹⁾ Under the name of *Belgium*, we must only comprise a part of the peoples of Belgic Gaul, such as the Atrebatas, the Ambiani, and the Bellovaci. (*De Bello Gallico*, V. 24, 25, 46; VIII. 46)

⁽²⁾ *Unam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat*—According to the use of the good Latin writers, *proxime* does not mean *recently*, but *in the last place*. Through an incorrect interpretation of this phrase, General de Gœler has supposed that Cæsar had, at this time, brought from Italy the 15th legion, this legion, as we shall see, was only raised at a later period.

⁽³⁾ More than fourteen different localities have been proposed for identification with Aduatuca. If some writers have advanced good arguments for placing Aduatuca on the right bank of the Meuse, others have believed that they have offered equally good ones for seeking it on the left bank of that river, but the greater part of them have admitted this or that site for the most futile reasons. Nobody has dreamt of resolving the question by the simplest of all means—which consists in seeking if, among the different sites proposed, there is one which, by the form of the ground, agrees with the requirements of the narrative given in the "Commentaries." Now, Tongres is in this position, and it alone, and so completely satisfies them that we cannot think of placing Aduatuca elsewhere. In fact, Tongres is situated in the country occupied formerly by the Eburones, and, as Cæsar expresses it, *in modis finibus Eburorum*, which signifies entirely in the country of the Eburones, and not in the centre of the country. It is moreover enclosed in a circle of a hundred miles radius, comprising all the winter quarters of the Roman army except those of

Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148 kil.). It was Cæsar's intention not to leave them until he knew that the legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (*See Plate 14*, the sites of the winter quarters.)

There was among the Carnutes (*country of Chartres*) a man of high birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In consideration of his valour and of his important military services, Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of Tasgetius. (¹)

Roscus. This locality fulfils all the conditions required for the establishment of a camp; it is near a river, on a height which commands the neighborhood, and the country produces wheat and forage. At two miles towards the west is a long defile, *magna convallis*, the vale of Lowaige, where the relation of the massacre of the cohorts of Sabinus is perfectly explained. At three miles from Tongres we find a plain, separated from the town by a single hill; on the same side as this hill rises a rounded eminence—that of Berg, to which the name of tumulus may be fauly applied. Lastly, the Geer, the banks of which were formerly marshy, defended through a large extent the height of Tongres. (*See Plate 18*)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 25.

XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the lieutenants and the Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuna questor, the news that the legions had arrived and retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation of Ambiorix and Catuvoleus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran Indutiomarus, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the *vallum*. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm. Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate on their common interests. C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus

had no other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their counsel from the enemy.

Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some disaster. "The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt, started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she supports with impa-

tience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters."

Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the contrary opinion. "Let it then be as you will!" said Sabinus; and then, raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: "Death does not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war; they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine."

When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy. The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta, moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero, encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations; the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the troops, in full

security, begin their march in a long column, encumbered with a numerous baggage.

At the distance of three kilomètres (*a millibus passuum circiter duobus*) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in length (*magnam convalllem*). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood; (') it was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.

Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale, and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of the locality.

Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled, hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures—as happens to him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks—a general and a soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage and form the circle.

(') See the notice by M. M F. Driesen on the position of Aduatuca, in the *Bulletins de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, 2nd series, tom XV. No. 3.

This resolution, though justified by the circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and confusion.

The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.

The Eburones were rough adversaries; but by their number and their courage, the Romans might have maintained the struggle. Although abandoned by their chief and by fortune, they relied upon themselves for everything, and every time that a cohort fell upon the enemies, it made a great carnage of them. Ambiorix perceived this: he shouted loudly his commands that his men should throw their missiles from a distance, and not approach near; that they should retire whenever the Romans rushed forward, and only attack them in their retreat, when they returned to their ensigns—a manœuvre easy to the Eburones, practised in such exercises, and nimble on account of the lightness of their equipment.

The order was faithfully executed. When a co-

hort quitted the circle to charge the enemies, they fled with speed; but the cohort, in its advance, left its right flank (not protected, like the left flank, by the bucklers) exposed to the missiles; when it resumed its former position, it was surrounded on all sides both by those who had retreated, and by those who had remained on its flanks.

If, instead of sending forward their cohorts in succession, the Romans stood firm in their circle, they lost the advantage of attacking, and their close ranks made them more exposed to the multitude of missiles. Meanwhile, the number of the wounded increased every moment. It was two o'clock; the combat had lasted from sunrise, and yet the Roman soldiers had not ceased to show themselves worthy of themselves. At this moment the struggle becomes more desperate. T. Balventius, a brave and respected man, who, in the previous year, had commanded as *primipilus*, has his two thighs transpierced by a javelin; Q. Lucanius, an officer of the same grade, is killed fighting valiantly to rescue his son, who is surrounded by enemies. Cotta himself, while he runs from rank to rank to encourage the soldiers, is wounded in the face by a missile from a sling.

At this sight, Sabinus, discouraged, sees no other help but to treat with Ambiorix. Perceiving him at a distance in the act of urging on his troops, he sends to him his interpreter Cn. Pompeius, to pray him to spare him and his men. Ambiorix replies that he is quite willing to enter into negotiations with Sabinus, whose person he undertakes under the obligation of his oath to cause to be respected; that further, he

hopes to obtain from the Eburones safety of life for the Roman soldiers. Sabinus communicates this reply to Cotta, who is already wounded, and proposes that they should go together to confer with Ambiorix; this step may secure the safety of themselves and the army. Cotta refuses obstinately, and declares that he will never treat with an enemy in arms.

Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally, Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians, raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L. Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few, however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of this disaster. (¹)

XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediate-

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 37.

Attack on Cicero's
Camp

ly repairs with his cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades them.

These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence: they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii, with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans rush to arms, and mount the *vallum*; but that day they make head with difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this victory nothing further could resist him. ⁽¹⁾

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 39.

XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the camp, (¹) and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great number of stakes hardened by fire, and *pila* employed in sieges; they establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.

Meanwhile, the chiefs and *principes* of the Nervii proposed an interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to Sabinus: "All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the

(¹) The towers of the Romans were constructed of timber of small size, bound together by cross pieces. (See Plate 27, fig. 8) They still raise scaffolding at Rome in the same manner at the present day.

quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked." They added: "Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country. The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes." Cicero replied "that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would decide."

Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in circuit. ⁽¹⁾ On the following days, they raised towers to the height of the *vallum*, prepared hooks (*falces*), and covered galleries (*testudines*), which they had similarly been taught by the prisoners. ⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Although the text has *passuum*, we have not hesitated in substituting *pedum*, for it is very improbable that Gauls could have made, in three hours' time, a countervallation of more than 22 kilomètres.

⁽²⁾ The siege machine called *testudo*, "a tortoise," was ordinarily a gallery mounted upon wheels, made of wood strongly squared, and covered with a solid

On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of burning clay (*ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes*.⁽¹⁾) The barracks, roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of ladders, to scale the *vallum*; but such were the courage and steadiness of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the *val-lum*.⁽²⁾ The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be there, drew their men back, and, in blindness. It was pushed against the wall of the place besieged. It protected the workmen employed either in filling the fosse, or in mining the wall, or in working the ram. The siege operations of the Gauls lead us to presume that the camp of Cicero was in a fort surrounded by a wall. (*See, on the word falces, note (1) on p 143*)

(1) In the coal-basin, in the centre of which Charleroy is situated, the coal layers crop out of the surface of the soil on different points. Still, at the present day, they knead the clay with small coal. But, what is most curious, people have found at Breteuil (Oise), as in the ruins of Carthage, a quantity of ovoid balls made of pottery.

(2) It will be seen that we use indifferently the terms *vallum* and *rampart*

vado, invited, by their gesture and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.

Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for tending the wounded. ⁽¹⁾ The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero's danger.

Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of the day (four o'clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three legions—that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius, was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol. ⁽²⁾ (*See Plate 14.*)

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 8.

⁽²⁾ It has appeared to us that the movement of concentration of Cæsar

He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night, and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C. Fabius, to direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their quarters.

Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and next day, towards the third hour (ten o'clock), his couriers announced his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus. He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken

and Fabius did not allow the winter quarters of the latter to be placed at Therouanne or at Montreuil-sur-Mer, as most authors have supposed. These localities are too far distant from the route from Amiens to Charlevoix to have enabled Fabius to join Cæsar on the territory of the Atrebates, as the text of the Commentaries requires. For this reason, we place Fabius at Saint-Pol.

place among the Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in quitting his winter quarters.

Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter to him: it was written in Greek, ⁽¹⁾ in order that the enemy, if he intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter to the *amentum* (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words: *Θαρόρειν, βοήθειαν προσδέχου* ("Courage! expect succour"). ⁽²⁾ As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not

⁽¹⁾ The "Commentaries" say, *Græcis conscriptam litteris*; but Polyænus and Dio Cassius affirm that the letter was written in Greek.

⁽²⁾ Polyænus, *Strateg.*, VIII. xxiii. 6.

daring to penetrate to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days' march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000, marched to meet the legions.

Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of the Haine. ⁽¹⁾ Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops.

(1) We admit that Cicero encamped at Charleroi all circumstances concur in justifying this opinion. Charleroi is situated on the Sambre, near the Roman road from Amiens to Tongres (*Aduatuca*), and, as the Latin text requires, at fifty miles from this latter town. On the high part of Charleroi, where the camp was, no doubt, established, we command the valley of the Sambre, and we can see, in the distance towards the west, the country through which Cæsar arrived. Moreover, the valley of the Haine and mount Sainte-Aldegonde, above the village of Canières, agree perfectly with the details of the combat in which the Gauls were defeated.

Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march; he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching—mount Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men, without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.

That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with less danger. On the morrow, at day-break, the enemy's cavalry came up to the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.

The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had even abandoned the *vallum*, they approached nearer to it, threw their missiles over it from all sides, and caused

their heralds to proclaim round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o'clock), every Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.

Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero, where he arrived the same day.⁽¹⁾ The towers, the covered galleries, and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment. Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero's legion, nine-tenths of whom were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and

(1) From Amiens to Charleroi it is 170 kilomètres. Cæsar must have arrived on the territory of the Nervii, towards Cambrai, *the morning of the third day*, counting from his departure from Amiens, after marching ninety kilomètres. He immediately sends the Gaulish horseman to Cicero. This horseman has to perform eighty kilomètres. He can only take eight to nine hours, and arrive at the camp in the afternoon of the third day. He throws his javelin, which remains where it was fixed *the third and the fourth day*. *The fifth day* it was discovered, and the smoke of the fires is then seen. Cæsar, then, arrived on the fifth day (reckoning thirty kilomètres for a day's march) at Binche, twenty kilomètres from Charleroi. That town is on a sufficiently elevated knoll to allow the smoke to be seen. The siege lasted about fifteen days

soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt, and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans to be afflicted. (¹)

We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle invoked by Cotta, *not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in arms*, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof, in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to him. (²) If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning, he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his lieutenants, (³) which only happened in the year following, by the destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 53.

(²) "I have read with a lively joy what you tell me of the courage and strength of mind of Cæsar in this cruel trial" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Q. M. Tullium*, III. viii. 166.)

(³) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 67.—Polyænus, *Strateg.*, VIII. xxiii.

XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar's victory reached Labienus, across the country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero's camp, where Cæsar had only arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o'clock in the afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew during the night, and took all his troops with him.

These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen, along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that period. (¹) Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same positions. The gravity of the circumstances determined Cæsar to remain all the winter with the army. In fact, on the news of the disaster of Sabinus, nearly all the people of Gaul

(¹) One is on the site of the citadel of Amiens; the second is near Tiran-court; the third is the camp of l'Etoile. (See the *Dissertation sur les Camps Romains de la Somme*, by the Comte L. d'Allonville.)

showed a disposition to take arms, sent deputations and messages to each other, communicated their projects, and deliberated upon the point from which the signal for war should be given. They held nocturnal assemblies in bye-places, and during the whole winter not a day passed in which there was not some meeting or some movement of the Gauls to cause uneasiness to Cæsar. Thus he learnt from L. Roscius, lieutenant placed at the head of the 13th legion, that considerable troops of Armorica had assembled to attack him; they were not more than eight miles from his winter quarters, when the news of Cæsar's victory had compelled them to retreat precipitately and in disorder.

The Roman general called to his presence the *principes* of each state, terrified some by letting them know that he was informed of their plots, exhorted the others to perform their duty, and by these means maintained the tranquillity of a great part of Gaul. Meanwhile a vexatious event took place in the country of the Senones, a powerful and influential nation among the Gauls. They had resolved, in an assembly, to put to death Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for king. Cavarinus had fled; upon which they pronounced his deposition, banished him, and pursued him to the limits of their territory. They had sought to justify themselves to Cæsar, who ordered them to send him all their senators. They refused. This boldness on the part of the Senones, by showing to the barbarians some individuals capable of resisting the Romans, produced so great a change in their minds, that, with the exception of the Ædui and the

Remi, there was not a people which did not fall under suspicion of revolt, each desiring to free itself from foreign domination.

During the whole winter, the Treviri and Indutiomarus never ceased urging the people on the other side of the Rhine to take up arms, assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army had been destroyed. But not one of the German nations could be persuaded to pass the Rhine. The remembrance of the double defeat of Ariovistus and the Tencteri made them cautious of trying their fortune again. Deceived in his expectations, Indutiomarus did not discontinue collecting troops, exercising them, buying horses from the neighbouring countries, and drawing to him from all parts of Gaul outlaws and condemned criminals. His ascendancy was soon so great, that from all parts people eagerly sought his friendship and protection.

When he saw some rallying to him spontaneously, others, such as the Senones and the Carnutes, engaging in his cause through a consciousness of their fault, the Nervii and the Aduatuci preparing for war, and a crowd of volunteers disposed to join him as soon as he should have quitted his country, Indutiomarus, according to the custom of the Gauls at the beginning of a campaign, called together an assembly in arms. He pronounced Cingetorix, his son-in-law, who remained faithful to Cæsar, an enemy of his country; and announced that, in reply to the appeal of the Senones and Carnutes, he would go to them through the country of the Remi, whose lands he would ravage; but, above all, he would attack the camp of Labienus.

The latter, established on the Ourthe, master of a position naturally formidable, which he had further fortified, was in fear of no attack, but dreamt, on the contrary, of seizing the first opportunity of combating with advantage. Informed by Cingetorix of the designs of Indutiomarus, he demanded cavalry of the neighbouring states, pretended fear, and, letting the enemy's cavalry approach with impunity, remained shut up in his camp.

While, deceived by these appearances, Indutiomarus became daily more presumptuous, Labienus introduced secretly into his camp during the night the auxiliary cavalry, and, by keeping a close watch, prevented the Treviri from being informed of it. The enemy, ignorant of the arrival of this re-enforcement, advanced nearer and nearer to the retrenchments, and redoubled his provocations. They were unnoticed, and towards evening he withdrew in disorder. Suddenly Labienus causes his cavalry, seconded by his cohorts, to issue by the two gates. Foreseeing the rout of the enemy, he urges his troops to follow Indutiomarus alone, and promises great rewards to those who shall bring his head. Fortune seconded his designs; Indutiomarus was overtaken just at the ford of the river (the Ourthe), and put to death, and his head was brought into the camp. The cavalry, in their return, slew all the enemies they found in their way. The Eburones and the Nervii dispersed. The result of these events was to give to Gaul a little more tranquillity. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 58.

XVI. The Emperor Napoleon, in his *Précis des Guerres de César*, explains in the following manner the advantage the Romans drew from their camps:—

Observations

“The Romans owe the constancy of their successes to the method, from which they never departed, of encamping every night in a fortified camp, and of never giving battle without having behind them a retrenched camp, to serve them as a place of retreat, and to contain their magazines, their baggage, and their wounded. The nature of arms in those ages was such that, in these camps, they were not only in safety from the attacks of an equal army, but even an army which was stronger; they were the masters to fight or to wait a favourable opportunity. Marius is assailed by a cloud of Cimbri or Teutones; he shuts himself up in his camp, remains there until the favourable day or occasion comes, then he issues with victory before him. Cæsar arrives near the camp of Cicero; the Gauls abandon the latter, and march to meet the former; they are four times more numerous. Cæsar takes a position in a few hours, retrenches his camp, and in it he bears patiently the insults and provocations of an enemy whom he is not yet willing to combat; but a favourable opportunity is not long in presenting itself. He then issues through all his gates; the Gauls are vanquished.

“Why, then, has a rule so wise, so fertile in great results, been abandoned by modern generals? Because offensive arms have changed its character; arms for the hand were the principal arms of the ancients; it was with his short sword that the legionary con-

quered the world; it was with the Macedonian pike that Alexander conquered Asia. The principal arms of modern armies are projectiles; the musket is superior to anything ever invented by man; no defensive arm is a protection against it.

“As the principal arm of the ancients was the sword or the pike, their habitual formation was in deep order. The legion and the phalanx, in whatever situation they were attacked, either in front, or in right flank, or in left flank, faced everywhere without disadvantage; they could encamp on surfaces of small extent, in order to have less labour in fortifying the line of circuit, and in order to hold their ground with the smallest detachment possible. The principal arm of the moderns is the projectile; their habitual order has naturally been narrow order, the only one which permits them to bring all their projectiles to bear.

“A consular army enclosed in its camp, attacked by a modern army of equal force, would be driven out of it without assault, and without being able to use their swords; it would not be necessary to fill up the fosses or to scale the ramparts: surrounded on all sides by the attacking army, pierced through, enveloped, and raked by the fire, the camp would be the common drain of all the shots, of all the balls, of all the bullets: fire, devastation, and death would open the gates and throw down the retrenchments. A modern army, placed in a Roman camp, would at first, no doubt, make use of all its artillery; but, though equal to the artillery of the besieger, it would be taken in *rouage* and quickly reduced to silence;

a part only of the infantry could use their muskets, but it would fire upon a line less extended, and would be far from producing an effect equal to the injury it would receive. The fire from the centre to the circumference is null; that from the circumference to the centre is irresistible. All these considerations have decided modern generals in renouncing the system of retrenched camps, to adopt instead natural positions well chosen.

“A Roman camp was placed independently of localities: all these were good for armies whose strength consisted in arms used with the hand; it required neither experienced eye nor military genius to encamp well; whereas the choice of positions, the manner of occupying them and placing the different arms, by taking advantage of the circumstances of the ground, is an art which forms part of the genius of the modern captain.

“If it were said now-a-days to a general, You shall have, like Cicero, under your orders, 5,000 men, sixteen pieces of cannon, 5,000 pioneers’ tools, 5,000 sacks of earth; you shall be within reach of a forest, on ordinary ground; in fifteen days you shall be attacked by an army of 60,000 men, having 120 pieces of cannon; you shall not be succoured till eighty or ninety-six hours after having been attacked. What are the works, what are the plans, what are the profiles, which art prescribes? Has the art of the engineer secrets which can solve this problem?” (¹)

(¹) *Précis des Guerres de César*, by Napoleon, Chapter V 5.

CHAPTER IX.

(Year of Rome 701.)

(BOOK VI. OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI — SECOND PASSAGE OF THE RHINE—WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE TREVIRI.

I. THE state of Gaul gave Cæsar cause to anticipate serious agitations, and he felt convinced Cæsar augments his Army. of the necessity of new levies. He employed on this mission his lieutenants M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius; at the same time he asked Pompey, who had remained before Rome with the *imperium*, in order to watch over the public interests, to recall to their colours and send him the soldiers of Cisalpine Gaul enlisted under the consulate of the latter in 699. Cæsar attached, with a view to the present and to the future, great importance to giving the Gauls a high idea of the resources of Italy, and to proving to them that it was easy for the Republic, after a check, not only to repair its losses, but also to bring into the field troops more numerous than ever. Pompey, through friendship and consideration for the public good, granted his demand. Thanks to the activity of his lieutenants, before the end of winter three new legions (or thirty cohorts) were raised and joined to the army: the 1st, the 14th,

which had just taken the number of the legion annihilated at Aduatuca, and the 15th. In this manner, the fifteen cohorts lost under Sabinus were replaced by double their number, and it was seen, by this rapid display of forces, what was the power of the military organization and resources of the Roman people. It was the first time that Cæsar commanded ten legions.

II. After the death of Indutiomarus, the Treviri took for their chiefs some members of his family. These in vain urged the nearest peoples of the right bank of the Rhine to make common cause with them; but they succeeded with some of the more distant tribes, particularly the Suevi, and persuaded Ambiorix to enter into their league. From all parts, from the Rhine to the Scheldt, were announced preparations for war. The Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii, all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, were in arms. The Senones persisted in their disobedience, and acted in concert with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states; everything urged upon Cæsar the counsel to open the campaign earlier than usual. Accordingly, without waiting for the end of winter, he concentrates the four legions nearest to Amiens, his head-quarters (those of Fabius, Crassus, Cicero, and Trebonius), invades unexpectedly the territory of the Nervii, gives them time neither to assemble nor to fly, but carries off the men and cattle, abandons the booty to the soldiers, and forces this people to submission.

This expedition so rapidly terminated, the legions

War against the
Nervi General As-
sembly of Gaul

returned to their winter quarters. At the beginning of spring, Cæsar convoked, according to his custom, the general assembly of Gaul, which met, no doubt, at Amiens. The different peoples sent thither their representatives, with the exception of the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri. He regarded this absence as a sign of revolt, and in order to pursue his designs without neglecting the general affairs, he resolved to transfer the assembly nearer to the insurrection, to Lutetia. This town belonged to the Parisii, who bordered on the Senones, and although formerly these peoples had formed but one, the Parisii do not appear to have entered into the conspiracy. Cæsar, having announced this decision from the summit of his prætorium (*pro suggestu pronuntiata*), started the same day at the head of his legions, and advanced by forced marches towards the country of the Senones.

At the news of his approach, Acco, the principal author of the revolt, ordered the population to retire into the *oppida*; but, taken by surprise by the arrival of the Romans, the Senones employed the Ædui, once their patrons, to intercede in their favour. Cæsar pardoned them without difficulty, preferring to employ the fine season in war than in the search of those who were culpable. A hundred hostages exacted from the Senones were entrusted to the Ædui. The Carnutes imitated the example of the Senones, and, by the intermediation of the Remi, whose clients they were, obtained their pardon. Cæsar pronounced the close of the assembly of Gaul, and ordered the different states to furnish their contingents of cavalry. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 4.

III. Having pacified this part of the country, Cæsar turned all his thoughts towards the war with the Treviri and with Ambiorix, the chief of the Eburones. He was, above all, impatient to take a striking vengeance for the humiliation inflicted on his arms at Aduatuca. Knowing well that Ambiorix would not hazard a battle, he sought to penetrate his designs. Two things were to be feared: the first, that Ambiorix, when his territory was invaded, would take refuge among the Menapii, whose country, adjoining that of the Eburones, was defended by woods and vast marshes, and who, alone among the Gauls, had never made an act of submission; the second, that he might join the Germans beyond the Rhine, with whom, as was known, he had entered into friendly relations through the intermediation of the Treviri. Cæsar conceived the plan of first preventing these two eventualities, in order to isolate Ambiorix. Wishing, above all, to reduce to submission the Menapii and Treviri, and carry the war at the same time into the countries of these two peoples, he undertook in person the expedition against the Menapii, and entrusted that against the Treviri to Labienus, his best lieutenant, who had operated against them on several occasions. Labienus, after his victory over Indutiomarus, had continued in his winter quarters with his legions at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe. (') Cæsar sent him all the baggage of the

(') The "Commentaries," after having informed us (V. 24) that Labienus established himself in the country of the Remi, on the confines of that of the Treviri, give us afterwards to understand that he encamped among the Treviri, where he had passed the winter, "*Labienum cum una legione, quæ in eorum finibus hiemaverat.*" (VI 7) We believe, with certain authors, that the

army and two legions. He marched in person towards the country of the Menapii, at the head of five legions without baggage. He took with him Cavari- nus and the Senonese cavalry, fearing lest the resentment of this king against his people, or the hatred which he had drawn upon himself, might raise some disorders, and, following the general direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay, and Brussels, he reached the frontier of the Menapii. The latter, trusting in the nature of the ground, had assembled no forces, but took refuge in the woods and marshes. Cæsar divided his troops with the lieutenant C. Fabius and the questor M. Crassus, formed them into three columns, and, causing bridges to be hastily constructed, to cross the marshy water-courses, penetrated at three points into their territory, which he ravaged. The Menapii, reduced to extremity, demanded peace: it was granted to them on the express condition that they should refuse all shelter to Ambiorix or to his lieutenants. Cæsar left Commius among them with part of the cavalry to hold them under surveillance, and marched thence towards the country of the Treviri. (¹)

IV. On his part, Labienus had obtained brilliant successes; the Treviri had marched with considerable forces against his winter quarters. They were no more than two days' march

Success of Labienus
against the Treviri.

country in which he encamped was either on the boundary of the two countries, or ground of which the Remi and the Treviri disputed the possession. Is it not evident, moreover, that after the catastrophe of Aduatuca and the insurrection of the people seduced by Ambiorix, everything dictated to Labienus the necessity of engaging himself no further in a hostile country, by separating himself from the other legions?

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 6

from him, when they learnt that he had been joined by two other legions. Resolving then to wait the succour of the Germans, they halted at a distance of fifteen miles from the camp of Labienus. The latter, informed of the cause of their inaction, and hoping that their imprudence would present an opportunity for giving battle, left five cohorts to guard the greatest part of the baggage, and, with the twenty-five others and a numerous cavalry, established his camp within a mile of the enemy.

The two armies were separated by the river Ourthe, the passage of which was rendered difficult by the steepness of the banks. Labienus had no intention of crossing it, but he feared that the enemy might imitate his prudence until the arrival of the Germans, who were expected immediately. To draw them to him, he spread a rumour that he should withdraw on the morrow at break of day, in order to avoid having to combat the united forces of the Treviri and the Germans. He assembled during the night the tribunes and centurions of the first class, informed them of his design, and, contrary to Roman discipline, broke up his camp with every appearance of disorder and a precipitate retreat. The proximity of the camps allowed the enemy to obtain information of this movement by his scouts before daybreak.

The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross the river and advance un-

hesitatingly upon unfavourable ground. Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy, forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the *pila* are thrown from all sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.

Labienus employed those wise tactics to which the Romans owed their greatest successes. Invincible in their fortified camps, they could, as the Emperor Napoleon I. has so well remarked, either combat or wait for the opportune moment. The Gauls, on the contrary, warlike peoples, carried away by a fiery courage, not understanding the patience and wiliness of their adversaries, fell always into the snare which was laid for them. It was enough to feign terror, and inspire them with contempt for the enemy's forces, to make them engage instantly in disorderly attacks, which the Romans, by sudden sorties, easily defeated. This was the system followed by Sabinus when attacked by the Unelli, by Cæsar on his way to the relief of Cicero, and by Labienus himself in the previous year.

A few days afterwards the country submitted; for, on the news of the defeat of the Treviri, the Germans returned home, followed by the relatives of Indutiomarus, the author of the revolt. Cingetorix, constant in his fidelity to the Romans, was replaced at the head of the nation. The double object proposed by Cæsar was thus attained; for, on one hand, since the submission of the Menapii, Ambiorix could no longer dream of finding a refuge among them; and, on the other, the victory of Labienus, followed by the retreat of the Germans, placed it out of his power to league with these latter. Nevertheless, to assure this double result, punish the Germans for their readiness to succour the Treviri, and cut off Ambiorix from all retreat, Cæsar, after having effected his junction with Labienus, resolved to pass the Rhine a second time. (¹)

V. He had passed from the country of the Menapii into that of the Treviri, and had arrived
Second Passage of the Rhine near the locality where now stands the town of Bonn. He there caused a bridge to be built a little above the spot where his army had crossed two years before. In consequence of the experience gained by the processes employed on the former occasion, and of the extreme zeal of the soldiers, the work was finished in a few days. Having left for the protection of the bridge a strong detachment on the bank belonging to the Treviri, for fear of some movement on their part, Cæsar crossed the river with the legions and the cavalry. The Ubii, who had long before made their submission, assured him that they had

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 8.

neither sent assistance to the Treviri or violated their oath; that the Suevi alone had furnished auxiliaries; and that thus he ought not to confound them with the latter in his anger against the Germans. He accepted their excuses, and obtained information on the roads and passes which led to the country of the Suevi.

A few days afterwards, he learnt that the latter were concentrating on a single point their troops and the contingents of the tribes under their dependence. He provided for the supply of provisions, chose a favourable position for his camp, and enjoined the Ubii to transport their cattle and goods into their *oppida*, hoping to compel the barbarians by famine to fight at disadvantage. The Ubii were similarly charged to watch the enemy by means of numerous scouts. A few days later, they informed Cæsar that the Suevi, at the approach of the Romans, had retired, with all their troops and those of their allies, to the extremity of their territory. There lay the forest Bacenis, ⁽¹⁾ which advanced very far into the country, and which, placed like a natural barrier between the Suevi and the Cherusci, separated these two peoples and defended them against their mutual excursions. It was at the entrance to this forest, probably towards the mountains of Thuringia, that the Suevi had resolved to await the Romans.

In this expedition, as in the one preceding, Cæsar feared to engage himself too far in the middle of an uncultivated country, where provisions might have failed him. He therefore repassed the Rhine. But to keep the barbarians in fear of his return, and to

⁽¹⁾ See page 82.

prevent their re-enforcements from reaching the Gauls, he did not destroy the whole bridge, but only cut off 200 feet on the side of the Ubian bank; at the extremity of the truncated part he built a tower of four stories, and left on the left bank twelve cohorts in a retrenched post. Young C. Volcatius Tullus had the command of it. Cæsar's two expeditions to the right bank of the Rhine led to no battle, and yet the moral effect was so great, that after this period the Germans no longer supported the insurrections in Gaul, and even became the auxiliaries of the Romans. (¹)

VI. On the approach of harvest, Cæsar marched
War against Ambi-
onix. against Ambiorix, with his ten legions,
except the guard left at the bridge of the
Rhine. He started from Bonn, and advanced towards
the country of the Eburones, by way of Zulpich and
Eupen (*see Plate 14*), across the forest of the Ar-
dennes, which extended, it will be remembered, from
the banks of the Rhine to the country of the Nervii.
In the hope of surprising the enemy, he sent forward
M. Minucius Basilus, with all the cavalry, recommend-
ing to him not to light fires, which would reveal his
approach, and informing him that he should follow
him closely.

Basilus, faithful to his orders, fell by surprise on a
great number of Eburones, proceeded straight to-
wards the locality to which Ambiorix was said to
have retired with a few cavalry, succeeded in pene-
trating to the abode of this chieftain, and seized upon
all his effects; but the latter, protected by some of his

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 29.

followers, escaped on horseback through the woods; his partisans dispersed. It was thus that fortune, which plays so important a part in war, favoured at the same time the enterprise against Ambiorix and his escape. The Eburon chief sent secret messages in all directions, recommending the inhabitants to provide for their own safety. Some concealed themselves in the forest of the Ardennes, others in the midst of the marshes. Those who were nearest to the ocean sought refuge in the islands which are formed at high tide; others expatriated themselves, and settled in distant countries. Catuvolcus, king of one-half of the country of the Eburones, crushed with age and misfortunes, took poison, that he might not fall alive into the power of the Romans.

During this time, Cæsar was approaching the country of the Segni and Condrusi, ⁽¹⁾ who came to implore him not to confound in the same cause all the Germans beyond the Rhine, and protested their neutrality. The fact having been satisfactorily proved, Cæsar assured them that, if they would deliver up to him the Eburones who had sought refuge among them, their territory should be respected. Having arrived at Visé, on the Meuse, where a ford exists from time immemorial, he divided his troops into three bodies, and sent the baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca (*Tongres*): it was the place which had witnessed the recent disaster of Sabinus. He gave preference to this position, because the retrenchments of the pre-

⁽¹⁾ We must suppose from this that, during his march, Cæsar crossed the territory of the Segni and Condrusi, or that at least he passed not far from it. This consideration has induced us to extend this territory farther towards the north than is generally done. (See *Plates 1 bis and 13*)

ceding year, still standing, would spare the troops much labour. He left, as a guard for the baggage, the 14th legion, and placed it, with 200 cavalry, under the command of Quintus Cicero.

Of the nine legions remaining with Cæsar, three were sent with T. Labienus to the north towards the ocean, into the part of the country of the Eburones which touched on that of the Menapii; three to the south with C. Trebonius, to ravage the districts neighbouring on the Aduatuci (towards the south-west, between the Meuse and the Demer); lastly, Cæsar, at the head of the three others, advanced towards the Scheldt, the waters of which, at this period, mingled with those of the Meuse. ⁽¹⁾ (*See Plate 14.*) It was his intention to gain the extremity of the Ardennes (between Brussels and Antwerp), whither it was said that Ambiorix had retired with a few horsemen. He announced, on his departure, that he should return to Aduatuca on the seventh day, the period for the distribution of provisions to the legion which was left at that place in charge of the baggage. Labienus and Trebonius were, if they found it possible, to return at the same period, in order to concert again on the measures to be taken after they had made themselves acquainted with the designs of the enemy.

The Eburones had neither regular force, nor garrison, nor *oppidum*. They formed a scattered multitude, always in ambush, attacking the soldiers when

⁽¹⁾ Cæsar might very well say that the Scheldt mingles his waters with those of the Meuse. Several ancient authors share in this opinion. This took place by the eastern arm of the Scheldt, formerly more developed than in modern times, which spread itself in the space which, according to Tacitus, formed the *immense mouth of the Meuse* (*immensum Mosæ os*)

isolated, and obliging the Romans to carry on a harassing war, without any decisive result; for the nature of the country, covered with thick forests, and intersected by marshes, protected the barbarians, who could only be reached by small detachments. In the midst of these difficulties, Cæsar preferred doing less injury to the enemy, and sparing the lives of his own soldiers, by having recourse to the Gauls. He accordingly sent messages to invite the neighbouring peoples to come and ravage the territory of the Eburones, and assist him in exterminating a race guilty of having slaughtered his soldiers. At his call, numerous hordes rushed from all sides, and the entire territory of the Eburones was soon given up to pillage. (¹)

VII. Meanwhile, the seventh day, the period fixed for Cæsar's return, approached. Chance, The Sicambri attack Aduatuca. so common in war, brought about a remarkable incident. The enemy, scattered, and struck with terror, could no longer inspire the least fear. But rumour having spread beyond the Rhine, among the Germans, that all peoples were invited to ravage the country of the Eburones, the Sicambri, neighbours to the river, who had, as we have seen, received the Usipetes and Tencteri after their defeat, collect 2,000 cavalry; they pass the Rhine on rafts and boats, thirty miles below where Cæsar had built his bridge and left a guard (forty-five kilomètres below Bonn.) (²)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI 34.

(²) Forty-five kilomètres reckoned down from Bonn bring us to the confluence of the Wipper and the Rhine.

They invade the territory of the Eburones, pick up a crowd of fugitives, and seize upon a great number of cattle. The attraction of booty draws them on farther and farther; bred in the midst of war and plundering, nothing stops them—neither marshes nor woods. On their arrival at some distance from the Meuse, they learn from prisoners the absence of Cæsar and the distance of the army, and that in three hours they can reach Aduatuca, where the riches of the Romans are deposited. They are made to believe that this fortress is defended by a garrison too weak to line the walls or venture to issue from the retrenchments. Trusting in this information, the Germans hide their booty, and, guided by a prisoner, march against Aduatuca, crossing the Meuse at Maes-tricht.

Hitherto, Cicero had scrupulously executed Cæsar's order, and retained the troops in the camp without even permitting a single valet to quit it; but on the seventh day, reckoning no longer on the return of the general at the term fixed, he yielded to the complaints of the soldiers, who blamed his obstinacy in keeping them shut up as though they were besieged. He believed, moreover, that the nine legions, and the numerous cavalry which scoured the country, permitted him to venture without danger to a distance of three miles from his camp, especially after the dispersion of the enemy's forces; he therefore sent five cohorts to cut wheat in the nearest fields, situated to the north of Aduatuca, and separated from the camp only by a hill. With them went, under the same ensign, 300 men of different legions left sick, but then restored,

and a multitude of valets, taking with them a great number of beasts of burden, which were in the camp.

Suddenly the German cavalry arrive; their march had been concealed by the woods. Without halting, they rush toward the Decuman gate, and attempt to enter the camp. (*See Plate 18.*) The attack is so sudden, that the merchants established under the *vallum* have not time to enter. The soldiers, taken by surprise, are in confusion; the cohort on guard struggles to prevent the enemy from entering the gate. The Sicambri spread themselves round the camp, to discover another passage; but, fortunately, the nature of the locality and the retrenchments render access impossible everywhere but at the gates. They attempt to force an entry there, and are prevented with difficulty. The alarm and disorder are at their height. The soldiers are uncertain where to direct their steps, or where to assemble; some pretend that the camp is taken, others that the army and Cæsar have perished. A feeling of superstitious anxiety recalls to their minds the disaster of Sabinus and Cotta, slain at the same place. At the sight of such a general consternation, the barbarians are confirmed in their opinion that the Romans are too few to resist; they strive to force an entrance, and urge one another not to let so rich a prey escape.

Among the sick left in the camp was the primipilus P. Sextius Baculus, who had signalised himself in the preceding combats. For five days he had taken no food. Uneasy for the safety of all, as well as his own, he leaves his tent without arms, sees before him the enemy and the danger, snatches a sword from the first

man he meets, and takes his post at a gate. The centurions of the cohort on guard follow him, and all together sustain the attack for a few instants. Baculus, grievously wounded, faints. He is passed from hand to hand, and only saved with difficulty. This incident gives the others time to recover their courage. They remain on the rampart, and present at least some appearance of defence.

At this moment the soldiers who had gone out to reap were on their way back to the camp; they are struck with the cries they hear; the cavalry press forward, perceive the imminence of the danger, and see, with terror, that it is no longer possible to obtain refuge behind the retrenchments. The newly-levied soldiers, inexperienced in war, interrogate the tribune and centurions with their looks, and wait their orders. There is no one so brave as not to be agitated by so unexpected an event. The Sicambri, perceiving the ensigns at a distance, believe at first that the legions were returning, and cease from the attack; but soon, filled with contempt for such a handful of men, they rush upon them on all sides.

The valets take refuge on a neighbouring hill, that on which now stands the village of Berg. Driven from this post, they rush back into the midst of the ensigns and manipuli, and increase the fear of the already intimidated men. Among the soldiers, some propose to form in wedge, in order to open themselves a way to the camp they see so near them: the loss of a small number will be the safety of all. Others advise to remain firm on the heights, and run the same chance together. This latter opinion is not

that of the old soldiers, united under the same ensign. Led by C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, they fight their way through the enemy, and re-enter the camp without the loss of a single man. Under protection of this bold movement, the valets and cavalry succeed in following them. As to the young soldiers who had posted themselves on the heights, they were not able, in their inexperience, either to maintain their resolution to defend themselves in their position, or to imitate the successful energy of the veterans; they engaged on disadvantageous ground in an attempt to regain the camp, and their destruction would have been certain but for the devotedness of the centurions. Some had been promoted from the lowest ranks of the army to this grade, in reward for their courage; and for a moment they intimidated the enemy, by sacrificing their lives in order to justify their renown. This heroic act, contrary to all expectation, enabled three cohorts to re-enter the camp; the two others perished.

During these combats, the defenders of the camp had recovered from their first alarm. When they saw them stationed on the rampart, the Germans despaired of being able to force the retrenchments; they withdrew, and repassed the Rhine with their booty. The terror they had spread was such that, even after their retreat, when, the following night, C. Volusenus arrived at Aduatuca with the cavalry which preceded the legions, the return of Cæsar and the safety of the army seemed hardly credible. Men's minds were affected to such a degree that they supposed the cavalry alone had escaped from the disaster; for, they

said, the Germans would never have attacked the camp if the legions had not been defeated. The arrival of Cæsar alone dissipated all their fears.

Accustomed to the various chances of war, and to events which must be supported without complaining, he uttered no reproach; ⁽¹⁾ he merely reminded them that they should not have run the least risk by letting the troops go out of the camp; that, moreover, if they might blame fortune for the sudden attack of the enemy, they might, on the other hand, congratulate themselves on having driven them back from the gates of the camp. He was astonished, nevertheless, that the Germans, having crossed the Rhine for the purpose of ravaging the territory of the Eburones, should have acted so as to render the most signal service to Ambiorix, by coming to attack the Romans.

Cæsar, to complete the ruin of the Eburones, marched again, collected a great number of pillagers from the neighbouring states, and sent them in different directions in pursuit of the enemy, to plunder and burn everything. Their villages and habitations became, without exception, a prey to the flames. The cavalry scoured the country in all directions, in the hope of overtaking Ambiorix; the prospect of seizing him, and gaining thereby the gratitude of the general, made them support infinite fatigues, almost beyond human endurance. At every moment they believed they were on the point of seizing the fugitive, and continually the thick forests or deep retreats hid him

⁽¹⁾ Cæsar complained of the conduct of Quintus, when he wrote to Cicero the orator: "He did not keep within the camp, as would have been the duty of a prudent and scrupulous general." (Chaisius, p. 101.)

from their pursuit. At last, under protection of night, he reached other regions, escorted by four horsemen, the only friends left to whom he dared trust his life. Ambiorix escaped, but the massacre of the legion of Sabinus was cruelly avenged by the devastation of the country of the Eburones!

After this expedition, Cæsar led back to Durocor-torum (*Rheims*), the chief town of the Remi, the army diminished by the two cohorts lost at Aduatuca. He there convoked the assembly of Gaul, and caused judgment to be passed on the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes. Acco, the chief of the revolt, was condemned to death, and executed according to the old Roman custom. Some others, fearing the same fate, took flight. They were forbidden fire and water (that is, they were condemned to exile). Cæsar sent two legions to winter quarters on the frontier of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, and the six others among the Senones, at Agedincum (*Sens*). After providing for the provisionment of the army, he proceeded into Italy. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 42.

CHAPTER X.

(Year of Rome 702.)

(BOOK VII. OF THE "COMMENTARIES")

REVOLT OF GAUL—CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM—SIEGES OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA—CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE PARISII—SIEGE OF ALESIA.

I. THE Roman arms had in six years subjugated, one after another, the principal states of
Revolt of Gaul. Gaul. Belgium, Aquitaine, and the countries on the sea-coast, had been the theatre of the most desperate struggles. The inhabitants of the isle of Britain, like the Germans, had become prudent by the defeats they had suffered. Cæsar had just taken a signal vengeance upon the revolted Eburones, and thought that he might without danger leave his army and proceed into Italy, to hold the assemblies. During his abode in this part of his command, the murder of P. Clodius took place (the 13th of the Calends of February, 30th of December, 701), which caused a great agitation, and gave rise to the *Senatus-consultus*, which ordered all the youths of Italy to take the military oath; Cæsar took advantage of it to make levies also in the Province. The rumours of what was taking place at Rome soon passed the Alps, to revive the resentments and hopes of the Gauls; they believed that the domestic troubles would detain Cæsar in It-

aly, and would give rise to a favourable opportunity for a new insurrection.

The principal chiefs meet in secluded spots; mutually excite each other by the recital of their grievances, and by the remembrance of the death of Acco; promise great rewards to those who, at the peril of their lives, will commence the war; but decide that, before all, the return of Cæsar to his army must be rendered impossible, a project the execution of which was so much the easier, since the legions would not dare to leave their winter quarters in the absence of their general, and since the general himself could not join them without a sufficient escort.

The Carnutes are the first to offer to take arms: as the necessity of acting secretly did not allow them to exchange hostages, they exact as security an oath of alliance. This oath is taken by all the ensigns in a meeting in which the moment for the rising is fixed.

On the day appointed, the Carnutes, led by two resolute men, Cotuatus and Conetodunus, rush to Genabum (*Gien*), plunder and slaughter the Roman merchants, amongst others the knight C. Fusius Cita, charged by Cæsar with the victualling department. These news reached every state in Gaul with an extreme celerity, according to the custom of the Gauls of communicating remarkable events by cries transmitted from neighbour to neighbour across the country. ⁽¹⁾ Thus what had happened at Genabum at

⁽¹⁾ An ancient manuscript belonging to Upper Auvergne, the manuscript of Drugeac, informs us that this custom continued long in use, and that it still existed in the Middle Ages. Rough towers were built for this purpose on the heights, 400 or 500 mètres apart; watchmen were placed in them, who transmitted the news from one to another by sonorous monosyllables. A certain

sunrise, was known by the Arverni before the end of the first watch (towards eight o'clock at night), at a distance of 160 miles.

Vercingetorix, a young Arvernian who possessed great influence in his country, ⁽¹⁾ and whose father, Celtillus, for a time chief of all Gaul, had been put to death by his countrymen for having aspired to the royalty, calls his clients together, and excites their zeal. Expelled from Gergovia by those who were unwilling to tempt fortune with him, he raises the country, and, with the help of a numerous band, retakes the town, and causes himself to be proclaimed king. Soon he seduces the Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the Aulerci, the Lemovices of Armorica, the Andes, and the other peoples who dwell on the shores of the ocean. The commandment is given to him by unanimous consent. He exacts hostages from those peoples, orders a prompt levy of soldiers, fixes the number of men and arms which each country is to furnish in a given time, and occupies himself especially with the raising of the cavalry. Active, daring, severe, and inflexible even to cruelty, he subjects to the most atrocious tortures those who hesitate, and by these means of terror soon forms an army.

number of these towers still exist in the Cantal. If the wind prevented this mode of transmission, they had recourse to fire.

It is evident that criers had been posted beforehand from Genabum to Gergovia, since it was agreed that the Carnutes should give the signal of the war. It is exactly 160 miles (about 240 kilomètres), through the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, from Guen to Gergovia, the principal *oppidum* of the Arverni.

⁽¹⁾ "Hic corpore, armis, spirituque terribilis, nomine etiam quasi ad terrorem composito" (Florus, II. x. 21.)—Vercingetorix was born at Gergovia. (Strabo, IV, p. 158)

He sent a part of it to the Ruteni, under the command of Cadurcus Lucterius, a man full of daring; and to draw the Bituriges into the insurrection, he invaded their territory. By acting thus, he threatened the Province, and protected his rear whilst he moved towards the north, where the Roman occupation was concentrated. On his approach, the Bituriges solicited the help of the Ædui, their allies. The last, by the advice of Cæsar's lieutenants, who had remained with the army, sent them a body of cavalry and infantry to support them against Vercingetorix; but, when they reached the Loire, which separated the territory of the two peoples, these auxiliary troops halted for some days, and then returned, without having dared to cross the river, pretending that they had been betrayed by the Bituriges. Immediately after their departure, the latter joined the Arverni. ⁽¹⁾

II. Cæsar heard of these events in Italy, and, reassured on the troubles in Rome, which had
Cæsar begins the Campaign been appeased by the firmness of Pompey, he took his departure from Transalpine Gaul. When he arrived on the other side of the Alps (perhaps on the banks of the Rhone), he was struck with the difficulties which lay in the way of his joining the army. If he sent for the legions into the Roman province, they would be compelled, on their way, to fight without him; if, on the other hand, he would go to them, he was obliged to pass through populations to whom, notwithstanding their apparent tranquillity, it would have been imprudent to trust his person.

(1) *De Bello Gallico*, VII 5.

While Cæsar found so great difficulties before him, Lucterius, ⁽¹⁾ who had been sent by Vercingetorix to the Ruteni, brings them over to the alliance with the Arverni, advances towards the Nitiobriges and the Gabali, from whom he receives hostages, and, at the head of a numerous army, threatens the Province in the direction of Narbonne. These events made Cæsar resolve to proceed to that town. His arrival put an end to people's fears. He placed garrisons among the peoples who bordered on the territory of the enemy, the Ruteni of the left bank of the Tarn (*Ruteni provinciales*), the Volcæ Arecomici, the Tolosates, and near Narbonne. At the same time, he ordered a part of the troops of the province, and the re-enforcements which he had brought from Italy, to unite on the territory of the Helvi, which bordered upon that of the Arverni. ⁽²⁾ Intimidated by these dispositions, Lucterius did not venture to engage himself in the midst of these garrisons, and retired.

This first danger averted, it was important for Cæsar to prevent Vercingetorix from raising other peoples, who might perhaps be inclined to follow the example of the Bituriges. By invading the country of the Arverni, Cæsar might hope to draw the Gaulish chief into his own country, and thus remove him from those where the legions were wintering. He proceeded, therefore, to the country of the Helvi, where he

⁽¹⁾ Coins of Lucterius have been found, as well as of many of the Gaulish chiefs mentioned in the "Commentaries." The first has been described by MM. Mionet and Chaudruc de Crazannes (*Revue Numismatique*, t. V., pl 16, p. 333)

⁽²⁾ Their capital was Alba, now Aps (*Ardèche*). During recent researches, remains of an ancient road have been discovered, which passed by the places here indicated, and led from the land of the Helvi to the Vellavi and Arverni

joined the troops who had just concentrated there. The mountains of the Cévennes, which separated this people from the Arverni, were covered with six feet of snow; the soldiers opened a passage by dint of labour. Advancing by Aps and Saint-Cirgues, between the sources of the Loire and the Allier (*see Plate 19*), Cæsar debouched on Le Puy and Brioude. The Arverni, at this season, the most rigorous of the year, believed themselves defended by the Cévennes, as by an insurmountable wall: he fell upon them unexpectedly, and, in order to spread still greater terror, he caused the cavalry to scour the country far around.

Quickly informed of this march, Vercingetorix, at the prayer of the Arverni, who implored his succour, abandoned the country of the Bituriges. Cæsar had foreseen this; so he only remains two days amongst the Arverni, and, quitting them under the pretext of increasing his forces, he leaves the command to young Brutus, whom he enjoins to throw out his reconnoitring parties to as great a distance as possible, and promises to return at the end of three days. Having by this diversion drawn Vercingetorix southward, he proceeds in great haste to Vienne, arrives there unexpectedly, takes the newly-raised cavalry which he had sent thither, marches night and day, crosses the country of the Ædui, and directs his march towards the Lingones, where two legions were in winter quarters. By this extreme rapidity he seeks to prevent any evil design on the part of the Ædui. Scarcely has he arrived amongst the Lingones, when he sends orders to the other legions, two of which were on the frontiers of the Treviri, and the six others in the coun-

try of the Senones, to concentrate the whole army at Agedincum (*Sens*) before his march is known to the Arverni. As soon as Vercingetorix was informed of this movement, he returned with his army to the country of the Bituriges, and thence started to lay siege to Gorgobina (*Saint-Parize-le-Châtel*), an *oppidum* of the Boii, who had settled, after the defeat of the Helveti, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire. (¹)

III. Although Cæsar had succeeded in uniting his troops, and in placing himself at their head, he found it still difficult to fix upon a determined plan. If he opened the campaign too early, the army might run short of provisions through the difficulty of transport. If, on the other hand, during the rest of the winter, (²) his army, remaining inactive, allowed Vercingetorix to take Gorgobina, a place tributary to the Ædui, the example might discourage his allies and lead to the defection of the whole of Gaul. Rather than undergo such an affront, he resolved to brave all obstacles. He engaged the Ædui, therefore, to furnish provisions, announced his speedy arrival to the Boii, recommended them to remain faithful, and to offer an energetic resistance; and then, leaving at Agedincum two legions and the baggage of the whole army, he marched with the eight others towards the territory of the Boii. On

Taking of Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 9

(²) Since Cæsar did not start till after the murder of Clodius, which took place on the 13th of the Calends of February (December 30th, 701), and had raised troops in Italy, passed through the Roman province, penetrated over the Cevennes into Auvergne, and had thence returned to Vienne, it is probable that he did not arrive at Sens before the commencement of March.

the second day (¹) he arrived at Vellaunodunum (*Tri-*

(¹) The Latin term has *Altero die, quum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset*, &c. All authors, without exception, considering wrongly the expression of *altero die* as identical with those of *postero die*, *proximo die*, *insequenti die*, *pridie ejus diei*, have translated it by *the following day*. We consider that *altero die*, when used with regard to an event, signifies the second day which follows that of the said event.

Thus Cicero gives it this sense in his *Philippica Prima*, § 13, where he reminds us of the conduct of Antony after the death of Cæsar. Antony had begun by treating with the conspirators who had taken refuge in the Capitol, and, at a sitting of the Senate, which he called together *ad hoc*, on the day of the Liberalia, that is to say, the 16th of the Calends of April, an amnesty was pronounced in favour of the murderers of Cæsar. Cicero, speaking of this session of the Senate, says, *Proximo, altero, tertio, demque reliquis consecutis diebus*, &c. Is it not evident that here *altero die* signifies the second day which followed the session of the Senate, or two days after that session?

Here are other examples which show that the word *alter* must be taken in the sense of *secundus*. Virgil says (*Eclogue VIII.*, line 39), *Ager ab undecimo jam me ceperat annus*, which must be translated, *I was thirteen years old*. Servius, who composed a commentary on Virgil at a time when the traditions were still preserved, makes the following comment on this verse: *Id est tertius decimus Alter enim de duobus dicimus ut unus ab undecimo sit duodecimus, alter tertius decimus, et vult significare jam se vicinum fuisse pubertati, quod de duodecimo anno procedere non potest.* (Virgil, edit. Burmann, tom. I., p. 130.)

Forcellini peremptorily establishes that *vicesimo altero* signifies the *twenty-second legio altera vicesima* means the *twenty-second legion*.

The "Commentaries" inform us (*De Bello Civili*, III. 9) that Octavius, when besieging Salona, had established five camps round the town, and that the besieged took those five camps one after the other. The text is thus expressed *Ipsi in PROXIMA Octavii castra irruerunt. His expugnatis, eodem impetu, ALTERA sunt adorti; inde TERTIA et QUARTA, et deinceps RELIQUA.* (See also *De Bello Civili*, III. 83.)

In the "Commentaries" we find sixty-three times the expression *postero die*, thirty-six times *proximo die*, ten times *insequenti die*, eleven times *postridie ejus diei*, or *pridie ejus diei*. The expression *altero die* is used only twice in the eight books *De Bello Gallico*, viz., lib. VII. cc. 11 and 68, and three times in *De Bello Civili*, lib. III. cc. 19, 26, and 30. Is that coincidence alone not sufficient to make us suppose that *altero die* ought not to be confounded with the preceding expressions; and does it not appear certain that, if Cæsar had arrived at Vellaunodunum the morning after his departure from Agedincum, he would have written, *Postero die* (or *proximo die*) *quum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset*, &c.?

We believe, therefore, that we are authorised in concluding that Cæsar arrived at Vellaunodunum the second day after the army moved.

guères), a town of the Senones, and prepared to lay siege to it, in order to protect his rear and secure his supply of provisions. (*See Plate 19.*) The counter-vallation was finished in two days. On the third, the town offered to surrender: the capitulation was only accepted on condition of delivering up the arms, the beasts of burden, and 600 hostages. Cæsar left C. Trebonius, his lieutenant, to see the convention executed, and marched in haste towards Genabum (*Gien*), a town of the Carnutes. ⁽¹⁾ He arrived there

Farther on, on page 339, will be found a new confirmation of the sense which we give to *altero die*. It results from the appreciation of the distance which separates Alesia from the battle-field where Cæsar defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix. (See the opinions of the commentators on *altero die* in the sixth volume of Cicero, edit. Lemaire, *Classiques Latins, Excursus ad Philippicam primam.*)

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 11.—Contrary to the generally received opinion, we adopt *Gien* and not *Orléans* for the ancient Genabum, *Triguères* for Vellau-nodunum, *Sancerre* for Noviodunum, and, lastly, *Saint-Parize-le-Châtel* for the Gorgobina of the Boii.

As Cæsar's object, on quitting Sens, was to march as quickly as possible to the *oppidum* of the Boii, in order to raise the siege, since he starts without baggage, so as to be less impeded in his march, we will first examine the probable position of this latter town, before discussing the question relating to the intermediate points.

Gorgobina Boiorum After the defeat of the Helvetii, Cæsar allowed the Ædui to receive the Boii upon their territory, and it is probable that they were established on the western frontier, as in an advanced post against the Aiverni and the Bituriges. Several data confirm this opinion. Tacitus (*Hist.*, II. 61) relates that *Mariccus quidam, e plebe Boiorum, . . . concitis octo milibus hominum, proximos Æduorum pagos trahebat*. The possessions of the Boii were, therefore, contiguous to the Æduan territory. Pliny the Elder (*Hist. Nat.*, IV. 18) places the Boii in the number of the nations who inhabited the centre of the Lyonnaise. *Intus autem Ædui fœderati, Carnuti fœderati, Boii, Senones . . .* The place here occupied by the word *Boii* shows us again that this people was not far from the Ædui, the Senones, and the Carnutes. Lastly, the text of the "Commentaries" represents Vercingetorix as obliged to traverse the country of the Bituriges to repair to Gorgobina. The most plausible opinion is that which places the Boii between the Loire and the Allier, towards the confluence of these two rivers. This was already an old tradition, adopted in

in two days, and sufficiently early to surprise the inhabitants, who, thinking that the siege of Vellauno-

the fifteenth century by Raimondus Marlianus, one of the first editors of Cæsar. This space of ground, covered in its eastern part with woods and marshes, was admirably suited by its extent to the limited population of the Boii, who did not number more than 20,000 souls. Neither Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, marked on the map of Gaul as Gorgobina, nor La Guerche, proposed by General de Gœler, answer completely, by their topographical position, to the site of a Gaulish *oppidum*. In fact, Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier is far from being advantageously situated. this village stands at the foot of the hills which border the right bank of the Allier. La-Guerche-sur-Aubois fulfils no better the conditions of defence which must be required in the principal town of the Boii. it is situated almost in a plain, on the edge of a marshy valley of the Aubois. It presents a few remains of fortifications of the Middle Ages, but not a trace of more remote antiquity has been discovered in it. To seek Gorgobina farther down, and on the left bank of the Loire, is impossible, since, according to Cæsar, the Boii had been established on the territory of the Ædui, and the Loire formed the boundary between the Ædui and the Bituriges. If we are reduced to conjectures, we must at least admit as incontestable what is advanced by Cæsar.

The village of Saint-Parize-le-Châtel suits better. It is about eight kilometres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, nearly in the middle of the space comprised between the Loire and the Allier; it occupies the centre of an ancient agglomeration of inhabitants, which Guy Coquille, at the end of the sixteenth century, designates under the name of the *bourg de Gentilly*, and which the *chronicles* called, down to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, *Pagus Gentilius*, or *bourg des gentils*. The history of this people has this remarkable peculiarity, that, whilst all the neighbouring nations on the other side of the Allier and the Loire had, as early as the fourth century, accepted the Christian religion, they alone continued in idolatry until the sixth century. Does this fact apply to a tribe settled in a foreign country, as the Boii were, who would retain their customs and religion for a longer time unchanged? An ancient tradition states that, in the environs of Saint-Parize, there was, at a very remote period, a considerable town, which was destroyed by a fire. A few scattered foundations, discovered in the woods of Bord, to the south-west of Saint-Parize, seem to indicate the site of the *oppidum* of the Boii. The name of the castle, of the domain, and of the place called *Les Bruyères de Buy*, remind us of that of the Boii.

There was probably a Roman station at Saincaise-Meauce (thirteen kilometres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier), on the right bank of the Allier. In 1861, there were discovered there numerous objects of the Gallo-Roman period, and two busts in white marble, life-size, representing Roman emperors. At Chantenay, eight kilometres south from Saint-Pierre, a few Roman founda-

dunum would last longer, had not yet assembled sufficient troops for the defence of the place. The Ro-

tions have been found, and a considerable number of Gaulish coins, one of which, amongst others, bears the name of the *Æduan Litavicus*.

Genabum. The position of Gorgobina once established at the confluence of the Loire and the Allier, we must admit *Gien* as the ancient Genabum, and, not *Orleans*, for the following reasons:—

1st. We cannot believe that Cæsar, leaving Sens in spite of the rigour of the season, and in haste to raise the siege of Gorgobina, should, without any reason, have taken a circuitous road of seventy-five kilomètres, which would represent three or four days' march, in order to pass by Orleans. In fact, the distance from Sens to the confluence of the Allier and the Loire, is, by Orleans, 270 kilomètres, whilst it is only 180 kilomètres by the way of Gien.

2nd. From Sens to Gien the road was short and easy; on the contrary, from Sens to Orleans it was necessary to pass the great marsh of Sceaux and the forest of Orleans, probably impracticable. Now, the road indicated on the Peutingerian Table, as leading from Orleans to Sens, must have had a decided curve towards the south, and passed close by Gien, after having passed through *Aquæ-Segeste* (*Craon* and *Chenevière*), for the distance between Sens and Orleans is marked at fifty-nine Gaulish leagues, or 134 kilomètres. The Roman road, which leads directly from Sens to Orleans, by way of Sceaux, and which the itineraries do not mention, has only a length of 110 kilomètres: it is certainly less ancient than the former, and can never have been a Gaulish road.

3rd. The "Commentaries" inform us that the news of the insurrection of Genabum arrived in a short time among the Arverni (of whom Gergovia, near Clermont, was the principal centre), at a distance of 160 miles (237 kilomètres) from Genabum. Now, the distance from Gien to Gergovia, by the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, is 240 kilomètres, which agrees with the text, whilst from Orleans to the same spot it is 300 kilomètres.

4th. After having crossed the Loire at Genabum, Cæsar was in the territory of the Bituriges. This is true if he passed by Gien, and false if he passed by Orleans, since, opposite Orleans, the left bank belonged to the territory of the Carnutes. It is true that it has been pretended that Gien belonged to the ancient diocese of Auxerre, and that, consequently, it was in the territory of the Senones, and not in that of the Carnutes. The limits of the ancient dioceses cannot be considered as indicating in an absolute manner the frontiers of the peoples of Gaul, and we cannot admit that the territory of the Senones formed an acute angle upon the territory of the Carnutes, the summit of which would be occupied by Gien. Moreover, whatever change it may have experienced in feudal times, in regard to its diocesan attribution, Gien has never formed a part of the Orléanais, in its civil and political relations. In 561, Gien was included in the kingdom of Orleans and Burgundy.

We believe, therefore, that Genabum was, not old Gien, which, notwith-

man army took its position before the *oppidum*; but the approach of night made it necessary to post-

standing its epithet, may be posterior to Cæsar, but the present Gien. This little town, by its position on the banks of the Loire, besides containing a hill very appropriate for the site of an ancient *oppidum*, possesses sufficiently interesting ruins, and agrees much better than Old Gien with the *oppidum* of the Carnutes. Without attaching too great faith to traditions and etymologies, we must, nevertheless, mention a gate at Gien, which, from time immemorial, has been called Cæsar's Gate (*la Porte de César*), a street called *à la Genabye*, which leads, not towards Orleans, but towards the high part of the town; a piece of ground, situated to the north of Gien, at the angle formed by the road to Montargis and the Roman road, at a distance of about one kilomètre, which still preserves the name of the Field of the Camp (*La Pièce du Camp*). Perhaps this is the spot where Cæsar placed his camp, opposite the most accessible part of the town.

The principal reason why Orleans has been taken for Genabum is that the Itinerary of Antoninus indicates that town under the name of *Cenabum* or *Cenabo*, and that this name is also found in some lately discovered inscriptions. It may be supposed that the inhabitants of Gien, after having escaped from the destruction of their town, descended the river, and, on the spot where Orleans now stands, formed a new establishment, to which they gave the name of the first city; in the same manner the inhabitants of Bibracte removed to Autun, and those of Gergovia to Clermont.

Independently of the above considerations, Orleans, by its position on a declivity uniformly inclined toward the Loire, does not at all answer to the conditions of a Gaulish *oppidum*. If we admit Orleans to be Genabum, it becomes very difficult to assign a convenient site for the *oppida* of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.

Vellaunodunum. The situation of the territory of the Bon being admitted, as well as that of Genabum, we have to find, on the road which Cæsar pursued from Sens to Gorgobina, the intermediate points of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.

On the direct line from Sens to Gien, at the distance of 40 kilometres from Sens, we meet with the little town of Triguères. The hill which overlooks it from the north agrees with the position of the ancient *oppidum*. The remains of walls, fosses, and parapets have been found on it. Farther, there were discovered in 1856, at 500 mètres to the north-west of Triguères, the ruins of a large semi-elliptical theatre, capable of containing from 5,000 to 6,000 spectators. In another direction, the ruins of a Druidical monument have been pointed out, in fact, everything leads to the belief that there existed at Triguères, in the Gallo-Roman period, an important centre, which had been preceded by a Gaulish establishment anterior to the conquest. A road paved with stones, considered by some as a Gaulish or Celtic way, but accepted by all

pone the attack until the following morning. However, as Genabum had a bridge on the Loire adjoining

archæologists as a Roman road, goes direct from Sens to Tiguères, by Courtenay, and passes along the eastern side of the *oppidum*. Another ancient way leads similarly from Tiguères to Gien. We feel no hesitation, after what precedes, in placing Vellaunodunum at Tiguères.

It will be objected that the distance from Sens to this little town (40 kilomètres) is too small to have taken the Roman army, without baggage, three days' march, but Cæsar does not say that he employed three days in proceeding from *Agedincum* to *Vellaunodunum* he informs us merely that, leaving all his baggage at Agedincum, he journeyed towards the country of the Boii, and that on the second day he arrived at Vellaunodunum. Nothing, therefore, obliges us to suppose that, before it marched, the Roman army was concentrated or encamped at Agedincum itself. Persons unacquainted with military art are apt to suppose that an army lives and marches always concentrated on one point.

Cæsar, although he was effecting the concentration of his troops before entering into campaign, did not keep them massed at the gates of Sens, but he probably distributed them in *échelon* in the neighbourhood of the town, along the Yonne. When afterwards he decided on marching to the succour of the Boii, we must suppose that the first day was employed in concentrating the whole army at Sens itself, in leaving the baggage there, perhaps also in crossing the Yonne, a long operation for more than 60,000 men. The first day having passed, the army continued its march next day, and arrived at Tiguères the day following, having performed two days' march of 20 kilomètres each. We see, then, that the distance between Sens and Tiguères does not prevent us from identifying this latter locality with Vellaunodunum. Tiguères is distant 44 kilomètres from Gien, the distance which separated Vellaunodunum from Genabum, and which might have been marched in two days.

Noviodunum. To find the site of Noviodunum, we must seek a position which agrees best with the "Commentaries" in the triangle formed by the three known points, Gien, Le Bec-d'Allier, and Bouiges. Since, according to the text, Vercingetorix did not raise the siege of the town of the Boii until he had heard of Cæsar's arrival on the left bank of the Loire, and since the two hostile armies, marching towards each other, met at Noviodunum, it follows that this last-named town must be about half-way between the spot where the Loire was passed and the town of the Boii; on another hand, since Cæsar took several days to reach Bouiges from Noviodunum, there must have been a rather considerable distance between those two last-named towns. Moreover, in order that the inhabitants of Noviodunum should have seen in the distance, from the top of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, the town must necessarily have been situated on an eminence. Lastly, the cavalry combat, fought at a small distance from the town, proves that the ground was sufficiently flat to permit that engagement.

to the town, Cæsar kept two legions under arms to watch it, in the fear that the besieged might escape

It is, therefore, because certain points hitherto indicated do not answer to the conditions required by the text, that we have not admitted, as representing Noviodunum, the towns of Nouan-le-Fuselier, Pierrefitte-sur-Saure, Nohant-en-Goût, Neuzy-en-Sullias, or Neuzy-sur-Barangeon. In fact, some of these are too far from Bec-d'Allier, while others are too near Bourges, and most of them are situated in a plain.

Sancerre, on the contrary, answers all the conditions of the text. It is situated on a hill which rises 115 mètres above the valley watered by the Loire. Encircled on all sides by deep ravines, it can only be approached from one point, situated to the east, where the ancient Roman road of Bourges terminated, which is still at the present day called the Big Road (*le Gros Chemin*). The Abbé Lebœuf, as early as 1727, had designated this town as the ancient Noviodunum. It is near Saint-Satur, at the very foot of the mountain of Sancerre, that a Gallo-Roman town existed, of which, within the last few years, numerous foundations have been found. It is probable that this Gallo-Roman town had succeeded to a great centre of Gaulish population, for the Bituriges must necessarily have occupied in their territory a point so admirably fortified by nature, and which commanded the course of the Loire, the line of boundary between them and the Ædui. The present town seems to have kept within the very limits of the ancient *oppidum*; it has the form of an ellipse of from 700 to 800 mètres in length on a breadth of about 500 mètres, capable of containing a population of from 4,000 to 5,000 inhabitants. At Sancerre there was also, at the extremity of one of the streets, towards the north, a gate called the Gate of Cæsar (*Porte de Cæsar*), which was demolished in the beginning of the nineteenth century. By adopting Sancerre, all the movements of the commencement of the campaign of 702 are easily explained. This town is forty-six kilomètres from Gien, forty-eight kilomètres from Le Bec-d'Allier, distances nearly equal, so that Vercingetorix and Cæsar, starting almost at the same time from two opposite points, may have met under its walls. Its elevated position allowed the eye to range far towards the south along the valley of the Loire, through which the inhabitants would have seen the approach of the cavalry of Vercingetorix. Cæsar may have occupied with his army the heights of Verdigny or Saint-Satur, to the north of Sancerre. A cavalry engagement may have taken place in the valley of Saint-Satur, or on the plain between Ménétrol and Saint-Thibaud. The captain of staff Rouby has examined with the greatest care the places just mentioned.

Cæsar, after the surrender of Noviodunum, marches towards Bourges. Vercingetorix follows him by short marches (*minoribus itineribus*). The Roman general, having Bourges before him, and a hostile army on his left, marches slowly and with precaution. Perhaps he took three or four days to perform the forty-five kilomètres which separate Sancerre from Bourges. At last, after

during the night. And, in fact, towards midnight they silently issued from Genabum and began to pass the river. Cæsar, informed by his scouts, set fire to the gates, introduced the legions he had kept in reserve, and took possession of the place. The fugitives, who were closely crowded together at the issues of the town, and at the entrance of the bridge, which were too narrow to allow them to pass, fell nearly all into the hands of the Romans. Genabum was plundered and burnt, and the spoil abandoned to the soldiers. Then the army passed the Loire, arrived on the territory of the Bituriges, and continued its march.

The town of Noviodunum (*Sancerre*), belonging to this latter people, lay in Cæsar's route; he undertook to lay siege to it. The inhabitants were already hastening to make their submission, and a part of the hostages had been delivered, when they saw in the distance the cavalry of Vercingetorix, who, warned of the approach of the Romans, had raised the siege of Gorgobina, and marched to meet them. At this sight, the besieged, mustering courage again, seize their arms, shut their gates, and man the wall. The Roman cavalry was immediately sent to meet the enemy; staggered at the first shock, it was on the point of giving way; but soon, supported by about 400 German cavalry, in Cæsar's pay since the commencement

having reconnoitred the site of Avaricum, he must have traversed the marshes of the Yèvre, at a distance of three or four kilomètres from that town, so as to take up a position to the south-east of the *oppidum*, in that part which was not surrounded by the river and the marshes, and which only offered a narrow passage. As to Vercingetorix, he follows, or rather hovers on, the Roman army, taking up his position on its left, and still keeping up his communication with Avaricum, hesitating whether he shall deliver it to the flames

of the campaign, they entirely routed the Gauls. This defeat having again spread terror in the town, the inhabitants delivered up the instigators of the revolt, and surrendered. Cæsar marched thence, through the fertile territory of the Biturges, towards Avaricum (*Bourges*), the largest and strongest *oppidum* of that people. The taking of this town, he considered, would render him master of the whole country. (¹)

IV. Vercingetorix, after having experienced so many reverses successively at Vellaunodunum, Siege of Avaricum. at Genabum, and at Noviodunum, convokes a council, in which he explains the necessity of adopting a new system of warfare. Above all, according to him, they must take advantage of the season, and of the numerous Gaulish cavalry, to cut off the Romans from provisions and forage, sacrifice private interest to the common welfare, set fire to the habitations, burgs, and *oppida* which they could not defend, so as to spread desolation from the territory of the Boii as far as the enemy could extend his incursions. If that be an extreme sacrifice, it is nothing in comparison with death and slavery.

This advice having been unanimously approved, the Bituriges, in one single day, set fire to more than twenty towns; the neighbouring countries follow their example. The hope of a speedy victory made them support this painful sight with resignation. They deliberated whether Avaricum should not undergo the same fate; the Bituriges implored them to spare one of the most beautiful towns in Gaul, the

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 13.

ornament and bulwark of their country; "the defence of it will be easy," they added, "on account of its almost inaccessible position." Vercingetorix, at first of a contrary opinion, ended by giving way to this general feeling of compassion, entrusted the place to men capable of defending it, and, following Cæsar by short marches, pitched his camp in a spot defended by woods and marshes, sixteen miles from Avaricum ⁽¹⁾ (two kilomètres to the north of *Dun-le-Roy*, at the confluence of the Auron and the Taisseau).

Avaricum was situated, as Bourges is at present, at the extremity of a piece of ground surrounded, to the north and west, by several marshy streams: the Yèvre, the Yévrette, and the Auron. (*See Plate 20.*) The Gaulish town, adorned with public places, and enclosing 40,000 souls, exceeded, no doubt, in extent the Gallo-Roman circuit. The aspect of the locality is certainly no longer the same: the marshes have been dried, and the courses of water reduced within regular limits; the ruins accumulated so many centuries ago have raised the level of the ground on many points. To the south of Bourges, at a distance of 700 mètres, the ground forms a neck, which, in the time of Cæsar's wars, was narrower than at present;

(1) Archæologists have pretended they find traces still existing of the camp of Vercingetorix in the neighbourhood of Bourges, not considering that Cæsar declares that the Gaulish chief did not, for the first time, think of retrenching his camp in the Roman fashion till after the siege of this town. We believe that Vercingetorix, although he came from the east, encamped to the south of Bourges. It was, indeed, natural that he should place himself between the Roman army and the land of the Arverni, whence, probably, it drew its provisions. Besides, if he had placed his camp to the east of Bourges, he would have intercepted the provisions which Cæsar expected from the land of the Ædui, which the text does not say.

it inclined more towards the place, and presented, at 80 mètres from the walls, a sudden depression, resembling a vast fosse. (*See the section along C D.*) The slopes, then, abrupt towards the Yévrette and the Auron, defined more clearly the only and very narrow avenue (*unum et perangustum aditum*) which gave access to the town. ⁽¹⁾

Cæsar established his camp behind this tongue of land, to the south, and at 700 mètres from Avaricum, between the Auron and the Yévrette. As the nature of the locality prevented all countervallation, he took his dispositions for a regular siege. The place was only open to attack towards that part of the enclosure which faced the avenue, on a width of from 300 to 400 Roman feet (about 100 metres). In this place the summit of the walls commanded by about 80 feet (twenty-four mètres) the ground situated in advance. ⁽²⁾ Cæsar commanded a terrace to be commenced, covered galleries to be pushed towards the *oppidum*, and two towers to be constructed.

⁽¹⁾ The ravine which descends to the Auron is still recognised at the present day, between the Portes Saint-Michel and Saint-Paul, by the sudden incline of the ground. Old plans of Bourges designate it by the name of the *Vallée Saint-Paul*. The opposite ravine, which runs towards the Porte Bourbonnoux, has disappeared under the successive fillings up composing the soil of the garden of the archbishop's palace. The ridge of land forming the avenue cannot have been in Cæsar's time more than 100 mètres broad. It has lost its primitive physiognomy, especially by the formation of the Place Sérancourt, in 1700, on a site the level of which did not then exceed that of the field of the present fair. The depression of the ground which existed before the wall is more visible; it has been filled up during the different sieges of Bourges.

⁽²⁾ This is evident, since the Romans, in order to be able to give the assault, were obliged to construct a terrace eighty feet high. General de Gœler believed this measurement exaggerated. Nevertheless, as this terrace was constructed in a ravine, it was necessary that it should compensate a difference of level of eighty mètres, of which thirty, perhaps, represent the height of the wall.

During the execution of these works, trusty messengers informed Vercingetorix every moment of what was going on in Avaricum, and carried back his orders. The besiegers were watched when they went to forage, and, notwithstanding their precaution to choose every day different hours and roads, they could not move any distance from the camp without being attacked.

The Romans incessantly demanded provisions from the Ædui and the Boii; but the first showed little haste to send them, and the latter, poor and weak, had exhausted their resources; moreover, their country had just been laid waste by fire. Although, during several days, the troops, deprived of corn, lived only on cattle which had been brought from afar, yet they uttered no complaint unworthy of the Roman name and of their preceding victories. When, visiting the works, Cæsar addressed by turn each of the legions, and offered to the soldiers to raise the siege if they felt their privations too rigorous, they unanimously called upon him to persevere: "they had learned," they said, "after so many years that they served under his command, never to suffer anything that was humiliating, and to leave nothing unfinished." They renewed this protest to the centurions and to the tribunes.

The towers already approached the walls, when prisoners informed Cæsar that Vercingetorix, from want of forage, had quitted his camp, leaving in it the mass of his army, and had advanced nearer to Avaricum with his cavalry and light infantry, with the intention of laying an ambush on the spot where

he expected that the Romans would go to forage the following day. (1) Upon this information, Cæsar, seeking to take advantage of the absence of Vercingetorix, started silently in the middle of the night, and came in the morning near the camp of the enemies. As soon as they were acquainted with his march, they hid their baggage and wagons in the forests, and drew up their troops on an open height. Cæsar immediately ordered his soldiers to lay down their bundles in one spot, and to keep their arms ready for combat.

The hill occupied by the Gauls rose with an easy slope above a marsh which, surrounding it on nearly all sides, rendered it difficult of access, although it was only fifty feet broad. They had broken the bridges, and, full of confidence in their position, drawn up according to tribes, and guarding all the fords and passages, they were ready to fall upon the Romans, if the latter attempted to overcome this obstacle. With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the

(1) Vercingetorix, encamped first towards Dun-le-Roi, had approached nearer Bourges. He had established his new camp to the east of that of Cæsar, perhaps at La Chenevière, at the confluence of the Yèvre and the brook of Villabon, fourteen kilomètres from Bourges.

more they were bent upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same day he led them back to the siege operations.

Vercingetorix, on his return to his army, was accused of treason, for having placed his camp nearer to that of the Romans, taken away with him all the cavalry, left his infantry without a head, and facilitated, by his departure, the sudden and so well-calculated arrival of the enemy. "All these incidents," they said, "could not be the effect of chance; evidently Vercingetorix preferred owing the empire of Gaul to Cæsar than to his fellow-citizens." As the improvised chief of a popular movement, Vercingetorix had to expect one of those fickle demonstrations of the multitude, who are rendered fanatical by successes, and unjust by reverses. But, strong in his patriotism and in his conduct, he justified easily to his followers the dispositions he had taken. "The scarcity of forage only has decided him, at their entreaties, to change the position of his camp; he has chosen a new position, which is impregnable; he has employed the cavalry, which is useless in a marshy place, to advantage. He has transferred the command to nobody, for fear that a new chief, to please bands without discipline, incapable of supporting the fatigues of war, might let himself be persuaded to give battle. Whether it were chance or treason which had brought the Romans before them, they ought to thank Fortune for it, since they had retired with disgrace. He has no desire to obtain the supreme authority from Cæsar

at the price of a guilty defection: victory will soon give it him. It is now no longer doubtful. As to himself, he is ready to lay down an authority which would be only a vain honour, and not a means of delivery;" and, to prove the sincerity of his hopes, he brought forward slaves who had been made prisoners, whom he represents as legionaries, and who, at his instigation, declare that in three days the Romans will be obliged by want of provisions to raise the siege. His discourse is received by the acclamations of the army, and all signify their applause by the clang of their arms, according to the Gaulish manner. It is agreed to send 10,000 men to Avaricum, taken among the different contingents, so that the Bituriges alone should not have the glory of saving a town upon which depended in a great measure the fate of the war.

The Gauls, endowed with the genius of imitation, struggled by all means possible against the wonderful perseverance of the Roman soldiers. They turned away the rams with pointed heads (*falces*) ⁽¹⁾ by means of nooses, and, when they had once caught hold of them, they dragged them up by means of machines. ⁽²⁾ Accustomed to work in the iron mines, and to the construction of subterranean galleries, they skilfully countermined the terrace, and also provided their walls with towers of several stories, covered

(1) See the quotation from Vegetius, p. 143, note (1).

(2) We read in Vitruvius, on occasion of the siege of Marseilles: "When the tortoise approached to batter the wall, they let down a cord furnished with a slip-knot, in which they caught the ram, and raised its head so high, by means of a wheel, that they prevented its striking the wall." (Vitruvius, X. 16)

with leather. Day and night they made sallies, and set fire to the works of the besiegers. As the daily increase of the terrace heightened the level of the towers, the besieged raised theirs to the same height by means of scaffoldings; they stopped the progress of the subterranean galleries, prevented them from being advanced to the walls by trying to break them open with pointed stakes hardened in the fire (*aper-tos cuniculos præusta ac præacuta materia . . . morabantur*), ⁽¹⁾ and by throwing molten pitch and blocks of stone.

The Gauls constructed their walls in this manner: beams were placed horizontally on the ground, in a direction perpendicular to the line of the enclosure, ⁽²⁾ at intervals of two feet from each other; they were bound together on the side of the town by cross-beams, usually of forty feet in length, firmly fixed in the ground, and the whole covered with a great quantity of earth, except on the exterior side, where the intervals were furnished with large blocks of rock, and formed a facing. After this first layer had been well fixed and rendered compact, they raised upon it a second, absolutely similar, taking care that the beams were not exactly above each other, but corresponded

⁽¹⁾ Titus Livius expresses himself thus in speaking of the besieged in Ambracia, who dug a mine to meet that of the enemies. "*Aperiunt viam rectam in cuniculum.*" (XXXVII. 7.)

⁽²⁾ Several authors have thought that these beams, instead of being placed perpendicularly to the direction of the wall, were placed parallel to that direction. This interpretation appears to us inadmissible. The beams so placed would have no solidity, and would easily have been torn down. We see on the Trajan Column walls constructed as we describe; moreover, the Latin expression *trabes directæ* can leave no doubt, for the word *directus* means always *perpendicular to a direction*. (See *De Bello Gallico*, IV 17, *directa materia injecta*, and the dissertation in the *Philologus*, Jahrganges 19, Heft. 3.)

with the intervals filled in with stones, in which they were, as it were, enchased. The work was thus continued until the wall had attained the required height. These successive layers, in which the beams and stones alternated regularly, offered, by their very variety, an agreeable appearance to the eye. This construction had great advantages for the defence of places: the stone preserved it from fire, and the wood from the ram; held together by the cross-beams, the beams could be neither torn down nor driven in. (*See Plate 20.*)

Notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defence, and the cold and continual rains, the Roman soldiers surmounted all obstacles, and raised in twenty-five days a terrace 330 feet wide by 80 feet high. It already nearly touched the town wall, when, towards the third watch (midnight), clouds of smoke were seen issuing from it. It was the moment when Cæsar, according to his custom, was inspecting the works, and encouraging the soldiers at their labour; the Gauls had set the terrace on fire from the gallery of a mine. At the same instant cries arose from the whole extent of the rampart, and the besieged, rushing out by two gates, made a sally on the two sides where the towers were; from the top of the walls some threw dry wood and torches on the terrace, others pitch and various inflammable materials; nobody knew whither to run nor where to give help. As two legions, however, generally passed the night under arms in front of the camp, whilst the others relieved each other alternately for the work, they were soon able to face the enemy; meanwhile some drew

back the towers, and others cut the terrace to intercept the fire; the whole army, in fact, hurried to put out the latter.

When day broke, they were still fighting on every point; the besieged had the more hope of conquering, as the penthouses which protected the approaches to the towers were burnt (*deustos pluteos turrium*), ⁽¹⁾ and as then the Romans, compelled to march without cover, could with difficulty arrive at the burning works. Persuaded that the salvation of Gaul depended on this critical moment, they replaced incessantly the troops which were weary. Then happened a fact worthy of notice: before the gate of the *oppidum* there was a Gaul who threw balls of grease and pitch into the fire opposite a Roman tower; a dart shot from a *scorpion* ⁽²⁾ struck him in the right side and killed him. The next man immediately takes his place, and perishes in the same manner; a third succeeds him, then a fourth, and the post is only abandoned after the extinction of the fire and the retreat of the assailants.

After so many fruitless efforts, the Gauls resolved next day to obey the order of Vercingetorix, and evacuate the place. His camp not being far off, they hoped, by favour of the night, to escape without great loss, reckoning on a continuous marsh to protect their

(1) The name of *pluteus* was given generally to all kinds of covering with hurdles or with skins (Festus, in voce *Pluteus*.—Vitruvius, X 20)—Vegetius (IV. 15) applies the name of *pluteus* to a kind of penthouse, of wicker-work or skins, mounted on three wheels, and protecting the men placed behind it, so that they might shoot at the defenders

(2) They gave this name to a small engine resembling the balistæ, which threw darts. These scorpions composed, as it were, the field-artillery of the ancients.

flight. But the women, in despair, struggle to retain them, and, seeing that their supplications had no effect, to such an extent does fear extinguish pity, they give warning to the Romans by their cries, and thus compel the Gauls to renounce their intended flight.

The day following Cæsar caused a tower to be advanced, and the works to be prosecuted with vigour; an abundant rain, and the negligence of the enemy in guarding the wall, engaged him to attempt an assault. He thereupon ordered the work to be slackened without entirely stopping it, in order not to awaken suspicions, assembled his legions under arms, sheltered behind the covered galleries (*vineas*), and informed them that they were going to reap the fruit of so many fatigues. He promised rewards to those who should be first to scale the wall of the town, and gave the signal. The Romans at once rushed forward from every side, and reached the top of the ramparts.

The enemies, terrified by this unexpected attack, and thrown down from the tops of the walls and towers, sought refuge in the public places, and formed in wedges, so as to offer a resistance on all sides; but when they saw that the Romans, instead of descending into the town, went round it on the ramparts, they were afraid of being shut in, and threw down their arms and fled towards the other extremity of the *oppidum* (where are at present the faubourgs Taillegrain and Saint-Privé). (*See Plate 20.*) Most of them were killed near the gates, the narrow passage of which they blocked up; the others by the cavalry outside the town. No one among the Roman soldiers thought of plunder. Irritated by the remem-

brance of the massacre of Genabum, and by the fatigues of the siege, they spared neither old men, women, nor children. Of about 40,000 combatants, scarcely 800 fugitives were able to join Vercingetorix. He, fearing that their presence, if they came in a body, might excite a mutiny, had, in the middle of the night, sent trusty men and the principal chiefs a long way out, to distribute them in fractions among the camps belonging to the different tribes.

The next day Vercingetorix sought, in a general assembly, to revive the courage of his countrymen, by ascribing the success of the Romans to their superiority in the art of sieges, which was unknown to the Gauls. He told them that this reverse ought not to dishearten them; that his advice, they well knew, had never been to defend Avaricum; that a signal revenge would soon console them; that, through his care, the countries separated from the common cause would enter into his alliance, animate Gaul with the one thought, and cement a union capable of resisting the whole world. Then this fearless defender of the national independence shows his genius in taking advantage even of a misfortune to subject his ill-disciplined troops to the rough labours of war, and succeeds in convincing them of the necessity of retrenching their camp in the manner of the Romans, so as to protect it from surprise.

The constancy of Vercingetorix, after so great a reverse, and the foresight which he had shown in recommending, from the beginning of the war, to burn, and afterwards to abandon Avaricum, increased his influence. So the Gauls, for the first time, fortified their

camp, and their courage was so much confirmed, that they were ready to undergo all trials.

Vercingetorix, true to his engagements, exerted himself to the utmost to gain over to his cause the other states of Gaul, and to seduce the chiefs by presents and promises; and, for this purpose, he sent to them zealous and intelligent agents. He caused the men who had fled from Avaricum to be clothed and armed anew, and, in order to repair his losses, he required from the divers states a contingent at a stated period, and archers, who were very numerous in Gaul. At the same time Teutomatus, son of Ollovico, King of the Nitiobriges, whose father had received from the Senate the title of friend, came to join him with a numerous corps of cavalry, raised in his own country and in Aquitaine. Cæsar remained some time in Avaricum, where he found great store of provisions, and where the army recovered from its fatigues. (¹)

V. The winter was drawing to a close, and the season was propitious for the continuation of military operations. As Cæsar prepared to march against the enemy, either in order to draw him from the woods and marshes, or to shut him up in them, the *principes* of the Ædui came to request him to put an end to dissensions among them which threatened to degenerate into civil war. "The situation was most critical. In fact, according to ancient customs, the supreme authority was only granted to a single magistrate, named for a year. At that moment, however, there were two, each claiming to

Arrival of Cæsar at
Decetia, and March
towards Auvergne

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VII 32.

have been legally elected. The first was Convictolitavis, a young man of illustrious birth; the second, Cotus, sprung from a very ancient family, powerful also by his personal influence, his alliances, and whose brother, Valetiacus, had the year before filled the same office. The country was in arms, the Senate divided like the people, each of the pretenders at the head of his clients. The authority of Cæsar alone could prevent civil war."

The Roman general considered it essential to prevent troubles from arising in an important state, closely attached to the Republic, and where the weakest party would not fail to call in the aid of Vercingetorix. Consequently, notwithstanding the inconvenience of suspending the military operations and moving from the enemy, he resolved to repair to the Ædui, whose first magistrate, according to the laws, could not leave the territory. Having thus aimed at proving to them the respect which he entertained for their institutions, he arrived at Decetia (*Decize, in the Nivernais*), where he called before him the Senate and the two pretenders. (¹) Nearly the whole nation came thither. Cæsar, having acquired the conviction that the nomination of Cotus was the result of an intrigue of the minority, obliged him to resign, and maintained Convictolitavis, who had been chosen by the priests, according to the legal forms and customs of the country.

After this decision, he engaged the Ædui to forget

(¹) It is very probable that Cæsar proceeded first to Noviodunum (*Nevers*), since he informs us that he had established in that town a great magazine and provisions of every kind.

their quarrels, and to devote themselves entirely to the war; Gaul once subjected, he would recompense them for their sacrifices. He exacted from them all their cavalry and 10,000 infantry, intending to distribute them in such a manner as to ensure the regularity of the victualling department. He next divided his army into two bodies. Labienus, detached with two legions and part of the cavalry, had instructions to take at Sens the two other legions which Cæsar had left there, and to repair, at the head of those four legions, to the country of the Parisii, who had been drawn by Vercingetorix into the revolt.

On his part, Cæsar resolved, with the six other legions and the rest of the cavalry, to invade the country of the Arverni themselves, the focus of the insurrection. He started from Decetia, and directed his march upon Gergovia, the principal *oppidum* of that people.

After the capture of Avaricum, Vercingetorix, suspecting Cæsar's ulterior designs, had moved towards the Allier, which the Romans were obliged to pass in order to reach Gergovia; and, on the news of their march, he had caused all the bridges to be destroyed.

Cæsar, having arrived on the banks of the Allier, towards Moulins (*see Plate 19*), followed its downward course, on the right bank. Vercingetorix, on his part, marched along the opposite bank. The two armies were within sight of each other, the camps nearly opposite, and the Gaulish scouts, who watched the left bank, prevented the Romans from establishing a bridge. The position of the latter was difficult, for the Allier, which is fordable in the autumn only,

might delay their passage a long time. ⁽¹⁾ In order to surmount this obstacle, Cæsar had recourse to a stratagem: he fixed his camp in a place covered with wood, opposite the remains of one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be destroyed (probably at Varennes). There he remained hidden the following day with two legions, and made the rest of the troops, as well as the baggage, proceed in the usual order. But, that they might present to the enemy the appearance of six legions, he had divided into six corps the forty cohorts or four legions which he sent forward. ⁽²⁾ They received the order to march as long as possible, in order to attract Vercingetorix, and, at the time Cæsar presumed that they had arrived at their camp, he caused the bridge to be rebuilt on the old piles, the lower part of which remained untouched. The work being soon completed, the legions which remained with him passed the river, and, after having chosen a favourable position, he recalled the mass of his army, which rejoined him during the night. ⁽³⁾ When Vercingetorix was informed of this manœuvre, fearing lest he should be compelled to fight against his will, he took the start and marched in great haste to occupy the *oppidum* of the Arverni.

From the place he occupied, which we believe to have been Varennes, ⁽⁴⁾ Cæsar reached Gergovia in

⁽¹⁾ At present the Allier is fordable almost everywhere in summer; but in the course of nineteen centuries the bed of the river must have been considerably raised.

⁽²⁾ The commentators are not agreed on this passage. I have adopted the version which seemed to me the best, and which MM. Kochly and Rustow have followed in their German translation, Stuttgart, 1862.

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 35

⁽⁴⁾ Cæsar, on leaving Decize, followed, no doubt, the Gaulish road which led

five days; on the very day of his arrival, after a slight skirmish of cavalry, he reconnoitred the position of the town. As it was built on a very high mountain of difficult access, he considered it impossible to take it by assault; he therefore resolved to blockade it, and not to begin investing it until he had assured his provisions. (*See Plate 21.*)

VI. The *oppidum* of the Arverni was situated at a distance of six kilomètres to the south of Clermont-Ferrand, on the mountain which has preserved the name of Gergovia. Its summit, elevated about 740 mètres above the level of the

Blockade of Gergo-
vix

to the Allier, and the existence of which may be assumed from the later construction of the Roman road which goes from Decize to Bourbon-l'Archambault (*Aquæ Borvoniis*), and which crossed the Allier a little below Moulins. Thence he followed the course of the river for some days, constantly in face of the enemy. In order to pass it by the help of a stratagem, he took advantage of the remains of a bridge; and, as this bridge indicates that there must have been a road, it becomes a question to find among the ancient roads which crossed the Allier that which Cæsar followed. Now we only know two Roman roads leading to the Allier below Moulins, one at Varennes, the other at Vichy. We adopt Varennes. That locality is seventy-seven kilomètres from Gergovia, reckoning them along the Allier, and Cæsar took five days to perform them; but, as the four legions sent forward to deceive the enemy returned during the night, in order to rejoin him, they must have suffered great fatigues, hence it is to be presumed that the next day the first march was very short. The fifth also was not long, for, according to the "*Commentaries*," Cæsar had time on the day of his arrival to fortify his camp, to reconnoitre the place, and to engage in a cavalry combat. Besides, the country, interspersed with woods and marshes, was unknown to him; and we believe that we do not depart from the truth if we admit that the first and the last march were of no more than ten kilomètres, and the three others of nineteen, which gives a total of seventy-seven kilomètres, the distance from Varennes to Gergovia. When Cæsar left Gergovia, he crossed the Allier again, but at a point nearer to Gergovia, being in haste to place the river between him and the enemy. Indeed, on the second day after his check, he fought a successful cavalry engagement, broke up his camp, and the following day (*tertio die*) crossed the Allier again, according to our opinion, at Vichy, which is only fifty-five kilomètres from Gergovia.

sea, and 380 above the plain, forms a plateau of 1,500 mètres in length by more than 500 mètres in breadth. The northern and eastern slopes present such abrupt declivities that they defy the escalade. The southern slope presents a very different character: it may be compared to an immense staircase, the steps of which would be vast terraces with very little inclination, and a breadth which in some places extends to as much as 150 mètres.

On the western side, the mountain of Gergovia is attached by a narrow defile of 120 mètres in width, called the *Goules* (see *Plate 21, C*), to the heights of Risolles, an irregular mass, the plateau of which is at a mean depth of about 30 mètres beneath that of Gergovia. To the west are the detached mountains of Montrognon and Le Puy-Giroux. This latter is separated from that of Risolles by a rather deep gorge, in which the village of Opme is built. Opposite the southern slope of Gergovia, at the very foot of the mountain, rises a very steep hill, called the Roche Blanche. Its culminating point is at about 108 mètres below the plateau. Two brooks, the Auzon and the Artières,⁽¹⁾ tributaries of the Allier, flow, one to the south, the other to the north of Gergovia. Lastly, a low tract of ground, situated to the east, indicates the site of the ancient marsh of Sarlièves, which has been dry since the seventeenth century.

Cæsar established his camp near the Auzon, on the undulations of the ground which extend to the north-

(¹) The Artières receives, on the north of Gergovia, the little brook of Clémensat, marked on *Plate 21*.

west of the village of Orcet, and as far as the ancient marsh of Sarlièves. These undulations form a natural *glacis* towards the plain, above which they rise about thirty mètres; on the side of the stream of the Auzon they terminate in almost imperceptible slopes. The camp occupied a part of the table-land and of the northern slope. (¹) (*See Plate 21.*)

Vercingetorix had arranged the contingents of each country separately, at small intervals, on the southern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia and the mountain mass of Risolles which look towards the Auzun; they covered all the heights attached to the principal mountain, and presented, in the space which the eye could embrace, a formidable aspect. (²) His principal camps were situated between the outer wall of the *oppidum* and a wall of large stones, six feet high, which ran along the bend of the hill.

Every day, at sunrise, the chiefs who composed the council of Vercingetorix repaired to him in order to

(¹) It is by seeking the essential conditions required for the placing of troops that Commandant Baion Stoffel succeeded in finding the camps. Cæsar had to place from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of water, at a convenient distance from Gergovia, and in such a manner as to preserve his line of operation upon Nevers, where his magazines were. These necessities indicated that the principal camp would be near the Auzon, and to the east. Moreover, it must be sufficiently near the *oppidum*, that from the top of the mountain of Gergovia could be seen what was going on in it; and yet sufficiently distant that the objects could not be clearly distinguished. The camp must be in the plain; Dio Cassius (XL. 36) formally says, “Cæsar remained in the plain, not having been able to take (for placing his camp) a place strong by its elevation;” and then the “Commentaries” inform us that the Romans only occupied one single hill, namely, the one they took by surprise (La Roche-Blanche). Lastly, it was indispensable that there should be in front of the camp a space sufficiently large to admit of cavalry engagements.

(²) Vercingetorix, placed in the centre of a kind of semicircle, might easily be considered by Cæsar as surrounded by his numerous troops (*collocaverat copias circum se*).

make their reports or to receive his orders. Every day, also, he tried in slight engagements ⁽¹⁾ the courage of his cavalry mixed with archers. The Gauls occupied, as an advanced post, but by a weak garrison, La Roche-Blanche, which, scarped on three sides, presented an extremely strong position; Cæsar judged that, by taking possession of this hill, he would deprive the Gauls almost entirely of forage and water, for they could no longer descend to the Auzon, the only considerable stream in the neighbourhood. He started from the camp in the silence of the night, drove away this post before it could be succoured from the town, took the position, and placed two legions upon it. The Roche-Blanche became his smaller camp; ⁽²⁾ it was joined to the larger one by a

⁽¹⁾ The combats of cavalry took place in the plain which extends from the small eminence called *Le Puy-de-Marmant* to the marsh of Sarlièves.

⁽²⁾ This hill is certainly the Roche-Blanche, for it is situated opposite the *oppidum* (*e regione oppidi*), it begins at the very foot of the slopes of the mountain of Gergovia (*sub ipsis radicibus montis*), is singularly fortified by nature, and, as it were, cut out from all sides (*egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcissus*). So long as the Gauls occupied it, they could go to the Auzon by the ravine of Merdogne, to obtain water and forage; but as soon as it was in the power of the Romans, the Gauls were compelled to draw their water from the springs on the mountain of Gergovia, and from the little brook of Artières.

The excavations made in 1862 brought the two camps to light. The fosses of the little camp are clearly defined in the calcareous soil. They form an irregular outline, represented on *Plate 22*. The Roche-Blanche, which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by successive landslips, the last of which took place within memory of the inhabitants. The communication between the great and little camps was composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth of the two together is only twelve feet. If we wonder that the Romans should have dug two little ditches, each six feet broad and four feet deep, instead of making one eight feet wide by six feet deep, which would have given the same amount of soil to take out, it may be answered that the two little ditches were much more quickly made than one large ditch.

double ditch of twelve feet, which allowed the troops to communicate in safety, even singly, without fear of being surprised by the enemy. (*See Plate 22.*)

During this time, the Æduan Convictolitavis, who, as we have seen, owed the supreme magistracy to Cæsar, seduced by the money of the Arverni, resolved to abandon the party of the Romans, and entered into communication with several young men, at whose head was Litavicus and his brothers, descended from an illustrious family. He shares with them the price of his treason; exhorts them to remember that, born free, they are made to command in their country; proves to them that the lukewarmness of the Ædui alone delayed the general insurrection; and that they ought to value above everything the independence of their country. Seduced by such discourses and by the bait of gold, those young men occupy themselves only with the means of executing their project; yet, mistrusting the inclination of the people to be drawn into war, they decide that Litavicus shall take the command of the 10,000 men who were to join the Roman army, and induce them to revolt on the road, whilst his brothers go before them to Cæsar.

Litavicus began his march. At thirty miles from Gergovia (probably at Serbannes), he halts his troops, assembles them, and, spreading the report that Cæsar has caused the Æduan nobility and knights who were in his pay to be massacred, among others Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he easily persuades them to go and join the Arverni at Gergovia, instead of proceeding to the Roman camp. But, before taking this determination, he gives up to plunder the convoy of provi-

sions which marched under his guard, causes the Romans who conducted it to be put to death with tortures, and then sends messengers to raise the whole country of the Ædui, by means of the same imposture. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whose death he had falsely announced, were with Cæsar, who, by special favour, had raised Viridomarus from a very low to a high dignity. The former, informed of the design of Litavicus, came in the middle of the night to acquaint the proconsul with it, imploring him not to allow the folly of a few young men to detach his country from the Roman alliance. It would be too late when so many thousands of men had embraced the contrary party.

Cæsar, more affected by this news as he had always favoured the Ædui, takes immediately four legions, without baggage, and all the cavalry; he waits not even to contract the compass of the two camps, for everything depends upon celerity. His lieutenant, C. Fabius, is left to guard them, with two legions. He orders the brothers of Litavicus to be placed under arrest, and learns that they have just passed over to the enemy. His soldiers, encouraged to support the fatigues of the march, follow him with ardour, and at about twenty-five miles from Gergovia (near Randan, on the road which Litavicus had to follow to join Vercingetorix) they meet the Ædui. The cavalry, sent in advance, have orders to stop them without using their arms. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been reported as dead, step forth from the ranks, speak to their fellow-citizens, and are recognised. As soon as the deception practised by

Litavicus is discovered, the *Ædui* throw down their arms, ask for pardon, and obtain it. Litavicus flies to Gergovia, with his clients, who, in Gaul, never abandoned their patrons, not even in their worst fortunes.

Cæsar sent to the *Ædui* to represent to them how generously he had acted towards men whom the laws of war authorised him to put to death; and, after having given his army three hours' rest during the night, he returned to his quarters before Gergovia. Half-way, horsemen came to inform him of the perilous position of Fabius. The camps had been attacked by troops which were unceasingly renewed. The Romans were exhausted by unceasing labour, for the great extent of the enclosure obliged them to remain continually on the *vallum*. The arrows and missiles of all sorts thrown by the barbarians had wounded a great number; but, on the other hand, the machines had been of great help in supporting the defence. After the retreat of the enemies, Fabius, expecting to be again attacked next day, had hastened to block up the gates of the great camp, with the exception of two, and to add a palisade to the *vallum*. On receiving this information, Cæsar hurried his march, and, seconded by the ardour of his soldiers, arrived at the camp before sunrise (having thus performed fifty miles, or seventy-four kilomètres, in twenty-four hours. (¹)

	HOUS
(¹) Cæsar starts at four o'clock in the morning, and arrives at Randan at one o'clock in the afternoon	9
Employs in negotiation from one o'clock to seven o'clock... ..	6
Repose from seven o'clock to ten o'clock in the evening.	3
Hurried return from Randan to Gergovia, from ten o'clock to four o'clock in the morning.	6
Duration of Cæsar's absence.....	<u>24</u>

While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Ædui, also deceived by the news which Litavicus had spread, fall upon the Roman citizens, plunder their goods, kill some, and drag others to prison. It is Convictolitavis, also, who prompts these violences. The military tribune M. Aristius, who was on his way to join his legion, as well as the foreign merchants who resided in the country, are compelled to leave Cabillonum (*Châlon-sur-Saône*). An escort is promised to protect them; but they have hardly started when they are attacked and stripped. They defend themselves, and their resistance, which lasts during twenty-four hours, calls a greater multitude to arms. However, as soon as the Ædui hear of the new submission of their troops, they exert themselves to the utmost to obtain their pardon; they have recourse to Aristius, throw the blame of the outbreak upon a few, order the plundered goods to be collected, and confiscate those of Litavicus and his brothers. They send deputies to Cæsar to excuse themselves. Their object, in acting thus, was to obtain the free disposal of their troops, for the consciousness of their treason and the fear of punishment made them, at the same time, conspire in secret with the neighbouring states.

Although informed of these secret plots, Cæsar received their deputies with kindness, declaring that he did not hold the nation responsible for the fault of some individuals, and that his feelings towards the Ædui were not changed. Nevertheless, as he foresaw a general insurrection of Gaul, which would surround him on all sides, he entertained serious thoughts of abandoning Gergovia, and again effecting the con-

centration of his whole army; but it was of importance that his retreat, caused by the sole fear of a general defection, should not appear to be a flight.

In the midst of these cares, the besieged offered him a favourable chance, of which he sought to take advantage. As he was visiting the little camp to inspect the works, he perceived that a hill (no doubt the hill marked *A*, which forms part of the mountain mass of Risolles, *see Plate 21*), which was almost hidden from sight by the masses of enemies on the previous days, was clear of troops. Astonished at this change, he inquired the cause of the deserters, who came every day in crowds to surrender to him. All agreed in saying, as his scouts had already reported to him, that the mountain ridge to which this hill belonged (the top of the heights of Risolles) was almost flat, was connected with the town, and gave access to it by a narrow and wooded defile. (*See Plates 21 and 22.*) This point caused particular anxiety to the enemy; for if the Romans, already masters of La Roche-Blanche, gained possession of the mountain mass of Risolles, the Gauls would be almost entirely invested, and could neither escape nor go to forage. This was the reason why Vercingetorix had decided upon fortifying these heights, and had called thither all his troops. ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Plate 22* shows the places which Cæsar's eye could embrace from the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor the country situated on the northern slopes of the mountains of Gergovia and Risolles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (*dorsum ejus jugi*) was not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (*ad alteram partem oppidi*) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the Goules, which separates Risolles from Gergovia).

In accordance with this information, Cæsar sends in this direction, towards the middle of the night, several detachments of cavalry, with orders to scour with great noise the country in every direction at the foot

(See Plate 21 in *C*) This defile leads to the gate *P* of the *oppidum*. The foundations, of masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile *C* is distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the *oppidum*. These latter would have been almost blockaded (*pœne circumvallati*), without any way out, and in the impossibility of procuring forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern part of the town was difficult of access. Consequently, the words *sic alterum collem amisissent* can only apply to the mountain mass of Risolles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest either for the attack or for the defence.

The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part *D E* of the heights of Risolles which are opposite the village of Opme, because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion, which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps, on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides, two facts which result from the "Commentaries" prove that the Gauls were not very far from the *oppidum*. Cæsar sees the southern front abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in the place (*primo exaudito clamore*), have time to hurry to them, and dive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200 paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore, that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate *O* of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of Risolles.

of the heights of Risolles. At break of day, he sends out of the great camp many horses and mules without pack-saddles, and causes the muleteers to mount them, who put on helmets, so as to assume the appearance of mounted troopers. He enjoins them to wind round the hills, and a few cavalry who are joined with them have orders to spread wide over the country, so as to increase the illusion. Finally, they are all, by a long circuit, to move towards the spots which have just been mentioned. These movements were perceived from the town, which overlooked the camp, but at too great a distance to distinguish objects accurately. Cæsar sends towards the same mountain mass one legion, who, after having marched for a short distance, halt in a hollow, and pretend to hide in the woods (towards Chanonat), so as to feign a surprise. The suspicions of the Gauls increase; they take all their forces to the spot threatened. Cæsar, seeing the enemy's camp deserted, orders the military ensigns (plumes, shields, &c.) to be covered, the standards to be lowered, and the troops to pass in small detachments from the great to the little camp, behind the epaulment of the double fosse of communication, so that they cannot be perceived from the *oppidum*.⁽¹⁾ He communicates his intentions to the lieutenants placed at the heads of the legions, recommends them to take care to prevent the soldiers from allowing themselves to be carried away by the ardour of the combat or the hope of plunder, and draws their attention to the difficulties of the ground.

(1) According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii 9), the soldiers marched with their heads bent down, in order not to be seen

"Celerity alone," he says, "can enable us to overcome them; in fact, it is to be an attack by surprise, and not a fight." Having communicated these directions, he gives the signal, and, at the same time, sends the *Ædui* out of the great camp, with orders to climb the eastern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia, to effect a diversion to the right. (*See Plate 21.*)

The distance from the wall of the *oppidum* to the foot of the mountain, where the ground is almost flat, was 1,200 paces (1,780 mètres) in the most direct line; but the way was longer, on account of the circuits it was necessary to make to break the steepness. (¹) Towards the middle of the southern slope, in the direction of its length, the Gauls, taking advantage of the character of the ground, had, as we have said, built a wall of large stones, six feet high, a serious obstacle in case of attack. The lower part of the slopes had remained free; but the upper part, up to the wall of the *oppidum*, was occupied with camps placed very near together. When the signal is given, the Romans reach rapidly the wall, scale it, and take three camps with such promptitude, that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, surprised in his tent where he was taking his repose in the middle of the day, fled half naked; his horse was wounded, and he escaped with difficulty from the hands of the assailants.

Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the re-

(¹) It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate *O* of the *oppidum*. This is the line which passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to climb it.

treat to be sounded, and made the tenth legion, which accompanied him, halt (from an examination of the ground, the spot where Cæsar stood is the knoll which rises to the west of the village of Merdogne). (*See Plate 21*, first position of the tenth legion.) But the soldiers of the other legions, separated from him by a rather wide ravine, did not hear the trumpet. Although the tribunes and the lieutenants did all they could to restrain them, excited by the hope of an easy victory, and by the recollection of their past successes, they thought nothing was insurmountable to their courage, and persisted in the pursuit of the enemy up to the walls and gates of the *oppidum*.

Then an immense cry arises in the town. The inhabitants of the most remote quarters believe that it is invaded, and rush out of the walls. The matrons throw from the top of the walls their precious objects to the Romans, and, with breasts bare and hands extended in supplication, implore them not to massacre the women and children, as at Avaricum. Several even, letting themselves down from the walls, surrender to the soldiers. L. Fabius, centurion of the 8th legion, excited by the rewards given at Avaricum, had sworn to be the first to mount to the assault; he is lifted up by three soldiers of his company, reaches the top of the wall, and, in his turn, helps them to mount one after the other.

Meanwhile the Gauls, who, as we have seen, had proceeded to the west of Gergovia to raise retrenchments, hear the cries from the town; repeated messages announce the capture of the *oppidum*. They immediately hurry towards it, sending their cavalry

before them. As they arrive, each man takes his stand under the wall and joins the combatants, and their number increases every moment; while the same women who just before implored the pity of the besiegers, now excite against them the defenders of Gergovia, displaying their dishevelled hair and showing their children. The place as well as the numbers rendered the struggle unequal; the Romans, fatigued with their run and the length of the combat, resisted with difficulty troops which were still fresh.

This critical state of things inspired Cæsar with alarm; he ordered T. Sextius, who had been left to guard the little camp, to bring out the cohorts quickly, and take a position at the foot of the mountain of Gergovia, on the right of the Gauls, so as to support the Romans if they were repulsed, and check the enemy's pursuit. He himself, drawing the 10th legion a little back ⁽¹⁾ from the place where he had posted it, awaited the issue of the engagement. (*See Plate 21, second position of the 10th legion.*)

When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans. The resemblance of their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they had their right shoulders bare (*dextris humeris exsertis*), the ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fa-

(1) General Goeler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to read *re-gressus* instead of *progressus*. The 10th legion, which acted as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the front.

bius, and those who had followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall. M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (*see Plate 21, third position*), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on a commanding post (*Le Puy-de-Marmant*), under the command of the lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700 men. (¹)

(¹) The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate *O* of the *oppidum*, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which, according to the "Commentaries," prevented the legions from hearing the signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of Merdogne. Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur, *H*, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur, they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards Merdogne, but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops, who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.

Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with having "wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more than to the valour of the enemy." ⁽¹⁾

General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly the site of the Roman camp, but he does not place it sufficiently to the west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression *circum se* (VII. 36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too much towards the west.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 52

VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the "Commentaries,"

Observations.

Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and, according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed, relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out *Cæsar*, which signifies in Gaulish *let him go*, and thus he escaped. (¹) Plutarch gives another version: "The Arverni," he says, "still show a sword hung up in one of their

(¹) "In the war of the Gauls, Caius Julius Cæsar was surprised by an enemy, who carried him off, armed as he was, on his horse, when another Gaul, who recognised Cæsar, called out, intending to insult him, '*Cæcos Cæsar*!' which in the Gaulish language signifies, *let him go*, *set him loose*; and so he escaped. Cæsar says so himself, in his *Ephemerides*, in the passage where he speaks of his good fortune." (Servius Maurus Honoratus, a grammarian of the fifth century, in his commentary on the 11th book of the *Æneid*, line 743, II p. 48, edit. Albert Lion)

The manuscripts of Servius do not all present the same reading. The following are some of the principal variations: *Cecos*, *Cæsar*; *Cæcos ac Cæsar*; and *Cæsar*, *Cesar*.

temples, which they pretend to be a spoil taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused, pretending that it had become a sacred object." (') This tradition proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was engraved the law of his banishment.

VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The next day the same manœuvre was repeated with the same success. Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived on the third day (that is, his second day's march, reckoning from the assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

(') Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 29.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience, and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (*Nevers*). This town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and, lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain. Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away, and destroy

the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the Narbonnese—a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire, swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges, irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at Bourbon-Lancy. (¹) The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity made

(¹) There has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy.

them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched towards the land of the Senones. ⁽¹⁾

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an island in the Seine, the *oppidum* of the Parisii. After leaving his baggage at Agedincum (*Sens*) ⁽²⁾ under the guard of the troops recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important streams and considerable towns. ⁽³⁾ At the news of his approach, the enemy

Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII 56

⁽²⁾ A sling-ball of lead has been found at Sens, on which are stamped in relief the words "T. Labienus" This ball forms part of the collection of the Museum of Saint-Germain.

⁽³⁾ MM de Sauley and J. Quicherat have already demonstrated in a conclusive manner that Labienus must have followed the left bank of the Yonne, after leaving Sens, and that he crossed over to the right bank of the Seine at Melun. In fact, Labienus, on the right bank, found himself, as Cæsar says, threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, on the other by the army of Camulogenus (VII 59) On the opposite bank, on the contrary, Labienus would not have been placed between the two, since he would have had Camulogenus in front, and, at a greater distance, the Bellovaci coming from the north

"A very large river kept the legions separated from their reserve and their baggage." This very great river cannot be the Marne, which Cæsar does not even mention in the whole course of this campaign it was evidently the Seine, which Labienus has crossed once only, at Melodunum (*Melun*), by crossing

assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh sloped towards

over to the right bank, he was separated from his base of operations, which was at Sens. On the contrary hypothesis, no river would have separated Labienus from his line of retreat; unless we admit, with Dulaure and several others, the identity of Agedincum with Provins, which is no longer possible.

The Captain of the Staff Rouby has made investigations on the spot, which prove that from Sens the most ancient ways leading to Paris passed on the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine. Moreover, the discoveries of M. Carié have made us acquainted with the exact direction followed by the Roman road after quitting Sens towards Paris; it was entirely on the left bank of the Yonne. If Cæsar's lieutenant had followed the right bank of the Yonne, he would, the day after his departure, have been arrested by the course of the Seine, and would have fallen in with the Gaulish town of Condate, built in the very angle of the two streams, in the midst of perhaps impassable marshes. If only a few thousand Gauls had occupied the heights which played so important a part in the campaign of 1814, Labienus, compelled to seek for a place to cross higher up the stream, would have been diverted considerably from his aim.

It has been supposed wrongly that the Bièvre was the marsh where Labienus, in his march on the left bank of the Seine, had been arrested by the Gaulish army. Leaving out of consideration the fact that the Bièvre, which flows through a calcareous soil, can at no epoch have formed a marsh capable of arresting an army, how can we suppose that Labienus, if he had arrived at this stream, that is, close to Lutetia, would have retraced his steps as far back as Melun, to march from thence towards the *oppidum* of the Parisi by the right bank of the Seine, which would have obliged him to make a journey of twenty-four leagues? The manœuvre of Labienus can only be explained by his desire to turn the strong position of Camulogenus, and arrive at Paris before him. The text of the "Commentaries" says clearly that Labienus, stopped by the marsh which shelves towards the Seine, stole away by night, surprised the passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre, the marsh in question must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The Essonne alone fulfils that condition. The ground on the banks of this little river offers, even at present, by its nature, a very serious obstacle to an army. It is cut up by innumerable peat mosses; and it was behind this line of Essonne that, in 1814, the Emperor Napoleon I. established his army, whilst the enemy occupied Paris.

the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (*See Plate 23.*)

When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the Seine at Melodunum (*Melun*), and, when once on the right bank, of advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and, retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an *oppidum* of the Senones, situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the *oppidum*, that is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.

It was already rumoured that Cæsar had raised the siege of Gergovia; the news of the defection of the Ædui, and of the progress of the insurrection, had begun already to spread. The Gauls repeated incessantly that Cæsar, arrested in his march by the Loire, had been compelled, by want of provisions, to retire towards the Roman province. The Bellovaci, whose fidelity was doubtful, had no sooner heard of the revolt of the Ædui, than they collected troops and prepared openly for war.

At the news of so many unfavourable events, Labienus felt all the difficulties of his situation. Placed on the right bank of the Seine, he was threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, who had only to cross the Oise to fall upon him; on the other by Camulogenus, at the head of a well-trained army, ready to give battle; lastly, a large river, which he had crossed at Melun, separated him from Sens, where he had his dépôts and baggage. To escape from this perilous position, he thought it advisable to change his plans: he renounced all offensive movements, and resolved to return to his point of departure by an act of daring. Fearing that, if he went by the road on which he had advanced, he should not be able to cross the Seine at Melun, because his boats would not have remounted the river without difficulty, he decided on surprising the passage of the Seine below Paris, and returning to Sens by the left bank, marching over the body of the Gaulish army. Towards evening he convoked a council, and urged on his officers the punctual execution of his orders. He entrusted the boats he had brought from Melun to the Roman knights,

with orders to descend the river at the end of the first watch (ten o'clock), to advance in silence for the space of four miles (six kilomètres), which would bring them as far down as the village of Point-du-Joir, and to wait for him. The five cohorts which had least experience were left in charge of the camp, and the five others of the same legion received orders to re-ascend on the right bank of the river in the middle of the night, with all their baggage, and attract by their tumult the attention of the enemy. Boats were sent in the same direction, which were rowed with great noise. He himself, a little after, left in silence with the three remaining legions, and, proceeding down the river, repaired to the spot where the first boats waited for him.

When he arrived there, a violent storm enabled him to carry by surprise the Gaulish posts placed along the whole bank. The legions and cavalry had soon passed the Seine with the assistance of the knights. Day began to appear, when the enemy learnt, almost at the same instant, first, that an unusual agitation prevailed in the Roman camp, that a considerable column of troops was ascending the river, and that in the same direction a great noise of oars was heard; lastly, that lower down the stream the troops were crossing the Seine in boats. This news made the Gauls believe that the legions intended to cross it on three points, and that, perplexed by the defection of the *Ædui*, they had decided on forcing the road by the left bank. ⁽¹⁾ Camulogenus divided

⁽¹⁾ We have not translated these words, *fugam parare*, because this passage has always appeared unintelligible to us. How, indeed, could the Gauls, see-

also his forces into three corps: he left one opposite the Roman camp; sent the second, less numerous, in the direction of Melodunum, ⁽¹⁾ with instructions to regulate its march according to the progress of the enemy's boats which re-ascended the Seine; and, at the head of the third, went to meet Labienus.

At sunrise the Roman troops had crossed the river, and the enemy's army appeared drawn up in order of battle. Labienus exhorts his soldiers to recall to mind their ancient valour, and so many glorious exploits, and, as they marched to the combat, to consider themselves under the eye of Cæsar, who had led them so often to victory: he then gives the signal. At the first shock the 7th legion, placed on the right wing, routs the enemy; but on the left wing, although the 12th legion had transpierced the first ranks with their *pila*, the Gauls defend themselves obstinately, and not one dreams of flight. Camulogenus, in the midst of them, excites their ardour. The victory was still doubtful, when the tribunes of the 7th legion, informed of the critical position of the left wing, lead their soldiers to the back of the enemies, and take them in the rear. The barbarians are surrounded, yet not one yields a step; all die fighting, and Camulogenus perishes with the rest. The Gaulish troops left opposite the camp of Labienus had hurried forward at the first news of the combat, and had taken possession of a hill (probably that of Vaugirard); but they did not sustain the attack of the victorious Romans, and were

ing that the Romans were ready to pass the Seine by force, believe that this was a flight?

(1) Some manuscripts have Metiosedum, a version which, in our opinion, is utterly incorrect.

hurried along in the general rout; all who would not find refuge in the woods and on the heights were cut to pieces by the cavalry.

After this battle Labienus returned to Agedincum; thence he marched with all his troops, and went to join Cæsar. (¹)

X. The desertion of the Ædui gave the war a greater development. The Gauls assume the offensive. Deputies are sent in all directions: credit, authority, money, everything is put in activity to excite the other states to revolt. Masters of the hostages whom Cæsar had entrusted to them, the Ædui threaten to put to death those who belong to the nations which hesitate. In a general assembly of Gaul, convoked at Bibracte, at which the Remi, the Lingones, and the Treviri only were absent, the supreme command is conferred on Vercingetorix, in spite of the opposition of the Ædui, who claim it, and who, seeing themselves rejected, begin to regret the favours they had received from Cæsar. But they had pronounced for the war, and no longer dare to separate themselves from the common cause. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of great promise, obey Vercingetorix unwillingly. The latter begins by exacting from the other states hostages to be delivered on a fixed day; orders that the cavalry, amounting to 15,000 men, shall be gathered round his person; declares he has infantry enough at Bibracte, for his intention is not to offer a pitched battle to the Romans, but, with a numerous cavalry, to intercept their convoys of grain and forage. He

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 62.

exhorts the Gauls to set fire with a common accord to their habitations and crops, which are only small sacrifices in comparison to their liberty. These measures having been decided, he demands from the Ædui and the Segusiavi, who bordered upon the Roman province, 10,000 foot soldiers, sends them 800 horse, and gives the command of these troops to the brother of Eporedorix, with orders to carry the war into the country of the Allobroges. On another side, he orders the Gabali and the neighbouring cantons of the Arverni to march against the Helvii, and sends the Ruteni and the Cadurci to lay waste the country of the Volcæ Arecomici. At the same time, he labours secretly to gain the Allobroges, in the hope that the remembrance of their ancient struggles against the Romans is not yet effaced. He promises money to their chiefs, and to their country the sovereignty over the whole Narbonnese.

To meet these dangers, twenty-two cohorts, raised in the province, and commanded by the lieutenant Lucius Cæsar, (¹) had to face the enemy on every side. The Helvii, faithful to the Romans, by their own impulse, attacked their neighbours in the open field; but repulsed with loss, and having to deplore the death of their chiefs, among others that of C. Valerius Donnotaurus, they ventured no more outside their walls. As to the Allobroges, they defended their territory with energy, by placing a great number of posts along the Rhone. The superiority of the enemy in cavalry, the interruption of the communications, the impossibility of drawing succour from Italy

(¹) See *Appendix D.*

or the province, decided Cæsar on demanding from the German peoples on the other side of the Rhine, subdued the year before, cavalry and light infantry accustomed to fight intermingled. On their arrival, finding that the cavalry were not sufficiently well mounted, he distributed amongst them the horses of the tribunes, and even those of the Roman knights and the volunteers (*evocati*). (¹)

XI. The line of march followed by Cæsar after he had crossed the Loire has been the subject of numerous controversies. Yet the "Commentaries" appear to us to furnish sufficient data to determine it with precision. On leaving Gergovia, Cæsar's object was, as he tells us himself, to effect a junction with Labienus; with this view, he marched towards the land of the Senones, after having crossed the Loire at Bourbon-Lancy. On his part, Labienus, after returning to Sens, having advanced to meet Cæsar, their junction must necessarily have taken place on a point of the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens; this point, in our opinion, is Joigny. (*See Plate 19.*) Encamped not far from the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne, Cæsar could easily receive the contingent which he expected from Germany.

The Roman army was composed of eleven legions: the 1st, lent by Pompey, and the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th. (²) The effect-

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VII 65.—*Evocati* was the name given to the old soldiers who, after having served, returned voluntarily to the ranks of the army.

(²) Let us here recapitulate the numbers of the legions employed during the war in Gaul. Cæsar's army, as we have seen, was composed in 696 of six legions, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. In 697, two new legions were

ive force of each of them varied from 4,000 to 5,000 men; for, if we see (lib. V. 49) that on the return from Britain two legions reckoned together only 7,000 men, their effective force was soon increased by considerable re-enforcements which came to the army of Gaul in 702; ⁽¹⁾ the legion lent by Pompey was

raised in Italy, the 13th and 14th. Probably, in the winter between 699 and 700, Cæsar brought several cohorts composed of soldiers and sailors who were to serve in the fleet; for, on his return from the second expedition into England, notwithstanding the losses he had sustained, he was at the head of eight legions and five cohorts (V 24) He lost at Aduatuca one legion and a half, that is, the 14th legion, besides five cohorts; but in 701 three new legions replaced the cohorts lost, and even doubled their number. These legions were the 1st, lent by Pompey (*De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 54, and Lucan, *Pharsalia*, VII., l 218); the 14th, which took the number of the legion destroyed at Aduatuca (*De Bello Gallico*, VI. 32, VIII 4); and the 15th: this last legion was afterwards, with the 1st, given to Pompey for the war of the Parthians; it figured in the Civil War, and took, in Pompey's army, the number 3. (Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, III. 88)

The 6th legion, judging from its number, must have been one of the oldest, for Dio Cassius (XXXVIII 47) informs us that the legions were designated according to their order of inscription on the rolls of the army; but, as it only appears for the first time in 702, it is probable that it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy. A proof that this legion assisted in the siege of Alesia is found in the fact that, after the surrender of the place, it was sent to winter quarters on the Saône, where Cæsar found it a few months afterwards (*De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 4). The distribution of the troops in their winter quarters after the taking of Alesia confirms the number of legions given above. The re-distribution after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the same result, for in book VII. c. 46 the "Commentaries" give the positions of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according to book VIII c 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are repeated again, book VIII c. 54.

⁽¹⁾ It is evident that an army could not remain in the wars for eight years without receiving frequent re-enforcements in order to keep it up to its effective number. Thus, when, after the murder of Clodius, all the youth of Italy had been called to arms, Cæsar made new levies, which were used probably to swell the ranks of his legions, for no new numbers appear (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 1) —In the same manner, when he arrived, in 702, in the south of Gaul, and crossed the Cévennes, he placed himself at the head of the troops which had been recruited in the Roman province and of the re-enforcements which he had brought from Italy (*partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque quod ex Italia adduxerat in Helvios, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire jubet*).

of 6,000 men; ⁽¹⁾ and the 13th, at the breaking out of the civil war, had in its ranks 5,000 soldiers. ⁽²⁾ Cæsar had then at his disposal, during the campaigns which ended with the taking of Alesia, 50,000 legionaries, and perhaps 20,000 Numidian or Cretan archers, and 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry, a thousand of whom were Germans, making a total of about 75,000 men, without counting the valets, who were always very numerous.

When the junction of the troops had been effected, Cæsar sought above all to approach the Roman province, in order to carry succour to it with more ease; he could not think of taking the most direct road, which would have led him into the country of the *Ædui*, one of the centres of the insurrection; he was, therefore, obliged to pass through the territory of the *Lingones*, who had remained faithful to him, and to proceed into *Sequania*, where *Besançon* offered an important place of arms. (*See Plate 19.*) He started from *Joigny*, following the road which he had taken when he marched to meet *Ariovistus* (696), ⁽³⁾ and the winter before, when he moved from *Vienne* to *Sens*. After reaching the *Aube* at *Dancevoir*, he proceeded towards the little river *Vingeanne*, crossing, as the "*Commentaries*" say, the extreme part of the territory of the *Lingones* (*per extremos Lingonum fines*). ⁽⁴⁾ His intention was, no doubt, to cross the *Saône*, either at *Gray*, or at *Pontailier*.

(*Be Bello Gallico*, VII. 7.)—*Labienus*, on the other hand, during his expedition to *Paris*, left his recruits in dépôt at *Sens* (*Labienus eo supplemento quod nuper ex Italia venerat relicto*) (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 57)

⁽¹⁾ *Plutarch, Cato*, 53.

⁽²⁾ *Plutarch, Cæsar*, 36

⁽³⁾ See above, page 87.

⁽⁴⁾ See above, page 108, note ⁽²⁾

Whilst the Romans abandoned that part of Gaul which had revolted, in order to approach nearer to the province, Vercingetorix had assembled his army, amounting to more than 80,000 men, at Bibracte; it had come in great part from the country of the Arverni, and counted in its ranks the cavalry furnished by all the states. Having been informed of Cæsar's march, he started at the head of his troops, to bar the road through Sequania. Passing, as we believe, by Arnay-le-Duc, Sombornon, Dijon, and Thil-Châtel, he arrived at the heights of Occey, Sacquenay, and Montormentier, where he formed three camps, at a distance of 10,000 paces (fifteen kilomètres) from the Roman army. (*See Plate 24.*) In this position Vercingetorix intercepted the three roads which Cæsar could have taken towards the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler, or at Chalon. (¹) Resolved on risking a battle, he convoked the chiefs of the cavalry. "The moment of victory," he told them, "has arrived;

(¹) We learn from the text that he formed three camps. This disposition was necessitated by circumstances and the character of the locality. The heights of Sacquenay form, in fact, three promontories, *V, V, V* (*see Plate 24*), advancing towards the north; the road to Dijon passes over the one to the left, the road to Pontailler over the one in the middle. By establishing three camps on these three promontories, Vercingetorix occupied each of these roads with one-third of his army, whilst he backed his right wing against the Vingeanne.

The Gaulish army had there a position of great natural strength, for, to attack it, the enemy would have to climb high hills which were easy to defend, it was, moreover, protected by two watercourses: one, the Vingeanne, which covered its right; the other, the Bâin, a small tributary of the Vingeanne, which protected its front. In the space comprised between these two watercourses and the road from Dijon to Langres, a ground extends, measuring five kilomètres in every direction, slightly broken in some parts, but almost flat everywhere else, particularly between the Vingeanne and the hillock of Montsaugéon. Near the road, and to the west, arise hills which command it, as well as the whole country as far as Bâin and the Vingeanne.

the Romans fly into their province, and abandon Gaul. If this retreat delivers us for the present, it ensures neither peace nor rest for the future; they will return with greater forces, and the war will be endless. We must attack them, therefore, in the disorder of their march; for if the legions stop to defend their long convoy, they will not be able to continue their road; or if, which is more probable, they abandon their baggage in order to secure their own safety, they will lose what is indispensable to them, and, at the same time, their prestige. As to their cavalry, they will surely not dare to move away from the column; that of the Gauls must show so much the more ardour, as the infantry, ranged before the camp, will be there to intimidate the enemy." Then, the cavalry exclaimed, "Let every one swear, by a solemn oath, never to return to the home of his forefathers, his wife, or his children, if he has not ridden twice through the ranks of the enemy!" This proposition was received with enthusiasm, and all took the oath.

The day on which Vercingetorix arrived on the heights of Sacquenay, (¹) Cæsar, as we have seen, en-

(¹) The field of battle of the Vingeanne, which H. M. Defay, of Langres, first pointed out, answers perfectly to all the requirements of the Latin narrative, and, moreover, material proofs exist which are undeniable evidences of the struggle. We allude to the tumuli which are found, some at Prauthoy, others on the banks of the Vingeanne, at Daidenay, and Cusey, and those which, at Pressant, Rivières-les-Fosses, Chamberceau, and Vesvres, mark, as it were, the line of retreat of the Gaulish army, to a distance of twelve kilomètres.

Two of these tumuli are situated near each other, between Prauthoy and Montsaugéon (*see Plate 24*, where the tumuli are marked). There is one near Daidenay, three to the west of Cusey, one at Rivières-les-Fosses, another at Chamberceau. We will not mention those which have been destroyed by agriculture, but which are still remembered by the inhabitants.

Researches lately made in these tumuli have brought to light skeletons, many

camped on the Vingeanne, near Longeau. Ignorant of the presence of the Gauls, he started next day, in marching column, the legions at a great distance from each other, separated by their baggage. When his vanguard arrived near Dommarien, it could perceive the hostile army. Vercingetorix was watching the moment they (the Romans) debouched, to attack. He had divided his cavalry in three bodies, and his infantry had descended from the heights of Sacquenay in order to take a position along the Vingeanne and the Badin. (*See Plate 24.*) As soon as the

of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs, calcined bones of men and horses, thirty-six bracelets, several iron circles which were worn round the neck, iron rings, fibulæ, fragments of metal plates, pieces of Celtic pottery, an iron sword, &c.

It is a fact worthy of remark, that the objects found in the tumuli at Rivières-les-Fosses and Chamberceau bear so close a resemblance to those of the tumuli on the banks of the Vingeanne, that we might think they had come from the hand of the same workman. Hence there can be no doubt that all these tumuli refer to one and the same incident of war. (Several of these objects are deposited in the Museum of Saint-Germain)

We must add that the agricultural labourers of Montsaugéon, Isomes, and Cusey have found during many years, when they make trenches for drainage, horse-shoes buried a foot or two deep under the soil. In 1860, at the dredging of the Vingeanne, hundreds of horse-shoes, the inhabitants say, of excellent metal, were extracted from the gravel of the river, at a depth of two or three feet. They are generally small, and bear a groove all round, in which the heads of the nails were lodged. A great number of these horse-shoes have preserved their nails, which are flat, have a head in the form of a T, and still have their rivet—that is, the point which is folded back over the hoof—which proves that they are not shoes that have been lost, but shoes of dead horses, the foot of which has rotted away in the soil or in the gravel. Thirty-two of these horse-shoes have been collected. One of them is stamped in the middle of the curve with a mark, sometimes found on Celtic objects, and which has a certain analogy with the stamp on a plate of copper found in one of the tumuli of Montsaugéon.

When we consider that the action between the Roman and Gaulish armies was merely a cavalry battle, in which were engaged from 20,000 to 25,000 horses, the facts just stated cannot but appear interesting, although they may possibly belong to a battle of a later date.

vanguard of the enemy appears, Vercingetorix bars its way with one of the bodies of cavalry, while the two others show themselves in order of battle on the two wings of the Romans. Taken unexpectedly, Cæsar divides his cavalry also into three bodies, and opposes them to the enemy. The combat engages on all sides; the column of the Roman army halts; the legions are brought into line, and the baggage placed in the intervals. This order, in which the legions were, no doubt, in column of three deep, was easy to execute, and presented the advantages of a square. Wherever the cavalry gives way or is too hotly pressed, Cæsar sends to its support the cohorts, which he draws from the main body to range them in order of battle. ⁽¹⁾ By this manœuvre he renders the attacks less vigorous, and increases the confidence of the Romans, who are assured of support. Finally, the German auxiliaries, having gained, to the right of the Roman army, the summit of a height (the hill of Montsaugéon), drive the enemies from it, and pursue the fugitives as far as the river, where Vercingetorix stood with his infantry. At the sight of this rout, the rest of the Gaulish cavalry fear to be surrounded, and take to flight. From this time the battle became a mere carnage. Three Ædui of distinction are taken and brought to Cæsar: Cotus, chief of the cavalry, who, at the last election, had contended with Convictolitavis for the sovereign magistracy; Cavarillus, who, since the defection of Litavicus, commanded the infantry; and Eporedorix, whom the Ædui had for

⁽¹⁾ We have adopted the reading, *aciemque constitui jubebat*, which alone gives a reasonable interpretation.

chief in their war against the Sequani, before the arrival of Cæsar in Gaul. ⁽¹⁾

XII. Vercingetorix, after the defeat of his cavalry, decided on a retreat; taking his infantry with him, without returning to his camp, he marched immediately towards Alesia, the *oppidum* of the Mandubii. The baggage, withdrawn from the camp, followed him without delay. ⁽²⁾ Cæsar ordered

Blockade of Alesia.

⁽¹⁾ He was not the same as the one mentioned in pp 307, 321, 329. (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 67.)

⁽²⁾ The three Gaulish camps having been established on the heights of Sacquenay, four or five kilomètres behind the position occupied by the infantry during the battle, and the line of retreat towards Alesia lying to the left, in the direction of Pressant and Vesvres, if Vercingetorix had returned to ascend the hills with his 80,000 men, to remove the baggage, that operation would have taken two or three hours, during which Cæsar might have cut off his retreat, or have inflicted a still more serious defeat upon him. But, by immediately hastening his march on Pressant, in order to follow from thence the road which, by Rivières-les-Fosses and Vesvres, joined the great road from Langres to Alise, near Aujour, he got in advance of the Roman army, which, in the disorder in which it was at that moment, was not able to pursue him at once. And this is what he did.

The text says, also, that Vercingetorix gave orders that the baggage should be taken out of the camps in all haste, to follow him. If the baggage of an army of 100,000 men had accompanied Vercingetorix, on the road followed by the infantry, we cannot understand how the Roman army, which pursued the Gauls as long as daylight lasted, should not have captured it all. But investigations made in the country situated between the field of battle and the Alise, behind the heights of Sacquenay, have brought to light vestiges of a Roman road which, starting from Thil-Châtel, thirteen kilomètres behind Sacquenay, proceeded, by Avelanges, towards the hamlet of Palus, where it branched from the road from Langres to Alise. We may suppose, therefore, that Vercingetorix caused his baggage to follow in his rear as far as Thil-Châtel, where it took the road to Palus.

The Roman road from Langres to Alise, which, without any doubt, marks the direction followed by the two armies, has been traced almost in its whole extent by Commandant Stoffel. Even at the present day, on the territories of Fraignot, Salives, Echalot, and Poiseul-la-Grange, the inhabitants call it the *Road of the Romans*, or *Cæsar's way*.

his baggage to be carried to a neighbouring hill, under the guard of two legions, pursued the enemies as long as daylight permitted, killed about 3,000 men of their rear-guard, and established his camp, two days afterwards, before Alesia. ⁽¹⁾ After having reconnoitred the position of the town, and taking advantage of the disorder of the enemy, who had placed his principal confidence in his cavalry, which was thrown into consternation by its defeat, he resolved to invest Alesia, and exhorted his soldiers to support the labours and fatigues of a siege with constancy.

Alise-Sainte-Reine, in the department of the Côte-d'Or, is, undoubtedly, the Alesia of the "Commentaries." The examination of the strategic reasons which determined the march of Cæsar, the correct interpretation of the text, and, lastly, the excavations lately made, all combine to prove it. ⁽²⁾

Ancient Alesia occupied the summit of the mount-

⁽¹⁾ We read (*De Bello Gallico*, VII. 68) the words, *Altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit*. We have before sought to prove that the words *altero die* must be translated by the *second day after*, and not by the *next day*. [See page 279, note ⁽¹⁾] It took Cæsar, therefore, two days' march to move from the field of battle to Alesia.

A study of the country fully confirms the interpretation we give to the expression *altero die*. In fact, to the north and east of Alise-Sainte-Reine (*Alesia*), to less than two days' march, the ground is so cut up and broken that no cavalry battle would be possible upon it. It retains this character as far as fifty-five or sixty kilometres from Alise, to the east of the road from Pranthoy to Dijon, where it becomes more easy and open. The battle-field of the Vinjeanne, which we consider as the true one, is at a distance of sixty-five kilometres from Alise. Supposing that, on the day of the victory, the Roman army had pursued the Gauls over a space of fifteen kilometres, it would have had to traverse in the two following days, before arriving at Alesia, a distance of fifty kilometres, that is to say, twenty-five kilometres a day.

⁽²⁾ We call the reader's attention particularly to the numerous Roman and Gaulish coins found in one of the fosses of the camp *D*, the list of which will be found in *Appendix C*, at the end of this volume.

ain now called Mont Auxois; on the western slope is built the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine. (*See Plates 25 and 26.*) It is an entirely isolated mountain, which rises 150 to 160 mètres above the surrounding valleys (*erat oppidum Alesia in colle summo, admodum edito loco . . .*). Two rivers bathe the foot of the mountain on two opposite sides: they are the Ose and the Oserain (*cujus collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina subluébant*). To the west of Mont Auxois the plain of Laumes extends, the greatest dimension of which, between the village of Laumes and that of Pouillenay, is 3,000 paces or 4,400 mètres (*ante oppidum planities circiter millia passuum III in longitudinem patebat*). On all other sides, at a distance varying from 1,100 to 1,600 mètres, rises a belt of hills, the plateaux of which are at the same height (*reliquis ex omnibus partibus colles, mediocri interjecto spatio, pari altitudinis fastigio oppidum cingebant*).

The summit of Mont Auxois has the form of an ellipse, 2,100 mètres in length, and 800 mètres broad in its greatest diameter. Including the first spurs which surround the principal mass, it is found to contain a superficies of 1,400,000 square mètres, 973,100 mètres of which for the upper plateau and 400,000 mètres for the terraces and spurs. (*See Plate 25.*) The town appears to have crowned the whole of the plateau, which was protected by scarped rocks against all attack. (')

(') Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs arise; there is another on the eastern side. With these springs, as at Gergovia, it was easy to form large watering-places for cattle. Besides, manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the table-land, so that it is evident the

This *oppidum* could, apparently, only be reduced by a complete investment. The Gaulish troops covered, at the foot of the wall, all the slopes of the eastern part of the mountain; they were there protected by a fosse and by a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. Cæsar established his camps in favourable positions, the infantry on the heights, the cavalry near the watercourses. These camps, and twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses, ⁽¹⁾ formed a line of investment of 11,000 paces (sixteen kilomètres). ⁽²⁾ The redoubts were occupied in the day by small posts, to prevent any surprise; by night, strong detachments bivouacked in them.

The works were hardly begun, when a cavalry engagement took place in the plain of Laumes. The combat was very hot on both sides. The Romans were giving way, when Cæsar sent the Germans to their assistance, and ranged the legions in order of battle in front of the camps, so that the enemy's infantry, kept in awe, should not come to the assistance of the cavalry. That of the Romans recovered confidence on seeing that they were supported by the legions. The Gauls, obliged to fly, became embarrassed by their own numbers, and rushed to the openings left in the wall of unhewn stones, which were too narrow for the occasion. Pursued with fury by the

besieged can never have wanted water, besides which, they could always descend to the two rivers.

⁽¹⁾ We believe that these *castella* were palisaded redoubts having a recess attached, similar to the wooden blockhouses represented on the Trajan Column; often even these recesses alone composed the *castellum*.

⁽²⁾ It was not, as will be remarked, the countervallation which was 11,000 feet in extent, but the line of investment.

Germans up to the fortifications, some were slain, and others, abandoning their horses, attempted to cross the fosse and climb over the wall. Cæsar then ordered the legions, who were drawn up before his retrenchments, to advance a little. This movement carried disorder into the Gaulish camp. The troops within feared a serious attack, and the cry to arms rose on all sides. Some, struck with terror, threw themselves into the *oppidum*; Vercingetorix was obliged to order the gates to be closed, for fear the camp should be abandoned. The Germans retired, after having killed a great number of the cavalry, and taken a great number of horses.

Vercingetorix resolved to send away all his cavalry by night, before the Romans had completed the investment. He urges the cavalry, on their departure, to return each to his country, and recruit the men able to carry arms; he reminds them of his services, and implores them to think of his safety, and not to deliver him as a prey to the enemies, him who has done so much for the general liberty: their indifference would entail with his loss that of 80,000 picked men. On an exact calculation, he has only provisions for one month; by husbanding them carefully, he may hold out some time longer. After these recommendations, he causes his cavalry to leave in silence, at the second watch (nine o'clock). It is probable that they escaped by ascending the valleys of the Ose and the Oserain. Then he orders, on pain of death, all the corn to be brought to him. He divides among the soldiers individually the numerous cattle which had been collected by the Mandubii; but as to the,

grain, he reserves the power of distributing it gradually and in small quantities. All the troops encamped outside withdraw into the *oppidum*. By these dispositions he prepares to wait for the succour of Gaul, and to sustain the war.

As soon as Cæsar was informed of these measures by the prisoners and deserters, he resolved to form lines of countervallation and circumvallation, and adopted the following system of fortifications: he ordered first of all to be dug, in the plain of Laumes, a fosse twenty feet wide, with vertical walls, that is, as wide at the bottom as at the level of the ground (*see Plates 25 and 28*), so as to prevent lines so extensive, and so difficult to guard with soldiers along their whole extent, from being attacked suddenly by night, and also to protect the workmen from the darts of the enemy during the day. Four hundred feet behind this fosse, he formed the countervallation. He then made two fosses of fifteen feet wide, of equal depth, ⁽¹⁾ and filled the interior fosse—that is, the one nearest to the town—with water derived from the river Oserain. Behind these fosses he raised a rampart and a palisade (*aggerem ac vallum*), having together a height of twelve feet. Against this was placed a fence of hurdles with battlements (*loricam pinnasque*); strong forked branches were placed horizontally at the junction of the hurdle-fence and the rampart, so as to render them more difficult to scale. (*See Plate 27.*) Lastly, he established towers on all this part of the countervallation, with a distance of eighty feet between them.

⁽¹⁾ *Eadem altitudine.* See paragraph XIII., Details on the Excavations of Alesia, page 364.

It was necessary at the same time to work at widely extended fortifications, and to fetch in wood and provisions, so that these distant and toilsome expeditions diminished incessantly the effective force of the combatants; and the Gauls, too, often attempted to harass the workmen, and even made vigorous sallies, through several gates at a time. Cæsar judged it necessary to increase the strength of the works, so that they might be defended with a smaller number of men. He ordered trees or large branches to be taken, the extremities of which were sharpened and cut to a point; (¹) they were placed in a fosse five feet deep; and, that they might not be torn up, they were tied together at the lower part; the other part, furnished with branches, rose above ground. There were five rows of these, contiguous and interlaced; whoever ventured amongst them would be wounded by their sharp points; they were called *cippi*. In front of these sorts of *abatis* were dug wolves' pits (*scrobes*), trunconic fosses, of three feet deep, disposed in the form of a quincunx. In the centre of each hole was planted a round stake, of the thickness of a man's thigh, hardened in the fire, and pointed at the top; it only rose about four inches above ground. In order to render these stakes firmer, they were surrounded at the base with earth well stamped down; the rest of the excavation was covered with thorns and brushwood, so as to conceal the trap. There were eight rows of holes, three feet distant from each other: they were called *libies* (*lilia*), on account of their resemblance to the flower of that name. Lastly, in front

(¹) *Dolabratis*, diminished to a point, and not *dehbratis*, peeled.

of these defences were fixed, level with the ground, stakes of a foot long, to which were fixed irons in the shape of hooks. These kind of caltrops, to which they gave the name of *stimuli*,⁽¹⁾ were placed everywhere, and very near each other.

When this work was finished, Cæsar ordered re-trenchments to be dug, almost similar, but on the opposite side, in order to resist attacks from the exterior. This line of circumvallation, of fourteen miles in circuit (twenty-one kilomètres), had been formed on the most favourable ground, in conforming to the nature of the locality. If the Gaulish cavalry brought back an army of succour, he sought by these means to prevent it, however numerous it might be, from surrounding the posts established along the circumvallation. In order to avoid the danger which the soldiers would have run in quitting the camps, he ordered that every man should provide himself with provisions and forage for thirty days. Notwithstanding this precaution, the Roman army suffered from want.⁽²⁾

Whilst Cæsar adopted these measures, the Gauls, having convoked an assembly of their principal chiefs, probably at Bibracte, decided not to collect all their men able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix wished, but to demand from each people a certain contingent, for they dreaded the difficulty of providing for so large and so confused a multitude, and of maintaining order and discipline. The different states were required to send contingents, the total of which was to amount

⁽¹⁾ In the excavations at Alesia, five *stimuli* have been found, the form of which is represented in *Plate 27*. The new names which Cæsar's soldiers gave to these accessory defenses prove that they were used for the first time.

⁽²⁾ This appears from a passage in *De Bello Civili*, III. 47.

to 283,000 men; but, in reality, it did not exceed 240,000. The cavalry amounted to 8,000. ⁽¹⁾

The Bellovaci refused their contingent, declaring that they intended to make war on their own account, at their own will, without submitting to anybody's orders. Nevertheless, at the instance of Commius, their host, they sent 2,000 men.

This same Commius, we have seen, had in previous years rendered signal service to Cæsar in Britain. In return for which, his land, that of the Atrebatæ, freed from all tribute, had recovered its privileges, and obtained the supremacy over the Morini. But such was then the eagerness of the Gauls to re-conquer their liberty and their ancient glory, that all feelings of gratitude and friendship had vanished from their memory, and all devoted themselves body and soul to the war.

(¹) The Ædui and their clients, the Segusiavi, the Ambluareti, the	MEN
Aulerci-Brannovices, and the Blannovii	35,000
The Arverni, with the peoples in their dependence, as the Cadurci-Eleutheri, the Gabali, the Vellavi	35,000
The Senones, the Sequani, the Bituriges, the Santones, the Ruteni, the Carnutes (each 12,000).. . . .	72,000
The Bellovaci	10,000
The Lemovices	10,000
The Pictones, the Turones, the Parisii, the Helvii (each 8,000)	32,000
The Suessiones, the Ambiani, the Mediomatrice, the Petrocorii, the Nervii, the Morini, the Nitobriges (each 5,000) . . .	35,000
The Aulerci-Cenomanni	5,000
The Atrebatæ	4,000
The Vellocasses, the Lexovii, the Aulerci-Eburovices (each 3,000)	9,000
The Rauraci and the Bori (each 3,000).....	6,000
Lastly, the peoples who dwelt on the shores of the ocean, and whom the Gauls called Armoricans, amongst whom were the Curiosolites, the Redones, the Ambibari, the Caletes, the Osismii, the Lemovices-Armoricani, the Veneti, and the Unelli, had to furnish together...	30,000
Total.....	283,000

The numbering and the review of the troops took place on the territory of the *Ædui*. The chiefs were named; the general command was given to the *Atrebatan Commius*; to the *Æduans Viridomarus* and *Eporedorix*, and to the *Arvernan Vercasivellaunus*, cousin of *Vercingetorix*. With them were joined delegates from each country, who formed a council of direction for the war. They began their march towards *Alesia*, full of ardour and confidence: each was convinced that the Romans would retreat at the mere sight of such imposing forces, especially when they found themselves threatened at the same time by the sallies of the besieged, and by an exterior army powerful in infantry and in cavalry.

Meanwhile, the day on which the besieged expected succour was past, and their provisions were exhausted; ignorant, moreover, of what was taking place among the *Ædui*, they assembled to deliberate on a final resolution. The opinions were divided: some proposed to surrender, others to make a sally, without waiting till their vigour would be exhausted. But *Critognatus*, an *Arvernan* distinguished by his birth and credit, in a discourse of singular and frightful atrocity, proposed to follow the example of their ancestors, who, in the time of the war of the *Cimbri*, being shut up in their fortresses, and a prey to want, ate the men who were unable to bear arms, rather than surrender. When the opinions were gathered, it was decided that that of *Critognatus* should only be adopted at the last extremity, and that for the present they would confine themselves to sending out of the place all useless mouths. The *Mandubii*, who

had received the Gaulish army within their walls, were compelled to leave with their wives and children. They approached the Roman lines, begged to be taken for slaves, and supplied with bread. Cæsar placed guards along the *vallum*, with orders not to admit them.

At length Commius and the other chiefs, followed by their troops, appear before Alesia; they halt upon a neighbouring hill, scarcely 1,000 paces from the circumvallation (the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse). The following day they draw their cavalry out of their camp; it covered the whole plain of Laumes. Their infantry establishes itself at a short distance on the heights. The plateau of Alesia commanded the plain. At the sight of the army of succour, the besieged meet together, congratulate each other, yield to excess of joy, and then they rush out of the town, fill the first fosse with fascines and earth, and all prepare for a general and decisive sally.

Cæsar, obliged to face the enemy on two sides at once, disposed his army on the two opposite lines of the retrenchments, and assigned to each his post; he then ordered the cavalry to leave its camps, and to give battle. From all the camps placed on the top of the surrounding hills, the view extended over the plain, and the soldiers, in suspense, waited for the issue of the event. The Gauls had mixed with their cavalry a small number of archers and light-armed soldiers, to support them if they gave way, and arrest the attack of the cavalry of the enemy. A good number of the latter, wounded by these foot-soldiers, whom they had not perceived until then, were obliged to re-

tire from the battle. Then the Gauls, confident in their numerical superiority, and in the valour of their cavalry, believed themselves sure of victory; and from all sides, from the besieged, as well as from the army of succour, there arose an immense cry to encourage the combatants. The engagement was in view of them all; no trait of courage or of cowardice remained unknown; on both sides, all were excited by the desire of glory and the fear of dishonour. From noon till sunset the victory remained uncertain, when the Germans in Cæsar's pay, formed in close squadrons, charged the enemy, and put them to the rout; in their flight they abandoned the archers, who were surrounded; then, from all parts of the plain, the cavalry pursued the Gauls up to their camp without giving them time to rally. The besieged, who had sallied out of Alesia, returned in consternation, and almost despairing of safety.

After a day employed in making a great number of hurdles, ladders, and hooks, the Gauls of the army of succour left their camp in silence towards the middle of the night, and approached the works in the plain. Then, suddenly uttering loud cries, in order to warn the besieged, they throw their fascines, to fill up the fosse, attack the defenders of the *vallum* with a shower of sling-balls, arrows, and stones, and prepare everything for an assault. At the same time, Vercingetorix, hearing the cries from without, gives the signal with the trumpet, and leads his troops out of the place. The Romans take in the retrenchments the places assigned to them beforehand, and they spread disorder among the Gauls by throwing leaden

balls, stones of a pound weight, and employing the stakes placed in the works beforehand; the machines rain down upon the enemy a shower of darts. As they fought in the dark (the shields being useless), there were in both armies many wounded. The lieutenants M. Antony and C. Trebonius, to whom was entrusted the defence of the threatened points, supported the troops that were too hardly pressed by means of reserves drawn from the neighbouring redoubts. So long as the Gauls kept far from the circumvallation, the multitude of their missiles gave them the advantage; but when they approached, some became suddenly entangled in the *stimuli*; others fell bruised into the *scrobes*; others again were transpierced by the heavy *pila* used in sieges, which were thrown from the tops of the *vallum* and the towers. They had many disabled, and nowhere succeeded in forcing the Roman lines. When day began to break, the army of succour retired, fearing to be taken in their uncovered flank (the right side) by a sally from the camps established on the mountain of Flavigny. On their side, the besieged, after losing much valuable time in transporting the material for the attack, and in making efforts to fill up the first fosse (the one which was twenty feet wide), learnt the retreat of the army of succour before they had reached the real retrenchment. This attempt having failed, like the other, they returned into the town.

Thus twice repulsed with great loss, the Gauls of the army of succour deliberated on what was to be done. They interrogate the inhabitants of the country, who inform them of the position and the sort

of defences of the Roman camps placed on the heights.

To the north of Alesia there was a hill (Mont Réa) which had not been enclosed in the lines, because it would have given them too great an extent; the camp necessary on that side had, for this reason, to be established on a slope, and in a disadvantageous position (*see Plate 25, camp D*); the lieutenants C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius Rebilus occupied it with two legions. The enemy's chiefs resolved to attack this camp with one part of their troops, whilst the other should assail the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes. Having decided on this plan, they send their scouts to reconnoitre the localities, secretly arrange among themselves the plan and the means of execution, and decide that the attack shall take place at noon. They choose 60,000 men amongst the nations most renowned for their valour. Vercasivellaunus, one of the four chiefs, is placed at their head. They sally at the first watch, towards nightfall, proceed by the heights of Grignon and by Fain towards Mont Réa, arrive there at break of day, conceal themselves in the depressions of the ground to the north of that hill, and repose from the fatigues of the night. At the hour appointed, Vercasivellaunus descends the slopes and rushes upon the camp of Reginus and Rebilus; at the same moment, the cavalry of the army of succour approaches the retrenchments in the plain, and the other troops, sallying from their camps, move forwards.

When, from the top of the citadel of Alesia, Vercingetorix saw these movements, he left the town, carry-

ing with him the poles, the small covered galleries (*musculos*), the iron hooks (*falces*), ⁽¹⁾ and everything which had been prepared for a sally, and proceeded towards the plain. An obstinate struggle follows; everywhere the greatest efforts are made, and wherever the defence appears weakest, the Gauls rush to the attack. Scattered over extensive lines, the Romans defend only with difficulty several points at the same time, and are obliged to face two attacks from opposite sides. Fighting, as it were, back to back, everybody is agitated by the cries he hears, and by the thought that his safety depends upon those that are behind him; "it lies in human nature," says Cæsar, "to be struck more deeply with the danger one cannot see." ⁽²⁾

On the northern slopes of the mountain of Flavigny (at the point marked *J C*, *Plate 25*), Cæsar had chosen the most convenient spot for observing each incident of the action, and for sending assistance to the places which were most threatened. Both sides were convinced that the moment of the decisive struggle had arrived. If the Gauls do not force the lines, they have no further hope of safety; if the Romans obtain the advantage, they have reached the end of their labours. It is especially at the retrenchments on the

(1) See note on page 143

(2) This passage proves clearly that the army of succour attacked also the circumvallation of the plain. In fact, how can we admit that, of 240,000 men, only 60,000 should have been employed? It follows, from the accounts given in the "Commentaries," that among this multitude of different peoples, the chiefs chose the most courageous men to form the corps of 60,000 which operated the movement of turning the hills; and that the others, unaccustomed to war, and less formidable, employed in the assault of the retrenchments in the plain, were easily repulsed

slopes of Mont Réa that the Romans run the greatest danger, for the commanding position of the enemy gives them an immense disadvantage (*iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium, magnum habet momentum*). One part of the assailants throw darts; another advances, forming the tortoise; fresh troops incessantly relieve the soldiers who are weary. All strive desperately to fill the fosses, to render useless the accessory defences by covering them with earth, and to scale the rampart. Already the Romans begin to feel the want of arms and strength. Cæsar, informed of this state of things, sends Labienus to their succour with six cohorts, and orders him, if the troops cannot maintain themselves behind the retrenchments, to withdraw them and make a sally, but only at the last extremity. Labienus, encamped on the mountain of Bussy, descends from the heights to proceed to the place of combat. Cæsar, passing between the two lines, repairs to the plain, where he encourages the soldiers to persevere, for this day, this hour will decide whether they are to gather the fruit of their former victories.

Meanwhile the besieged, having abandoned the hope of forcing the formidable retrenchments of the plain, direct their attack against the works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of Flavigny, and transport thither all their materials of attack; with a shower of arrows they drive away the Roman soldiers who fight from the top of the towers; they fill the fosses with earth and fascines, clear a passage for themselves, and, by means of iron hooks, tear down the wattling of the parapet and the

palisade. Young Brutus is first sent thither with several cohorts, and after him the lieutenant C. Fabius with seven more; at last, as the action becomes still hotter, Cæsar himself hurries to them with new reserves.

After the fortune of the fight has been restored, and the enemies driven back, he proceeds towards the place where he had sent Labienus, draws four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, orders a part of the cavalry to follow him, and the other part to go round by the exterior lines, to take the enemy in the rear by issuing from the camp of Grésigny. On his side, Labienus, seeing that neither the fosses nor the ramparts can arrest the efforts of the Gauls, rallies thirty-nine cohorts which have arrived from the neighbouring redoubts, and which chance offers to him, and informs Cæsar that, according to what had been agreed, he is going to make a sally. (1) Cæsar hastens his march in order to share in the combat. As soon as, from the heights on which they stood, the legionaries recognise their general by the colour of the garment which he was in the habit of wearing in battle (the purple-coloured *paludamentum*), (2) and see him followed by cohorts and detachments of cavalry, they sally from the retrenchments and begin the attack. Shouts arise on both sides, and are repeated from the

(1) According to Polyænus (VIII xxiii. 11), Cæsar, during the night, detached 3,000 legionaries and all his cavalry to take the enemy in the rear.

(2) "Cæsar (at Alexandria) was greatly perplexed, being burdened with his purple vestments, which prevented him from swimming." (Xiphilinus, *Julius Cæsar*, p. 26.)—"Crassus, instead of appearing before his troops in a purple-coloured *paludamentum*, as is the custom of the Roman generals. . . ." (Plutarch, *Crassus*, 28.)

vallum to the other works. When Cæsar arrives, he sees the lines abandoned, and the battle raging in the plain of Grésigny, on the banks of the Ose. The Roman soldiers throw away the *pilum*, and draw their swords. At the same time, the cavalry of the camp of Grésigny appears in the rear of the enemy; other cohorts approach. The Gauls are put to the rout, and in their flight encounter the cavalry, who make great slaughter among them. Sedulius, chief and prince of the Lemovices, is slain; the Arvernian Ver-casivellaunus is taken prisoner. Seventy-four ensigns are brought to Cæsar. Of all this army, so numerous as it was, few combatants return to their camp safe and sound.

Witnesses, from the top of their walls, of this sanguinary defeat, the besieged despaired of their safety, and called in the troops who were attacking the countervallation. (1) As the result of these reverses, the Gauls of the army of succour fly from their camp; and if the Romans, compelled to defend so many points at one time, and to assist each other mutually, had not been worn out by the labours of a whole day, the entire mass of the enemies might have been annihilated. Towards the middle of the night the cavalry sent in pursuit came up with their rear-guard; a great part of them were taken prisoners or killed; the others dispersed, to return to their countries.

Next day, Vercingetorix convokes a council. He declares that he has not undertaken this war out of

(1) "The inhabitants of Alesia despaired of their safety when they saw the Roman soldiers bringing from all sides into their camp an immense quantity of shields ornamented with gold and silver, cuirasses stained with blood, plate, and Gaulish flags" (Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 30)

personal interest, but for the cause of the liberty of all. "Since they must yield to fate, he places himself at the discretion of his fellow-citizens, and offers them, in order to appease the Romans, to be delivered up, dead or alive." A deputation is at once sent to Cæsar, who requires that the arms and the chiefs be delivered to him. He places himself in front of his camp, inside the retrenchments; the chiefs are brought, the arms are laid down, and Vercingetorix surrenders to the conqueror. This valiant defender of Gaul arrives on horseback, clad in his finest arms, makes the circuit of Cæsar's tribunal, dismounts, and laying down his sword and his military ensigns, exclaims: "Thou hast vanquished a brave man, thou, the bravest of all!"⁽¹⁾ The prisoners were distributed by head to each soldier, by way of booty, except the 20,000 who belonged to the Ædui and Arverni, and whom Cæsar restored in the hope of bringing back those people to his cause.

Dio Cassius relates the surrender of the Gaulish chief as follows: "After this defeat, Vercingetorix, who had neither been taken nor wounded, might have fled; but, hoping that the friendship which had formerly bound him to Cæsar would procure his pardon, he repaired to the proconsul, without having sent a herald to ask for peace, and appeared suddenly in his presence, at the moment he was sitting on his tribunal. His appearance inspired some fear, for he was of tall stature, and had a very imposing aspect

⁽¹⁾ Florus, III. x 26 — According to Plutarch (*Cæsar*, 30), Vercingetorix, after having laid down his arms, seated himself in silence at the foot of Cæsar's tribunal.

under arms. There was a deep silence: the Gaulish chief fell at Cæsar's knees, and implored him by pressing his hands, without uttering a word. This scene excited the pity of the by-standers, by the remembrance of Vercingetorix's former fortune compared to his present misfortune. Cæsar, on the contrary, upbraided him with the recollections on which he had hoped for his safety. He compared his recent struggle with the friendship of which he reminded him, and by that means pointed out more vividly the odiousness of his conduct. And thus, far from being touched with his misfortune at that moment, he threw him at once in fetters, and afterwards ordered him to be put to death, after having exhibited him in his triumph." By acting thus, Cæsar believed that he was obeying state policy and the cruel customs of the time. It is to be regretted for his glory that he did not use, towards Vercingetorix, the illustrious Gaulish chief, the same clemency which, during the Civil War, he showed towards the vanquished who were his fellow-citizens.

When these events were accomplished, Cæsar proceeded towards the Ædui, and received their submission. There he met the envoys of the Arverni, who promised to pay deference to his orders: he required from them a great number of hostages. Afterwards, he placed his legions in winter quarters. T. Labienus, with two legions and some cavalry, among the Sequani (Sempronius Rutilus was given him as a colleague); C. Fabius and L. Minucius Basilius, with two legions, among the Remi, in order to protect them against the Bellovaci, their neighbours; C. Antistius

Reginus amongst the Ambluareti; T. Sextius among the Bituriges; C. Caninius Rebilus among the Ruteni, each with one legion. Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpicius were established at Cabillonum (*Chalon*) and Matisco (*Mâcon*), in the land of the Ædui, on the Saône, to ensure the supply of provisions. Cæsar resolved to pass the winter at Bibracte.⁽¹⁾ He announced those events at Rome, where twenty days of public thanksgivings were decreed.

XIII. The excavations carried on round Mont Auxois, from 1862 to 1865, have brought to light, in nearly all points, the fosses of the Roman retrenchments. The following is the result:—

CAMPS.—Cæsar debouched upon Alesia by the mountain of Bussy (*see Plate 25*), and distributed his army round Mont Auxois: the legions encamped on the heights, and the cavalry was established on the lower grounds, near the streams.

There were four camps of infantry, two of them, *A* and *B*, on the mountain of Flavigny. Their form depends on that of the ground: they were shaped in

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 90 —By comparing the data of the VIIth book with those of the VIIIth, we obtain the following results. LEGIONS.

In Franche-Comté, Labienus with the 7th and 15th . . .	2
In the country of the Remi, Fabius and Basilius with the 8th and 9th	2
Between the Loire and the Allier, Reginus with the 11th. . .	1
In Berry, Sextius with the 13th.	1
In Rouergue, Rebilus with the 1st.	1
At Mâcon, Tullius Cicero with the 6th.	1
At Chalon, Sulpicius with the 14th	1
At Bibracte, Mark Antony with the 10th and 12th	2
Total.	11

such a manner that the retrenchments should, as far as possible, command the ground situated before them. On the side where it could have been attacked, that is, to the south, the camp *A* presented formidable defences, to judge from the triple line of fosses which surround this part. (*See Plates 25 and 28.*) We must, perhaps, suppose that it was occupied by Cæsar in person. The camp *B* is more extensive. The vestiges of its *remblai* are still visible at the present day, in the greatest part of its circuit, in consequence of this land having never been touched by the plough. It is the only known example of visible traces of a camp made by Cæsar. None of the camps of the mountain of Flavigny having been attacked, the excavations have only brought to light in the fosses a small number of objects. The entrances to the camps are at the places marked by arrows on *Plate 25*. A third camp of infantry was situated on the mountain of Bussy, at *C*.

The fourth infantry camp was established on the lower slopes of Mont Réa, at *D*. It is the one occupied by the two legions of Reginus and Rebilus, and which Vercasivellaunus attacked with 60,000 men. Indeed, it will be observed that the spur situated to the north of Mont Auxois, between the Rabutin and the Brenne, is much farther from Alesia than the other mountains which surround it, and Mont Réa, which is the nearest part of it, is still more than 2,000 mètres distant from it. Hence it follows that Cæsar could not have included Mont Réa in his lines without giving them an excessive development. Consequently, he was obliged to establish one of his camps on the

southern slope of that hill. This camp was on the point of being forced, and an obstinate battle was fought there. The excavations have led to the discovery in the fosses of a multitude of interesting objects, and, among them, more than 600 Roman and Gaulish coins. (See the list in *Appendix C.*) ⁽¹⁾ The extremity of the upper fosse, represented by dots on *Plates* 25 and 28, has not been discovered, because earthfalls have taken place on that part of Mont Réa, which would have obliged the excavators to dig too deep to arrive at the bottom of the fosse. The strength of the retrenchments of the infantry camps was very variable, as may be seen by inspecting the various profiles of the fosses. (*See Plate* 28.) For each camp, they have larger dimensions on the side which is not defended by the escarpments, as may easily be conceived.

⁽¹⁾ There have been found, on a length of 200 mètres, in the bottom of the upper fosse, ten Gaulish coins, twenty arrow-heads, fragments of shields, four balls of stone of different diameters, two millstones of granite, skulls and bones, earthenware, and fragments of amphoras in such quantity, that it would lead us to suppose that the Romans threw upon the assailants everything that came to hand. In the lower fosse, near which the struggle was hotter after the sally of Labienus, the result has surpassed all hopes. This fosse has been opened for a space of 500 mètres in length from *X* to *X* (*see Plate* 25) it contained, besides 600 coins (*see Appendix C.*), fragments of pottery, and numerous bones, the following objects: ten Gaulish swords and nine scabbards of iron, thirty-nine pieces which belonged to arms of the description of the Roman *pilum*, thirty heads of javelins, which, on account of their lightness, are supposed to have been the points of the *hasta amentata*, seventeen more heavy heads may also have served for javelins thrown by the *amentum*, or simply by the hand, or even for lances; sixty-two blades, of various form, which present such finished workmanship that they may be ranged among the spears.

Among objects of defensive armour there have been found one iron helmet and seven cheek-pieces, the forms of which are analogous to those which we see represented on Roman sculptures; umbos of Roman and Gaulish shields; an iron belt of a legionary; and numerous collars, rings, and fibulæ.

There were four cavalry camps, *GHIK*, placed near the different streams: three in the plain of Laumes, and one in the valley of the Rabutin. The fosses of these camps took greatly varied shapes. (*See Plate 28.*) In general, their dimensions were decidedly less than those of the fosses of the infantry camps. Camp *G*, however, had rather deep fosses; no doubt because it was farthest from the lines. The fosse which enclosed camp *I* towards the side of the Brenne has disappeared by the inundations of the river.

REDOUBTS, OR CASTELLA.—Of the twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses (*castella*), five only have been discovered; they were the most considerable; they are represented on *Plate 25*, by the numbers 10, 11, 15, 18, 22. The others, built of wood, and forming blockhouses, would not have left any trace; they are marked by circles on the most convenient places.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINE OF INVESTMENT. — We know, from the “Commentaries,” that camp *D*, on the slopes of Mont Réa, contained two legions. By comparing its superficies with that of the other camps, we may admit that these were occupied in the following manner: in camp *A*, one legion; in camp *B*, two legions; in camp *C*, three legions; total, eight legions. The three remaining legions would have been distributed in the twenty-three redoubts. As we have said, the number of 11,000 paces can evidently only apply to the line of investment formed by the eight camps and the twenty-three redoubts established round Alesia immediately after the arrival of the army, and not, as

has been believed, to the countervallation properly so called, which was only constructed subsequently (VII. 72). This number is rigorously exact, for the circuit of ground surrounded by the camps measures a little more than sixteen kilomètres, which represents 11,000 Roman paces.

THE FOSSE OF TWENTY FEET.—This fosse has been discovered in its whole extent: it barred the plain of Laumes, following a direction perpendicular to the course of the Ose and the Oserain, and did not go round Mont Auxois. *Plate 28* represents two of its most remarkable sections. It was not exactly twenty feet in width, as stated in the “*Commentaries*,” neither was it everywhere 400 paces distant from the countervallation. This measurement is only exact towards the extremities of the fosse, near the two rivers.

COUNTERVALLATION.—Vercingetorix, having retired to the plateau of Alesia, could only have escaped by the plain of Laumes, and, at the worst, by the valley of the Rabutin; for the spurs situated to the south, the east, and the north of Mont Auxois are surmounted by a belt of perpendicular rocks, which form insurmountable barriers, and the valleys of the Oserain and the Ose, which divide them, constitute veritable defiles. It became important, therefore, to bar the plain of Laumes with impregnable works. Hence Cæsar accumulated there the means of defence; but he simplified them everywhere else, as the excavations have shown.

These are the works, peculiar to the plain of Laumes, which Cæsar describes in chapters 72 and

73. The traces of the two fosses exist over the whole extent of the plain, from one river to the other. They had not the same form: the one nearest to Mont Auxois is square-bottomed; the other is triangular. (*See Plates 27 and 28.*) The width of the first is fifteen feet, as stated in the text; that of the triangular fosse is fifteen feet at certain points, but more frequently a little less. The two fosses have the same depth; but it does not reach fifteen feet, as the translators have wrongly understood it. To dig a fosse of fifteen feet deep is so considerable a work, on account of the two stages of workmen which it requires, that it has, perhaps, never been executed for a temporary fortification. Moreover, the result of the excavations leaves no doubt on this subject: the two fosses of the countervallation have both only a depth of from eight to nine feet.

The fosse which is nearest Mont Auxois was filled with water. The Romans had naturally introduced the water into that of the two fosses which, owing to its square bottom, could contain the most considerable volume. A careful level made in the plain of Laumes has proved that this water was derived from the Oserain. During the excavations, the gravel has been found which the water of this river had carried with it, at the time of the investment of Alesia, almost to the middle of the length of the fosse.

To the left of the Oserain, the countervallation cut the first slopes of the hill of Flavigny for a length of 800 mètres; thence it continued, having but one fosse, the various sections of which are indicated on *Plate 28*. It ran at first along the left bank of the river,

at a mean distance of fifty mètres, as far as the mill of Chantrier, then cut the western extremity of Mont Penneville, between the Oserain and the Ose, followed the right bank of the latter river, along the slopes of the mountain of Bussy, and, after having crossed the small plain of Grésigny, joined the camp established at the foot of Mont Réa. Nearly everywhere the Romans had the advantage of a commanding position to defend the countervallation. The excavations have proved that in the plain of Grésigny the fosse of the countervallation had been filled with water from the Rabutin. They have led to the discovery in the ancient bed of this stream (*see Plate 25*), at the very point where the fosse joined it, of a wall of unhewn stones, which barred the waters so as to conduct them into this fosse. (¹)

CIRCUMVALLATION.—Over the extent of the plain of Laumes, and on the slopes of the mountain of Flavigny, the circumvallation was parallel to the countervallation, at a mean distance of 200 mètres. It had only one single fosse, which in the plain was square-bottomed, so as to allow more soil to be dug out; everywhere else its form was triangular. (*See Plate 28.*) The circumvallation of the mountain of Flavigny ceased towards the escarpments, where the defences became useless; then, again, it continued on the plateau, where it formed the connection between

(¹) In the fosses of the plain of Laumes have been found a fine sword, several nails, and some bones, on the left bank of the Oserain, two coins, three arrow-heads, and other fragments of arms; in the fosse which descends towards the Ose, on the northern slopes of Mont Penneville, a prodigious quantity of bones of animals. A spot planted with vines, close by, on the southern slope of Mont Penneville, is still at the present day called, on the register of lands, *Cæsar's Kitchen* (*la Cuisine de César*).

the camps. After this, it descended towards the Oserain, cut the point of Mont Penneville, re-ascended the slopes of the mountain of Bussy, where it similarly united the camps, descended into the plain of Grésigny, which it crossed in a direction parallel to the countervallation, and ended at camp *D*. On the heights it was made to follow the undulations of the ground, so that its defenders should occupy as much as possible a commanding position with respect to that of the assailants. Moreover, the works of the circumvallation were not everywhere the same. Thus, near the escarpments and ravines which cut this line, the Romans had made no fosse with epaulment, but only accessory defences, such as *abatis* and wolf-pits, which even alternated on divers points.

Above the *castellum* 21, between Grésigny and Mont Réa, the excavations have brought to light a fosse of great dimensions, the bottom of which was full of bones of animals of divers kinds. Its position, near a small ravine in which runs a brook, may lead us to suppose that here was the *abattoir* of the Roman army. In considering this fosse, and those which have been discovered on the top and on the slopes of Mont Réa, as forming part of the circumvallation, there will be found for the development of this line about twenty kilomètres, which represents with sufficient accuracy the fourteen miles of the text of the "Commentaries." (¹)

(¹) In the fosses of the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes have been found stone balls, some fragments of arms, pottery, and a magnificent silver vase, of good Greek art. This last was found at *z* (see Plate 25), near the imperial road from Paris to Dijon, at the very bottom of the fosse, at a depth of 1·40m. Bronze arms, consisting of ten spears, two axes, and two swords, have been found previously at *y* near the Oserain.

WOLF-PITS.—In the plain of Laumes, at the top of the circumvallation, and close to the exterior bank of the fosse, there have been counted more than fifty wolf-pits, in five rows. Others have been cleared out on the heights—nine between the camp *A* and the escarpments, twenty-seven on the mountain of Bussy, near the *castellum* 15; they are dug in the rock, and in such a perfect state of preservation that they appear as though they had been made but yesterday. At the bottom of some of these last, fifteen arrow-heads were picked up. All these wolf-pits are three feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and a little less than one foot at the bottom.

GAULISH CAMP.—During the first days of the investment, the besieged encamped on the slopes of Mont Auxois, towards the eastern part of the hill. They were protected by a fosse and a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. We have traced the site of this camp at *P Q R S* on *Plate* 25. The excavations have brought to light, in the direction of *Q R* on the slopes which shelve towards the Oserain, traces of fosses and remains of walls. On the plateau of Mont Auxois it might be interesting to attempt to discover the ancient Gaulish wall. It has been uncovered in pieces here and there over the whole space of the declivities; hence it may be concluded that the town occupied the whole of the plateau.

A remarkable specimen of this wall is visible at a point of Mont Auxois, near the spot where recently the statue of Vercingetorix has been erected.

As to the camps of the army of succour, it is probable that the Gauls did not form any retrenchments on the hills where they established themselves.

CHAPTER XI.

(Year of Rome 703)

(BOOK VIII. (1) OF THE "COMMENTARIES.")

I. THE capture of Alesia and that of Vercingetorix, in spite of the united efforts of all Gaul, naturally gave Cæsar hopes of a general submission; and he therefore believed that he could leave his army, during the winter, to rest quietly in its quarters from the hard labours which had lasted, without interruption, during the whole of the past summer. But the spirit of insurrection was not extinct among the Gauls; and convinced by experience that, whatever might be their number, they could not, in a body, cope with troops inured to war, they resolved, by partial insurrections, raised on all points at once, to divide the attention and the forces of the Romans, as their only chance of resisting them with advantage.

Cæsar was unwilling to leave them time to realise this new plan, but gave the command of his winter quarters to his quæstor Mark Antony, quitted Bibracte on the day before the Calends of January (the 25th of December), with an escort of cavalry, joined the 13th legion, which was in winter quarters among the Bituriges, not far from the frontier of the Ædui,

(1) This book, as is known, was written by Hirtius

and called to him the 11th legion, which was the nearest at hand. Having left two cohorts of each legion to guard the baggage, he proceeded towards the fertile country of the Bituriges, a vast territory, where the presence of a single legion was insufficient to put a stop to the preparations for insurrection.

His sudden arrival in the midst of men without distrust, who were spread over the open country, produced the result which he expected. They were surprised before they could enter into their *oppida*, for Cæsar had strictly forbidden everything which might have raised their suspicion, especially the application of fire, which usually betrays the sudden presence of an enemy. Several thousands of captives were made; those who succeeded in escaping sought in vain a refuge among the neighbouring nations. Cæsar, by forced marches, came up with them everywhere, and obliged each tribe to think of its own safety before that of others. This activity held the populations in their fidelity, and, through fear, engaged the wavering to submit to the conditions of peace. Thus the Bituriges, seeing that Cæsar offered them an easy way to recover his protection, and that the neighbouring states had suffered no other chastisement than that of having to deliver hostages, did not hesitate in submitting.

The soldiers of the 11th and 13th legions had, during the winter, supported with rare constancy the fatigues of very difficult marches, in intolerable cold. To reward them, he promised to give, by way of prize-money, 200 sesterii to each soldier, and 2,000 to each centurion. He then sent them into their winter quar-

ters, and returned to Bibracte, after an absence of forty days. Whilst he was there dispensing justice, the Bituriges came to implore his support against the attacks of the Carnutes. Although it was only eighteen days since he returned, he marched again, at the head of two legions, the 6th and the 14th, which had been placed on the Saône to ensure the supply of provisions.

On his approach, the Carnutes, taught by the fate of others, abandoned their miserable huts, which they had erected on the site of their burgs and *oppida* destroyed in the last campaign, and fled in every direction. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the rigour of the season, established his camp at Genabum (*Gien*), and lodged his soldiers partly in the huts which had remained undestroyed, partly in tents, under penthouses covered with straw. The cavalry and auxiliary infantry were sent in pursuit of the Carnutes, who, hunted down everywhere, and without shelter, took refuge in the neighbouring countries. (¹)

II. After having dispersed some rebellious meetings

Campaign against
the Bellovaci.

and stifled the germs of an insurrection, Cæsar believed that the summer would pass without any serious war. He left, therefore, at Genabum, the two legions he had with him, and gave the command of them to C. Trebonius. Nevertheless, he learnt, by several intimations from the Remi, that the Bellovaci and neighbouring peoples, with Correus and Commius at their head, were collecting troops to make an inroad on the territory of the Suessiones, who

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VIII 5.

had been placed, since the campaign of 697, under the dependence of the Remi.

He then considered that it regarded his interest, as well as his dignity, to protect allies who had deserved so well of the Republic. He again drew the 11th legion from its winter quarters, sent written orders to C. Fabius, who was encamped in the country of the Remi, to bring into that of the Suessiones the two legions under his command, and demanded one of his legions from Labienus, who was at Besançon. Thus, without taking any rest himself, he shared the fatigues among the legions by turns, as far as the position of the winter quarters and the necessities of the war permitted.

When this army was assembled, he marched against the Bellovaci, established his camp on their territory, and sent cavalry in every direction, in order to make some prisoners, and learn from them the designs of the enemy. The cavalry reported that the emigration was general, and that the few inhabitants who were to be seen were not remaining behind in order to apply themselves to agriculture, but to act as spies upon the Romans. Cæsar, by interrogating the prisoners, learnt that all the Bellovaci able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that they had been joined by the Ambiani, the Aulerci, (') the Caletes, the Vellocasses, and the Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest, on a height surrounded by marshes (Mont Saint-Marc, in the forest of Compiègne) (*see Plate 29*); their baggage had been transported to more distant woods. The command was divided among sev-

(') Viz., the Aulerci-Eburovices.

eral chiefs, but the greater part obeyed Correus, on account of his well-known hatred to the Romans. Commius had, a few days before, gone to seek succour from the numerous Germans who lived in great numbers in the neighbouring countries (probably those on the banks of the Meuse). The Bellovaci resolved with one accord to give Cæsar battle, if, as report said, he was advancing with only three legions, for they would not run the risk of having afterwards to encounter his entire army. If, on the contrary, the Romans were advancing with more considerable forces, they proposed to keep their positions, and confine themselves to intercepting, by means of ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which were very scarce at that season.

This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Cæsar full of prudence, and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He took, therefore, every possible care to dissimulate the number of his troops; he had with him the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions, composed of old soldiers of tried valour, and the 11th, which, formed of picked young men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his confidence, although it could not be compared with the others with regard to bravery and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemies by showing them only three legions, the only number they were willing to fight, he placed the 7th, 8th, and 9th in one line; whilst the baggage, which was not very considerable, was placed behind, under the protection of the 11th legion, which closed the march. In this order, which formed almost a square, he came unawares in sight

of the Bellovacî. At the unexpected view of the legions, which advanced in order of battle and with a firm step, they lost their courage; and instead of attacking, as they had engaged to do, they confined themselves to drawing themselves up before their camp, without leaving the height. A valley, deeper than it was wide (*magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente*), separated the two armies. On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of the barbarians, Cæsar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the idea of attacking them, and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls, in a strong position (the camp of Saint Pierre-en-Chatre [*in Castris*], in the forest of Compiègne).⁽¹⁾ (*See Plates 29 and 30.*) He caused it to be surrounded with a parapet twelve feet high, surmounted with accessory works, proportioned to the importance of the retrenchment (*loriculamque pro ratione ejus altitudinis*),⁽²⁾ and preceded by a double fosse, fifteen feet wide, with a square bottom; ⁽³⁾ towers of three stories were constructed

(1) It has been objected that Mont Saint-Pierre was not sufficiently large to contain seven legions; but, since Cæsar for a long while had only four legions with him, the camp was made for that number. Afterwards, instead of remaining on the defensive, he determined, as at Alesia, to invest the Gaulish camp, and it was then only that he sent for three more legions. The appearance of the different camps which have been found is, on the contrary, very rational, and in conformity with the number of troops mentioned in the "Commentaries." Thus, the camp of Berry-au-Bac, which contained eight legions, had forty-one hectares of superficies; that of Geigovia, for six legions, had thirty-three hectares; and that of Mont Saint-Pierre, for four legions, twenty-four hectares

(2) "Non solum vallo et sudibus, sed etiam tunniculis instruunt quod opus loriculam vocant." (Vegetius, IV 28)

(3) It may be seen, by the profiles of the fosses which have been brought to light, that they could not have had vertical sides; the expression used by Hirtius leads us to believe that, by *lateribus directus*, he meant fosses not triangular, but with a square bottom.

from distance to distance, and united together by covered bridges, the exterior part of which was protected by hurdle-work. In this manner, the camp was protected not only by a double fosse, but also by a double row of defenders, some of whom, placed on the bridges, could, from this elevated and sheltered position, throw their missiles farther and with a better aim; while the others, placed on the *vallum*, nearer to the enemy, were protected by the bridges from the missiles which showered down upon them. The entrances were defended by means of higher towers, and were closed with gates.

These formidable retrenchments had a double aim: to increase the confidence of the barbarians, by making them believe that they were feared; and, next, to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced with safety, when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there were no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain which extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few foragers did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which was still more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had brought only 500 German cavalry.

The enemies remained for several days shut up in their impregnable position. Cæsar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an investment alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater number of troops. He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as possible the 13th legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in winter quarters among the Bituriges; to join it

with the 6th and the 14th, which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum, and to come himself with these three legions by forced marches. During this time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent surprises. But this daily service, as is often the case, ended by being negligently performed; and one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with too much ardour, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing, they were surrounded by foot-soldiers, in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief, met with his death. True to his Gaulish manner, he would not allow his age to dispense him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he was hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage raised the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered the Romans more circumspect. Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which were continually taking place within sight of the two camps, about the fordable places of the marsh, the German infantry, which Cæsar had sent for from beyond the Rhine, in order to mix them with the cavalry, joined in a body, boldly crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little resistance, continued the pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized not only the enemies who fought, but even those who were in reserve. Instead of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled cowardly; they did not stop till they were within their camp, and some even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily damped by the least reverse as they became arrogant on the smallest success.

Day after day was passing in this manner, when Cæsar was informed of the arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused multitude in motion, embarrassed with its own mass and its numerous chariots, when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up in line before the camp, to give the column time to move away. Cæsar saw no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, or, on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions advance in order to disturb the enemy in his retreat. Having observed that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown on the marsh; the legions crossed over them, and soon attained the summit of the height, which was defended on both sides by abrupt declivities. There he collected his troops, and advanced in order of battle up to the extremity of the plateau, whence the engines, placed in battery, could reach the masses of the enemy with their missiles.

The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position, were ready to accept battle, if the Romans dared to attack the mountain; besides,

they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led Cæsar to resolve on leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing a camp on this spot, and retrenching it. When the works were completed, the legions were placed before the retrenchments, and the cavalry distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the same time their order of battle, placed them in front of the camp, and, towards the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to them. Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish troops, who fled in haste.

Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy, he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry in pursuit; but he marched only slowly, for fear of some stratagem, as the barbarians might have formed the design of drawing the Romans to a disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass over a distance of ten miles, and halt in a place strongly fortified by nature, Mont Ganelon, where they pitched their camp. In this position, they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to forage. (')

(') *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 17.

III. After several encounters of this kind, Cæsar learnt by a prisoner that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with 6,000 picked infantry and 1,000 horsemen, were preparing an ambuscade in the places where the abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans. In consequence of this information, he sent forward the cavalry, which was always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some light-armed auxiliaries; and he himself, with a greater number of legions, followed them as near as possible.

The enemy had posted themselves in a plain (that of Choisy-au-Bac) of about 1,000 paces wide in every direction, and surrounded on one side by forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to pass (the Aisne). The cavalry were acquainted with the designs of the Gauls; feeling themselves supported, they advanced resolutely, in squadrons, towards this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all sides. Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity favourable for the execution of his plan, and began by attacking the first squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock, without concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, "which," says Hirtius, "happens usually in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a dangerous confusion." There, on the contrary, the squadrons remained separated, fought in detached bodies, and, when one of them advanced, its flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest of his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all sides, without any de-

cisive result, until the enemy's infantry, debouching from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to fall back. The lightly-armed soldiers, who preceded the legions, placed themselves between the squadrons, and restored the fortune of the combat. After a certain time, the troops, animated by the approach of the legions and the arrival of Cæsar, and ambitious of obtaining alone the honour of the victory, redoubled their efforts, and gained the advantage. The enemies, on the other hand, were discouraged and took to flight; but they were stopped by the very obstacles which they intended to throw in the way of the Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped through the forest and crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken under this catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell pierced with wounds.

After this success, Cæsar hoped that, if he continued his march, the enemy, in dismay, would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not without great difficulties.

The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their infantry, fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked, by sound of trumpets, a general assembly, and decided by acclamation to send deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them from oppression, for during his life it

was not the Senate who governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers, Cæsar replied, "that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other Gaulish peoples, but that they alone had persisted in the revolt. It was very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead; but how could it be believed that, with nothing but the help of a weak populace, a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain a war, contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the Senate, and the desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn upon themselves was for him a sufficient reparation."

The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the exception of Commius, who fled to the country whence he had recently drawn succours. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the following reason: the year before, in the absence of Cæsar, T. Labienus, informed that Commius was conspiring and preparing an insurrection, thought that, without accusing him of bad faith, says Hirtius, he could repress his treason. Under pretext of an interview, he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus with some centurions to kill him; but, when they were in the presence of the Gaulish chief, the centurion who was to strike him missed his blow, and only wounded him; swords were drawn on both sides, and Commius had time to escape. ⁽¹⁾

IV. The most warlike tribes had been vanquished, and none of them dreamt of further revolt. Never-

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 23

Devastation of the
Country of the Ebu-
rones.

theless, many inhabitants of the newly-conquered countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to withdraw themselves from the Roman dominion. Cæsar, in order to put a stop to this emigration, distributed his army into different countries. He ordered the quæstor Mark Antony to come to him, with the 12th legion, and sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite part of Gaul (to the country situated between the Creuse and the Vienne), where it was said that several peoples were in arms, and where the lieutenant Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions, appeared not to be sufficiently strong; ⁽¹⁾ lastly, he ordered T. Labienus to join him in person, and to send the 15th legion, ⁽²⁾ which he had under his command, into Cisalpine Gaul, to protect the colonies of Roman citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians, who, the summer before, had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of Trieste).

As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the Eburones, to lay it waste; as he could not secure Ambiorix, who was still wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything by fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return to a country on which he had brought such a terrible calamity: the legions and the

⁽¹⁾ Rebilus had at first only one legion; we believe, with Rustow, that the 10th, which was quartered at Bibracte, had come to join him. It is said (VII. 90) that Rebilus had been sent to the Ruteni; but it appears, from a passage of Orosius (VI. 11), "that he was stopped on his way by a multitude of enemies, and ran the greatest dangers." He remained, therefore, in the country of the Pictones, where Fabius came to his succour.

⁽²⁾ Some manuscripts read erroneously the 13th legion

auxiliaries were charged with this execution. Then, he sent Labienus with two legions to the country of the Treviri, who, always at war with the Germans, were only kept in obedience by the presence of a Roman army. (')

V. During this time, Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to go into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by partial insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne, learnt that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of the Pictones; he was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their king, who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained invariably faithful to the Romans. He started immediately for Lemonum (*Poitiers*). On the road, he learnt from prisoners that Duratius was shut up there, and besieged by several thousand men under the orders of Dumnacus, chief of the Andes. Rebilus, at the head of two weak legions, did not dare to measure his strength with the enemy; he contented himself with establishing his camp in a strong position. At the news of his approach, Dumnacus raised the siege, and marched to meet the legions. But, after several days' fruitless attempts to force their camp, he returned to attack Lemonum.

Meanwhile, the lieutenant Caius Fabius, occupied in pacifying several peoples, learnt from Caninius Rebilus what was going on in the country of the Pictones; he marched without delay to the assistance of Dura-

(') *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 25.

tius. The news of the march of Fabius deprived Dumnacus of all hope of opposing at the same time the troops shut up in Lemonum and the army of succour. He abandoned the siege again in great haste, not thinking himself safe until he had placed the Loire between him and the Romans; but he could only pass that river where there was a bridge (at Saumur). Before he had joined Rebilus, before he had even obtained a sight of the enemy, Fabius, who came from the north, and had lost no time, doubted not, from what he heard from the people of the country, that Dumnacus, in his fear, had taken the road which led to that bridge. He therefore marched thither with his legions, preceded, at a short distance, by his cavalry. The latter surprised the column of Dumnacus on its march, dispersed it, and returned to the camp laden with booty.

During the night of the following day, Fabius again sends his cavalry forward, with orders to delay the march of the enemy, so as to give time for the arrival of the infantry. The two cavalries are soon engaged; but the enemy, thinking that he had to contend only with the same troops as the day before, draws up his infantry in line, so as to support the squadrons, when, suddenly, the legions appear in order of battle. At this sight, the barbarians are struck with terror, the long train of baggage is thrown into confusion, and they disperse. More than 12,000 men were killed, and all the baggage fell into the hands of the Romans.

Only 5,000 fugitives escaped from this rout; they were received by the Senonan Drappes, the same who,

in the first revolt of the Gauls, had collected a crowd of vagabonds, slaves, exiles, and robbers, to intercept the convoys of the Romans. They took the direction of the Narbonnese with the Cadurcan Lucterius, who, as has been seen in the preceding chapter (p. 275), had before attempted a similar invasion. Rebilus pursued them with two legions, in order to avoid the shame of seeing the province suffering any injury from such a contemptible rabble.

As for Fabius, he led the twenty-five cohorts against the Carnutes and the other peoples, whose forces had already been reduced by the defeat they had just experienced with Dumnacus. The Carnutes, though often beaten, had never been completely subdued; they gave hostages; the Armorican peoples followed their example. Dumnacus, driven out of his own territory, went to seek a refuge in the remotest part of Gaul. (')

VI. Drappes and Lucterius, when they learnt that they were pursued by Rebilus and his two legions, gave up the design of penetrating into the province; they halted in the country of the Cadurci, and threw themselves into the *oppidum* of Uxellodunum (*Puy-d'Issolu*, near Vayrac), an exceedingly strong place, formerly under the dependence of Lucterius, who soon excited the inhabitants into revolt.

Rebilus appeared immediately before the town, which, surrounded on all sides by steep rocks, was, even without being defended, difficult of access to

(') *De Bello Gallico*, VIII 31

armed men. Knowing that there was in the *oppidum* so great a quantity of baggage that the besieged could not send them secretly away without being overtaken by the cavalry, and even by the infantry, he divided his cohorts into three bodies, and established three camps on the highest points. (*See Plate 31.*) Next, he ordered a countervallation to be made. On seeing these preparations, the besieged remembered the ill fortune of Alesia, and feared a similar fate. Lucterius, who had witnessed the horrors of famine during the investment of that town, took especial care for the provisions, and, with the consent of all, having 2,000 men in Uxellodunum, he left by night, with Drappes and the rest of the troops, to procure them.

After a few days they collected, by good-will or by force, a great quantity of provisions. During this time the garrison of the *oppidum* attacked the redoubts of Rebilus several times, which obliged him to interrupt the work of the countervallation, which, indeed, he would not have had sufficient forces to defend.

Drappes and Lucterius established themselves at a distance of ten miles from the *oppidum*, with the intention of introducing the provisions gradually. They shared the duties between them. Drappes remained with part of the troops to protect the camp. Lucterius, during the night-time, endeavoured to introduce beasts of burden into the town, by a narrow and woody path. The noise of their march gave warning to the sentries. Rebilus, informed of what was going on, ordered the cohorts to sally from the neighbouring redoubts, and at daybreak fell upon the convoy,

the escort of which was slaughtered. Lucterius, having escaped with a small number of his followers, was unable to rejoin Drappes.

Rebilus soon learnt from prisoners that the rest of the troops which had left the *oppidum* were with Drappes at a distance of twelve miles, and that, by a fortunate chance, not one fugitive had taken that direction to carry him news of the last combat. The Roman general sent in advance all the cavalry and the light German infantry; he followed them with one legion without baggage, leaving the other as a guard to the three camps. When he came near the enemy, he learnt by his scouts that the barbarians, according to their custom, neglecting the heights, had placed their camp on the banks of a river (probably the Dordogne); that the Germans and the cavalry had surprised them, and that they were already fighting. Rebilus then advanced rapidly at the head of the legion, drawn up in order of battle, and took possession of the heights. As soon as the ensigns appeared, the cavalry redoubled their ardour, the cohorts rush forward from all sides, the Gauls were taken or killed, the booty was immense, and Drappes fell into the hands of the Romans.

Rebilus, after this successful exploit, which cost him but a few wounded, returned under the walls of Uxellodunum. Fearing no longer any attack from without, he set resolutely to work to continue his circumvallation. The day after, C. Fabius arrived, followed by his troops, and shared with him the labours of the siege.

While the south of Gaul was the scene of serious

troubles, Cæsar left the quæstor Mark Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the Bellovaci. To deprive the Belgæ of all idea of revolt, he had proceeded to the neighbouring countries with two legions, had exacted hostages, and restored confidence by his conciliating speeches. When he arrived among the Carnutes, who, the year before, had been the first to revolt, he saw that the remembrance of their conduct kept them in great alarm, and he resolved to put an end to it by causing his vengeance to fall only upon Gutruatus, the instigator of the war. This man was brought and delivered up; and although Cæsar was naturally inclined to indulgence, he could not resist the tumultuous entreaties of his soldiers, who made that chief responsible for all the dangers they had run, and for all the misery they had suffered. Gutruatus died under the stripes, and was afterwards beheaded.

It was in the land of the Carnutes that Cæsar received news, by the letters of Rebilus, of the events which had taken place at Uxellodunum, and of the resistance of the besieged. Although a handful of men shut up in a fortress was not very formidable, he judged it necessary to punish their obstinacy, for fear that the Gauls should acquire the conviction that it was not strength, but constancy, which had failed them in resisting the Romans; and lest this example might encourage the other states, which possessed fortresses advantageously situated, to recover their independence.

Moreover, it was known everywhere amongst the Gauls that Cæsar had only one summer more to hold

his command, and that after that they would have nothing more to fear. He left, therefore, the lieutenant Quintus Calenus⁽¹⁾ at the head of his two legions, with orders to follow him by ordinary marches, and with his cavalry he hastened by long marches towards Uxellodunum.

Cæsar, arriving unexpectedly before that town, found it completely invested on all accessible points. He judged that it could not be taken by assault (*neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla conditione posse*), and, as it was abundantly provided with provisions, he conceived the project of depriving the inhabitants of water. The mountain was surrounded nearly on every side by very low ground; but on one side there existed a valley through which a river (the Tourmente) ran. As it flowed at the foot of two precipitous mountains, the disposition of the localities did not admit of turning it aside and conducting it into lower channels. It was difficult for the besieged to come down to it, and the Romans rendered the approaches to it still more dangerous. They placed posts of archers and slingers, and brought engines which commanded all the slopes which gave access to the river. The besieged had thenceforth no other means of procuring water but by fetching it from an abundant spring which arose at the foot of the wall, 300 feet from the channel of the Tourmente. (*See Plate 31.*) Cæsar resolved to drain this spring, and for this purpose he did not hesitate to attempt a laborious undertaking: opposite the point where it rose, he ordered covered galleries to be pushed for-

(1) See his biography in *Appendix D.*

wards against the mountain, and, under protection of these, a terrace to be raised, labours which were carried on in the middle of continual fights and incessant fatigues. Although the besieged, from their elevated position, fought without danger, and wounded many Romans, yet the latter did not yield to discouragement, but continued their task. At the same time they made a subterranean gallery, which, running from the covered galleries, was intended to lead up to the spring. This work, carried on free from all danger, was executed without being perceived by the enemy; the terrace attained a height of sixty feet, and was surmounted by a tower of ten stories, which, without equalling the elevation of the wall, a result it was impossible to obtain, still commanded the fountain. (*See Plate 32.*) Its approaches, battered by engines from the top of this tower, became inaccessible; in consequence of this, many men and animals in the place died of thirst. The besieged, terrified at this mortality, filled barrels with pitch, grease, and shavings, and rolled them in flames upon the Roman works, making at the same time a sally, so as to prevent them from extinguishing the fire; soon it spread to the covered galleries and the terrace, which stopped the progress of the inflammable materials. Notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground and the increasing danger, the Romans still persevered in their struggle. The battle took place on a height, within sight of the army; loud cries were raised on both sides; each individual sought to rival his fellows in zeal, and the more he was exposed to view, the more courageously he faced the missiles and the fire.

Cæsar, as he was sustaining great loss, determined to feign an assault, in order to create a diversion: he ordered some cohorts to climb the hill on all sides, uttering loud cries. This movement terrified the besieged, who, fearing to be attacked on other points, called back to the defence of the wall those who were setting fire to the works. Then the Romans were able to extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, the siege span out in length; the Gauls, although exhausted by thirst and reduced to a small number, did not cease to defend themselves vigorously. At length, the subterranean gallery having reached the veins of the spring, they were taken and turned aside. The besieged, seeing the fountain all at once dried up, believed, in their despair, that it was an intervention of the gods, submitted to necessity, and surrendered.

Cæsar considered that the pacification of Gaul would never be completed if the same resistance was encountered in many other towns. He thought it indispensable to spread terror by a severe example, so much the more as "the well-known mildness of his temper," says Hirtius, "would not allow this necessary rigour to be ascribed to cruelty." He ordered all those who had carried arms to have their hands cut off, and sent them away, as living witnesses of the chastisement reserved for rebels. Drappes, who had been taken prisoner, starved himself to death; Lucterius, who had been arrested by the Arvernian Epasnactus, a friend of the Romans, was delivered up to Cæsar. (¹)

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VIII 44.

VII. The excavations made at Puy-d'Issolu in 1865 leave no further doubt as to the site of Uxellodunum. (See Plates 31 and 32.)

Excavations made
at Puy d'Issolu

The Puy d'Issolu is a lofty mountain, situated not far from the right bank of the Dordogne, between Vayrac and Martel; it is isolated on all sides except towards the north, where it is joined by a defile of 400 mètres wide (the Col de Roujon) to heights named the Pech-Demont. Its plateau, crowned by a circle of perpendicular rocks, commands, almost in every direction, the low ground which surrounds it. This is what the author of the VIIIth book *De Bello Gallico* expresses by these words: *Infima vallis totum pæne montem cingebat in quo positum erat præruptum undique oppidum Uxellodunum.* This plateau, with a surface of eighty hectares in extent, presents strongly-marked undulations: its general incline lies from the north to the south, in the direction of the length of the mountain mass; its highest point is 317 mètres above the level of the sea, and it rises 200 mètres above the valleys which surround it.

The whole eastern slope of the mountain, that which looks towards Vayrac and the Dordogne, is surmounted with rocks, which have a height of as much as forty mètres; consequently, no operation took place on this side during the time of the siege. The western slope alone was the theatre of the different combats. Its declivities are not inaccessible, especially between the village of Loulié and the hamlet of Leguillat, but they are sufficiently abrupt to make the Latin author say: *Quo, defendente nullo, tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile.* At the very foot of this

declivity, and at 200 mètres beneath the culminating point of the plateau, the Tourmente flows, a little river ten mètres broad, embanked between this declivity and that of the opposite heights: *Flumen infimam vallem dividebat*, &c. Such a disposition of the localities, as well as the slight descent of the Tourmente (one mètre in 1,000), rendered it impossible to turn off that river. (*Hoc flumem averti loci natura prohibebat*, &c.)

There is no spring on the plateau of Puy-d'Issolu; but several issue from the sides of the mountain, one of which, that of Loulié, is sufficiently abundant to provide for the necessities of a numerous population. This was the spring which the Romans succeeded in turning off. At the time of the siege, it issued from the side of the mountain at *S* (see *Plate 31*), at twenty-five mètres from the wall of the *oppidum*, and at a distance of about 300 mètres from the Tourmente. These 300 mètres make about 200 Roman paces. We see, therefore, that in the Latin text the word *pedum* must be replaced by *passuum*. We also see that the word *circuitus* (VIII. 4) must be taken in the sense of the *course* of the river.

The "Commentaries" say (VIII. 33) that Rebilus established three camps in very elevated positions. Their sites are indicated by the nature of the localities: the first, *A*, was on the heights of Montbuisson; the second, *B*, on those of the Château de Termes; the third, *C*, opposite the defile of Roujon, on the Pech-Demont. It appears from the excavations that the Romans had not retrenched the two first, which is easily explained, for the heights to the west of the

Puy-d'Issolu are impregnable. Moreover, the Romans at Uxellodunum were not in the same situation as at Alesia. There they had before them 80,000 men, and in their rear a very numerous army of succour; here, on the contrary, it was only a question of reducing a few thousand men. The camp *C* required to be protected, because it was possible for troops to descend from the tableau of the Puy-d'Issolu towards the defile of Roujon, which, being situated fifty mètres lower down, gives an easy access to the heights of Pech-Demont. The excavations have, in fact, brought to light a double line of parallel fosses, which barred the defile behind, and formed at the same time a countervallation.

The Gauls could only quit the town by this defile, and by the western slope of the mountain. It became, consequently, interesting to ascertain if the Romans made a countervallation along the Tourmente, on the slopes of the heights of the castle of Termes and of Montbuisson. Unfortunately, the railway from Périgueux to Capdenac, which passes over the very site where the countervallation might have been made, has destroyed all traces of the Roman works: the excavations made above this line have produced no result.

The most interesting discovery was that of the subterranean gallery. (1) Until the moment when the excavations were commenced, a part of the rain-water absorbed by the plateau of the Puy-d'Issolu issued near the village of Loulié by two springs, *A* and *A'*.

(1) It is due to the persevering researches of M J.B. Cessac, assisted subsequently by the departmental commission of the Lot.

(See Plate 32.) The spring *A'* flows from a ravine, and corresponds to the *thalweg* of the slope; as to the source *A*, it is easily seen by the appearance of the ground that it has been turned from its natural course. The excavations, in fact, have proved that it is produced by the waters which run in the Roman gallery. This gallery has been opened over an extent of forty mètres. It was dug in a solid mass of tufa nearly ten mètres thick, which had been formed in the centuries anterior to Cæsar. Its form is that of a semicircular vault, supported by two perpendicular sides; its average dimensions are 1·80m. in height, by a width of 1·50 mètres. The mud carried along by the waters, and accumulated since the time of the siege of Uxellodunum, had almost filled the gallery, leaving only at the top of the *intrados* an empty space, in the form of a segment of a circle, with 0·50m. chord by 0·15m. for the absciss of its curve. Through this empty space the water ran at the time of the excavations.

Before reaching the tufa, the first subterranean works of the Romans had been made in the pure soil, which had to be propped: fragments of blindage have been found, some of them fixed in silicious mud, corroded or reduced to the state of ligneous paste, others petrified by their long contact with the waters charged with calcareous sediments. A considerable number of these petrified blocks, and remains of wood, collected in the interior of the gallery, are deposited in the museum of Saint-Germain.

The gallery does not lead directly to the spring which existed in the time of the Gauls. The Roman

miners, after having made their way straightforward for a length of six metres, came upon a thick bed of blue marl of the lias: they turned to their left to avoid digging through it, and advanced four mètres further, following the marl, which they left to the right. When they reached the end of the marls, a horizontal layer of hard rock, one mètre thick, obliged them to bring the gallery back to its former direction, and to raise it, in order to avoid this new obstacle without going out of the tufas, which, formed by the waters, would necessarily lead towards the spring. (*See Plate 32.*) From this second turning, the gallery continued close to the line of separation of the marls and the tufas. It rose rapidly, until it reached the limit of the deposits of tufa. At this point blindage had again been necessary. It was there chiefly that the blocks of petrification presented a peculiar character: some lay thrown down in the gallery, pierced by sockets with a rectangular section, which show the dimensions and the way in which it had been worked; others, with a rounded base, are veritable uprights, still standing on the rock.

Independently of the excavations made to find the Roman fosses and the subterranean gallery, others have been made on the slope of Loulié, in the soil which is near the spring. They have brought to light numerous fragments of Gaulish pottery and of amphoræ, and, which is a further confirmation of the identity of the Puy d'Issolu with Uxellodunum, remains of arms similar in all respects to those found in the fosses of Alesia. ⁽¹⁾ Under the earthfalls which

(1) List of the objects found at Puy-d'Issolu: one blade of a *dolabrum*,

during nineteen centuries have taken place on the slope of Loulié, all the traces of the fire described in the "Commentaries" have been also found. The site of the terrace and the covered galleries which were fired were also traced on the ground. *Plate 32* represents the slope which was the scene of the struggle: the terrace, the tower, and the covered galleries are represented on it, as well as the subterranean gallery, according to a very exact survey made on the spot.

VIII. Whilst these events were taking place on the banks of the Dordogne, Labienus, in a Complete Submission of Gaul. cavalry engagement, had gained a decisive advantage over a part of the Treviri and Germans, had taken prisoner their chief, and thus subjected that people, who were always ready to support any insurrection against the Romans. The *Æduan* Surus fell also into his hands: he was a chief distinguished for his courage and his birth, and the only one of that nation who had not yet laid down his arms.

From that moment Cæsar considered Gaul to be completely pacified; he resolved, however, to go himself to Aquitaine, which he had not yet visited, and which Publius Crassus had partly conquered. Arriving there at the head of two legions, he obtained the complete submission of that country without difficulty: all the tribes sent him hostages. He pro-

thirty-six arrow-heads, six heads of darts for throwing by catapults, fragments of bracelets, bear's tooth (an amulet), necklace beads, rings, a blade of a knife, and nails.

ceeded next to Narbonne with a detachment of cavalry, and charged his lieutenants to put the army into winter quarters. Four legions, under the orders of Mark Antony, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium; two among the Ædui, and two among the Turones, on the frontier of the Carnutes, to hold in check all the countries bordering on the ocean. These two last legions took up their winter quarters on the territory of the Lemo-vices, not far from the Arverni, so that no part of Gaul should be without troops. Cæsar remained but a short time in the province, presiding hastily over the assemblies, determining cases of public contestation, and rewarding those who had served him well. He had had occasion, more than any one, to know their sentiments individually, because, during the general revolt of Gaul, the fidelity and succour of the province had aided him in triumphing over it. When these affairs were settled, he returned to his legions in Belgium, and took up his winter quarters at Nemeto-cenna (*Arras*).

There he was informed of the last attempts of Commius, who, continuing a partisan war at the head of a small number of cavalry, intercepted the Roman convoys. Mark Antony had charged C. Volusenus Quadratus, prefect of the cavalry, to pursue him; he had accepted the task eagerly, in the hope of succeeding this time better than the first; but Commius, taking advantage of the rash ardour with which his enemy had rushed upon him, had wounded him seriously, and escaped; he was discouraged, however, and had promised Mark Antony to retire to any spot

which should be appointed him, on condition that he should never be compelled to appear before a Roman. ⁽¹⁾ This condition having been accepted, he had given hostages. ⁽²⁾

Gaul was henceforth subjugated ; death or slavery had carried off its principal citizens. Of all the chiefs who had fought for its independence, only two survived, Commius and Ambiorix. Banished far from their country, they died unknown.

⁽¹⁾ According to Frontinus (*Strateg.*, II 11). Commius sought an asylum in Great Britain.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 48

B O O K I V.

RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM 696 TO 705.

CHAPTER I.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.

I. IN the preceding book we have given, from the Difficulties of Cæsar's Task. "Commentaries," the relation of the war in Gaul, and endeavoured to elucidate doubtful questions, and to discover the localities which were the scenes of so many combats. It will now be not uninteresting to recapitulate the principal events of the eight campaigns of the Roman proconsul, separated from all their technical details: We will at the same time examine what was passing, during this period, on the banks of the Tiber, and the events which led to the Civil War.

Writers who dislike glory take pleasure in undervaluing it. They seem to wish thus to invalidate the judgment of past ages: we seek in preference to confirm it, by explaining why the renown of certain men has filled the world. To bring to light the heroic examples of the past, to show that glory is the legitimate reward of great actions, is to pay homage to the public opinion of all times. Man struggling with difficulties which seem insurmountable, and conquer-

ing them by his genius, offers a spectacle always worthy of our admiration; and this admiration will be the more justified, according to the greater disproportion between the end and the means.

Cæsar is going to quit Rome, to go far from the debates of the Forum, the agitation of the comitia, and the intrigues of a corrupt town, in order to take the command of his troops. Let us, then, for a moment lay aside the statesman, and consider only the warrior, the great captain. The Roman proconsul is not one of those barbarian chieftains who, at the head of innumerable hordes, throw themselves upon a foreign country to ravage it with fire and sword. His mission is not to destroy, but to extend to a distance the influence of the Republic, by protecting the peoples of Gaul, either against their own dissensions, or against the encroachments of their dangerous neighbours. The dangers from which Italy had been saved by the victories of Marius are not forgotten. Men's memory still recalls the savage bravery, and, still more, the multitude of those barbarians who, before the battle of Aix, had employed six entire days in defiling in front of the camp of Marius; (¹) they still fear a renewal of these inundations of peoples, and Cæsar's first duty is to avert similar perils. Already the Helvetii and their allies, to the number of 368,000, are on the road towards the Rhine; 120,000 Germans have established themselves in Gaul; 24,000 Harudes, their countrymen, have just followed the same example; others are marching after them, and more than 100,000 Suevi are preparing to cross the Rhine.

(¹) Plutarch, *Marius*, 19.

The Narbonnese forms the proconsul's basis of operation, but it is partly composed of populations recently subjugated, whose fidelity is as yet doubtful. Rome has in Gaul allied peoples, but they have lost their preponderance. The different states, divided among themselves by intestine rivalries, offer an easy prey to the enemy; but let the Roman army come to occupy their territory in a permanent manner, and thus wound their feelings of independence, and all the warlike youth will unite, eager to begin a struggle full of perils for the invaders. Cæsar is obliged, therefore, to act with extreme prudence, to favour the ambition of some, repress the encroachments of others, and spare the susceptibility of all, taking care not to wound their religion, their laws, or their manners; he is obliged at the same time to draw a part of his forces from the country he occupies, and obtain thence men, subsidies, and provisions. The greatest difficulty experienced by the commander of an army operating in a country the good-will of which he seeks to conciliate, is to enable his troops to live without exhausting it, and to assure the welfare of his soldiers without exciting the discontent of the inhabitants. "To seek to call," says the Emperor Napoleon I. in his *Mémoires*, "a nation to liberty and independence; to desire that a public spirit should form in the midst of it, and that it should furnish troops; and at the same time to take from it its principal resources, are two contradictory ideas, and to conciliate them is the province of talent." (¹)

Thus, to fight between two and three hundred

(¹) *Mémoires de Napoleon I.*, Revolt of Pavia, VII. 4.

thousand Helvetii and Germans, to hold in dominion eight millions of Gauls, and to maintain the Roman province—such is the task which Cæsar has undertaken, and, to carry it out, he has as yet only at hand a single legion. What means will he have to overcome all these obstacles? His genius and the ascendancy of civilisation over barbarism.

II. Cæsar starts from Rome towards the middle of

Campaign against
the Helvetii.

March, 696, and arrives in eight days at Geneva. Immediately the Helvetii, who had appointed their rendezvous on the banks of the Rhine towards the 24th of March, the day of the equinox, ask his permission to cross Savoy, with the intention of going to establish themselves in Saintonge. He adjourns his answer to the 8th of April, and employs the fifteen days thus gained in fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, from Geneva to the Pas-de-l'Ecluse, in raising troops in the Roman province, and in renewing the old bonds of friendship with the Burgundians,⁽¹⁾ who will soon furnish him with men, horses, and provisions.

By rendering the passage of the Rhone impossible, and by binding to his cause the peoples who occupied the whole course of the Saône, from Pontailier to near Trévoux, he had cut off from the Helvetii the road to the south, and thrown difficulties in their way towards the west. Still, these persisted none the less in their design; they made an arrangement with the

⁽¹⁾ For the clearer intelligence of the recapitulation, we have adopted the modern names of the different peoples of Gaul, although these names are far from answering to their ancient boundaries.

people of Franche-Comté, to whom the passage of the Pas-de-l'Ecluse belonged, to debouch by that defile into the plains of Ambérieux and on the plateau of the Dombes. They could thus arrive at the Saône, pass it peaceably or by force, proceed into the valley of the Loire by crossing the mountains of Charolais, and penetrate thence into Saintonge.

As soon as Cæsar was aware of this project, he immediately decided on his course of action: he foresaw that a long time would elapse before the Helvetii effected a passage across the unquiet countries of so many hosts; he reckons that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, carrying three months' provisions in wagons, would be slow to move; he repairs to the Cisalpine, raises two legions there, sends to Aquileia for the three who were in winter quarters there, and, crossing the Alps again, arrives, two months afterwards, at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights of Sathonay. He learns that the Helvetii have been employed during twenty days in crossing the Saône between Trévoux and Villefranche, but that a part of them still remain on the left bank; seizes the opportunity, attacks the latter, defeats them, and thus diminishes the number of his adversaries by one-fourth; then, crossing the Saône, he follows during fifteen days the mass of the Helvetian emigration, which was advancing towards the sources of the Bourbince. As he finds himself in want of provisions, he turns off from his road, and marches towards Bibracte (*Mont Beauvray*), the citadel and principal town of the Burgundians. This march to the right leads the Helvetii to

believe that he is afraid of encountering them; they then march back, and attack him unexpectedly; a great battle is fought, and, with his four old legions only, Cæsar gains the victory. The immigration, already considerably diminished by the battle of the Saône, no longer counts more than 130,000 individuals, who make their retreat towards the country of Langres. The Roman general does not pursue them; he remains three days burying the dead and attending to the wounded. But his influence is already so great, that, to deprive the wreck of the vanquished army of provisions, he has only to give orders to the peoples whose territory they cross. Deprived of all resources, the fugitives discontinue their march, and make their submission. He hastens to overtake them towards Tonnerre. When he arrives in the midst of them, he adopts a generous policy, and gains, by his generous behaviour, those whom he had subjugated by his arms.

There was in the Helvetic conglomeration a people renowned for their valor, the Boii; Cæsar permits the Burgundians to receive them into the number of their fellow-citizens, and give them lands at the confluence of the Allier and the Loire. As to the other barbarians, with the exception of 6,000 who had attempted to withdraw from the capitulation by flight, he obliges them to return to their country, dismisses them without ransom, instead of selling them as slaves, and thus drawing from them a considerable profit, according to the general usage of that period. (¹) By preventing

(¹) Cicero, when proconsul in Cilicia, obtained the sum of twelve millions of sesterii (2,280,000 francs) from the sale of prisoners made at the siege of Pindenissus. (Cicero, *Epistolæ ad Atticum*, V. 20.)

the Germans from establishing themselves in the countries abandoned by the immigration, he made a calculation of interest secondary to a high political sentiment, and foresaw that Helvetia, by its geographical position, was destined to be a bulwark against invasion from the north, and that, then as now, it was important for the power seated on the Rhone and the Alps to have on its eastern frontiers a friendly and independent people. (¹)

III. The victory gained near Bibracte has, at one blow, restored the prestige of the Roman arms. Cæsar has become the arbitrator of the destinies of a part of Gaul: all the peoples comprised between the Marne, the Rhone, and the mountains of Auvergne, obey him. (²) The Helvetii have returned into their country; the Burgundians have re-conquered their ancient preponderance. The assembly of Celtic Gaul, held with his permission at Bibracte, invokes his protection against Ariovistus, and, to the far north, the people of Trèves hasten to denounce to him a threatened invasion of Germans. It had always been a part of the policy of the Republic to extend its influence by going to the succour of oppressed peoples. Cæsar could not fail to regulate his conduct upon this principle. Not only did it concern him to deliver the Gauls from a foreign yoke, but he sought to deprive the Germans of the possi-

(¹) Julian (*Cæsares*, p. 72, edit Lasius) makes Cæsar say that he had treated the Helvetii *like a philanthropist*, and rebuilt their burnt towns.

(²) It was probably at this time that the chiefs of Auvergne, and perhaps Vercingetorix himself, as Dio Cassius tells us, came to render homage to the Roman proconsul. (See above, p. 80.)

bility of settling on the banks of the Saône, and thus threatening the Roman province, and perhaps Italy itself.

Before having recourse to arms, Cæsar, who, during his consulship, had caused Ariovistus to be declared the ally and friend of the Roman republic, undertook to try upon him the means of persuasion. He sent to demand an interview, and received only a haughty reply. Soon, informed that, three days before, the German king has crossed his frontiers at the head of a numerous army, and that, on another side, the hundred cantons of the Suevi are threatening to cross the Rhine towards Mayence, he starts from Tonnerre in haste to go forward to meet him. When he arrives near Arc-en-Barrois, he learns that Ariovistus is marching with all his troops upon Besançon. He then turns to the right, anticipates him, and takes possession of that important place. No doubt, at the news of the march of the Roman army, Ariovistus slackened his own, and halted in the neighbourhood of Colmar.

After remaining a few days at Besançon, Cæsar takes the way to the Rhine, avoids the mountainous spurs of the Jura, proceeds by Pennesières, Arcey, and Belfort, and debouches towards Cernay in the fertile plains of Alsace. The two armies are only twenty-four miles apart. Cæsar and Ariovistus have an interview; its only result is to increase their mutual resentment. The latter conceives the project of cutting the line of operation of the Romans, and, passing near the site of the modern Mulhouse, he proceeds, by a circuitous movement, to establish himself on the

stream of the little Doller, to the south of the Roman army, which, encamped on the Thur, supports its rear on the last spurs of the Vosges, near Cernay. In this position, Ariovistus intercepts Cæsar's communications with Franche-Comté and Burgundy. The latter, to restore them, distributes his troops into two camps, and causes a second camp to be made, less considerable than the first, on his right, near the little Doller. During several days, he seeks in vain to draw Ariovistus to a battle; then, learning that the matrons have advised the Germans not to tempt fortune before the new moon, he unites his legions, places all the auxiliaries on his right, marches resolutely to assault the camp of the Germans, forces them to accept battle, and defeats them after an obstinate resistance. In their flight, they take the same road by which they had advanced, and, pursued for a distance of fifty miles, they re-pass the Rhine towards Rhinau. As to the Suevi, who had assembled near Mayence, when they are informed of the disaster of their allies, they hasten to regain their country.

Thus, in his first campaign, Cæsar, by two great battles, had delivered Gaul from the invasion of the Helvetii and the Germans; all the Gauls looked upon him as a liberator. But services rendered are very soon forgotten when people owe their liberty and independence to a foreign army.

Cæsar places his troops in winter quarters in Franche-Comté, leaves the command to Labienus, and starts for Cisalpine Gaul, where he is obliged, as proconsul, to preside over the provincial assemblies. Nearer Rome during the winter, he could follow more easily the political events of the metropolis.

IV. While the armies were augmenting the power of the Republic without, at Rome the

Sequel of the Consulship of L. Calpurnius Piso and Aulus Galbinus

intestine struggles continued with new fury. It could hardly be otherwise among the elements of discord and anarchy which were at work, and which, since the departure of Cæsar, were no longer held under control by a lofty intelligence and a firm will. Moral force, so necessary to every government, no longer existed anywhere, or rather, it did not exist where the institutions willed it to be, in the Senate; and, according to the remark of a celebrated German historian, this assembly, which ruled the world, was incapable of ruling the town. ⁽¹⁾ For a long time the prestige of one man in visible power was master over that of the Senate; Pompey, by his military renown, and by his alliance with Cæsar and Crassus, continued dominant, although he had not then any legal power. Cæsar had reckoned upon him to continue his work, and curb the bad passions which were in agitation in the highest regions as well as in the lowest depths of society: but Pompey had neither the mind nor energy necessary to master at the same time the arrogance of the nobles and the turbulence of certain partisans of the demagogy; he was soon exposed to the censure of both parties. ⁽²⁾ Moreover, entirely under the influence of the charms of his young wife, he appeared indifferent to what was passing around him. ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, III., p. 291. Berlin, 1861.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 51, 52.

⁽³⁾ "He soon allowed himself to be enervated by his love for his young wife. Entirely occupied in pleasing her, he passed whole days with her in his country house or in his gardens, and ceased to think of public affairs. Thus

The relation of the events at Rome during the eight years of Cæsar's abode in Gaul will only offer us an uninterrupted series of vengeance, murders, and acts of violence of every description. How, indeed, could order be maintained in so vast a city without a permanent military force, when each man of importance took with him, for his escort, his clients or slaves in arms, and thus, within it, everybody had an army except the Republic? From this moment, as we shall see, the quarrels which are about to spring up among the parties will result always in riots; the slaves and gladiators will be enrolled as the ordinary actors.

V. Clodius, whose imprudent support of those who were subsequently called the triumvirs
Intrigues of Clodius had increased his influence, continued, after Cæsar's departure, to court a vain popularity, and to excite the passions which had been imperfectly allayed. Not satisfied with having, at the beginning of his tribuneship, re-established those religious, commercial, and political associations, which, composed chiefly of the dregs of the people, were a permanent danger to society; with having made distributions of wheat, restrained the censors in their right of exclusion, forbidden the auspices to be taken or the sky observed on the day fixed for the meeting of the comitia, ⁽¹⁾ and with having provoked the exile of Cicero, he turned his restless activity against Pompey, ⁽²⁾ whom he soon deeply offended, by causing to be taken Clodius, then tribune of the people, regarding him no longer with anything but contempt, dared to embark in the rashest enterprises." (Plutarch, *Pompey*, 50.)

(1) Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 13.

(2) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 51, 52.

ken away and set at liberty a son of Tigranes, King of Armenia, made prisoner in the war against Mithridates, and retained as a pledge for the tranquillity of Asia. (1) At the same time he began judicial proceedings against some of Pompey's friends, and replied to the expostulations which were addressed to him, "That he was glad to learn how far the great man's credit went." (2) The latter then conceived the idea of recalling Cicero, to oppose him to Clodius, just as, a few months before, he had raised Clodius against Cicero. We see the game of political see-saw is not new.

VI. Under these circumstances, the opinion of Cæsar was of great weight. Pompey wrote to consult him, (3) and P. Sextius, one of those nominated as the new tribunes, repaired to Gaul to ascertain his mind. (4) It appears certain that it was favourable, (5) for, so early as the Calends of

Pompey consults
Cæsar on the Re-
turn of Cicero.

(1) Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 30

(2) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 48 and 50.

(3) "Pompey is going at last to labour on my recall: he only waited for a letter from Cæsar to cause the proposal to be made by one of his partisans." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, III. 18.)—"If Cæsar has abandoned me, if he has joined my enemies, he has been unfaithful to his friendship, and has done me an injury; I ought to have been his enemy, I deny it not; but if Cæsar has interested himself in my restoration, if it be true that you thought it important for me that Cæsar should not be opposed," &c (Orat. de *Provincis Consularibus*, 18.)

(4) "It was then that P. Sextius, the tribune nominate, repaired to Cæsar to interest him in my recall. I say only that if Cæsar were well intentioned towards me, and I believe he was, these proceedings added nothing to his good intentions. He (Sextius) thought that, if they wished to restore concord among the citizens and decide on my recall, they must secure the consent of Cæsar." (Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 33.)

(5) "Pompey took my brother as witness that all he had done for me he had done by the will of Cæsar." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 9.)

June, 696, hardly two months after the decree against Cicero, a tribune of the people, L. Ninnius, demanded his recall in the Senate. This proposal was on the point of being carried, when another tribune of the people, Ælius Ligus, *interceded*. (¹) The Senate, in its irritation, declared that it would take into consideration no political or administrative affair until it had voted on Cicero's return. (²) We thus judge how much the assembly took to heart the success of this measure, and how much, in supporting it, Pompey flattered the sentiments of the majority.

VII. A singular occurrence determined his recon-

Pompey believes
himself threaten-
ed by a Slave of
Clodius

ciliation with the Senate: on the 3rd of the Ides of Sextilis (the 5th of August), a slave of Clodius let a dagger fall in

Pompey's way, as he was entering the curia; arrested by the lictors, and questioned by the consul A. Gabinius, the slave declared that his master had ordered him to assassinate the great citizen. (³) This attempt, whether serious or not, produced a sufficient impression on Pompey to prevent him, for a long time, from going to the Forum, or showing himself in public. (⁴)

The demands in favour of Cicero were renewed; and on the 4th of the Calends of November (the 20th of October) eight tribunes of the people, most of them men devoted to Pompey, proposed formally in the Senate the recall of the exile. One of these was T.

() Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 31, *et seq.*

(²) Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 31

(³) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 51.—Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 32; *De Responsu Haruspis*, 23; *Pro Milone*, 7.—Asconius, *Comment. in Orat pro Milone*, p 47, edit Orelli

(⁴) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 51 — Cicero, *Pro Milone*. 7.—Asconius, *Comment. in Orat pro Milone*, p. 47, edit. Orelli.

Annius Milo, a violent, bold man, without scruples, and resembling Clodius in all things, but his open adversary. Clodius and his brother, the prætor Appius, again succeeded in defeating this motion. ⁽¹⁾ At last, with the extreme of audacity, the turbulent tribune, when near the close of his functions, dared to attack Cæsar himself, and tried to obtain the revocation of the Julian laws; but this attempt was powerless in face of the splendour of the victories gained over the Helvetii and the Germans.

(1) Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, III. 23.—DIO CASSIUS, XXXIX. 6

CHAPTER II.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 697.

I. CÆSAR'S victories had awakened among the
War against the Belgæ Gauls feelings of admiration, but also of distrust; they could not see without fear that it had required only six legions to scatter two invasions, each counting 100,000 combatants. There are successes which, by their very brilliancy, alarm even those who profit by them. Nearly all Gaul looks on with jealousy at events which prove the superiority of permanent armies over populations without military organisation. A small number of experienced and disciplined soldiers, under the guidance of a great captain, make all the peoples tremble from the Rhine to the ocean, and even the islanders of Great Britain feel themselves unsafe against the attacks of the Roman power; the Belgæ especially, proud of having formerly alone repulsed the invasion of the Cimbri and the Teutones, feel their warlike instincts revive. Provocations which have come from the other side of the Straits increase their distrust; these picture to them the abode of the Roman army in Franche-Comté as a threat against the independence of the whole of Gaul. The greatest part of the peoples comprised between the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Ocean, and the Seine, agitate, combine, and assemble an army of 300,000 men.

Informed in Italy of these preparations, Cæsar raises two new legions, rejoins his army in Franche-Comté, and decides immediately on invading the country of the Belgæ. The first who present themselves on his road are the people of Champagne. Surprised by his sudden arrival, they submit, and even offer him subsidies and auxiliaries. Cæsar is able to add to his eight legions and his light troops the contingents from Rheims, and join them with those of Burgundy and Trèves. In spite of this augmentation of his forces, the enemy he has to combat is four times more numerous. To defeat them, he sends the Burgundians to make a diversion and ravage the territory of Beauvais, then he crosses the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and selects, behind the Miette, a marshy stream, a defensive position which he renders inexpugnable.

The Belgæ, whose army occupies, on the right bank of the Miette, an extent of twelve kilomètres, are powerless to force the position of the Romans, and fail in all their attempts to cross the Aisne at Pontavert. Soon, discouraged by the want of provisions, disputes among themselves, and the news that the Burgundians have just invaded the territory of Beauvais, they separate, because each, believing his own country threatened, thinks only of going to its defence. The Belgian league is thus dissolved almost without combat. Cæsar then hastens to chastise each people one after the other; he seizes in their turn Soissons and Breteuil, the principal citadels of the Soissonais and Beauvaisis, and arrives at Amiens.

But the coalitions of the peoples of the north suc-

ceed, each other like the waves of the sea; after the Helvetii, the Germans; after the Germans, the people of the Beauvaisis; after them, the inhabitants of Hainault. These have assembled on the Sambre, and wait to be re-enforced by the peoples of German origin established in the neighbourhood of Namur. Cæsar then marches towards the Sambre by its left bank. When he arrives near the enemy concealed in the woods of the right bank, on the heights of Haumont, he unites six legions, places the two others in reserve with the baggage of the army, and, reaching the heights of Neuf-Mesnil, begins to fortify his camp; but hardly have the soldiers commenced their work, when the Belgæ debouch from all the issues of the forest, cross the shallow waters of the Sambre, scale the abrupt slopes, and fall upon the Romans, who, taken by surprise and unable to form their line of battle, range themselves without order under the first ensigns which offer themselves. The confusion is extreme; Cæsar is obliged, sword in hand, to throw himself into the thick of the fight. Nevertheless, the fortune of the battle is gradually restored; the centre and left wing have repulsed their assailants; the latter arrives to succour the right wing in its peril; the two legions of the rear-guard hasten to the field of battle; then victory decides for the Romans, and the peoples of Hainault are nearly annihilated. In this engagement the experience and valour of the old veteran soldiers save the Roman army from the impetuosity of the Belgæ. After this exploit, Cæsar marches towards Namur, in which the inhabitants of the whole country have shut themselves up on the news

of the defeat of their allies, and he makes himself master of that place.

While he was completing the conquest of Belgic Gaul, one of his lieutenants, the young Publius Crassus, detached, after the battle of the Sambre, into Normandy and Brittany, reduced to submission the peoples of those provinces, so that at that time the greatest part of Gaul acknowledged the authority of the Republic: the effect of Cæsar's victories was such that the Ubii, a German people from beyond the Rhine, established between the Maine and the Sieg, sent their congratulations to the conqueror with the offer of their services.

Before leaving for the Cisalpine, Cæsar sent a legion into the Valais, to chastise the inhabitants of those Alpine valleys, who, at the beginning of the year, had attacked in their march the two new legions on their way from Italy; it was his aim also to open easy communications with the Cisalpine by the Simplon and Saint-Bernard. But his lieutenant Galba, after a sanguinary battle, was obliged to retreat and take up his winter quarters in Savoy. Thus Cæsar's designs could not be realised. It was reserved for another great man, nineteen centuries afterwards, to level that formidable barrier of the Alps.

II. Let us now resume the account of events in

Return of Cicero

Rome subsequent to the Calends of January, 697 (20th of December, 696). The consuls who entered upon their office were P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther and Q. Cecilius Metellus Nepos; the first, a friend of Cicero; the second, favour-

able to Clodius from hatred to the celebrated orator who had offended him. (¹)

Lentulus brought forward the question of the recall of the exile. (²) L. Aurelius Cotta, a man of esteem and of consular dignity, declared that the banishment of Cicero, pronounced in the sequel of extreme acts of violence, carried in itself the cause of its nullity; and that, therefore, there was no need of a law to revoke an act that was contrary to the laws. (³) Pompey combated the opinion of Cotta, and sustained that it was necessary that Cicero should owe his recall, not only to the authority of the Senate, but also to a vote of the people. Nothing further was proposed but to present a *plebiscitum* to the comitia. Nobody opposed it, when Sextus Atilius, tribune of the people, demanded the adjournment, (⁴) and, by those dilatory manœuvres so familiar to the Romans, obliged the Senate to defer the presentation of the law to the 22nd of the same month. When the day arrived, the two parties prepared to support their opinion by force. Q. Fabricius, tribune of the people, favourable to Cicero, sought in the morning to gain possession of the rostra. Clodius was no longer tribune, but he continued to guide the populace. To the professional agitators in his pay he had joined a troop of gladiators, brought to Rome, by his brother Appius, for the funeral of one of his kinsmen. (⁵) The troop of Fabricius was easily put to the rout; a trib-

(¹) Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 33.

(²) Cicero, *Orat. pro Domo sua*, 27; *Pro Sextio*, 34.

(³) Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 34; *De Legibus*, III. 19

(⁴) Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 34. .

(⁵) Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 35.—Dio Cassius, XXXIX 7.—Plutarch, *Pompey*, 51

une, M. Cistius, had hardly presented himself, when he was driven away. Pompey had his toga covered with blood, and Quintus Cicero, whom he had brought with him to the Forum to speak to the people in favour of his brother, was obliged to hide himself; the gladiators rushed upon another tribune, P. Sextius, and left him for dead. "The struggle was so violent," Cicero says, "that the corpses obstructed the Tiber and filled the sewers, and the Forum was inundated with blood to such a degree that it was found necessary to wash it with sponges. A tribune was killed, and the house of another was threatened with fire." (¹) The amazement was so great, that the question of the recall of the exile was again adjourned. It was thus by the sword that everything was decided in Rome in its disorder and abasement.

In fact, to obtain the recall of Cicero, the Senate saw itself obliged to oppose riot to riot, and to make use of P. Sextius, who had recovered from his wounds, as well as of Milo, who had organised, with military discipline, an armed band in condition to make head against the rioters. (²) At the same time, it hoped to intimidate the urban mob by bringing into Rome, from all parts of Italy, (³) the citizens upon whom it relied. In fine, the very men who had, two years before, engaged Bibulus to embarrass all Cæsar's measures by observing the sky, (⁴) now prohibited, under

(¹) Cicero, *Pro Sextio*, 35; *Orat. prima post Reditum*, 5, 6.

(²) Cicero, *De Officiis*, II. 17; *Orat. pro Sextio*, 39.—Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 8

(³) Cicero, *Orat. secunda post Reditum ad Senatum*, 10; *Orat. pro Domo sua*, 28; *Orat. in Pisonem*, 15.

(⁴) We thus see that the power of observing the sky continued to exist in spite of the law Clodia.

pain of being considered as an enemy of the Republic, ⁽¹⁾ those religious artifices which suspended all deliberations. The result was that the law of recall was passed.

Cicero re-entered Rome on the eve of the Nones of September (the 15th of August, 697), in the midst of the warmest demonstrations of joy. The Senate had thus at last triumphed over the factious opposition of Clodius; but it was not without great efforts, nor without frequently having had recourse on its own side to violence and arbitrary acts.

III. From the first moment of his return, Cicero gave all his care to augmenting the influence of Pompey and reconciling him with the Senate. The famine under which Italy suffered that year furnished him with the occasion. The populace rose suddenly, hurried first to a theatre, where games were celebrating, and afterwards to the Capitol, uttering threats of death and fire against the Senate, to which they attributed the public distress. ⁽²⁾ Before this, in July, at the time of the Apollinarian games, ⁽³⁾ a riot had occurred from the same motive.

Cicero, by his persuasive eloquence, calmed the irritated mob, and proposed to entrust to Pompey the care of provisioning, and to confer upon him for five years proconsular powers in Italy and out of Italy. ⁽⁴⁾ The senators, in their terror, adopted this measure immediately. It was, as at the time of the war of the

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, in the passages cited.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 1.

⁽³⁾ Asconius, *Comment in Orat. Ciceronis pro Milone*, p. 48, edit. Orelli.

⁽⁴⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 9 — Plutarch, *Pompey*, 52.

pirates, to give to one man an excessive power *over all the earth*, according to the words of the decree. Fifteen lieutenants were associated with him, of whom Cicero was one. ⁽¹⁾ But the creation of this new office did not put an end to the discontent of the multitude. Clodius tried to persuade the people that the famine was fictitious, and that the Senate had created it, in order to have a pretext for making Pompey master over everything. ⁽²⁾ He overlooked no occasion for stirring up troubles.

Although the Senate had given Cicero an indemnity of more than two millions of sestertii, ⁽³⁾ and decided that his house should be rebuilt in the same place, Clodius, who sought to prevent the rebuilding of it, came several times to blows with Milo, in struggles which resembled regular battles, their adherents carrying bucklers and swords. Every day witnessed a riot in the streets. Milo swore he would kill Clodius, and Cicero confessed at a later period that the victim and the arm which was to strike were pointed out beforehand. ⁽⁴⁾

IV. It was towards the end of the year 697 that the news of Cæsar's prodigious successes against the Belgæ reached Rome; they

Festivals to commemorate Cæsar's Victories

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 1.—Cicero's proposal was further amplified by C. Messius, tribune of the people, who demanded for Pompey a fleet, an army, and the authority to dispose of the finances.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 52.—Cicero, *Orat. pro Domo sua*, 10.

⁽³⁾ *Epist. ad Attic.*, IV. 2.

⁽⁴⁾ "I will add that, in the opinion of the public, Clodius is regarded as a victim reserved for Milo." (Cicero, *De Respons. Harusp.*, 3.)—This oration on the reply of the Aruspices is of May, June, or July, 698. See, also, what he says in his letter to Atticus, of November, 697. (*Epist. ad Attic.* IV. 3.)

excited there the warmest enthusiasm. As soon as the Senate was informed of them, it voted fifteen days of thanksgiving to celebrate them. ⁽¹⁾ This number of days had never before been accorded to anybody. Marius had obtained five, and Pompey, when he had vanquished Mithridates, only ten. The decree of the Senate was expressed in more flattering terms than had ever been used for any general. Cicero himself took part in obtaining this high testimony of public gratitude. ⁽²⁾

V. In spite of these demonstrations, there continued
Riots at Rome.
to exist among a certain class a secret
hatred against the conqueror of Gaul: in

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 23.—*De Bello Gallico*, II. 35.

⁽²⁾ "But why, especially on that occasion, should any one be astonished at my conduct or blame it, when I myself have already several times supported propositions which were more honourable for Cæsar than necessary for the state? I voted in his favour fifteen days of prayers; it was enough for the Republic to have decreed to Cæsar the same number of days which Marius had obtained. The gods would have been satisfied, I think, with the same thanksgivings which had been rendered to them in the most important wars. So great a number of days had therefore for its only object to honour Cæsar personally. Ten days of thanksgivings were accorded, for the first time, to Pompey, when the war of Mithridates had been terminated by the death of that prince. I was consul, and, on my report, the number of days usually decreed to the consulars was doubled, after you had heard Pompey's letter, and been convinced that all the wars were terminated on land and sea. You adopted the proposal I made to you of ordaining ten days of prayers. At present I have admired the virtue and greatness of soul of Cn. Pompey, who, loaded with distinctions such as no other before him had received the like, gave to another more honours than he had obtained himself. Thus, then, those prayers which I voted in favour of Cæsar were accorded to the immortal gods, to the customs of our ancestors, and to the needs of the state; but the flattering terms of the decree, this new distinction, and the extraordinary number of days, it is to the person itself of Cæsar that they were addressed, and they were a homage rendered to his glory." (Cicero, *Orat. pro Provinciæ Consulari*, 10, 11.) (August, A. U. C. 698.)

the month of December, 697, Rutilius Lupus, named tribune for the following year, proposed to revoke Cæsar's laws, and to suspend the distribution of the lands in Campania; ⁽¹⁾ he expatiated in accusations against that general and Pompey. The senators were silent; Cn. Marcellinus, the consul nominate, declared that in the absence of Pompey nothing could be decided. On another hand, Racilius, tribune of the people, rose to renew the old accusations against Clodius. ⁽²⁾ In order to baffle the designs of the latter, who aspired to the office of ædile, and who, once named, would have been inviolable, the consuls nominate proposed that the election of the judges should take place before that of the ædiles. Cato and Cassius opposed this. Cicero eagerly seized the opportunity of fulminating against Clodius; but the latter, who was prepared, defended himself at length, and during this time his adherents excited, by attacking Milo's men, such an uproar on the steps of the Temple of Castor, where the Senate held its sitting, that the Forum became a new field of battle. The senators fled, and all projects of laws were abandoned. ⁽³⁾

In the presence of these sanguinary collisions, the elections of ædiles and quæstors could not take place; moreover, Milo and Sextius, from feelings of personal vengeance, prevented the Consul Q. Metellus from convoking the comitia. As soon as the consul named a day of assembly, the two tribunes declared immediately that *they were observing the sky*; and, for fear that this cause of adjournment might not be sufficient,

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quint.*, II. 1.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quint.*, II. 1.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quint.*, II. 1.

Milo established himself in the Campus Martius with his followers in arms. Metellus tried to hold the comitia by surprise, ⁽¹⁾ and proceeded by night to the Campus Martius through bye-streets; but he was well watched. Before he arrived at the place, he was met and recognised by Milo, who signified to him, in virtue of his tribunitial power, the *obnunciation*, that is, the declaration of a religious obstacle to the holding of the popular assemblies. ⁽²⁾ Thus ended the year 697.

During these inglorious struggles, in which both parties dishonoured themselves by acts of violence, Cæsar had, in two campaigns, saved Italy from the invasion of the barbarians, and vanquished the most warlike peoples of Gaul. Thus, at Rome, venality and anarchy prevailed; with the army, devotedness and glory. Then, as at certain epochs of our own revolution, we may say that the national honour had taken refuge under the flag.

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Attic.*, IV. 3

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Attic.*, IV. 2 and 3; *Epist. ad Quint.*, II. 1.

CHAPTER III.

EVENTS IN ROME DURING THE YEAR 698.

I. THE Consuls of the year preceding had just been succeeded by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus; the latter allied by family to Cæsar, whose niece, Atia, he had married. ⁽¹⁾ It was in vain that the chief magistrates succeeded each other annually, the change of persons led to no change in the state of the Republic.

There happened about this time a circumstance which showed to what a low degree of contempt law and morality had fallen. Ptolemy Auletes, King of Egypt, father of the famous Cleopatra, hated by his subjects, had fled from Alexandria, and arrived in Rome, towards the end of 697, in spite of the advice of M. Cato, whom he had met at Rhodes. He came to solicit the protection of the Republic against the Egyptians, who, in his absence, had given the crown to his daughter Berenice. He had obtained the title, then the object of so much emulation, of friend and ally of the Roman people, by purchasing the suffrages of a great number of considerable personages, which had obliged him to exact heavy taxes from his subjects. He was at first well received, for it was known that he had brought with him his treasure, ready for

(1) Atia had wedded in first marriage Octavius, by whom she had a son, who was afterwards Augustus.

distribution among his new protectors. Pompey gave him a lodging in his house, ⁽¹⁾ and declared publicly in his favour. But the Egyptians, when they were informed of his departure, sent an embassy, composed of more than a hundred persons, to defend their cause; most of them were assassinated on their way by Ptolemy's agents; and the rest, terrified or corrupted by force of bribery, never carried out their mission. ⁽²⁾ This affair made so much noise, that Favonius, called the *ape* of Cato, because he imitated his austerity, denounced the conduct of Ptolemy in the Senate, and added that he knew one of the Egyptian deputies, named Dio, who was ready to confirm his assertions. Dio did not dare to appear, and, a short time after, was assassinated. In spite of this crime, Pompey persisted in his friendship for Ptolemy, and no one dared to prosecute the guest of so powerful a man. ⁽³⁾

Several plans were proposed for replacing the King of Egypt on the throne, and this enterprise, which promised glory and profit, excited everybody's ambition. Those who, probably, were opposed to it, proposed to consult the Sibylline books, which gave the answer: "If the King of Egypt come to ask you for succour, do not refuse him your friendship, but grant him no army." Caius Cato, tribune of the people, kinsman of M. Porcius Cato, and yet his adversary, lost no time in divulging this reply, although it was not permitted, without a decree of the Senate, to pub-

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 14.

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 12, 13.—Plutarch, *Pompey*, 52.

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 14.—"I do not spare upon him even reproaches, to prevent him (Pompey) from meddling in this infamy." Cicero, *Epist. Famul.*, I. 1.

lish the Sibylline oracles. ⁽¹⁾ The Senate decreed that the King of Egypt should be restored to his throne by the Roman magistrates, but without an armed intervention. ⁽²⁾ But this mission was a cause of great dispute: some proposed to charge Lentulus Spinther with it, others preferred Pompey, with the obligation to employ only two lictors; the jealousy of the candidates caused it soon to be renounced. Ptolemy, abandoning all hope, quitted Rome and retired to Ephesus. ⁽³⁾ He was restored subsequently by Gabinius.

II. The election for the ædileship had taken place

Clodius named
Ædile Trial of
Milo. on the 11th of the Calends of February of the year 698 (28th of December, 697), and, thanks to the money he had distributed, Clodius had been named ædile. ⁽⁴⁾ He had hardly been invested with this office, which protected him from the prosecutions of Milo, when he turned round and attacked his accuser, charging him with an armed conspiracy, precisely the same crime with which Milo reproached him. It was not Milo he had in view, but his powerful protectors. Moreover, alleging unfavourable auspicia, or employing for that purpose some tribunes of the people, he absolutely opposed the presentation by the consuls of all public affairs of any importance, not excepting the curiate law, which decreed their commands to the proconsuls and proprætors. ⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 15.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Q. fr.*, II. 2.

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 16.

⁽⁴⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Q. fr.*, II. 2.—Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 18.

⁽⁵⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 18, 19.

The trial with which he was threatened by Clodius gave little uneasiness to Milo, who had lost none of his habitual audacity. In fact, at a time when a political personage could not be in safety unless escorted by a band of armed men, it was difficult to condemn Milo for having gladiators in his pay, especially when his enemies had set the example of having recourse to similar auxiliaries.

The judicial struggle was at hand, and preparations were made as for a combat. The accused had for his defenders Cicero and Pompey; the greater part of the Senate was favourable to him, and, as a precaution against riots, his friends brought their clients from all parts of Italy, and even from Cisalpine Gaul. ⁽¹⁾ Clodius and Caius Cato, on their side, had assembled all their forces. They calculated, moreover, that the populace, rendered still more turbulent by the dearth, would give a very ill reception to Pompey, who found no remedy for the public misery; and to Cicero, who, as superstitious people said, had drawn upon the town the anger of the gods, by choosing to rebuild his house on a piece of ground consecrated to the goddess *Libertas*. ⁽²⁾ It appears that many enemies of Pompey secretly encouraged and aided Clodius. Crassus himself was suspected of giving money to him, as well as to Caius Cato.

On the 8th of the Ides of February (the 12th January, 698), Milo appeared before his judges. ⁽³⁾ When Pompey presented himself to speak in his defence, the mob, excited by Clodius, received him with hooting

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 3.

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 20.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 3.

and insults. The town mob knew all Pompey's vanities, and wounded them with subtle cruelty. He, meanwhile, though every moment interrupted, kept his temper, and strove to speak. Clodius replied to him; but his adversaries also had a mob organised and paid to abuse him, and to sing infamous verses on the subject of his amours with his own sister. (¹) In this strange and ignoble dispute Milo was forgotten; it had become nothing more than a sort of duel between Clodius and Pompey. Clodius, in the midst of his satellites, cried out at the utmost extent of his voice, "Who is the man who makes us die of hunger?" And all the populace, with the unity of a tragic chorus, cried "Pompey!"—"Who wants to go into Egypt?" cried Clodius again. A thousand voices replied, "Pompey!"—"Who ought to be sent there?" "Crassus!" (²) Clodius added, "Who is the autocrat whom nothing satisfies? Who is the man who seeks a man? Who scratches his head with a single finger?" "Pompey! Pompey!" the crowd continued repeating. After all these mutual provocations, the two parties, tired of shouting, came to blows. Cicero prudently made his escape, (³) and the victory once again remained with the nobles, who were probably supported by a greater number of gladiators. (⁴) The judgment of Milo, adjourned to another day, gave rise again to similar scenes; but he was acquitted.

(¹) Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 3

(²) Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 3 —We look upon this word as giving the explanation of the quarrel then existing between the two triumvirs. Egypt was so rich a prey, that it was calculated to cause division between them.

(³) "Clodius is cast down from the tribune, and I steal away, for fear of accident." (Cicero, *Ep. ad Quint.*, II. 3) (⁴) Cicero, *Ep. ad Quint.*, II. 3.

III. In the midst of these intestine quarrels, M.

Cato returned from Cyprus to Rome.

Return of Cato.

He brought with him the treasure of Ptolemy, the brother of Ptolemy Auletes, amounting to 7,000 talents (about 40,000,000 francs), a considerable quantity of personal goods, and a great number of slaves. Ptolemy had poisoned himself on the report of Cato's arrival, leaving him no other trouble than that of collecting his treasures, for the Cypriots, then slaves, in the hope of becoming the allies and friends of Rome, received him with open arms. Proud of his expedition, which he had carried out with the most perfect integrity, he was very anxious that it should be approved. ⁽¹⁾

The return of Cato could bring no remedy to the deeply troubled state of the Republic. ⁽²⁾ His virtue was not one of those which attract, but of those which repulse. Blaming everybody, because, perhaps, everybody was to blame, he remained the only one of his party.

From the moment of his arrival, he found himself at the same time in opposition with Cicero, who attacked the legality of his mission; and with Clodius, who, having entrusted it to him in his quality of tribune, counted on appropriating all the glory of it to himself. In these new intrigues of Clodius, Cæsar, it is said, supported him, and furnished him with subjects of accusation against Cato. ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 22.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Cato*, 45, tells us that Cato returned under the consulship of Marcus Philippus.

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 23.

IV. A concise view of the events at Rome at this time shows to what a degree the moral level had been abased. It was no longer those memorable struggles between the patricians and the plebeians, where the greatness of the object aimed at ennobled the means. It was no longer a question of defending secular rights, or of acquiring new rights, but of vulgar ambitions and personal interests to be satisfied.

State of Anarchy
in Rome

Nothing indicates more the decay of society than when law becomes an engine of war for the use of the different parties, instead of remaining the sincere expression of the general needs. Each man who arrived at power rendered himself guilty on the morrow of that which he had condemned on the eve, and made the institutions of his country the slaves of his momentary passion. At one time it was the Consul Metellus who, in 697, retarded the nomination of the quæstors, in order to prevent that of the judges, with the view of shielding Clodius, his kinsman, from a judiciary accusation; ⁽¹⁾ at another time it was Milo and Sextius who, by way of reprisals against the same consul, opposed all imaginable obstacles to the convocation of the comitia; ⁽²⁾ lastly, it was the Senate itself which (in 698) sought to retard the election of the judges, in order to deprive Clodius of the chance of being named ædile. The ancient custom of taking the auspices was no longer, in the eyes of anybody, more than a political manœuvre. Not one of the great personages whom the momentary favour of the people and the Senate raise to distinction preserve

(1) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 7.

(2) Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II 1

any true sentiment of rectitude. Cicero, who sees the whole Republic in himself, and who attacks as monstrous all which is done against him and without him, declares all the acts of the tribuneship of Clodius illegal; the rigid Cato, on the contrary, defends, through personal interest, these same acts, because Cicero's pretension wounds his pride, and invalidates the mission he has received from Clodius. (¹) Caius Cato violates the law by making public the Sibylline oracle. On all sides people have recourse to illegal means, which vary according to their several tempers; some, like Milo, Sextius, and Clodius, openly place themselves at the head of armed bands; others act with timidity and dissimulation, like Cicero, who, one day, after a previous unsuccessful attempt, carries away by stealth from the Capitol the plate of brass which bore inscribed the law which had proscribed him. A singular error of men, who believe that they efface history by destroying a few visible signs of the past!

This relaxation of the social bonds caused inevitably the dispersion of all the forces, the union of which would have been so useful to the public good. It was no sooner agreed, in a moment of danger, to give to one man the authority necessary to restore order and tranquillity, than, at the same moment, everybody united to attack and degrade him, as if each were afraid of his own work. Cicero has hardly returned from exile, when the friends who have recalled him become jealous of his influence; they see with pleasure a certain degree of coldness arise between Pompey and him, and secretly support the intrigues

(¹) Plutarch, *Cato*, 40, *Cicero*, 45.

of Clodius. ⁽¹⁾ Pompey, amid the famine and the public agitation, is hardly invested with new powers, before the Senate on one side, and the popular faction on the other, plot together to ruin his credit: by clever intrigues, they awaken the old hatred between him and Crassus.

Pompey believed, or pretended to believe, that there was a conspiracy against his life. He would no longer attend the Senate, unless the session were held close to his residence, he seemed to think it so dangerous to pass through the town. ⁽²⁾ "Clodius," he said, "seeks to assassinate me. Crassus pays him, and Cato encourages him. All the talkers, Curio, Bibulus, all my enemies excite him against me. The populace, who love the tattle of the tribune, have almost abandoned me; the nobility is hostile to me; the Senate is unjust towards me; the youth is entirely perverted." He added that he would take his precautions, and that he would surround himself with people from the country. ⁽³⁾

Nobody was safe from the most odious imputations. Caius Cato accused the Consul P. Lentulus of

⁽¹⁾ "There has reached me a mass of private talk of people here, whom you may guess, who have always been, and always are, in the same ranks with me. They openly rejoice at knowing that I am, at the same time, already on terms of coolness with Pompey, and on the point of quarrelling with Cæsar; but what was most cruel was to see their attitude towards my enemy (Clodius), to see them embrace him, flatter him, coax him, and cover him with caresses." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 9)

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 3.

⁽³⁾ These words are reported by Cicero (*Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 3), to whom they were addressed by Pompey. Dio Cassius, contrary to all probability, pretends that Pompey, from this moment, was irritated against Cæsar, and sought to deprive him of his province. There is no proof of such an allegation. The interview at Lucca, which took place this same year, offers a formal contradiction to it.

having assisted Ptolemy with the means of quitting Rome clandestinely. (¹) M. Cato was exasperated against everybody. Lastly, an implacable party never ceased manifesting, by its motions, without result, it is true, its rancour and animosity against the proconsul of Gaul. Towards the spring of 698, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the brother-in-law of Cato, whose sister Porcia he had espoused, and who had enriched himself with the spoils of the victims of Sylla, proposed to deprive him of his command. (²) Others renewed the proposal to put an end to the distribution of the lands of the Campania, and revived the opposition to the Julian laws. (³) But Cicero, at the request of Pompey, obtained the adjournment of this question to the month of May. (⁴) He was, indeed, himself perplexed on this question, and confessed that he had no very clear views upon it. (⁵)

V. In the midst of the general confusion, many citizens turned their eyes towards Cæsar.

The Interview at
Lucca

Appius Claudius had already paid him a visit. (¹) Crassus left Rome suddenly to join him at Ravenna, at the beginning of the spring of 698, before the campaign against the Veneti, and explain to

(¹) See Nonius Marcellus (edit. Gerlach and Roth, p. 261), who quotes a passage from Book XXII. of the *Annales* of Fenestella, who wrote under Augustus or Tiberius.

(²) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 24.

(³) Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 5.

(⁴) Cicero, *Epist. Familiæ*, I. 9.

(⁵) "The question of the lands of Campania, which ought to have been settled on the day of the Ides and the day following, is not yet decided. I have much difficulty in making up my mind on this question." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 8) (April, 698)

(⁶) "Appius is not yet returned from his visit to Cæsar." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 6.) (April, 698.)

him the state of affairs, for, as Cicero says in a letter of a subsequent date, there was no occurrence so small in Rome that Cæsar was not informed of it. ⁽¹⁾

Some time afterwards, Pompey, who was to embark at Pisa, to proceed to Sardinia, in order to hasten the supply of wheat, arrived at Lucca, where he had an interview with Cæsar and Crassus. A crowd of people assembled similarly in that town; some were drawn thither by the prestige of Cæsar's glory, others by his well-known generosity, all by the vague instinct which, in moments of crisis, points to the place where strength exists, and gives a presentiment of the side from which safety is to come. The Roman people sent him a deputation of senators. ⁽²⁾ All the most illustrious and powerful personages in Rome, such as Pompey, Crassus, Appius, governor of Sardinia, Nepos, proconsul of Spain, ⁽³⁾ came to show their warm admiration for him and invoke his support; ⁽⁴⁾ even women repaired to Lucca, and the concourse was so great that as many as 200 senators were seen there at a time; 120 lictors, the obligatory escort of the first magistrates, ⁽⁵⁾ besieged the door

⁽¹⁾ "Knowing well that small news as well as great news have reached Cæsar" (*Epist. ad Quintum*, III. i. 3.)

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 25

⁽³⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 24.

⁽⁴⁾ "Appius, he says, has visited Cæsar, in order to wrest from him some nominations of tribunes" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 15.)

⁽⁵⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 17.—The consuls and proconsuls had twelve lictors, the prætors six, the dictators twenty-four, and the master of the cavalry a number which varied. The cædiles ædiles, the quæstors, and the tribunes of the people, not having the *imperium*, had no lictors. As, at the time of the conference of Lucca, there was no dictator or master of cavalry, the number of 120 fasces can only apply to the collective escort of proconsuls and prætors. It is not probable that the two consuls then in office at Rome should have gone to Lucca. On the other hand, the proconsuls were prohibited from quitting their

of the proconsul. "Already," Appian writes, "he disposed of everything by his ascendance, by his riches, and by the affectionate eagerness with which he conferred obligations upon everybody." (¹)

What took place in this interview? No one knows; but we may conjecture from the events which were the immediate consequences of it. It is evident, in the first place, that Crassus and Pompey, who had recently quarrelled, were reconciled by Cæsar, who, no doubt, placed before their eyes the arguments most calculated to reconcile them: "The public interest required it; they alone could put an end to the state of anarchy which afflicted the capital; in a country

provinces as long as they were in the exercise of their commands. (See Titus Livius, XLI. 7; XLIII. 1.) But, as the conferences of Lucca took place just at the epoch when the proconsuls and proprætors were starting for their provinces (we know from Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, III. 9, that this departure took place in the months of April and May), it is probable that the newly-named proconsuls and proprætors repaired to Lucca before they went to take possession of their commands. Thus the number of 120 fasces would represent the collective number of the lictors of proprætors or proconsuls who could pass through Lucca before embarking either at Pisa, or Adria, or at Ravenna.

On this hypothesis, we should have the following numbers:—

Proprætor of Sicily.	6 fasces.
“ of Sardinia	6 “
Proconsul of Citerior Spain	12 “
“ of Ulterior Spain.....	12 “
“ of Africa.....	12 “
“ of Asia.....	12 “
“ of Macedonia....	12 “
“ of Bithynia.	12 “
“ of Crete.	12 “
“ of Syria	12 “
“ of Cilicia	12 “

120

Plutarch (*Pompey*, 53) says in so many words that there were seen every day at his door 120 fasces of proconsuls and prætors.

(¹) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 17.

which was a prey to vulgar ambitions, it required, to control them, ambitions which were greater, but, at the same time, purer and more honourable; they must easily have seen that it was not in the power of a man like Cicero, with his tergiversations, his cowardice, and his vanity, or Cato, with his stoicism, belonging to another age, or Domitius Ahenobarbus, with his implacable hatred and his selfish passions, to restore order, or put an end to the divisions of opinion. In order to obtain these results, it was necessary that Crassus and Pompey should labour resolutely to obtain the consulship. ⁽¹⁾ As to himself, he only asked to remain at the head of his army, and complete the conquest he had undertaken. Gaul was vanquished, but not subjugated. Some years were still necessary to establish there the Roman domination. This fickle and warlike people, always ready for revolt, was secretly incited and openly supported by two neighbouring nations, the Britons and the Germans. In the last war against the Belgæ, the promoters of the rising, according to the confession of the Bellovaci, had clearly shown, by taking refuge in Britain after their defeat, whence came the provocation. Even at this very moment, the insurrection which was in preparation among the tribes of the Veneti, on the shores of the ocean, was instigated by these same islanders. As to the Germans, the defeat of Ariovistus had not discouraged them; and several contingents of that nation were lately found with the troops of Hainault.

⁽¹⁾ See Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 24.—The proof that this plan originated with Cæsar is found in the fact that Pompey and Crassus had not previously taken any steps to ensure their election.

He intends to chastise these two peoples, and to carry his arms beyond the Rhine as well as beyond the sea; let them, then, leave him to finish his enterprise. Already the Alps are levelled; the barbarians, who, hardly forty-four years ago, were ravaging Italy, are driven back into their deserts and forests. A few years more, and fear or hope, punishments or recompenses, arms or laws, will have bound for ever Gaul to the empire." (¹)

Language like this could not fail to be understood by Pompey and by Crassus. People are easily persuaded when the public interest offers itself through the prism of selflove and personal interest. Beyond the consulship, Crassus and Pompey saw at once the government of provinces and the command of armies. As to Cæsar, the logical realisation of his desires was the prolongation of his powers. Only one difficulty lay in the way of the execution of this plan. The period of the elections was near at hand, and neither Pompey nor Crassus had taken steps to offer themselves as candidates for the consulship within the time fixed by the law; but it had been so usual for many years to delay the comitia, under frivolous pretexts, that the same thing might easily be done on the present occasion with a more legitimate object.

(¹) We have put into the mouth of Cæsar the following words of Cicero: "In giving the Alps as a boundary to Italy, Nature had not done it without a special intention of the gods. If the entrance had been open to the ferocity and the multitude of the Gauls, this town would never have been the seat and centre of a great empire. These lofty mountains may now level themselves; there is now nothing, from the Alps to the ocean, which Italy has to fear. One or two campaigns more, and fear or hope, punishments or recompenses, arms or the laws, will reduce all Gaul into subjection to us, and attach her to us by everlasting ties." (Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 14.)

Cæsar promised to support their election with all his power, by his recommendations, and by sending his soldiers on leave to vote in the comitia. In fact, his soldiers, either recruited from the veterans whom he had carried from Rome, or among Roman citizens established in great numbers in Cisalpine Gaul, had the right to give their vote in Rome, and enjoy the legitimate influence which is the reward of a life of dangers and self-denial. Cicero assures us of this in these words: "Do you consider, in seeking the consulship, as a weak support the will of the soldiers, so powerful by their number and by the influence which they exercise in their families? Moreover, what authority must the vote of our warriors have over the whole Roman people in the question of nominating a consul! For, in the consular comitia, it is the generals they choose, and not the rhetoricians. It is a very powerful recommendation to be able to say, I was wounded, he has restored me to life; he shared the booty with me. It was under him that we captured the enemy's camp, that we gave battle; he never required from the soldier more labour than he took upon himself; his success is as great as his courage. Can you imagine what a favourable influence such discourses have upon people's minds?"⁽¹⁾ Thus Cæsar conformed to the established practice, in allowing his soldiers to exercise their rights of citizens.

VI. The result of the interview at Lucca had been

Consequences of the
Interview at Lucca.
Conduct of Cicero.

to unite in a common feeling the most important men in the Republic. Some

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Orat. pro Muraena*, 18.

historians have seen in it a mysterious conspiracy, and they have not hesitated to qualify it with the name of *triumvirate*, a denomination as inapplicable to this agreement as to that which took place in 694. All interview in the midst of so many illustrious citizens, who have assembled from all sides to salute a victorious general, had hardly the appearance of a mystery, and the mutual understanding of some men of influence in the same political thought was not a conspiracy. Some authors have, nevertheless, pretended that the Senate, informed of this plot devised in Cisalpine Gaul, had expressed its indignation; but there is nothing to support this allegation; if it had been the case, would they, a few months after the interview at Lucca, have granted Cæsar everything he desired, and rejected everything that was displeasing to him? We see, indeed, that at the annual distribution of the governments of provinces, the senators hostile to Cæsar proposed that he should be deprived of his command, or, at least, of the part of his command decreed by the Senate. ⁽¹⁾ Yet, not only was this proposal rejected, but the Senate gave him ten lieutenants and subsidies to pay the legions he had raised on his own authority, in addition to the four legions originally placed at his disposal by the Senate. In fact, the triumphs of Cæsar had excited people's minds. Public opinion, that irresistible force in all times, had declared loudly for him, and his popularity reflected upon Pompey and Crassus. ⁽²⁾ The

⁽¹⁾ *Orat de Provinciis Consularibus*, 15.

⁽²⁾ "Evidently all opposition to these great men, especially since the brilliant successes of Cæsar, was contrary to the general feeling, and unanimously rejected." (Cicero, *Epist Familiar.*, I. 9.)

Senate had then silenced its animosity, and even Cæsar showed himself full of deference for that assembly. (¹)

It must be said, in praise of humanity, that true glory possesses the privilege of rallying all generous hearts; only men who are madly in love with themselves, or hardened by party fanaticism, can resist this general attraction towards those who constitute the greatness of their country. At this period, with the exception of a few spiteful and intractable individuals, the greater part of the senators felt the general impulse, as we learn from the orations of Cicero. (²)

But if, on one side, the members of this pretended triumvirate are represented as closely leagued together against the Republic, on the other, Dio Cassius asserts that, at this time, Pompey and Crassus were conspiring against Cæsar. This opinion has no better foundation. We see, on the contrary, by a letter of Cicero, how warmly Pompey at that time advocated the party of his father-in-law. Pompey, when he was leaving Lucca, met with Quintus Cicero, and, addressing him with warmth, he bade him remind his brother of his past engagements: "Cicero ought not to forget that what Pompey had done for his recall

(¹) "Cæsar, strengthened by his successes, and by the recompenses, honours, and testimonials with which the Senate had loaded him, had just lent to this illustrious order his glory and his influence." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 9.)

(²) "Why should I want to be reconciled with Cæsar? Has this reconciliation not been effected already by the Senate? the Senate, the supreme council of the Republic, my rule and my guide in all my opinions. I walk in your steps, senators, I obey your counsels, I yield to your authority. . . . So long as the political measures of Cæsar have not had your approbation, you did not see me allied with him. When his exploits had changed your feelings and dispositions, you have seen me not only agree in your decisions, but loudly applaud them." (Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 10)

was also the work of Cæsar, whose acts he had promised not to attack; if he would not serve him, at least let him abstain from all hostility.”⁽¹⁾ These reproaches did not remain without effect. Cicero, very apt to turn to the side of fortune, wrote to Atticus: “There is an end to everything; and since those who are without power will have me no longer, I will seek friends among those who have the power.”⁽²⁾

He had already acted with the senators in voting thanks for Cæsar’s victories, since which he had employed all his efforts in seconding every proposal in favour of the conqueror of Gaul. As the part Cicero acted on this occasion has had a particular importance, it will not be uninteresting to quote his words: “Could I be the enemy of a man whose couriers and letters, in concert with his renown, make our ears listen every day to the names of so many peoples, of so many nations, of so many countries which he has added to our empire? I am inflamed with enthusiasm, senators, and you are the less inclined to doubt it, since you are animated by the same sentiments.”⁽³⁾ He has combated, with the greatest success, the most warlike and powerful nations of the Germans and Helvetii; he has overthrown, subdued, and driven back the others, and has accustomed them to obey the Roman people. Countries, which no history, no relation, no public report had hitherto brought to our knowledge, have been overrun by our general, our troops, our arms. We had formerly but one way into Gaul; the other parts were occupied by peoples

⁽¹⁾ *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 9.

⁽²⁾ *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 5.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Orat. de Prov. Consularibus*, 9. (August, A. U. C. 698)

who were either enemies of this empire, or little to be trusted, or unknown, or at least ferocious, barbarous, and warlike; there was no one who was not desirous of seeing them vanquished and subdued. (1) A report has been recently presented to us on the pay of the troops. I was not satisfied with giving my opinion, but I laboured to secure its adoption; I replied at great length to those who held a contrary opinion; I assisted in drawing up the decree; then, again, I granted more to the person than to I know not what necessity. I thought that, even without such a succour of money, with the mere produce of the booty, Cæsar might have maintained his army and terminated the war; but I did not consider that we ought, by a narrow parsimony, to diminish the lustre and glory of his triumph.

“Moreover, there has been a question of giving Cæsar ten lieutenants: some absolutely opposed the grant, others required precedents; these would have put off the consideration to another day; those granted it, without employing flattering terms. Under these circumstances, from the manner in which I spoke, everybody understood that, while I sought to serve the interests of the Republic, I did still more to honour Cæsar.”

In another speech, the same orator exclaims: “The Senate has decreed Cæsar public prayers in the most honourable form, and for a number of days hitherto without example. In spite of the exhausted state of the treasury, it has provided for the pay of his victorious army; it has decided that ten lieutenants shall

(1) Cicero, *Orat. de Prov. Consularibus*, 13. (August, A. U. C. 698)

be given to the general, and that, by derogation of the law Sempronia, a successor should not be sent him. It was I who moved these measures, and who spoke in support of them; and, rather than listen to my old disagreement with Cæsar, I lent myself to what is demanded, under present circumstances, by the interest of the Republic and the need of peace." (¹)

But if in public Cicero expressed himself with so much clearness, in his private intercourse he was still tender of the opinion of his former friends. It is, indeed, the only manner in which we can explain a contradiction too glaring even in a temper so inconstant. In fact, at the moment when he was boasting openly of the services he had assisted in rendering to Cæsar, he wrote to his friend P. Lentulus, proconsul in Cilicia: "They have just granted Cæsar subsidies and ten lieutenants, and they have paid no regard to the law Sempronia, which required that a successor should be given to him. But it is too sorrowful a subject, and I will not dwell upon it." (²)

VII. From what precedes, it is evident that unpopularity did not fall upon Cæsar, but upon Intrigues of Pompey and Crassus to obtain the Consulship. the means employed by Crassus and Pompey for the purpose of obtaining the consulship.

They made use of Caius Cato, kinsman of the Stoic, and of other men equally undeserving of esteem, to cause delay in the time of holding the comitia, and thus lead to the creation of an interrex, (³) which would facilitate their election, since the consuls, who

(¹) Cicero, *Orat. pro Balbo*, 27.

(²) Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, I. 7.

(³) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 27.

were the ordinary presidents of the assembly of the people, were opposed to them.

The relations of the events of this period present great confusion. Dio Cassius informs us that, in the sequel of violent disputes in the curia, between Pompey, who had recently returned from Sardinia, and the Consul Marcellinus, the Senate, in sign of its displeasure, decreed that it would go into mourning, as for a public calamity, and immediately carried the decree into effect. Caius Cato opposed his veto. Then the Consul Cn. Marcellinus, at the head of the Senate, proceeded to the Forum, and harangued the people to ask it for the comitia, without success probably, since the senators returned immediately to the place of their session. Clodius, who, since the conference of Lucca, had become more intimate with Pompey, appeared suddenly among the crowd, interrupted the consul, and bantered him on this display of untimely mourning. In the public place Clodius would easily carry the approval of the multitude; but when he attempted to return to the Senate, he encountered the most resolute opposition. The senators rushed to meet him and prevent him from entering; many of the knights assailed him with insults; they would have treated him still worse, had not the populace rushed to his aid and delivered him, threatening to commit to the flames the entire assembly. (¹)

On another hand, Pompey, with more authority and less violence, protested against the last *senatus-consultus*. Lentulus Marcellinus, addressing him in full Senate, demanded if it were true, as reported, that he

(¹) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 29.

aimed at the consulship. "As yet I know not what I shall do," replied Pompey, roughly. Then, perceiving the bad impression caused by these disdainful words, he added immediately, "For the good citizens, there is no use in my being consul; against the factions, perhaps I am necessary." (1) To a similar question, Crassus replied, modestly, "that he was ready to do whatever would be useful to the Republic." Then Lentulus bursting into reproaches against Pompey's ambition, the latter interrupted him insolently. "Remember," he said, "that thou art indebted to me for everything. Thou wast dumb, I made thee a talker; thou wast a greedy beggar, I turned thee into a glutton, who vomits to eat again." This language will give an idea of the violence of political passions at that period. The senators, and Marcellinus himself, seeing that they could not contend against the influence of these two men, withdrew. During the rest of the year they took no part in public affairs; they confined themselves to wearing mourning, and absenting themselves from the festivals of the people.

VIII. While Pompey and Crassus, in accord with the convention of Lucca, employed all the means in their power to arrive at the consulship, Cæsar had his regards still fixed on a conquest which every year seemed achieved, yet every year it had to be commenced again. If the Gauls, divided into so many different peoples, were incapable of uniting for their common defence, they did not allow themselves to be discouraged by a single mis-

Campaign against
the Peoples on the
Shores of the Ocean.

(1) Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 30.—Plutarch, *Pompey*, 53; *Crassus*, 18.

fortune. Hardly were they crushed on one point, when the standard of insurrection was raised somewhere else.

In 698, the agitation showed itself first along the shores of the ocean, from the Loire to the Seine. The peoples of the Morbihan, masters of a considerable fleet, and possessing the exterior trade, placed themselves at the head of the movement. They entered into alliance with all the peoples who dwelt on the coasts between the Loire and the Scheldt, and sent for assistance from England, with which country they were in constant relation. Under these circumstances, Cæsar foresaw that it was on the sea that he must curb the spirit of these maritime peoples. He gave orders for the building of ships on the Loire, demanded others from the peoples of the Charente and the Gironde, and sent from Italy Decimus Brutus with galleys and sailors. As soon as the season permitted, he repaired in person to the neighbourhood of Nantes, not far from Angers, where Publius Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion. From the moment of his arrival his attention extended over the vast territory where he was to establish the domination of Rome. With this aim, he distributed his troops as follows: Labienus is sent with the cavalry to the east, in the direction of Trèves, to hold the Germans in check; on his way, he will confirm the fidelity of the people of Champagne and their neighbours; P. Crassus is sent towards Aquitaine, to subdue that country; Sabinus towards Normandy, to combat the insurgents of the Cotentin; Cæsar reserves for himself the operations in the Morbihan. After besieg-

ing, not without great difficulties, several small fortresses which, placed at the extremity of promontories, were surrounded with water at high tide, he resolved to wait for his fleet, and took a position on the coast, at Saint-Gildas, to the south of Vannes. Decimus Brutus led his vessels out of the Loire, encountered the enemy in sight of the Roman army, and, by a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, destroyed the Gaulish fleet; the flower of Brittany perished in the combat. The Morbihan and the neighbouring states submitted, and, nevertheless, the conqueror put to death all the principal citizens.

Cæsar's conduct towards the inhabitants of this province has been justly blamed by the Emperor Napoleon I. "These people," he says, "had not revolted; they had furnished hostages, and had promised to live peaceably; but they were in possession of all their liberty and all their rights. They had given Cæsar cause to make war upon them, no doubt, but not to violate international law in regard to them, and to commit so atrocious an abuse of victory. This conduct was not just, and it was still less politic. Such means never answer their object, they exasperate and revolt nations. The punishment of particular chiefs is all that justice and policy permit." (1)

While Brittany was vanquished on the sea, Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the peoples of Normandy, near Avranches; and, at the same time, Publius Crassus reduced Aquitaine. Although this young lieutenant of Cæsar had only a single legion, a corps of cavalry, and some auxiliaries, he gained possession

(1) *Précis des Guerres de César*, III 5.

of the strong fortress of Sos, and inflicted a sanguinary defeat on the peoples situated between the Garonne and the Adour. His glory was the greater, as the Aquitanians had called to their assistance the Spanish chiefs, the wreck of that famous army which Sertorius had so long formed on the model of the Roman tactics.

Although the season was far advanced, Cæsar still resolved to subjugate the peoples of Brabant and the Boulonnais, and marched against them. The Gauls retired into their forests; he was then obliged to clear a road in the woods by cutting down the trees, which, placed to the right and left, formed on each side a rampart against the enemy. The bad state of the weather obliged him to retire before he had completed his task.

In this campaign of 698, most of the countries which extend from the mouth of the Adour to that of the Scheldt had felt the weight of the Roman arms. The sea was free; Cæsar was at liberty to attempt a descent upon England.

CHAPTER IV.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.

I. THE successes of the preceding campaign, and the existence of a Roman fleet in the waters of the Morbihan, must have given Cæsar the hope that nothing henceforth would prevent an expedition against Great Britain; yet new events came to delay his projects.

Campaign against the Usipetes and the Tencteri. In the winter between 698 and 699, the Usipetes and the Tencteri, peoples of German origin, to escape the oppression of the Suevi, passed the Rhine not far from its mouth, towards Xanten and Clèves. They numbered 400,000, of all ages and both sexes; they sought new lands to settle in, and, in the spring of 699, the head of the emigration had already reached the country where now stand Aix-la-Chapelle and Liège. Cæsar, alarmed at this event, starts for the army sooner than usual, proceeds to Amiens, there assembles his troops, and finds the Gaulish chiefs profoundly shaken in their fidelity by the approach of these new barbarians, whose co-operation they hope to obtain. He confirms their feeling of duty, obtains a contingent of cavalry, marches to encounter the Usipetes and the Tencteri, and arrives on the Meuse, which he crosses at Maëstricht. These latter, on hearing of the approach of the Roman army, had concentrated in Southern Gueldres. Established on the

river Niers, in the plains of Goch, they send a deputation to Cæsar, who had arrived near Venloo, to ask him not to attack them, but to allow them to keep the lands they had conquered. The Roman general refuses, and continues his march. After new conferences, the object of which, on the part of the Germans, was to give their cavalry, sent beyond the Meuse, time to return, a truce of one day is accepted. Cæsar declares, nevertheless, that he will advance to Niers. Suddenly, however, his vanguard is treacherously attacked in its march and routed by the German cavalry; he then believes himself freed from his engagements; and when next day the deputies come to excuse this perfidious aggression, he has them arrested, falls unexpectedly on the camp of the Germans, and pursues them without remission to the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse (towards the place occupied now by Fort Saint-André), where these unfortunate people nearly all perish.

In the sequel of this exploit, which brought him little glory, and in which doubt has been thrown on his good faith, Cæsar resolved to cross the Rhine, on the pretence of claiming from the Sicambri the cavalry of the Usipetes and the Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them, but, in reality, to intimidate the Germans, and make them abandon the practice of seconding the insurrections in Gaul. He therefore proceeded up the valley of the Rhine, and arrived at Bonn, opposite the territory of the Ubii, a people which had already solicited his alliance and support against the Suevi. He caused to be built in ten days a bridge of piles, which he crossed with his troops,

but he did not penetrate far into Germany: unable to come up with either the Sicambri or the Suevi, who had withdrawn into the interior of their country, he re-crossed to the left bank, and caused the bridge to be broken.

II. Though the summer was already advanced, Cæsar determined to take advantage of the First Descent in England. time which still remained to pass into England and visit that island, concerning which people had but confused notions, and which was only known to the Romans by the intervention of the islanders in all the wars in Gaul. He therefore started from Bonn, travelled towards Boulogne, marking out, as we might say, the road which subsequently Augustus ordered to be constructed between those two towns, and collected in that port the ships of the neighbouring coasts and the fleet which, the year before, had vanquished that of the Morbihan. . After sending one of his officers to assure himself of the point of landing, he started from Boulogne, in the night of the 24th to the 25th of August, with two legions, reconnoitred in his turn the coast of Dover, and landed at Deal. The shore was covered with armed men, who offered a vigorous opposition to the landing of the Roman army, which, having repulsed them, established itself on land near the sea. The Britons, astonished at such boldness, came from all sides to implore peace and make their submission. But the elements conspired against the invaders, and a dreadful tempest destroyed the transport ships and galleys. At the news of this disaster, the Britons

raised their heads again; on their side the Roman soldiers, far from desponding, hastened to repair their ships with so much zeal that, out of eighty, sixty-eight were made fit for sea again. Not far from Cæsar's camp, the Britons one day drew a legion into an ambuscade; this led to a general battle, in which the Romans were victorious. Then Cæsar, hurried by the approach of the equinox, treated with the chiefs of some tribes, received hostages, and crossed again to the continent on the 12th of September, having remained eighteen days only in England. On the day after his arrival at Boulogne, the two legions he brought with him were dispatched against the people of the territory of Boulogne, who had taken refuge, since the preceding year, in the marshes of their country; other troops were sent to chastise the inhabitants of Brabant. After these expeditions, Cæsar placed his legions in winter quarters among the Belgæ, and then departed to visit the opposite part of his vast command, namely, Illyria, where also he had to protect the Roman frontiers against the incursion of the barbarians.

III. We are astonished, in reading the "Commentaries," at the ease with which Cæsar repaired every year from Gaul into Italy, or into Illyria. There must have been relays established on the principal lines along which he had to travel, not only for his own use, but also for the couriers who carried dispatches. We have seen that, in 696, Cæsar passed in eight days from the banks of the Tiber to Geneva. According to Suetonius, he trav-

Cæsar's Habits when
in Campaign.

elled 100 miles a day, or 150 kilomètres in twenty-four hours, which makes a little more than six kilomètres an hour. The couriers took twenty-eight or thirty days to go from England to Rome. Plutarch informs us that, in order to lose no time, Cæsar travelled by night, sleeping in a chariot or litter. ⁽¹⁾ By day he had with him a secretary, who wrote under his dictation, and he was followed by a soldier who carried his sword. In his military marches he went sometimes on horseback, but most frequently he preceded the soldiers on foot, and, with head uncovered, he gave no care either to sun or rain. ⁽²⁾

In the midst of the most perilous enterprises, he found time to correspond with men of influence, and even to read poems which Cicero sent him, to whom he sent back his opinions and criticisms; ⁽³⁾ his mind was incessantly occupied with the events which were passing in Rome.

IV. At the beginning of the year 699, the consuls were not yet nominated. In such circumstances, the Senate appointed *interreges*, who, invested with the consular powers, succeeded each other in office every five days. It was by favour of this interregnum that the comitia were held. The result was foreseen. Besides their immense *clientelle*, Pompey and Crassus were assured of the sup-

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 18.

⁽²⁾ Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 57.

⁽³⁾ "What does Cæsar think of my poem, I pray? He has written to me that he had read the first book, and that he had seen nothing, even in Greek, which ever pleased him more. The rest, up to a certain passage, is less finished—that is his expression. Tell me what it is that displeases him, the matter or the form, and fear not to speak candidly." (Cicero, *Ep. ad Quint*, II. 16.)

port of Cæsar, who, as we have said, had taken care to send on leave a great number of his legionaries to vote. (¹) They arrived in charge of Publius Crassus, son of the triumvir, whose exploits in Aquitaine had given him celebrity.

The only candidate of the previous year, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, excited by Cato, his brother-in-law, persisted in his candidature to the last moment. Starting before daybreak to the comitia, with M. Cato and many of his clients, he and his followers were exposed to violent attacks. The slave who walked before him with a lantern in his hand was killed, and Cato wounded. Domitius was seized with terror, and sought shelter in his house. The interrex who presided over the comitia proclaimed, without opposition, Crassus and Pompey consuls.

The arrangements concluded at Lucca had thus succeeded, and the ambition of the three eminent personages who absorbed public attention was satisfied; but the aim of this ambition varied according to their several tempers. Crassus only desired the command of an army, in order to increase his reputation and his immense riches. Pompey, without deep convictions, placed his vanity in being the first man of the Republic. Cæsar, the head of the popular party, aspired to power, in order, above all other considerations, to ensure the triumph of his cause. The way which would offer itself to his mind was not to excite civil war, but to obtain his own nomination several times to the consulship; the great citizens who had preceded him had followed no other way, and there is a

(¹) Plutarch, *Crassus*, 16.—Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 31.

natural tendency to take for our example that which has been successful in the past. The glory acquired in Gaul assured Cæsar beforehand of the public favour, which was to carry him again to the first magistracy. Nevertheless, to dispel the obstacles continually raised by a powerful party, it was necessary to remove hostile competitors from important offices; to gain the support of distinguished men, such as Cicero; and, as everything was venal, to buy, with the produce of the booty he made by war, the consciences which were for sale. This course, seconded by Pompey and Crassus, promised success.

Pompey, always under the influence of his wife's charms, appeared to rest satisfied with the part which was assigned to him. Had he been free from all engagement, and obeyed his own instincts, he would have embraced the cause of the Senate rather than that which he was sustaining; for men of a nature so vain as his, prefer the flattering adherence of the aristocracy in the middle of which they live, to the expression of the approbation of the people, which rarely reaches their ears. Dragged on by the force of circumstances, he was obliged to wrestle against those who stood in his way; and the more the opposition showed itself ardent, the more he gave way to the violence of his temper. Legality, moreover, was observed by nobody, as the following incident proves. Cato aspired to the prætorship. On the day of the comitia, the first century, to which the epithet of *prærogativæ* was given, and the suffrage of which exercised a great influence over the others, voted for him. Pompey, not doubting the same result from the other

centuries, declared suddenly that he heard a clap of thunder, ⁽¹⁾ and dismissed the assembly. Some days afterwards, by purchasing votes and employing all the means of intimidation at their disposal, the new consuls caused P. Vatinius, the author of the motion which, in 695, procured for Cæsar the government of the Cisalpine province, to be elected prætor, in the place of M. Cato. ⁽²⁾ Most of the other magistrates were similarly chosen among their creatures, and there were only two tribunes of the people, C. Ateius Capito and P. Aquilius Gallus, to represent the opposition. All these elections were conducted with a certain degree of order, troubled only once in the comitia for the ædileship. A battle took place in the Campus Martius, in which there were killed and wounded. Pompey rushed into the middle of the riot to appease it, and had his toga covered with blood. His slaves took it to his house to bring another. At the view of this blood, Julia, who was in an advanced state of pregnancy, believed that her husband had been slain, and suffered a miscarriage. This accident injured her health, but was not, as has been stated, the cause of her death, which occurred only in the year following. ⁽³⁾

V. There was no further resistance to the two consuls. The factions appeared to be vanquished. Cicero himself and Clodius became reconciled, and, through the mediation of Pompey and Crassus, promised reciprocal concessions. ⁽⁴⁾

Motion of Trebonius
on the Government
of the Provinces

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cato*, 48; *Pompey*, 54.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 55.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 9.

⁽⁴⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 9

The moment had arrived for presenting the law which was to give provinces and armies to the two first magistrates of the Republic: the latter wished the motion to come from a tribune of the people, and they had entrusted it to C. Trebonius, who was subsequently one of Cæsar's lieutenants. The Senate had not proceeded to the distribution of provinces before the consular elections, as the law required. Trebonius, following the example given a few years before, in the case of the government of Gaul, addressed the people, and took the initiative of the two motions, one relating to Pompey and Crassus, the other to Cæsar.

The provinces destined for the two consuls, on quitting office, were not named separately for each, but Pompey and Crassus were to arrange the partition between them: Dio Cassius even pretends that they drew lots. This assertion appears to be incorrect. An insurrection of the Vaccæi and the reduction of the revolt of Clunia ⁽¹⁾ served as a pretext to ask that Spain should be given to Pompey with four legions; Crassus was to have Syria and the neighbouring states, with a considerable army. The name of Parthians was not pronounced, but everybody knew why Crassus coveted Syria. ⁽²⁾ Although advanced in age (he was sixty years old), he dreamt of making the conquest of the countries which extend from the Euphrates to the Indus. ⁽³⁾ As to Cæsar, he was to be continued in his province. The duration of these governments was for five years; they conferred the

⁽¹⁾ The country of the Vaccæi comprised part of old Castile, of the kingdom of Leon, and of the Basque provinces. Clunia, a town of the Celtiberii, was situated near Coruña del Conde.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Crassus*, 19.

⁽³⁾ Plutarch, *Crassus*, 19.

power of raising Roman or allied troops, and of making war or peace.

The propositions of Trebonius were warmly combated by M. Cato, by Favonius, and by two other tribunes of the people, Ateius and Aquilius Gallus. "But Favonius," says Plutarch, "was listened to by nobody; some were retained by their respect for Pompey and Crassus, the greater number sought to please Cæsar, and remained quiet, placing all their hopes in him." ⁽¹⁾ The enemies of the consuls in the Senate were intimidated, and kept silence. Cicero, to avoid the discussion, had retired to the country.

In the assembly of the people, M. Cato spoke against the project of law of Trebonius, or rather he employed the two hours allowed him in declamations on the conduct of the depositaries of power. When the two hours were expired, Trebonius, who presided over the assembly, enjoined him to quit the tribune. Cato refused to obey; one of the tribune's lictors dragged him from it; he slipped from him, and a moment after re-appeared on the rostra, trying to speak again. Trebonius ordered him to be taken to prison, and, to obtain possession of his person, it required a regular contest; but, in the midst of this tumult, Cato had gained what he wanted, namely, to make them lose a day. ⁽²⁾

A second assembly had better success. Considerable sums had been distributed among the tribes, and armed bands were in readiness to interfere in case of need. The opposition, on their side, had omitted no

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 24.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Cato*, 49.—Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 34.

preparation for disputing the victory. The tribune P. Aquilius, fearing that they might prevent him from approaching the public place, conceived the idea of hiding himself the previous evening in the Curia Hostilia, which opened upon the Forum. Trebonius, informed of this, caused the doors to be locked, and kept him in all the night and the next day. ⁽¹⁾ M. Cato, Favonius, and Ateius succeeded with great difficulty in reaching the Forum; but, unable to force a way through the crowd up to the rostra, they mounted on the shoulders of some of their clients, and began to shout that *Jupiter was thundering*, and that there could be no deliberation. But it was all in vain; always repulsed, but always protesting, they gave up the contest when Trebonius had proclaimed that the law was accepted by the people. ⁽²⁾ One of its provisions decreed that Pompey should remain at Rome after his consulship, and that he should govern his province of Spain through his lieutenants. The vote was published in the midst of the most stormy tumult. Ateius was wounded in the fray, which cost the lives of several citizens; this was a thing then too frequent to produce any great sensation.

Such was the memorable struggle now commenced at Rome between the consuls and the opposition. If

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 35.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Cato*, 49.—Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 33, 35.—Dio Cassius pretends erroneously that the *imperium* in the province of Gaul was only continued to Cæsar by a sort of favour, and but for three years, when his partisans murmured at seeing that Crassus and Pompey thought only for themselves. He does not mention the conference of Luca, which is attested by Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian. He forgets that Trebonius, Cæsar's creature, was one of his most devoted lieutenants in the Civil War. We think that the testimony of the other historians is to be preferred.

we judge only from certain acts of violence related by the historians, we are at first tempted to accuse Crassus and Pompey of having had recourse to a strange abuse of force; but a more attentive examination proves that they were, so to say, constrained to it by the turbulent intrigues of a factious minority. In fact, these same historians, who describe complacently the means of culpable compulsion employed by the candidates for the consulship, allow contrary assertions to escape them here and there in the sequel, which help to deface the disagreeable impression made by their narrative. Thus, according to Cicero, public opinion blamed the hostility which was exercised against Pompey and Crassus.⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, after presenting under the most unfavourable colours the manœuvres of the consuls for the distribution of the governments of the provinces, adds: "This partition pleased all parties. The people desired that Pompey might not be sent away from Rome."⁽²⁾

Cæsar might hope that the consulship of Pompey and Crassus would restore order and the supremacy of the laws: it did nothing of the sort. After having themselves so often violated legality and corrupted the elections, they sought to remedy the evil, which they had contributed to aggravate, by proposing severe measures against corruption; this tardy homage rendered to public morality was destined to remain

⁽¹⁾ "In my opinion, that which it would have been best for his adversaries to do, would have been to cease a struggle which they are not strong enough to sustain. . . . At the present day the only ambition one can have is to be quiet, and those who governed would be disposed to allow it us, if they found certain people less rigid against their domination." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 8, letter to Lentulus.)

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Crassus*, 19

without effect, like all the remedies which had hitherto been employed.

VI. They sought to repress extravagance by a sumptuary law, but a speech of Hortensius was sufficient to cause its rejection. Pompey's Sumptuary Law. The orator, after a brilliant picture of the greatness of the Republic, and of the progress of civilisation, of which Rome was the centre, proceeded to laud the consuls for their magnificence, and for the noble use they made of their immense riches. ⁽¹⁾ And, in fact, at that very moment Pompey was building the theatre which bore his name, and was giving public games, in which it seemed his wish to surpass the acts of sumptuous extravagance of the most prodigal courtiers of the Roman people. ⁽²⁾ In these games, which lasted several days, 500 lions and eighteen elephants were slain. This spectacle inspired the mob with admiration; but it was remarked that, usually insensible to the death of the gladiators who expired under their eyes, they were affected by the cries of pain of the elephants. Cicero, who was present at these festivals, places, in the relation he addresses to one of his friends, the men and the animals on the same footing, and displays no more regret for the one than for the other, the spirit of humanity was still so little developed! ⁽³⁾

The splendour of these games had dazzled Rome and Italy, and restored to Pompey a great part of his prestige; but the levies of troops, which he was

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 37

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 38.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, VII. 1.

obliged to order soon afterwards, caused great discontent. Several tribunes vainly opposed their veto; they were obliged to renounce a struggle which had Pompey, and especially Crassus, to sustain it.

VII. Without waiting for the end of his consulship,

Crassus determined on quitting Rome; he left in the last days of October. ⁽¹⁾

Departure of Crassus for Syria.

As we have said, it was not the government of Syria which excited his ardour; his aim was to carry the war into the country of the Parthians, in order to acquire new glory, and obtain possession of the treasures of those rich countries.

The idea of this expedition was not new. The Parthians had long awakened the jealousy of Rome. They had extended their frontiers from the Caucasus to the Euphrates, ⁽²⁾ and considerably increased their importance; their chief assumed, like Agamemnon, the title of *king of kings*. It is true that the part of Mesopotamia taken from the Parthians by Tigranes had been restored to them by Lucullus, and Pompey had renewed the treaty which made the Euphrates the frontier of the empire of the Arsacides. But this treaty had not always been respected, for it was not one of the habits of the Republic to suffer a too powerful neighbour. Nevertheless, different circumstances might, at this moment, lead the Senate to make war upon the Parthians. While A. Gabinius exercised the command in Syria, Mithridates, dethroned,

⁽¹⁾ According to the letter from Cicero to Atticus (IV. 13), Crassus had left Rome a little before the 17th of the Calends of December, 699, which answers, according to the concordance established by M. Le Verrier, to the 28th of October, 699.

⁽²⁾ Justin, XLI. 6

on account of his cruelty, by his younger brother Orodes, had invoked the support of the proconsul; and the latter was on the point of giving it, when Pompey sent him orders to repair first into Egypt to replace Ptolemy on his throne. Mithridates, besieged in Babylon, had surrendered to his brother, who had caused him to be put to death. (¹) On another hand, the Parthians were always at war with the kings of Armenia, allies of the Romans. The Senate, had it the wish, was not, therefore, in want of pretexts for declaring war. It had to avenge the death of a friendly pretender, and to sustain a threatened ally. To what point could the law of nations be invoked? That is doubtful; but, for several centuries, the Republic had been in the habit of consulting its own interests much more than justice, and the war against the Parthians was quite as legitimate as the wars against Perseus, Antiochus, or Carthage.

Nevertheless, this enterprise encountered a warm opposition at Rome; the party hostile to the consuls feared the glory which it might reflect upon Crassus, and many prudent minds dreaded the perils of so distant an expedition; but Cæsar, who had inherited that passion of the ancient Romans who dreamt for their town the empire of the world, encouraged Crassus in his projects, and, in the winter of 700, he sent Publius to his father, with 1,000 picked Gaulish cavalry.

Inauspicious auguries marked the departure of the proconsul. The two tribunes of the people, C. Ateius Capito and P. Aquilius Gallus, adherents of the party

(¹) Justin, XLII 4.

of the nobles, opposed it. They had succeeded in imparting their sentiments to many of their fellow-citizens. Crassus, intimidated, took with him Pompey, whose ascendancy over the people was so powerful that his presence was sufficient to put a stop to all hostile manifestation. Ateius Capito was not discouraged; he gave orders to an usher to place Crassus under arrest at the moment when he was leaving Rome. The other tribune prevented this act of violence. Then, seeing that all his efforts had failed, he had recourse to an extreme measure: he sent for a chafing-dish, and threw perfumes into it, while he pronounced against Crassus the most terrible curses. These imprecations were of a nature to strike the superstitious minds of the Romans. People did not fail to call them to memory afterwards, when news came of the Syrian disasters.

VIII. About the same time, the news arrived at Rome of the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri, of the passage of the Rhine, and of the descent in Britain; they excited a warm enthusiasm, and the Senate decreed twenty days of thanksgiving.⁽¹⁾ The last expedition especially made a great impression on people's minds; it was like the discovery of a new world; the national pride was flattered at learning that the legions had penetrated into an unknown country, from which immense advantages for the Republic were promised.⁽²⁾ Yet

Cato proposes to deliver Cæsar to the Germans.

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 38.

⁽²⁾ "Cæsar was very proud of his expedition into Britain, and everybody at Rome cried it up with enthusiasm. People congratulated each other on be-

all were not dazzled by the military successes; some pretended that Cæsar had crossed, not the ocean, but a mere pool, ⁽¹⁾ and Cato, persevering in his hatred, proposed to deliver him to the Germans. He accused him of having attacked them at the moment when they were sending deputies, and, by this violation of the law of nations, drawn upon Rome the anger of Heaven; "they must," he said, "turn it upon the head of the perfidious general:" an impotent diatribe, which did not prevail against the public feeling! ⁽²⁾ Yet, as soon as Cæsar was informed of it, too sensitive, perhaps, to the insult, he wrote to the Senate a letter full of invectives and accusations against Cato. The latter at first repelled them calmly; then, taking advantage of the circumstance, he began to paint, in the darkest colours, Cæsar's pretended designs. "It was," he said, "neither the Germans nor the Gauls they had to fear, but this ambitious man, whose designs were apparent to everybody." These words produced a strong impression on an auditory already prejudiced unfavourably. Nevertheless, the fear of the public opinion prevented any decision; for, according to Plutarch, "Cato made no impression outside the Sen-

coming acquainted with a country of the existence of which they were previously ignorant, and of having penetrated into countries of which they had never heard before; everybody took his hopes for reality, and all that people flattered themselves with obtaining some day caused as great an outburst of joy as if they had already possessed it." (Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 53.)—"After having landed in Britain, Cæsar believed he had discovered a new world. He wrote (it is unknown to whom) that Britain was not an island, but a country surrounding the ocean" (Eumenius, *Panegyrica*, IV. 2.)

⁽¹⁾ Lucan, *Pharsalia*, II, line 571.

⁽²⁾ "Without paying any attention to the opinion of Cato, the people during fifteen days performed sacrifices to celebrate this victory, and exhibited the greatest marks of joy." (Plutarch, *Nicias and Clearchus*, 4.)

ate; the people desired that Cæsar should be raised to the highest power, and the Senate, though it was of the same opinion as Cato, dared not to act, through fear of the people." (¹)

(¹) Plutarch, *Cato of Utica*, 58.

CHAPTER V.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700.

I. THE expedition to England, in 699, may be said to have been only a reconnoitring visit, Second Descent in England. showing the necessity of more numerous forces and more considerable preparations to subjugate the warlike people of Great Britain. Accordingly, before starting for Italy, Cæsar gave orders to build on the coast, and especially at the mouth of the Seine, a great number of ships fitted for the transport of troops. In the month of June he left Italy, visited his stocks where the vessels were building, appointed Boulogne as the general rendezvous of his fleet, and, while it was assembling, marched rapidly, with four legions, towards the country of the Treviri, where the inhabitants, who had rebelled against his orders, were divided into two parties, having at their head, one Indutiomarus, and the other Cingetorix. He gave the power to the latter, who was favourable to the Romans. After having thus calmed the agitation of that country, Cæsar repaired at once to Boulogne, where he found 800 ships ready to put to sea; he embarked with five legions and 2,000 cavalry, and, without any resistance, landed, as in the year before, near Deal. A first successful combat, not far from Kingston, engaged him to continue his advance, when

he received information that a tempest had just destroyed part of his fleet; he then returned to the coast, took the measures necessary for repairing this new disaster, caused all his ships to be drawn on land, and surrounded them with a retrenchment adjoining to the camp. He next marched towards the Thames. On his way he encountered the Britons, who, vanquished in two successive combats, had nevertheless more than once scattered trouble and disorder through the ranks of the legions, thanks to their chariots; these engines of war, mixed with the cavalry, spread terror and disconcerted the Roman tactics. Cæsar forced the passage of the Thames at Sunbury, went to attack the citadel of Cassivellaunus near St. Albans, and obtained possession of it. Several tribes, situated to the south of that river, made their submission. Then, dreading the approach of the equinox, and especially the troubles which might break out in Gaul during his absence, he returned to the continent.

II. Immediately on his return, he placed his legions in winter quarters: Sabinus and Cotta at Tongres; Cicero at Charleroi; Labienus at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe; Fabius at Saint-Pol; Trebonius at Amiens; Crassus at Montdidier; Plan-
Displacement of the Army Disaster of Sabinus. cus at Champliieu; and, lastly, Roscius in the country of Séez. This displacement of the army, rendered necessary by the difficulty of provisioning it, separated by great distances the quarters from each other, though all, except that of Roscius, were comprised in a radius of 100 miles.

As in the preceding years, Cæsar believed he might

repair into Italy; but Gaul still chafed under the yoke of the foreigner, and, while the people of Orleans massacred Tasgetius, who had been given them for their king three years before, events of a more serious character were in preparation in the countries situate between the Rhine and the Meuse. The people of Liége, led by Ambiorix and Cativolcus, revolt and attack, at Tongres, the camp occupied by Sabinus and Cotta with fifteen cohorts. Unable to take it by assault, they have recourse to stratagem: they spread abroad the report of the departure of Cæsar, and of the revolt of the whole of Gaul; they offer the two lieutenants to let them go, without obstacle, to rejoin the nearest winter quarters. Sabinus assembles a council of war, in which Cotta, an old experienced soldier, refused all arrangement with the enemy; but, as often happens in such meetings, the majority rallies to the least energetic opinion; the fifteen cohorts, trusting in the promise of the Gauls, abandon their impregnable position, and begin their march. On arriving at the defile of Lowaige, they are attacked and massacred by the barbarians, who had placed themselves in an ambuscade in the woods. Ambiorix, emboldened by this success, raises all the peoples on his way, and hastens, at Charleroi, to attack the camp of Cicero. The legion, though taken unexpectedly, defends itself bravely, but the Gauls have learnt from deserters the art of besieging fortresses in the Roman manner; they raise towers, construct covered galleries, and surround the camp with a counter-vallation. Meanwhile Cicero has found the means of informing Cæsar of his critical position. The latter

was at Amiens; the morrow of the day on which he receives this news, he starts with two legions, and sends a Gaul to announce his approach. The assailants, informed on their part of Cæsar's march, abandon the siege, and go to meet him. The two armies encounter near the little stream of the Haine, at fourteen kilomètres from Charleroi. Shut up in his retrenchments on Mont Sainte-Aldegonde, Cæsar counterfeits fear, in order to provoke the Gauls to attack him; and when they rush upon the ramparts to storm them, he sallies out through all the gates, puts the enemies to the rout, and strews the ground with their dead. The same day he rejoins Cicero, congratulates the soldiers on their courage, and his lieutenant for having been faithful to the Roman principle of never entering into negotiation with an enemy in arms. For the moment this victory defeated at one blow the aggressive attempts of the populations on the banks of the Rhine against Labienus, and those of the maritime peoples on the coasts of the Straits against Roscius; but soon new disturbances arose: the inhabitants of the state of Sens expelled Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for king; and, a little later, Labienus was forced to combat the inhabitants of the country of Trèves, whom he defeated in an engagement in which Indutiomarus was slain. With the exception of the peoples of Burgundy and Champagne, all Gaul was in fermentation, which obliged Cæsar to pass the winter in it.

III. During this time, the struggle of parties continued at Rome, and Pompey, charged with the sup-

L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher,
Consuls

plying of provisions, having under his orders lieutenants and legions, posted himself at the gates of the town; his presence in Italy, a pledge of order and tranquillity, was accepted by all good citizens. (1) His influence was, as Cæsar thought, to paralyse that of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had obtained the consulship. In fact, when on the preceding occasion Crassus and Pompey placed themselves on the ranks as candidates for the consulship, the opposite party, hopeless of defeating both, had sought the admission of at least one of their candidates. They tried again the manœuvre they had employed in 695, by which they succeeded in the nomination of Bibulus as the colleague of Cæsar. The attempt had failed; but, at the moment when the question of the election of consuls for the year 700 was agitated, the aristocratic party, having no longer to contend against persons of such eminence as Crassus and Pompey, obtained without difficulty the election of Ahenobarbus. This latter represented alone, in that high magistracy, the passions hostile to the triumvirs, since his colleague Appius Claudius Pulcher was still, at that epoch, favourable to Cæsar.

The authority of the consuls, whoever they might be, was powerless for remedying the demoralisation of the upper classes, which was revealed by numerous symptoms at Rome as well as in the provinces. Cicero himself, as the following event proves, treated legality with contempt when it interfered with his affections or political opinions.

(1) See page 456

IV. The Sibylline oracle, it will be remembered, had forbidden recourse to arms for the purpose of restoring Ptolemy, King of Egypt, to his states. In spite of this prohibition, Cicero, as early as the year 698, had engaged P. Lentulus, proconsul in Cilicia and in Cyprus, to re-establish him by force, and, to encourage this enterprise, he had suggested to him the prospect of impunity in success, without, however, concealing from him that, in case of reverse, the legal question, as well as the religious question, would assume a threatening form. (¹) Lentulus had thought it prudent to abstain; but Gabinius, proconsul in Syria in the following year, had not shown the same degree of scruple. Bribed by the king, some said, but, as others said, having received orders from Pompey, he had left his son in Syria with a few troops, and had marched with his legions towards Egypt.

After having, on his way, plundered Judæa, and sent prisoner to Rome its king Aristobulus, he crossed the desert, and arrived before Pelusium. A certain Archelaus, who was looked upon as a good general, and had served under Mithridates, was detained in Syria. Gabinius, informed that Queen Berenice wished to place him at the head of her army, and that she offered a large sum of money for his ransom, immediately set him at liberty, showing thereby as much avidity for riches as contempt for the Egyptians. He defeated them in several battles, slew Archelaus, and entered Alexandria, where he re-established Ptolemy on the throne, and the latter, it is said, gave him

(¹) Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, I. 7

10,000 talents. ⁽¹⁾ In this expedition, Mark Antony, who was soon to be Cæsar's quæstor, commanded the cavalry; he distinguished himself by his intrepidity and by his military talent. ⁽²⁾ This was the commencement of his fortune.

Gabinus, if we believe Dio Cassius, took good care not to send an account of his conduct, but it was not long in becoming known, and he was compelled to return to Rome, where serious accusations awaited him. Unfortunately for him, when the period of his trial came on, Pompey, his protector, was no longer consul.

Gabinus had to undergo in succession two accusations: he was acquitted of the first, on the double head of sacrilege and high treason, because he paid heavy bribes to his judges. ⁽³⁾ As to the second accusation, relating to acts of extortion, he experienced more difficulties. Pompey, who had been obliged to absent himself, in order to provide for the provision-

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XXXIX 56, 57, 58 — *Schol. Bob. Pro Plancio*, 271.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Antony*, 2

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius speaks of it as follows: "The influence of powerful men and of riches was so great, even against the decrees of the people and of the Senate, that Pompey wrote to Gabinus, governor of Syria, to charge him with the restoring of Ptolemy in Egypt, and that he, who had already taken the field, performed this task, in spite of the public will, and in contempt of the oracles of the Sibyl. Pompey only sought to do what would be agreeable to Ptolemy; but Gabinus had yielded to corruption. Afterwards, when brought under accusation for this fact, he was not condemned, thanks to Pompey and to his gold. There reigned then in Rome such a degree of moral disorder, that the magistrates and judges, who had received from Gabinus but a small part of the sums which had served to corrupt him, set their duties at nought in order to enrich themselves, and taught others to do evil, by showing them that they could easily escape punishment with money. It was this which caused Gabinus to be acquitted; in the sequel, brought to trial for having carried off from his province more than 100,000,000 drachmas, he was condemned" (Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 55)

ing with which he was charged, hastened to the gates of Rome, which his office of proconsul did not allow him to enter, convoked an assembly of the people outside the Pomœrium, employed all his authority, and even read letters from Cæsar, in favour of the accused. Still more, he begged Cicero to undertake his defence, and Cicero accepted the task, forgetting the invectives with which he had overwhelmed Gabinius before the Senate. All these efforts failed: it was necessary to yield to the rage of the public opinion, skilfully excited by the enemies of Gabinius; and the latter, condemned, went into exile, where he remained until Cæsar's dictatorship. (¹)

V. We are astonished to see personages such as Pompey and Cæsar protecting men who seem to have borne such bad character as Gabinius; but, to judge with impartiality the men of that period, we must not forget, in the first place, that there were very few without blemish, and, further, that the political parties never hesitated in throwing upon their adversaries the most odious calumnies. Gabinius, belonging to the popular faction, and the partisan of Pompey, had incurred the hatred of the aristocracy and of the farmers of the revenues. The nobles never pardoned him for being the author of the law which had entrusted to Pompey the command of the expedition against the pirates, and for having shown, during his proconsulship in Syria, want of deference in regard to the Senate. So that assembly refused, in 698*, to order thanksgivings for his

Corruption of the
Elections

(¹) DIO CASSIUS, XXXIX. 48

victories. ⁽¹⁾ The farmers of the revenues bore ill-will towards him on account of his decrees against usury, ⁽²⁾ and his solicitude for the interests of his province. ⁽³⁾ This proconsul, who is represented as an adventurer pillaging those under his administration, appears to have governed Judæa with justice, and to have restored with skill, on his return from Egypt, the order which had been disturbed during his absence. His military capacity cannot be called in doubt. In speaking of him, the historian Josephus closes with these words his account of the battle against the Nabathæi: "This great captain, after so many exploits, returned to Rome, and Crassus succeeded him in the government of Syria." ⁽⁴⁾ Nevertheless, it is very probable that Gabinius was not more scrupulous than the other proconsuls in matter of probity; for, if corruption then displayed itself with impudence in the provinces, it was perhaps still more shameless in Rome. The following is a striking example. Two candidates for the consulship, Domitius Calvinus and Memmius Gemellus, united their clients and resources of all kinds to obtain the first magistracy. In their desire to procure the support of Ahenobarbus and Claudius Pulcher, the consuls in office, they engaged by writing to secure for them, on their quitting office, the provinces they desired, and that by a double fraud: they promised first to bring three augurs to affirm the existence of a supposititious curiate law, and then to find two consulars who would declare that they had assisted at the regulation

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quint.*, II. 8.

⁽²⁾ See the *Index Legum* of Baister, 181.

⁽³⁾ Josephus, XIV 43.

⁽⁴⁾ Josephus, XIV 11

relative to the distribution of the provinces; in case of non-performance, there was stipulated, for the profit of the consuls, 400,000 sesterii. ⁽¹⁾ This shameless traffic and others of the same kind, in which were compromised Æmilius Scaurus and Valerius Messala, had caused the interest of money to be doubled. ⁽²⁾ The bargain would probably have been carried out, if, in consequence of a quarrel between the two consuls, Memmius had not denounced the convention in full Senate, and produced the contract. The scandal was enormous, but it remained unpunished as regarded the consuls.

Memmius, formerly Cæsar's enemy, had recently joined his party; nevertheless, the latter, incensed at his impudence, blamed his conduct, and abandoned him; Memmius was exiled. ⁽³⁾ As to Domitius, he was, it is true, accused of solicitation, and the Senate intended absolutely to close the consulship against him by deciding that the consular comitia should not be held until after judgment had been given on his trial.

All these facts bear witness to the decay of society, for the moral degradation of the individuals must infallibly bring with it the abasement of the institutions.

VI. Towards the month of August of the year 700,

Death of Cæsar's Daughter. Cæsar lost his mother Aurelia, and, a few days afterwards, his daughter Julia. The

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Ep. ad Atticum*, IV. 18

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Ep. ad Quintum*, IV. 15

⁽³⁾ *Schol. Bob. Pro Sexto*, 297. — Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 16; *Epist. Familiar.*, XIII. 19.

latter, whose health had been declining since the troubles of the preceding year, had become pregnant; she died in giving birth to a son, which did not survive. Cæsar was painfully affected by this misfortune, ⁽¹⁾ of which he received the news during his expedition to Britain. ⁽²⁾ Pompey was desirous of burying his wife in his estate of Alba; but the populace opposed it, carried the body to the Campus Martius, and insisted on its being buried there. By that rare privilege reserved to illustrious men, the people sought, according to Plutarch, to honour rather the daughter of Cæsar than the wife of Pompey. ⁽³⁾ This death broke one of the ties which united the two most important men of the Republic. To create new ties, Cæsar proposed his niece Octavia in marriage to Pompey, whose daughter he offered to espouse, although she was already married to Faustus Sylla. ⁽⁴⁾

VII. At the same period, the proconsul of Gaul was, with the produce of his booty, re-
Cæsar's Buildings at Rome building at Rome a magnificent edifice, the old basilica of the Forum, which was extended as far as to the Temple of Liberty. "It will be the most beautiful thing in the world," says Cicero; "there will be in the Campus Martius seven electoral enclo-

(1) "Cæsar has written to me from Britain a letter dated on the Calends of September (28th of August), which I received on the 4th of the Calends of October (23rd of September). His mourning has prevented my replying and congratulating him" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 1.)

(2) "In Cæsar's affliction, I dare not write to him, but I write to Balbus" (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, VII. 9)—"How kind and affecting is Cæsar's letter! There is in what he writes a charm which increases my sympathy for the misfortune which afflicts him." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 1.)

(3) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 4

(4) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 27.

tures and galleries of marble which will be surrounded with great porticoes of a thousand paces. Near it will be a public villa." Paulus was charged with the execution of the works; Cicero and Oppius considered that 60,000,000 sesterii was a small sum for such an undertaking. ⁽¹⁾ According to Pliny, the mere purchase of the site in the Forum cost Cæsar the sum of 100,000,000 sesterii. ⁽²⁾ This building, interrupted by events, was only finished after the African war. ⁽³⁾

VIII. While Cæsar was gaining, by these works destined for the public, the general admira-
His Relations with Cicero. tion, he neglected none of those attentions which were of a nature to ensure him the alliance of men of importance. Cicero, as we have seen, was already reconciled with him, and Cæsar had done all in his power to gain his attachment still further. He flattered his self-love, listened to all his recommendations, ⁽⁴⁾ treating with great friendship Quintus Cicero, whom he had made one of his lieutenants; he went so far as to place at the disposal of the great orator his credit and fortune, ⁽⁵⁾ and accordingly

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 17.—Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 36.

⁽²⁾ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, XXXVI. 15

⁽³⁾ Appian, *De Bel. Civil*, II. 102.

⁽⁴⁾ "Have you any other *protégé* to send me? I take charge of him." (Letter of Cæsar cited by Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, VII 5)—"I say not a word, I take not a step in Cæsar's interest, but he immediately testifies in high terms that he attaches to it a value which assures me of his affection." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*., VII 5)

⁽⁵⁾ "I dispose, as though they were my own, of his credit, which is preponderant, and of his resources, which, you know, are immense." (*Epist. Familiar*, I. 9.)—A few years later, when Cicero foresaw the civil war, he wrote to Atticus: "There is, however, an affair of which I shall not cease speaking as long as I write to you at Rome: it is Cæsar's credit. Free me, before leaving, I implore you." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V 6)

Cicero was in continual correspondence with him. He composed, as we have seen, poems in his honour, and he wrote to Quintus "that he placed above everything the friendship of such a man, whose affection he prized as much as that of his brother and children." ⁽¹⁾ Elsewhere he said: "The memorable and truly divine behaviour of Cæsar towards me and towards my brother has imposed upon me the duty of seconding him in all his designs." ⁽²⁾ And he had kept his word. It was at Cæsar's request that Cicero had consented to resume his old friendly relations with Crassus, ⁽³⁾ and to defend Gabinius and Rabirius. This last, compromised in the affairs of Egypt, was accused of having received great sums of money from King Ptolemy; but Cicero proved that he was poor, and reduced to live upon Cæsar's generosity, and, in the course of the trial, he expressed himself as follows:—

"Will you, judges, know the truth? If the generosity of C. Cæsar, extreme towards everybody, had not, in regard to Rabirius, passed all belief, we should have ceased long ago to see him in the Forum. Cæsar singly performs towards Postumus the duty of his numerous friends; and the services which these rendered to his prosperity, Cæsar lavishes them upon his adversity. Postumus is no longer more than the shadow of a Roman knight; if he preserves this title, it is by the protection, by the devotedness of a single friend. This phantom of his old rank, which Cæsar alone has preserved for him and assists him in sus-

⁽¹⁾ *Epist. ad Quintum*, II 15; III 1

⁽²⁾ *Epist. Familiar.*, I 9.

⁽³⁾ "I have undertaken his defense (that of Crassus) in the Senate, as high recommendations and my own engagement made it imperative for me." (*Epist. Familiar.*, I 9)

taining, is the only wealth that we can now take from him. And this is a reason why we ought the more to maintain him in it in his distress. It cannot be the effect of a mean merit, to inspire, absent and in misfortune, so much interest in such a man, who, in so lofty a fortune, does not disdain to cast down his looks on the affairs of others. In that pre-occupation with the great things which he is doing or has done, we should not be astonished if we saw him forget his friends, and, if he forgot them, he would easily obtain forgiveness.

“I have recognised in Cæsar very eminent and wonderful qualities; but his other virtues are, as on a vast theatre, exposed to the gaze of nations. To choose with skill the place for a camp, to marshal an army, to take fortresses, break through enemies’ lines, face the rigour of winter and those frosts which we support with difficulty in the bosom of our towns and houses, to pursue the enemy in that same season when the wild beasts hide in the depth of their retreats, and where everywhere the law of nations gives a truce to combats: these are great things; who denies it? but they have for their motive the most magnificent of recompenses, the hope of living for ever in men’s memory. Such efforts cause us no surprise in the man who aspires to immortality.

“But this is the glory which I admire in Cæsar, a glory which is neither celebrated by the verses of poets nor by the monuments of history, but which is weighed in the balance of the sage: a Roman knight, his old friend, attached, devoted, affectioned to his person, had been ruined, not by his excesses, not by shame-

ful extravagance and the losses brought on by indulgence of the passions, but by a speculation which had for its object to augment his patrimony: Cæsar has arrested him in his descent; he has not suffered him to fall, he has held out his hand to him, has sustained him with his wealth, with his credit, and he still sustains him at the present time; he holds back his friend on the edge of the precipice, and the calm of his mind is no more disturbed by the brightness of his own name, than his eyes are dazzled by the blaze of his glory. May the actions of which I have spoken be as great in our esteem as they are in reality! Let people think what they will of my opinion in this respect; but when I see, in the bosom of such a power and of such a prodigious fortune, this generosity towards others, this unforgetfulness of friendship, I prefer them to all the other virtues. And you, judges, far from this character of goodness, so new and so rare among considerable and illustrious men, being disdained or repulsed by you, you should wrap it up in your favour, and seek to encourage it; you should do this the more, since this moment seems to have been chosen for attacking Cæsar's consideration, although, in this respect, we could do nothing but he supports it with constancy or repairs it without difficulty. But if he hears that one of his best friends has been struck in his honour, it will be with the deepest pain, and to him an irreparable misfortune." (1)

In another circumstance, Cicero explained as follows the reason of his attachment for the conqueror

(1) Cicero, *Pro Rubrio Postumo*, 15, 16.

of Gaul: "Should I refuse my praises to Cæsar, when I know that the people, and, after its example, the Senate, from which my heart has never been severed, have shown their esteem for him by loud and multiplied testimonies? Then, without doubt, it must be confessed that the general interest has no influence on my sentiments, and that individuals alone are the objects of my hatred or of my friendship! What then? Should I see my vessel float with full sails towards a port which, without being the same which I preferred formerly, is neither less sure nor less tranquil, and, at the risk of my life, wrestle against the tempest rather than trust myself to the skill of the pilot who promises to save me? No, there is no inconstancy in following the movements which storms impress on the vessel of the state. For me, I have learned, I have recognized, I have read a truth, and the writers of our nation, as well as those of other peoples, have consecrated it in their works by the example of the wisest and most illustrious of men; it is, that we ought not to persist irrevocably in our opinions, but that we ought to accept the sentiments which are required by the situation of the state, the diversity of conjunctures, and the interests of peace." (*)

In his *Oration against Piso*, he exclaims: "It would be impossible for me, in contemplation of the great things which Cæsar has done, and which he is doing every day, not to be his friend. Since he has the command of your armies, it is no longer the rampart of the Alps which I seek to oppose to the invasion of the Gauls; it is no longer by means of the barrier

(*) Cicero, *Pro Ch. Plancio*, 39. (A.U.C 700.)

of the Rhine, with all its gorges, that I seek to arrest the fierce Germanic nations. Cæsar has done so much that, if the mountains should be levelled, and the rivers dried, our Italy, deprived of her natural fortifications, would find, in the result of his victories and exploits, a safe defence." (¹)

The warm expansion of such sentiments must have touched Cæsar, and inspired him with confidence; therefore he earnestly engaged Cicero not to quit Rome. (²)

The influence of Cæsar continued to increase, as the letters and orations of Cicero sufficiently testify. If it was required to raise citizens such as C. Messius, M. Orfius, M. Curtius, C. Trebatius, (³) to elevated positions, or to excite the interest of the judges in favour of an accused, as in the trials of Balbus, Rabirius, and Gabinius, it was always the same support which was invoked. (⁴)

(¹) Cicero, *Orat. in L. Calpurnium Pisonem*, 33. (A.U.C. 700)

(²) Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 1

(³) Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 15, *Epist. Familiar.*, VII. 5, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 15

(⁴) "Pompey is all for Gutta, and he is confident of obtaining from Cæsar an active intervention." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III. 8.)

CHAPTER VI.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 701.

Expedition to the North of Gaul. Second Passage of the Rhine. I. THE disturbed state of Gaul and the loss of fifteen cohorts at Tongres obliged Cæsar to augment his army; he raised two legions in the Cisalpine, and asked for a third from Pompey. Again at the head of ten legions, Cæsar, with his usual activity, hastened to repress the incipient insurrections. From the Scheldt to the Rhine, from the Seine to the Loire, most of the peoples were in arms. Those of Trèves had called the Suevi to their assistance.

Without waiting for the end of winter, Cæsar brought together four legions at Amiens, and, falling unexpectedly upon the peoples of Hainault, forced from them a speedy submission. Then he convoked in this latter town the general assembly of Gaul; but the peoples of Sens, Orleans, and Trèves did not repair to it. He then transferred the assembly to Paris, and afterwards marched upon Sens, where his appearance sufficed to pacify not only that country, but also that of Orleans. Having thus appeased in a short time the troubles of the north and centre of Gaul, he directed all his attention towards the countries situated between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix continued to excite revolt. He was impatient to avenge upon him the defeat of Sabinus; but,

to make more sure of overtaking him, he resolved first to make two expeditions, one into Brabant, the other into the country of Trèves, and in this manner to cut off that chieftain from all retreat, either on the side of the north, or on the side of the east, where the Germans were.

He advanced in person towards Brabant, which he soon reduced to obedience. During this time, Labienus gained, on the banks of the Ourthe, a great victory over the inhabitants of the country of Trèves. At the news of this defeat, the Germans, who had already crossed the Rhine, returned home. Cæsar rejoined Labienus on the territory of Trèves, and, determined to chastise the Suevi, he a second time crossed the Rhine, near Bonn, a little above the place where he had built a bridge two years before. After compelling the Suevi to take refuge in the interior of their territory, he returned to Gaul, caused a part of the bridge to be cut, and left a strong garrison on the left bank.

II. Having thus rendered all retreat impossible to Ambiorix, he advanced with his army
Pursuit of Ambiorix. towards the country of Liége by way of Zulpich and Eupen, across the forest of the Ardennes. Having arrived on the Meuse, he divided his troops into three corps, and sent all his baggage with the 14th legion, under the command of Cicero, into the fortress of Tongres, the scene of the disaster of Sabinus. Of these three corps, the first was sent towards the north, near the southern frontiers of Brabant; the second towards the west, between the Meuse and the

Demer; and the third marched towards the Scheldt, under the command of Cæsar, whose intention was to gain the extremity of the forest of the Ardennes between Brussels and Antwerp, where Ambiorix was said to have taken refuge. When he quitted Tongres, he announced that he should return in seven days. But, unwilling to risk his troops on difficult ground, against men who, scattered, carried on a war of partisans, he sent messengers to invite the neighbouring peoples to go and ravage the country of Liége, and, at his call, all hurried to take part in the pillage. Among them 2,000 Sicambrian cavalry, attracted from beyond the Rhine, conceived the idea of falling upon Cicero's camp in order to carry off the riches it contained. They arrived at the moment when a part of the garrison had gone to forage. It was with great difficulty, and with the loss of two cohorts, that the Romans repulsed this attack. The devastation of the country of Liége was completed, but Ambiorix escaped.

The defeat of Sabinus at Tongres thus cruelly avenged, Cæsar returned to Rheims, convoked there the assembly of Gaul, and caused judgment to be passed on the conspiracy of the peoples of Sens and Orleans. Acco, the head of the revolt, was condemned to death and executed, and Cæsar, after placing his legions in winter quarters in the countries watered by the Moselle, the Marne, and the Yonne, repaired to Italy.

III. At Rome, the legal working of the institutions was incessantly clogged by the ambitions of individ-

C. Domitius Cal-
 nus and M. Valerius
 Messala, Consuls.

uals. The year 700 had closed without the holding of the consular comitia. Sometimes the tribunes of the people, the only magistrates whose elections took place on a fixed day, opposed the holding of the comitia; sometimes the *interreges* themselves failed to obtain favourable auspices, or, in moments of trouble, dared not assemble the people.⁽¹⁾ The boldness of the agitators of all parties explains this anarchy.

Wearied of intrigues and disorder, the public opinion looked for the end of it only from a new power, which wrests from Cicero this painful confession: "The Republic is without force; Pompey alone is powerful."⁽²⁾ Already people even spoke of the dictatorship.⁽³⁾ Several men, according to Plutarch, ventured to say openly "that the power of a single person was the only remedy for the evils of the Republic, and that this remedy must be sought from the mildest physician, which clearly indicated Pompey."⁽⁴⁾ Accordingly, the tribune Luceius brought forward the formal motion to elect Pompey dictator. Cato rose energetically against this ill-timed motion. Several of Pompey's friends considered it prudent to justify him by affirming that he never asked or desired the dictatorship. Cato's reproaches had none the less produced their effect; and, to put an end to suspicions, Pompey permitted the consular comitia to be held.⁽⁵⁾ In fact, he had never the courage equal to his ambition, and "although he affected in his speeches," says

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XL 45

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III 4.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, III 8.

⁽⁴⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 31.

⁽⁵⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 57

Plutarch, "to refuse absolute power, all his actions showed a desire to arrive at it." (¹)

The comitia opened in the month of Sextilis of the year 701; the consuls named were Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala. The first had been placed under accusation, as we have seen above; but the pre-occupations of the moment had caused his trial to drag out in length; and it is unknown whether he was acquitted, or whether all judicial action had been paralysed on account of the absence of magistrates during the first months of the year 701. Moreover, Calvinus was protected by Pompey, and his colleague, Messala, was favoured by Cæsar, at the recommendation of Cicero.

IV. Crassus had left for Syria about eighteen months before, full of ambitious hopes, and flattering himself with the prospect of immense conquests. He intended not only to subjugate the Parthians, but even to renew the campaigns of Alexander, penetrate into Bactriana, and reach India; unfortunately, he was not equal to such a task. Forgetting the first rules of a general-in-chief, which consist in never despising his enemies, and in placing on his side all the chances of success, he had no care for the army he was going to combat, had made no inquiries either as to the roads, or as to the countries he had to cross, and neglected the alliances and succours which the peoples who were neighbours and enemies to the Parthians might have offered him.

Expedition of Crassus against the Parthians, and his Death.

(¹) Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 31.

He had started from Brundusium in spite of the bad season, had landed at Dyrrachium, not without the loss of several vessels; thence, following the direct military road which led from the coasts of the Adriatic to the Bosphorus, (¹) he had proceeded by land into Galatia, and had entered into Mesopotamia, after crossing the Euphrates. (²)

The Parthians, taken by surprise, offered no resistance, and the rich and flourishing Greek colonies on the Euphrates and Tigris, who detested the Parthian yoke, received Crassus as a liberator. The town of Nicephorium (*Rakkah*), situated near Ichnæ, on the Balissus, opened its gates to him; Zenodotium alone stood a siege. Instead of taking advantage of the concurrence of circumstances, and advancing promptly upon the Tigris, carrying the considerable town of Seleucia, Ctesiphon, (³) the ordinary residence of the King of the Parthians, and even Babylon, he confined himself to plundering the province. Having left 7,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry in garrison in a few fortresses, he returned to Syria to take his winter quarters. There, without occupying himself with the next campaign, he only thought of committing exactions and of pillaging the temples of Hierapolis and Jerusalem.

At the commencement of 701, Crassus took the field again with seven legions, nearly 4,000 cavalry, and the same number of light-armed infantry, (⁴) and re-enter-

(¹) "Ut via illa nostra, quæ per Macedoniam est usque ad Hellespontum militaris" (Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 2.—Strabo, VII. vii. 268.)

(²) Plutarch, *Crassus*, 17.

(³) On the left bank of the Tigris, opposite Seleucia.

(⁴) Plutarch, *Crassus*, 24.

ed Mesopotamia. He had for lieutenants his son Publius, celebrated for his courage, his elevated sentiments, and his conduct in Gaul; the brave Octavius, who afterwards perished rather than abandon his general; Vargunteius, Censorinus, and Petronius: for quæstor, C. Cassius Longinus, esteemed for his valour and prudence, and who was, ten years afterwards, one of the murderers of Cæsar. An Arab had become his auxiliary; it was the chief of the Osroenes, Bedouins of the desert, who had formerly served Pompey in his campaign against Mithridates; he was named Abgaros, or Abgar, ⁽¹⁾ and had been bribed by the King of the Parthians to betray Crassus.

Artabazus, King of Armenia, visited the proconsul at the head of 6,000 cavalry, promising him 10,000 more, and 30,000 foot, if he consented to attack the Parthians through Armenia, where the mountainous character of the country rendered their numerous and formidable cavalry useless. Crassus rejected this proposal, alleging the necessity of proceeding into Mesopotamia to the garrisons he had left there in the preceding year. These, in fact, were already blockaded by the Parthians, and soldiers who had escaped brought information of the immense preparations Orodes was making to resist him. A second time, then, he crossed the Euphrates, not far from Biradjik, the place of the passage of Alexander the Great. ⁽²⁾ There he had his choice of two roads to reach Seleucia: either to descend the left bank of the Euphrates to the point

⁽¹⁾ The ancient authors name him Augar, Abgaros, or Allamnes.

⁽²⁾ Zeugma, according to Dio Cassius. This town is on the right bank of the Euphrates, opposite Buadjik.

where it approaches the Tigris, ⁽¹⁾ or to cross the desert. The first, proposed by Cassius, although the longest, procured him the immense advantage of having his right wing constantly supported by the Euphrates, on which boats could have carried his provisions. The second offered, it is true, a shorter passage; but in following it, the army was exposed to want of water and provisions, and to more laborious marches. The perfidious counsels of Abgar led him to prefer the latter. "There was not," said the Arab, "a moment to lose, to prevent the Parthians from carrying away their treasures, and placing them in safety among the Hyrcanians and Scythians." Crassus possessed some of the qualities which make a good general; he had given proofs of it in the war of the allies, as well as in that against Spartacus, but his faculties were paralysed by his covetousness. Glory ought to be the only thought of the soldier.

During this time, Orodes, King of the Parthians, had divided his forces into two armies: one, of which he took the command in person, went to ravage Armenia, in order to prevent Artabazus from joining the Romans; the other was entrusted to the vizier Surena, a man of merit, to whom Orodes owed his crown. Without undervaluing his intelligence, we are unwilling to believe, with some writers, that Surena invented new military tactics to oppose those of the Romans, and that that was the reason why, renouncing the employment of infantry, he made use

⁽¹⁾ According to Drumann, the course of the river could not always be followed, as Plutarch says, because there existed a canal which joined the Euphrates with the Tigris (Pliny, VI. 30.—Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIV. 2.)

only of cavalry. If he placed all his confidence in that arm, it was because the Parthians, in conformity with the nature of their country, generally fought only on horseback, and among them, as Dio Cassius says, infantry was of no value. (¹) Surena's talent consisted in the employment of the craft so familiar to the Asiatics, in order to surround Crassus with snares and traitors, and to draw him into the plains, where the advantage was all on the side of cavalry.

The army of the Parthians was thus composed solely of cavalry, some barbed with iron, as well as their horses, (²) and armed with long and heavy lances; others furnished with powerful bows and arrows, which, while they carried much farther than those of the Romans, perforated defensive armour.

After quitting the town of Carrhæ, the Roman army advanced towards the south, across the desert. The sand and heat made the march painful, while the enemy remained always invisible. At length, when they arrived on the banks of a small river, the Balissus (*Belick*), which flows into the Euphrates, they perceived a few Parthian horsemen. Abgar, sent against them with a vanguard to reconnoitre, did not return. The traitor had betrayed Crassus to Surena. The proconsul, impatient and uneasy, then crosses the Balissus with his whole army, and, without allowing it

(¹) "There are among them few infantry. These are only chosen among the weakest men. From the tenderest age the Parthians are accustomed to handle the bow and the horse. Their country, which forms almost entirely one plain, is very favourable for breeding horses, and for courses of cavalry." (Dio Cassius, XL. 15.)—"Equis omni tempore vectantur; illis bella, illis convivia, illis publica ac privata officia obeunt" (Justin, XLI. 3)

(²) "Munimentum ipsis equisque lorice plumatæ sunt, quæ utrumque toto corpore tegunt." (Justin, XLI. 2.)

to repose, pushes forward his cavalry, and obliges the infantry to follow it.

A few soldiers soon arrive to inform Crassus that they are all who have been able to escape from an ambuscade into which his vanguard has fallen, and that the whole Parthian army is on its march to encounter him. At this intelligence, he, who believed that the enemy would not dare to wait him, becomes confused, and hastily forms his troops in array of battle on a long front, for fear of being surrounded. The cavalry is on the wings; the Osroenes form a last line. The Parthians first throw forward their light cavalry, which makes whirls in the plain, raising clouds of dust, and causing the air to ring with their savage cries and the noise of their drums, ⁽¹⁾ and then retire as if in flight. ⁽²⁾ Crassus sends forward against them his light infantry; but, surrounded and overwhelmed with the more powerful missiles of the Parthians, it is obliged to take refuge behind the legions.

On a sudden, the Osroenes whom Abgar had not carried with him attack the Romans in the rear, ⁽³⁾ and at the same time appear, glittering in the sun, the long lines of the cuirassed horsemen. Crassus then forms his army in a square. Each face is composed of twelve cohorts, and the rest is in reserve. The cavalry and light infantry, divided into two

⁽¹⁾ "Signum in prælio non tuba, sed tympano datur." (Justin, *XLI* 2)

⁽²⁾ "Fidentemque fuga Parthum veisisque sagittis." (Virgil, *Georg*, III., line 31)

⁽³⁾ "The Osroenes, placed behind the Romans, who had their backs turned to them, struck them where their unprotected limbs were exposed, and rendered more easy their destruction by the Parthians." (Dio Cassius, *XL* 22.)

corps, flank two opposite sides of the square. ⁽¹⁾ Publius and Cassius command, one the right, the other the left. Crassus takes his place in the centre. ⁽²⁾ The heavy cavalry, lance in rest, charge the great Roman square, and attempt to break it; but the thick and close ranks of the legions oppose an invincible resistance. The Parthians fall back a certain distance and call up their numerous archers, then, all together, they return in line, and throw upon the deep masses of the Romans a shower of missiles of which none fail of their aim. The legionaries, if they remain in their position, have the disadvantage of their *pila* and slings, which carry but a short distance, and, if they advance to use their swords, they lose that cohesion which forms their strength. Without moving, and defending themselves with difficulty, they see their numbers diminish without being discouraged; they hope that the enemy will soon have exhausted his munitions. But the ranks of the Parthians succeed each other; as quickly as the first have used all their arrows, they go to fetch others near a long line of camels which carry their provisions. The combat has lasted several hours, and the Parthians continue to extend their circle, and threaten to surround entirely the great Roman square.

In this critical position, Crassus can only have recourse to his cavalry. The side hardest pressed by

⁽¹⁾ The army was composed of seven legions, but some troops had been left at Carrhæ. The square was composed of forty-eight cohorts, or nearly five legions; the rest was probably in reserve in the square. The 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 light infantry were probably divided half to the right and half to the left of the great square, the sides of which must have been about 1,000 mètres long.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Crassus*, 28.

the enemy is that commanded by Publius; his father orders him to make a desperate effort to disengage the army.

This noble and intrepid young man immediately takes 1,300 cavalry, among whom were the 1,000 Gauls sent by Cæsar, 500 archers, and eight cohorts of infantry. Two young men of his own age follow him—Censorinus and Megabacchus; the first a senator and talented orator, the second equally distinguished. As soon as they are in motion, the Parthians, according to their custom, fly, shooting their arrows at the same time, in the manner of the Scythians. Publius takes this flight for a rout, and allows himself to be drawn too far away. When he has long advanced far out of sight of the body of the army, the fugitives halt, wheel round, are joined by numerous reserves, and surround the Roman troop. These defend themselves heroically, but the Gauls, unprovided with defensive armour, resist with difficulty the cavalry barbed with iron. Meanwhile the son of Crassus has been rejoined by his foot, who combat valiantly; he orders them to advance, but they show him their hands nailed to their bucklers, and their feet fixed to the ground, by the arrows. Publius then makes a last appeal to his brave Gaulish cavalry, who, in their devotedness to him, meet death far from their country, in the service of a foreign cause. They dash with impetuosity against the wall of iron which rises before them, they overthrow some of the cavalry under the weight of their own armour, snatch their lances from others, or leap to the ground to stab their horses in the belly; but valour must

yield to numbers. Publius, wounded, tries to retreat, and draws up the wreck of his troops on ground the slope of which is disadvantageous to him. He attempts in vain to make a retrenchment with bucklers; his cavalry being placed in form of an amphitheatre, the last ranks are as much exposed as the first to the arrows of the Parthians. Two Greeks offer to save him by leading him to Ichnæ, a town not far off; the young hero replies that he will not abandon his soldiers; he remains to die with them. Of 6,000 men, 500 only are made prisoners, the others are killed fighting. Publius and his two friends, Censorinus and Megabacchus, slay each other.

During this time, Crassus, relieved by his son's offensive movement, had taken position on a height, and waited in expectation of his victorious return. But soon messengers come to inform him that, without prompt succour, his son is lost. He hesitates a moment between the hope of saving him and the fear of endangering the rest of his army. At last he decides on marching. Hardly has he put the troops in motion, when he sees the Parthians approaching to meet him, uttering shouts of victory, and carrying the head of his son on the end of a pike. In this circumstance, Crassus recovers an instant that energy familiar to the Roman character, and, passing along the ranks, "Soldiers," he exclaims, "this loss concerns me alone. As long as you live, all the fortune and all the glory of Rome endure and remain invincible. Be not discouraged by my misfortune, and let your compassion for me be changed into rage against your enemies." These last accents of a presumptuous chief produced

little effect upon an army already disheartened. It fought with resignation, no longer feeling that ardour which gives the hope of victory. Taken in flank by the numerous archers, attacked in front by the heavy cuirassed cavalry, the Romans struggled till evening, remaining always on the defensive, and seeing the circle in which they were enclosed incessantly contracting around them. Fortunately, the Parthians, incapable of holding a position during the night, never encamped on the field of battle; they withdrew.

This combat, fought at fifteen or twenty leagues to the south of Carrhæ, was disastrous. Nevertheless, all was not lost, if the general-in-chief preserved his energy and presence of mind; but, disheartened and plunged in deep grief, he stood immovable, aside from the rest, incapable of giving any order. Octavius and Cassius called together the tribunes and centurions, and decided on retreat; yet it was necessary to abandon 4,000 wounded, who could not be carried away, and even conceal their departure from them, lest their cries might awaken the attention of the enemy. The retreat is executed at first in complete silence; suddenly the miserable victims perceive that they are made a sacrifice, their groans give warning to the Persians, and excite a frightful tumult among the Romans: some return to load the wounded on the baggage horses, others form in battle to repulse the enemy: 300 of the cavalry escape, reach Carrhæ, and cross the Euphrates over the bridge which Crassus had built. Meanwhile the Parthians, occupied in massacring the 4,000 wounded and the stragglers, pursue only faintly the remains of the Roman army,

which, protected by a sally of the garrison of Carrhæ, succeed in shutting themselves up within its walls.

Either through discouragement, or through want of provisions, the Romans made no stay in this town, but abandoned it, to seek refuge in Armenia. Crassus, followed by a small number of troops, trusting again in a native who was deceiving him, saw his flight retarded by the circuitous way he was made to take uselessly. At daybreak the Parthians appeared. Octavius had reached, with 5,000 men, one of the spurs of the mountains of Armenia, and would have been able to place himself in safety in the fortress of Sinnaka, at a distance of only a day's march; he prefers descending into the plain to the succour of his general, whom he brings back with him to the heights. If they continue the combat till evening, all will not be lost; but Surena has again recourse to stratagem: he sends seductive offers, and proposes an interview. Crassus refuses it; he is resolved on fighting. Unfortunately, the soldiers, who hitherto had obeyed imprudent orders, this time refuse to obey the only order which could save them. Crassus is forced to agree to the interview. At the moment he is on his way to it, an accidental quarrel, or rather one raised by the treachery of the Parthians, arises between the escorts of the two nations. Octavius thrusts his sword through the body of a Parthian esquire; a battle follows, and all the Roman escort is massacred. Crassus is slain, and his head carried to Orodes. Of 40,000 legionaries, one quarter alone survived. The cavalry of C. Cassius, which had separated from the army on their departure from Carrhæ, and a few oth-

er fugitives, succeeded in reaching Syria, in covering Antioch, and even subsequently in expelling successfully the Parthians from the Roman province.

V. The death of Crassus had two serious consequences: the first was to raise still higher the merit of the conqueror of Gaul, by showing what became of the most numerous and best-disciplined armies under the command of a presumptuous and unskilful chief; the second, to take away from the scene a man whose influence was a check upon the ambition of two individuals destined to become rivals. With Crassus, Pompey would not have been the instrument of a party; without Pompey, the Senate would not have dared to declare against Cæsar.

The balance thus broken, Pompey sought a new point of support. His alliance with Cæsar had alone given him the concurrence of the popular party. Now that this alliance was weakened, he would naturally seek to be reconciled to the aristocracy, flatter its passions, and serve its rancours. In the first moments, he provoked disorder rather than repressed it.

Three competitors disputed the consulship for 702, T. Annius Milo, P. Plautius Hypsæus, and Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio. ⁽¹⁾ They rivalled each other in intrigue and corruption. ⁽²⁾ Pompey, especially since he had been reconciled to P. Clodius, treated Milo as an enemy, and, according to his habitual tactics, pretended to believe that he harboured designs against

⁽¹⁾ Q Cæcilius Metellus Scipio was the son of P Cornelius Scipio Nasica, and of Licinia, daughter of Crassus. He had been adopted by Q Cæcilius Metellus Pius.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Cato*, 55.

his life. Although he retarded the comitia, he favoured P. Hypsæus and Q. Scipio, who solicited the consulship, and Clodius, who, the same year, was a candidate for the prætorship. Milo had a great number of partisans; his largesses to the people and his spectacles seemed likely to ensure his election; and Pompey, in the way of whose views he stood, did all he could to prevent the Senate from naming an interrex to hold the comitia. He desired this important office for himself; but, obliged to give way before the resistance of Cato, he confined himself to preventing any election, and the year ended again without the nomination of consuls.

CHAPTER VII.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 702.

I. ROME seemed to be given up only to the petty contentions of individuals; but, behind the men who stood in view, grave interests and violent passions were in agitation. The disease which undermines society unknown to it, reveals itself when facts, of no great importance in themselves, occur suddenly to produce an unforeseen crisis, to unveil dangers which were unperceived, and to show to all men that society on the brink of an abyss of which nobody had suspected the depth. Thus, by mere accidents of his life, Clodius seems to have been destined to cause the explosion of the elements of disorder which the Republic concealed in its bosom. He is caught in the house of Cæsar's wife during a religious sacrifice, and this violation of the mysteries of the *Bona Dea* leads to a fatal division in the first bodies of the state. His impeachment irritates the popular party; his acquittal exposes to the world the venality of the judges, and separates the order of the knights from that of the Senate. The animosity with which he is pursued makes him a chief of a formidable party, which sends Cicero into exile, makes Pompey tremble, and accelerates the elevation of Cæsar. His death is destined to awaken all the popular passions, and inspire the opposite faction with so many fears,

that it will forget its rancours and jealousies to throw itself into the arms of Pompey, and all the people will be in arms from one end of Italy to the other.

On the 13th of the Calends of February, 702 (13th of December, 701), Milo started from Rome to proceed to Lanuvium, his native town, of which he was the dictator.⁽¹⁾ Towards the ninth hour, he met on the Appian Way, a little beyond Bovillæ, Clodius, who, on his part, was returning on horseback from Aricia to Rome, accompanied by three friends and thirty slaves, all armed with swords. Milo was in a chariot with his wife Fausta, daughter of Sylla, and M. Fufius, his familiar. In his train marched an escort ten times more numerous than that of Clodius, and in which were several celebrated gladiators. The two troops passed near a small temple of the *Bona Dea*,⁽²⁾ without exchanging a single word, but casting on each other furious looks. They had hardly passed, when two of Milo's gladiators, who lagged behind, picked a quarrel with the slaves of Clodius. At the noise of this dispute, the latter turned his bridle, and advanced uttering threats. One of the gladiators, named Birria, struck him with his sword, and wounded him grievously in the shoulder;⁽³⁾ he was carried into a neighbouring tavern.⁽⁴⁾

(1) All that follows is taken almost entirely from Asconius, the most ancient commentator on Cicero, and is derived, it is believed, from the *Acta Diurna*. (See the *Argument of the Oration of Cicero for Milo*, edit. Orelli, p. 31.)

(2) Nine years after the sacrilege committed on the day of the festival of the Bona Dea, Clodius was slain by Milo before the gate of the temple of the Bona Dea, near Bovillæ (Cicero, *Orat. pro Milone*, 31.)

(3) *Romphæa*. (Asconius, *Argument of the Orat. of Cicero pro Milone*, p. 32, edit. Orelli.)

(4) Cicero, *Orat. pro Milone*, 10.—Dio Cassius, XL. 48.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 21 —Asconius, *Argument of the Oration of Cicero pro Milone*, p. 31, et seq.)

Milo, learning that Clodius was wounded, feared the consequences of this aggression, and believed that he would incur less danger by dispatching his enemy. He therefore sent his men to burst open the tavern; Clodius, dragged from the bed on which he had been placed, is pierced with blows, and thrown into the high road. His slaves are slain or put to flight. The corpse remained stretched on the Appian Way, until a senator, Sext. Tediū, who was passing, caused him to be taken up, placed in a litter, and carried to Rome, where he arrived at night, and was laid on a bed in the *atrium* of his house. But already the news of the fatal meeting was spread through the whole town, and the crowd hastened towards the residence of Clodius, where his wife, Fulvia, pointing to the wounds with which he was covered, urged the people to vengeance. The concourse was so great that several men of mark, and among others C. Vibienus, a senator, were stifled in the crowd. The corpse was carried to the Forum, and exposed on the rostra; two tribunes of the people, T. Munatius Plancus and Q. Pompeius Rufus, harangued the multitude, and demanded justice.

Afterwards, at the instigation of a scribe named Sext. Clodius, the body was carried to the curia, in order to insult the Senate; a funereal pile was made of the benches, tables, and registers. The fire communicated to the Curia Hostilia, and thence gained the Basilica Porcia, and the two buildings were reduced to ashes. Then the multitude, becoming more and more furious, snatched the fasces which surrounded the funereal bed, ⁽¹⁾ and proceeded to the front of

(1) *Lectus hūtinæ*. (Asconius, p. 34.)—The sense of this word is given by

the houses of Hypsæus and Q. Metellus Scipio, as if to offer them the consulship. Lastly, they presented themselves before the abode of Pompey; some demanded with loud shouts that he should be consul or dictator, others shouted the same wishes for Cæsar. ⁽¹⁾

Nevertheless, nine days after, when the smoke was still rising from the ruins, the populace, on the occasion of a funereal banquet in the Forum, sought to burn the house of Milo and that of the interrex, M. Lepidus. They were driven away by a shower of arrows. ⁽²⁾ Milo, in the first moment, had dreamt only of hiding himself; but on hearing the indignation and terror caused by the burning of the curia, he resumed his courage. Persuaded, moreover, that, to repress these excesses, the Senate would proceed to severities against the opposite party, ⁽³⁾ he returned into Rome by night, carried his boldness so far as to announce that he still solicited the consulship, and began actually to buy the votes. Coelius, a tribune of the people, spoke in his favour in the Forum. Milo himself mounted the tribune, and accused Clodius of having laid an ambush for him. He was interrupted by a considerable number of armed men, who rushed into the public place. Milo and Coelius wrapped themselves in the mantles of slaves, and took flight. A great slaughter of their adherents was made. But soon the rioters, profiting by this pretext for disorder,

Acro, a scholiast on Horace (see *Scholia Horatiana*, edit. Pauly, tom. I., p. 360) It corresponds with our word *corbillard*, a hearse. We know the custom of the Romans of carrying at interments the images of the ancestors of the dead with the ensigns of their dignities. The fasces must have been numerous in the Clodian family.

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 50.

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 49.

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 49.

murdered all they met, whether citizens or strangers, especially such as attracted their attention by their rich garments and gold rings; armed slaves were the chief instruments of these disorders. No crime was spared; under pretence of seeking Milo's friends, a great number of houses were pillaged, and during several days all sorts of outrages were committed. ⁽¹⁾

II. Meanwhile the Senate declared the Republic in danger, and charged the interrex, the tribunes of the people, and the proconsul Cn. Pompey, having the *imperium* near the town, to watch over the public safety, and make levies in all Italy. The care of rebuilding the Curia Hostilia was entrusted to the son of Sylla: it was decided that it should bear the name of the old dictator, the memory of whom the Senate sought to place in honour. ⁽²⁾

As soon as Pompey had assembled a military force sufficiently imposing, the two nephews of Clodius, both named Appius, demanded the arrest of the slaves of Milo, and of those of Fausta, his wife. But the first care of Milo, his enemy once dead, had been to enfranchise his slaves, as a reward for having defended him, and, once enfranchised, they could no longer depose against their patron.

About a month after the death of Clodius, Q. Metellus Scipio brought the affair before the Senate, and accused Milo of falsehood in the explanations he had given. He arrayed skilfully all the circumstances which pointed to him as the aggressor: on one side, his escort much more numerous—the three wounds

⁽¹⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 22.

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XL 50.

of Clodius—the eleven slaves of the latter slain; on the other, certain criminal facts connected with the event—a taverner slaughtered—two messengers massacred—a slave chopped to pieces for refusing to give up a son of Clodius; lastly, the sum of 1,000 ases offered by the accused to whoever would undertake his defence. Then Milo sought to appease Pompey, by offering to desist from his candidature for the consulship. Pompey replied that the right of deciding belonged to the Roman people alone. Milo remained under the accusation not only of murder, but of electoral solicitation, and of an outrage on the Republic. He could not be judged before the previous nomination of the urban prætor, and before the convocation of the comitia.

III. This time the fear of disorder silenced opposition, and all eyes turned towards Pompey; but what title to give him? That of dictator caused alarm. M. Bibulus, though previously hostile, moved the proposal to elect him sole consul; it offered the only means of averting the dictatorship, and preventing Cæsar from becoming his colleague. ⁽¹⁾ M. Cato supported this motion, which passed unanimously. ⁽²⁾ It was added that, if Pompey believed a second consul necessary, he should name himself, but not within two months. ⁽³⁾ On

⁽¹⁾ "The Senate and Bibulus, who was first to state his opinion, forestalled the thoughtless resolutions of the multitude by conferring the consulship on Pompey, in order that he might not be proclaimed dictator; and in conferring it upon him alone, in order that he might not have Cæsar for his colleague." (Dio Cassius, XL. 2.)

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Cato*, 47.

⁽³⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 57.

the 5th of the Calends of March (27th of February)—it was during an intercalary month—Pompey, though absent, was declared consul by the interrex Serv. Sulpicius, and immediately re-entered Rome. “This extraordinary measure, which had never before been adopted for anybody, appeared wise; nevertheless, as Pompey sought less than Cæsar the favour of the people, the Senate flattered itself with the hope of detaching him completely from it, and securing him in its own interests. And so it happened. Proud of this new and altogether unusual honour, Pompey no longer proposed any measure with a view of pleasing the multitude, and did scrupulously all that could be agreeable to the Senate.” (¹)

Three days after his installation, he obtained two *senatus-consultus* — one, to repress outrages with violence, especially the murder committed on the Appian Way, the burning of the curia, and the attack on the house of the interrex, M. Lepidus; the other, to prevent electoral solicitation by a more rapid proceeding and a more severe penalty. In all criminal actions, a delay of three days was fixed for the interrogation of witnesses, and one day for the contradictory debates. The accuser had two hours to speak, the accused three to defend himself. (²)

M. Cœlius, tribune of the people, protested against these laws, alleging that they violated the tutelary forms of justice, and that they were only imagined for the ruin of Milo. Pompey replied in a tone of men-

(¹) Dio Cassius, XL. 50.

(²) Dio Cassius, XL. 52.—Cicero, *Brutus*, 94; *Epist. ad Atticum*, XIII 49 — Tacitus, *Dialog. de Oratoribus*, 38.

ace: "Let them not oblige me to defend the Republic by arms!" He, moreover, adopted all measures for his personal safety, and went with a military guard, as though he feared some outrage on the part of Milo.

IV. Pompey required further, that a quæstor should be chosen among the consulars to preside over the hearing of the cause. The comitia were held, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was elected. It was conceded to Milo that the accusation of murder should be tried first, and that that of solicitation should be adjourned.

The accusers were the elder of the Appii (the nephew of Clodius), M. Antonius, and P. Valerius Nepos. Cicero, assisted by M. Claudius Marcellus, was to defend the accused. Every effort had been made to intimidate Cicero. Pompeius Rufus, C. Sallustius, ⁽¹⁾ and T. Munatius Plancus had sought to excite the people against him, and to make Pompey look upon him with suspicion. Although he remained firm against the threats of his adversaries, his courage was shaken.

The trial began on the eve of the Nones of April, and on the first day the pleadings were interrupted by a violent agitation. Next day, the interrogation of the witnesses was carried on under the protection of an imposing military force. Most of the evidence was overpowering for the accused, and proved that

⁽¹⁾ This was the historian. He had been the paramour of Milo's wife. Surprised by him in the very act, he had been cruelly beaten, and compelled to pay, without pity.

Clodius had been massacred in cold blood. When Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, appeared, the emotion increased twofold; her tears, and the spectacle of her grief, affected the assembly. When the session was closed, the tribune of the people, T. Munatius Plancus, harangued the mob, engaged the citizens to come next day in great number to the public place, in order to oppose the acquittal of Milo, and he recommended them to show unmistakably *their opinion and grief to the judges when it came to the voting.*

On the 6th of the Ides of April the shops were closed; guards were placed on the issues of the Forum by order of Pompey, who, with a considerable reserve, stationed himself at the treasury. After the drawing for the judges, the eldest of the Appii, M. Antonius, and P. Valerius Nepos sustained the accusation. Cicero alone replied. He had been advised to represent the murder of Clodius as a service rendered to the Republic; but he rejected this plea, although Cato had dared to declare in full Senate that Milo had performed the act of a good citizen.⁽¹⁾ He preferred resting his argument on the right of legitimate defence. He had hardly commenced, when the cries and interruptions of the partisans of Clodius caused him an emotion which was visible in his speech; the soldiers were obliged to make use of their arms.⁽²⁾ The cries of the wounded, and the sight of the blood, deprived Cicero of his presence of mind; he trembled, and often broke off. His plead-

(1) Velleius Paterculus, II. 47.

(2) All this account is taken from the argument by Asconius Servius, serving as an introduction to his Commentary on the *Oration for Milo* (See the edit. of Orellh, pp. 41, 42 — Dio Cassius, XL. 53.)

ing was far from being worthy of his talent. Milo was condemned, and went into exile to Marseilles. In the sequel, Cicero composed at his leisure the magnificent oration which we know, and sent it to his unfortunate client, who replied: "If thou hadst spoken formerly as thou hast now written, I should not be eating mullets at Marseilles." ⁽¹⁾

During the wars of Greece and Africa, Milo, who had not forgotten his part of conspirator, returned into Italy, invited by Cœlius. They both attempted to organise seditious movements; but they failed, and paid for their rash enterprise with their lives. ⁽²⁾

Pompey, having reached the summit of power, believed, like most men who are vain of themselves, that all was saved because they had placed him at the head of affairs; but, instead of attending to these, his first care was to marry again. He espoused, in spite of his advanced age, Cornelia, daughter of Scipio, the young widow of Publius Crassus, who had just perished among the Parthians. "It was considered," says Plutarch, "that a woman so young, remarkable both for her mental qualities and for external graces, would have been more properly married to his son. The more honest citizens reproached him with having, on this occasion, sacrificed the interests of the Republic, which, in the extremity to which it was reduced, had chosen him for its physician, and trusted to him alone for its cure. Instead of responding to this confidence, he was seen crowned with flowers, offering sacrifices and celebrating nuptial rites, while he ought to have regarded as a public calamity this con-

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 54.

⁽²⁾ Velleius Paterculus, II. 68.

sulship, which he would not have obtained, according to the laws, alone and without a colleague, if Rome had been more happy." (¹)

Pompey had, nevertheless, rendered great services by putting down the riots and protecting the exercise of justice. He had delivered Rome from the bands of Clodius and Milo, had given a more regular organisation to the tribunals, (²) and caused their judgments to be respected by armed force. Still, if we except these acts, commanded by circumstances, he had used his power with hesitation, as a man who is struggling between his conscience and his interests. Having become, perhaps unknowingly, the instrument of the aristocratic party, the ties which had attached him to Cæsar had often checked him in the way in which they sought to push him. As the defender of order, he had promulgated laws to restore it; but, as the man of a party, he had been incessantly led to violate them, to satisfy the urgencies of his faction. He caused a *senatus-consultus* to be adopted, authorising prosecutions against those who had exercised public employments since his first consulship. The retrospective effect of this law, which embraced a period of twenty years, and consequently the consulship of Cæsar, excited the indignation of the partisans of the latter; they exclaimed that Pompey would do much better to occupy himself with the present than to call the hateful investigation of the factions to the past conduct of the first magistrates of the Republic; but Pompey replied that, since the law permitted the control of his own acts, he saw no reason why those

(¹) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 58.

(²) Dio Cassius, XL 53.

of Cæsar should be freed from it; and that, moreover, the relaxation of morals during so many years rendered the measure necessary. ⁽¹⁾

Complaint, was made of the power left to orators of pronouncing the eulogy of the accused, whose defence they offered, because the prestige attached to the word of men of consideration procured too easily the acquittal of the guilty. A *senatus-consultus* prohibited the custom. Yet in contempt of these orders, which he had brought forward, Pompey was not ashamed to pronounce the eulogy of T. Munatius Plancus, accused, with Q. Pompeius Rufus, of the fire which burnt the Curia Hostilia. ⁽²⁾ Cato, who was one of the members of the tribunal, exclaimed, stopping his ears: "I do not believe this eulogiser, who speaks against his own laws." The accused were condemned nevertheless.

With the aim of repressing electoral corruption and bringing to justice those guilty of it, it was enacted that every one condemned for bribery who should succeed in convicting another of the same crime should obtain thereby the remission of his punishment. Memmius, condemned for an act of this description, wishing to take advantage of the benefit of the legal impunity, denounced Scipio. Then Pompey appeared clothed in mourning before the tribunal, at the side of his father-in-law. At the view of this image of sorrow and of the moral pressure which resulted from it, Memmius desisted, deploring the misfortune of the Republic. As to the judges, they

⁽¹⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 24.

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XL 52.

pushed flattery to the point of conducting Scipio back to his dwelling. (¹)

To put a stop in the elections to the intrigues arising from the shameless covetousness of the candidates, it was decreed that the consuls and prætors should not be allowed to take the government of a province until five years after their consulship or prætorship. (²) This discouraged the ambitious, who threw themselves into extravagant expenses in order to arrive through one of these magistracies at the government of the provinces. And nevertheless Pompey, although consul, not only preserved the proconsulship of Spain, but he caused his government to be prolonged for five years, kept a part of his army in Italy, and received a thousand talents for the maintenance of his troops. In the interest of his partisans, he did not hesitate to violate his own laws, which has made Tacitus say of him, *Suarum legum auctor idem ac subversor*. (³)

The preceding law did not deprive Cæsar of the possibility of arriving at the consulship, but the Senate put in force again the law which prohibited any one who was absent from offering himself as a candidate, forgetting that it had just elected Pompey sole consul, although absent from the town of Rome. The friends of the proconsul of Gaul protested with energy. "Cæsar," they said, "had merited well of his country; a second consulship would only be the just recompense of his immense labours; or, at all events, if they felt reluctance in conferring this great dignity

(¹) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 59.

(²) Dio Cassius, XL. 56; comp. 30.

(³) Tacitus, *Annales*, III. 28.

upon him, they ought at least not to give him a successor, or deprive him of the benefit he had acquired." Pompey, who had no desire of breaking with Cæsar, had recourse to Cicero ⁽¹⁾ to add to the law already engraved on a tablet of brass, which was then the form of promulgation, that the prohibition did not apply to those who had obtained the authorisation to offer themselves as candidates in spite of their absence. All the tribunes, who had at first protested, accepted this qualification, at the motion of Cœlius. ⁽²⁾

Nevertheless, Cæsar's friends went to him in great numbers to demonstrate that Pompey's laws had been all brought forward against his interest, and that it was essential that he should be on his guard against him. Cæsar, proud in the justice of his claims, and strong in the services he had rendered, distrusted neither his son-in-law nor destiny, encouraged them, and praised greatly the conduct of Pompey. ⁽³⁾

V. About the first of August, Pompey chose his father-in-law Scipio as his associate in the consulship, for the last five months. This partition of power, purely nominal, and which was subsequently imitated by the emperors, appeared to satisfy men who thought only of forms. The senators

Pompey takes as his
Associate Cœcilius
Metellus Pius Scipio.

⁽¹⁾ "Shall I pronounce against Cæsar? But what then becomes of that faith sworn, when, for this same privilege which he demands, I myself, at his prayer at Ravenna, went to solicit Cœlius, the tribune of the people? What do I say, at his prayer! *at the prayer of Pompey himself*, then invested with his third consulship, of eternal memory." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 1.)

⁽²⁾ "It is he, Pompey, who has absolutely willed that the ten tribunes should propose the decree which permitted Cæsar to ask for the consulship without coming to Rome." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VIII. 3.—Dio Cassius, XL. 56.—Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 28.)

⁽³⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 25.

boasted of having restored order without injuring the institutions of the Republic. ⁽¹⁾

Scipio sought to signalise his short administration by abolishing the law of Clodius, which permitted the censors to expel from the Senate only men who had already undergone a condemnation. He restored things to the old footing, by rendering the power of the censors almost unlimited. This change was not received with favour, as Scipio had expected. The old consulars, among whom the censors were usually chosen, found the responsibility of such functions dangerous in a time of trouble and anarchy. Instead of being sought as an honour, the censorship was avoided as a perilous post. ⁽²⁾

It was every day more evident, in the eyes of all men of judgment, that the institutions of the Republic were becoming more and more powerless to guarantee order within, and perhaps even peace without. The Senate could no longer meet, the comitia be held, or the judges render judgment, without the protection of a military force; it was necessary, therefore, to place themselves at the discretion of a general, and to abdicate all authority into his hands. Thus, while the popular instinct, which is rarely deceived, saw the safety of the Republic in the power of a single individual, the aristocratic party, on the contrary, saw danger only in this general tendency towards one man. For this reason Cato inscribed himself among the candidates for the consulship for the year 703, denouncing Pompey and Cæsar as equally dangerous,

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 55 — Valerius Maximus, IX. 5.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 23, 24.

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 57.

and declaring that he only aspired to the first magistracy to counteract their ambitious designs. This competition, opposed to the spirit of the time and to the powerful instincts which were in play, had no chance of success: the candidature of Cato was defeated without difficulty.

VI. Not only had the murder of Clodius deeply agitated Italy, but the reverberation made itself felt beyond the Alps, and the troubles in Rome had revived in Gaul the desire to shake off the yoke of the Romans. The intestine dissensions, by spreading a belief in the debilitation of the state, awakened incessantly the hopes of its exterior enemies, and, which is sad to confess, these exterior enemies always find accomplices among traitors who are ready to betray their country. ⁽¹⁾

The campaign of 702 is, without dispute, the most interesting in the double point of view—political and military. To the historian, it presents the affecting scene of tribes, hitherto divided, uniting in one national thought, and arming for the purpose of reconquering their independence. To the philosopher it presents, as a result consoling for the progress of humanity, the triumph of civilisation against the best combined and most heroic efforts of barbarism. Lastly, in the eyes of the soldier, it is a magnificent example of what may be done by energy and experience

(1) “ He (Vercingetorix) reckoned on persuading all Gaul to take arms while they were preparing at Rome a revolt against Cæsar. If the chief of the Gauls had deferred his enterprise until Cæsar had the civil war to contend with, he would have struck all Italy with no less terror than was caused in former days by the Cimbri and the Teutones.” (Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 28.)

in war by a small number contending against masses who are wanting in organisation and discipline.

The events which had occurred in Rome led the Gauls to think that Cæsar would be detained in Italy, upon which a formidable insurrection is organised among them. All the different peoples act in concert, and form a coalition. The provinces in the military occupation of the legions, or held in fear by their proximity, alone remain foreign to the general agitation. The country of Orleans first gives the signal; the Roman citizens are slaughtered at Gien; Berry and Auvergne join the league; and soon, from the Seine to the Gironde, from the Cévennes to the ocean, the whole country is in arms. As a chief never fails to reveal himself when a great national movement breaks out, Vercingetorix appears, places himself at the head of a war of independence, and, for the first time, proclaims this truth, the stamp of grandeur and patriotism: "*If Gaul has the sense to be united, and become one nation, it may defy the universe.*" All respond to his call.

The peoples, but lately divided by rivalries, customs, and tradition, forget their reciprocal grievances, and unite under him. Foreign oppression creates nationalities much more than community of ideas and interests. Had Vercingetorix formerly, like so many others, bent his brow under the Roman domination? Dio Cassius is the only historian who says so. Be this as it may, he shows himself, as early as the year 702, the firm and intrepid adversary of the invaders. His plan is as bold as it is well combined: to create in the heart of Gaul a great centre of insurrection,

protected by the mountains of the Cévennes and of Auvergne; from this natural fortress to throw his lieutenants upon the Narbonnese, whence Cæsar would be no longer able to draw either succours or provisions; to prevent even the Roman general from returning to his army; to attack separately the legions while deprived of their chief, urge into insurrection the centre of Gaul, and destroy the *oppidum* of the Boii, that small people, the remains of the defeat of the Helvetii, placed by Cæsar at the confluence of the Allier and the Loire as an advance sentinel.

Informed of these events, Cæsar quits Italy in haste, followed by a small number of troops raised in the Cisalpine. On his descent from the Alps, he finds himself almost alone in presence of wavering allies, and of the greatest part of Gaul in revolt, while his legions are dispersed at a distance on the Moselle, the Marne, and the Yonne. So many perils excite his ardour instead of abating it, and his resolution is soon taken.

He is going to draw his enemies, by successful and multiplied diversions, to the points where he intends to strike decisive blows; and by sending his infantry into the Vivarais, his cavalry to Vienne, and proceeding in person to Narbonne, he divides the attention of his adversaries, in order to conceal his designs.

His presence in the Roman province is equivalent to an army. He encourages the men who have remained faithful, intimidates the others; doubles, with the local resources, all the garrisons of the towns of the Province as far as Toulouse; and, after having thus raised in the south a barrier against all invasion,

he returns, and arrives at the foot of the Cévennes, in the Vivarais, where he finds the troops which had been sent forward. He then crosses the mountains covered with snow, penetrates into Auvergne, and obliges Vercingetorix to abandon Berry, in order to hasten to defend his own country, which is threatened. Satisfied with this result, he starts unexpectedly, and, almost alone, hastens to Vienne. He takes the escort of cavalry which had preceded him, reaches the country of Langres, and proceeds thence to Sens, where he brings together his ten legions.

Thus, in little time, he has placed the Roman Province in security from any attack, forced Vercingetorix to fly to the defence of Auvergne, and rejoined and concentrated his army.

Although the rigour of the season adds to the difficulty of the marches and supplies of provisions (it was in the month of March), he decides upon immediately taking the field. Vercingetorix has just laid siege to Gorgobina, the *oppidum* of the Boii. These 20,000 Germans, so recently vanquished, preserve the sincere gratitude of a primitive people towards him who has given them lands, instead of selling them for slaves: they remain faithful to the Romans, and face the anger of Vercingetorix and the attacks of revolted Gaul. Cæsar, unwilling that a people who set the example of fidelity should become the victims of their devotedness, marches to their succour. He might go directly to Gorgobina, and cross the Loire at Nevers; but in that case, Vercingetorix, informed of his approach, would have had time to come and dispute the passage. To attempt this by force was a dangerous

operation. He leaves at Sens two legions and his baggage, starts at the head of the eight others, and hastens, by the shortest way, to cross the Loire at Gien. He proceeds up the left bank of the river; while Vercingetorix, instead of waiting for him, raises the siege of Gorgobina. He proceeds to meet Cæsar, who beats him at Sancerre in a cavalry encounter, and then marches upon Bourges, without further care for an enemy incapable of arresting him in the open field. The capture of that important town must make him master of the whole country. The Gaulish general confines himself to following by short marches, and burning all the country around, in order to starve the Roman army.

The siege of Bourges is one of the most regular and interesting of the war in Gaul. Cæsar opens the trenches, that is, he makes covered galleries which permit him to approach the place, to fill the fosse, and to construct a terrace, a veritable breaching battery, surmounted on each side by a tower. When, with the assistance of his military engines, he has thinned the ranks of the defenders, he assembles his legions under protection of the parallels composed of covered galleries, and by means of the terrace, which equals the elevation of the wall, he gives the assault and carries the place.

After the capture of Bourges, he proceeds to Nevers, where he establishes his magazines; then to Decize, to appease the disputes which had arisen, among the Burgundians, from the competition of two claimants to the supreme power. He next divides his army; sends Labienus, with two legions, against the Parisii

and their allies; orders him to take the two legions left at Sens; and in person, with the six others, directs his march towards Auvergne, the principal focus of the insurrection. By means of a stratagem, he crosses the Allier at Varennes without striking a blow, and obliges Vercingetorix to retire into Gergovia with all his forces.

Placed on almost inaccessible heights, these vast Gaulish *oppida*, which enclosed the greater part of the population of a province, could only be reduced by famine. Cæsar was well aware of this, and resolved on confining himself to the blockade of Gergovia; but one day he judges the occasion favourable, and he risks an assault. Repulsed with loss, he thinks only of retreat, when already the insurrection surrounds him on all sides. The Burgundians themselves, who owe everything to Cæsar, have followed the general impulse: by their defection, the communications of the Roman army are intercepted and its rear threatened. Nevers is burnt, and the bridges on the Loire are destroyed; the Gauls, in their presumptuous hope, already see Cæsar humiliated, and obliged to pass with his soldiers under new Furcæ Caudinæ; but old veteran troops, commanded by a great captain, do not recoil after a first reverse; and these six legions, shut up in their camp, isolated in the middle of a country in insurrection, separated from all succour by rivers and mountains, yet immovable and unshaken in face of a victorious enemy who dares not pursue his victory, resemble those rocks beaten by the waves of the ocean, which defy the tempests, and the approach to which is so perilous that no one dare brave them.

In this extremity Cæsar has not lost hope. Far from him the thought of re-crossing the Cévennes, and returning into the Narbonnese. This retreat would bear too great a resemblance to a flight. Moreover, he has fears for the four legions entrusted to Labienus, of whom he has received no news since they went to combat the Parisii; he is anxious to rejoin them at all risks. He therefore marches in the direction of Sens, crosses the Loire by a ford, near Bourbon-Lancy, and, on his arrival near Joigny, he rallies Labienus, who, after having defeated the army of Camulogenus under the walls of Paris, had returned to Sens and hastened to meet him.

What joy Cæsar must have experienced, when he found his lieutenant, then faithful still, on the banks of the Yonne! for this junction doubled his forces, and restored the chances of the struggle in his favour. While he was re-modelling his army, calling to him a re-enforcement of German cavalry, and preparing to approach nearer to the Roman province, Vercingetorix had not lost a moment in stirring up the whole of Gaul against the Romans. The inhabitants of Savoy, as well as those of the Vivarais, are drawn into revolt; all is agitation from the coasts of the ocean to the Rhone. He communicates to all hearts the sacred fire which inflames him, and from Mont Beuvray, as its centre, its action radiates to the extremities of Gaul.

But it is granted neither to the most eminent of men to create in one day an army, nor to popular insurrection, however general, to form suddenly a nation. The foreigner has not yet quitted the territory

of their country before the chiefs become jealous of each other, and rivalries break out between the different states. The Burgundians obey unwillingly the people of Auvergne; the people of the territory of Beauvais refuse their contingent, alleging that they will only make war at their own time and in their own manner. The inhabitants of Savoy, instead of responding to the appeal made to their old independence, oppose a vigorous resistance to the attacks of the Gauls, and the Vivarais shows no less devotedness to the Roman cause.

As to the Gaulish army, its strength consisted chiefly in cavalry; the footmen, in spite of the efforts of Vercingetorix, composed only an undisciplined mass; for military organisation is always a reflection of the state of society, and where there is no people there is no infantry. In Gaul, as Cæsar tells us, two classes alone were dominant, the priests and the nobles. (¹) It is not surprising if, then as in the Middle Ages, the nobility on horseback formed the true sinew of the armies. Accordingly, the Gauls never incurred the risk of resisting the Romans in the open field, or rather everything was confined to a combat of cavalry, and, when their cavalry was defeated, the army retired without the infantry being engaged at all. This is what happened before Sancerre: the defeat of his cavalry had forced Vercingetorix to make his retreat; he had allowed Cæsar to continue his route undisturbed towards Bourges, and take that

(¹) "In all Gaul there are only two classes of men who count and are considered (the Druids and the knights), for the people have hardly any other rank than that of slaves." (*De Bello Gallico*, VI. 13)

town, without ever daring to attack him either during his march or during the siege.

It will be the same at the battle of the Vingeanne. Cæsar directed his march from Joigny towards Franche-Comté, across the country of Langres. His aim was to reach Besançon, an important fortress, from whence he could at the same time resume the offensive and protect the Roman Province; but when he arrived at the eastern extremity of the territory of Langres, in the valley of the Vingeanne, at about sixty-five kilomètres from Alesia, his army, in march, is brought to a halt by that of Vercingetorix, whose numerous cavalry have sworn to pass three times through the Roman lines; this cavalry is repulsed by that of the Germans in Cæsar's pay, and Vercingetorix hastens to take refuge in Alesia, without the least resistance offered by his infantry.

It is the belief of the Gauls that their country can only be defended in the fortresses, and the example of Gergovia animates them with a generous hope; but Cæsar will attempt no more imprudent assaults. 80,000 infantry shut themselves up in the walls of Alesia, and the cavalry is sent into the whole of Gaul to call to arms, and to conduct to the succour of the invested town the contingents of all the states. About forty or fifty days after the blockade of the place, 250,000 men, of whom 8,000 are cavalry, appear on the low hills which bound the plain of Laumes on the west. The besieged leap with joy. How will the Romans be able to sustain the double attack from within and from without? Cæsar has obviated all perils by the art of fortification, which he has carried

to perfection. A line of countervallation against the fortress, and a line of circumvallation against the army of succour, are rendered almost impregnable by means of works adapted to the ground, and in which science has accumulated all the obstacles in use in the warfare of sieges. These two concentric lines are closely approached to each other, in order to facilitate the defence. The troops are not scattered over the great extent of the retrenchments, but distributed into twenty-three redoubts and eight camps, from which they can move, according to circumstances, on the points threatened. The redoubts are advanced posts. The camps of infantry, placed on the heights, form so many reserves. The cavalry camps are stationed on the banks of the streams.

In the plain especially, where the attacks may be most dangerous, to the fosses, ramparts, and ordinary towers are added *abatîs*, wolf-pits, things like caltrops, means still employed in modern fortification. Thanks to so many works, but thanks also to the imperfection of the projectiles of that time, we see a besieging army, equal in number to the army besieged, three times less in force than the army of succour, resist three simultaneous attacks, and finish by vanquishing so many enemies assembled against it. It is a thing to be remarked that Cæsar, in the decisive day of the struggle, shut up in his lines, has become, in a manner, the besieged, and, like all besieged who are victorious, it is by a sally that he triumphs. The Gauls have nearly forced his retrenchments on one point; but Labienus, by Cæsar's order, debouches from the lines, attacks the enemy with the sword, and puts him to flight: the cavalry completes the victory.

This siege, so memorable in a military point of view, is still more so in the historic point of view. Beside the hill, so barren at the present day, of Mont Auxois, were decided the destinies of the world. In these fertile plains, on these hills, now silent, nearly 400,000 men encountered each other; one side led by the spirit of conquest, the other by the spirit of independence; but none of them were conscious of the work which destiny was employing them to accomplish. The cause of all civilisation was at stake.

The defeat of Cæsar would have stopped for a long period the advance of Roman domination, of that domination which, across rivers of blood, it is true, conducted the peoples to a better future. The Gauls, intoxicated with their success, would have called to their aid all those nomadic peoples who followed the course of the sun to create themselves a country, and all together would have thrown themselves upon Italy; that focus of intelligence, destined to enlighten the peoples, would then have been destroyed, before it had been able to develop its expansive force. Rome, on her side, would have lost the only chief capable of arresting her decline, of re-constituting the Republic, and of bequeathing to her at his death three centuries of existence.

Thus, while we honour duly the memory of Vercingetorix, we are not allowed to deplore his defeat. Let us admire the ardent and sincere love of this Gaulish chieftain for the independence of his country; but let us not forget that it is to the triumph of the Roman armies that we owe our civilisation; institutions, manners, language, all come to us from the con-

quest. Thus are we much more the children of the conquerors than of the conquered; for, during long years, the former have been our masters for everything which raises the soul and embellishes life; and, when at last the invasion of the barbarians came to overthrow the old Roman edifice, it could not destroy its foundations. Those wild hordes only ravaged the territory, without having the power to annihilate the principles of law, justice, and liberty, which, deeply rooted, survived by their own vitality, like those crops which, bent down for a moment beneath the tread of the soldiers, soon rise again spontaneously, and recover a new life. On the ground thus prepared by Roman civilisation, the Christian idea was able easily to plant itself, and to regenerate the world.

The victory gained at Alesia was, then, one of those decisive events which decide the destinies of peoples.

It is towards the end of the third consulship of Pompey that the lictors must have arrived in Rome, carrying, according to the custom, with their fasces crowned with laurels, the letters announcing the surrender of Alesia. The degenerate aristocracy, who placed their rancours above the interests of their country, would, no doubt, have preferred receiving the news of the loss of the Roman armies, to seeing Cæsar become greater than ever by new successes; but public opinion compelled the Senate to celebrate the victory gained at Mont Auxois: it ~~ordered~~ sacrifices during twenty days; still more, the people, to testify their joy, trebled the number. ⁽¹⁾

(1) Dio Cassius, XL. 50.

CHAPTER VIII.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 703.

I. THE capture of Alesia and the defeat of the army of succour, composed of all the contingents of Gaul, must have encouraged the hope that the war was ended; but the popular waves, like those of the ocean, once agitated, require time to calm them. In 703, disturbances broke out on several points at the same time. Cæsar, who was wintering at Bibracte, was obliged to proceed with two legions into Berry, and, some time afterwards, into the country of Orleans, to restore order there; next he marched against the people of Beauvais, whose resistance threatened to be the more formidable, as they had taken but a slight part at the siege of Alesia. After having assembled four legions, he established his camp on Mont Saint-Pierre, in the forest of Compiègne, opposite the Gauls, who were posted on Mont Saint-Marc. At the end of a few weeks, unable to draw them to quit their post, and not considering his forces sufficient to surround on all sides the mountain which they occupied, he sent for three other legions, and then threatened to invest their camp, as had happened at Alesia. The Gauls left their position, and retired upon Mont Ganelon, from whence they sent troops to lay in ambush in the forest, in order to fall upon the Romans when they went to forage. The

New Troubles in
Gaul, and the Cam-
paign on the Aisne.

result was a combat in the plain of Choisy-a-Bac, in which the Gauls were defeated, and which led to the submission of the whole country. After this expedition, Cæsar turned his attention to the country situated between the Rhine and the Meuse, the populations of which, in spite of the hard lesson of 701, were again raising the standard of revolt under Ambiorix. The whole country was committed to fire and sword; but the invaders could not lay hold of the person of that implacable enemy of the Roman name.

The remains of the old Gaulish bands had united on the left bank of the Loire, the constant refuge of the last defenders of their country, and were still displaying an energy sufficient to give uneasiness to the conquerors. They joined Dumnacus, the chief of the Angevins, who was besieging, in Poitiers, Duratius, a Gaulish chief faithful to the Romans. Cæsar's lieutenants, Caninius Rebilus and C. Fabius, obliged Dumnacus to raise the siege, and defeated his army.

During this time, Drappes of Sens and Lucterius of Cahors, who had escaped from the last battle, attempted to invade the Roman province; but, pursued by Rebilus, they threw themselves into the fortress of Uxellodunum (*le Puy d'Issolud*), where the last focus of the insurrection was destined to be extinguished. After a battle outside the fortress, in which the Romans were victorious, Drappes fell into their power; Rebilus and Fabius continued the siege. But the courage of the besieged rendered useless the efforts of the besiegers. At this conjuncture Cæsar arrived there. Seeing that the place, being obstinately

defended and abundantly provisioned, could not be reduced either by force or by famine, he conceived the idea of depriving the besieged of water. For this purpose, a subterranean gallery was carried to the veins of the spring which, alone, supplied their wants. It became instantly dry. The Gauls, taking this circumstance for a prodigy, believed they saw in it a manifestation of the will of the gods, and surrendered. Cæsar inflicted on the heroic defenders of Uxellodunum an atrocious punishment: he caused their hands to be cut off; an unpardonable act of cruelty, even although it might have appeared necessary.

These events accomplished, he visited Aquitaine for the first time, with two legions, and saw his authority accepted everywhere. He subsequently proceeded to Narbonne, and from thence to Arras, where he established his head-quarters for the winter. Labienus, on his side, had obtained the complete submission of the country of Trèves.

II. After eight years of sanguinary struggles, Gaul

Cæsar's Policy in Gaul and at Rome. was subdued, and thenceforward, far from meeting enemies in it, Cæsar was destined to find only auxiliaries.

His policy had contributed as much as his arms to this result. Instead of seeking to reduce Gaul into a Roman province, the great captain had applied himself to founding the supremacy of the Republic on powerful alliances, making the conquered countries subject to the states of which he was sure, and leaving to each people its chiefs and its institutions, and to Gaul entire its general assemblies.

It may have been remarked with what consideration Cæsar, in all his wars, deals with the countries which offer him their co-operation, and with what generous ability he treats them. Thus, in his first campaign, he raises the Burgundians from the state of inferiority in which they were held by the people of Franche-Comté, and re-establishes them in possession of their hostages and of their rights of patronage over the states which were their clients; ⁽¹⁾ yielding to their prayer, in the second campaign, he pardons the people of Beauvais; ⁽²⁾ in the sixth, the inhabitants of Sens. ⁽³⁾ In 702, the auxiliary troops furnished by the Burgundians revolt, yet he takes no vengeance upon them; the same year these people massacre the Roman merchants: they expect terrible reprisals, and send to implore pardon; Cæsar replies to their deputies that he is far from wishing to throw on the whole country the fault of a few; lastly, when, under the influence of the national feeling, their contingents have taken part in the general insurrection, and are defeated before Alise, instead of reducing them to captivity, Cæsar gives them their liberty. He behaves in the same manner towards the people of Rheims, whose influence he augments by granting their petitions in favour, at one time of the people of Soissons, ⁽⁴⁾ at another of the inhabitants of Orléanais. ⁽⁵⁾ He restores similarly to the inhabitants of Auvergne their contingent vanquished at Alise; to the people of Artois, he remits all tribute, restores

⁽¹⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 12.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 4.

⁽³⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 4.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II. 15.

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, II. 12

their laws, and places the territory of the Boulonnaise in subjection to them. (¹) In each of his campaigns he follows an equally generous policy towards his allies.

The chiefs whom Cæsar places over the governments of the different states are not chosen arbitrarily; he takes them from the ancient families who have reigned over the country; often even he does no more than confirm the result of a free election. He maintains Ambiorix at the head of the people of Liège, restores to him his son and nephew, prisoners of the people of Namur, and frees him from the tribute which he paid to that people. (²) He gives to the people of Orleans for their chief Tasgetius, and to the inhabitants of Sens, Cavarinus, both issued from families which had possessed the sovereignty. (³) He appoints, as King of Artois, Commius, (⁴) who, nevertheless, as well as Ambiorix, subsequently revolted against him. In presence of the principal personages of the country of the Treviri, he decides between rival ambitions, and pronounces for Cingetorix, (⁵) whom he calls to the power. Again, he recognises Convictolitavis as chief of the Burgundians. (⁶) We can pardon Cæsar some acts of cruel vengeance, when we consider how far his age was still a stranger to the sentiments of humanity, and how far a victorious general must have been provoked to see those whose oath of fidelity he had received, and whom he had loaded with honours, incessantly revolting against his authority.

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 76

(³) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 25, 54

(⁵) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 4.

(²) *De Bello Gallico*, V. 27

(⁴) *De Bello Gallico*, IV. 21.

(⁶) *De Bello Gallico*, VII. 33

Almost every year he convokes the assembly of Gaul, ⁽¹⁾ either at Lutetia, or at Rheims, or at Bibracte, and he only imposes on the people the rights of the conqueror after having called them to discuss in his presence their several interests; he presides over them more as a protector than as a conqueror. Finally, when the last remains of the insurrection have been annihilated at Uxellodunum (*Puy d'Issolu*), he proceeds to pass the winter in Belgium; there he strives to render obedience more easy to the vanquished, brings into the exercise of power more of leniency and justice, and introduces among these races, still savages, the benefits of civilisation. Such was the efficacy of these measures that, when, finally abandoning Gaul, he was obliged to withdraw his legions from it, the country, formerly so agitated, remained calm and tranquil; the transformation was complete, and, instead of enemies, he left on the other side of the Alps a people always ready to furnish him with numerous soldiers for his new wars. ⁽²⁾

When we see a man of eminence devote himself, during nine years, with so much perseverance and skill, to the greatness of his country, we ask how so many animosities and rancours could rise against him in Rome. But this angry feeling is explained by the regret and vexation, very excusable indeed, which the

⁽¹⁾ "In the beginning of spring he convoked, according to custom, the assembly of Gaul." (*De Bello Gallico*, VI 3)

⁽²⁾ Cicero appeals to fear for his wife and daughter in thinking that Cæsar's army was filled with barbarians. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 13, A U.C 705) He wrote to Atticus that, according to Matus, the Gauls offered Cæsar 10,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, which they would entertain at their own expense for ten years. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IX. xii 2)

privileged castes feel when a system which has, during several centuries, been the cause of their power and of the glory of the country, has just given way under the irresistible action of new ideas; this hatred fell upon Cæsar as the most dangerous promoter of these ideas. It is true that people accused his ambition; in reality, it was his convictions openly pronounced which had long provoked hostility.

Cæsar began his political career with a trial which is always honourable, persecution supported for a good cause. The popular party then rested for support on the memory of Marius; Cæsar did not hesitate in reviving it with glory. Hence the prestige which surrounded him in his youth, and which ceased not to grow with him. The constancy of his principles gained him all the honours and all the dignities which were conferred upon him; named successively military tribune, quæstor, grand pontiff, guardian of the Appian Way, ædile, urban prætor, proprætor in Spain, and lastly consul, he might consider these different testimonies of public favour as so many victories gained under the same flag against the same enemies. This was the motive of the violent passions of the aristocracy: it made a single man responsible for the decay of an order of things which was falling into the abyss of corruption and anarchy.

When, during his ædileship, Cæsar causes the trophies of Marius, glorious symbols of the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, to be replaced in the Capitol, the opposite party already cries out that he intends to overthrow the Republic; when he returns from Spain, after having led his victorious legions as

far as Portugal, his passage across the Transpadane colonies inspires the Senate with so many fears, that two legions, destined for Asia, are retained in Italy; when he believes that he has a claim to a triumph and the consulate at the same time—a double favour accorded to many others—he is obliged to renounce the triumph. As consul he encounters, during the whole period of his magistracy, the most active and the most spiteful opposition. Hardly have his functions expired, when an accusation is sought to be brought against him, which he only escapes by the privilege attached to the *imperium*. In his interview, not far from the Rhine, with Ariovistus, he learns that the nobles of Rome have promised their friendship to the German king, if, by his death, he delivers them from their enemy. His victories, which transport the people with enthusiasm, excite jealousy and detraction among the Roman aristocracy. They seek to undervalue his expeditions beyond the sea, as well as beyond the Rhine. In 701 the news reached Rome of the defeat of the German tribes who again threatened Gaul with invasion. Cato, under the pretence that Cæsar had not observed the truce, proposed that they should deliver up to the barbarians the glorious chief of the legions of the Republic.

During the last campaign against the people of the Beauvaisin, his adversaries rejoice in the false rumours which were spread abroad concerning his military operations; they relate in whispers, without concealing their satisfaction, that he is surrounded by the Gauls, that he has lost his cavalry, and that the 7th

legion has been nearly annihilated. ⁽¹⁾ In the Senate, Clodius, Rutilius Lupus, Cicero, Ahenobarbus, and the two Marcelli, move in their turns, either to revoke the acts of his consulship, or to supersede him as governor of Gaul, or, lastly, to reduce his command. Political parties never disarm, not even before the national glory.

III. The two factions which divided the Republic had each, in 703, their adherent in the consulship. Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a lawyer of reputation, passed for a man attached to Cæsar; M. Claudius Marcellus was his declared enemy. The latter, a distinguished orator, who imitated Cicero, announced, on his entrance into office, the design of giving a successor to Cæsar before the legal period of his command had expired; but this design, counteracted by his colleague, and by the earnest opposition of the tribunes, was from time to time adjourned. "Why," it was said, "depose a magistrate who has not committed a fault?" ⁽²⁾ The attention of the Senate was, moreover, called in another direction by grave events.

It will be remembered that C. Cassius Longinus, the quæstor of Crassus, had rallied the wreck of the Roman army; he had even succeeded in repulsing vigorously an invasion of the Parthians into the province of Syria. He was reproached, meanwhile, with great rapacity in his administration; it was pretend-

⁽¹⁾ "All this," Cælius writes to Cicero, "is not said in public, but in secret, in the little circle which you know well, *sed inter paucos quos tu nosti palam secreto narrantur.*" (Cælius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 1.)

⁽²⁾ DIO CASSIUS, XL. 59.

ed that, for the purpose of justifying his acts of rapine, he had drawn in bands of Arabs, and afterwards driven them out, boasting that he had beaten the Parthians. ⁽¹⁾ Syria was an important province, which could not be left in the hands of a simple quæstor; M. Calpurnius Bibulus, Cæsar's old colleague in the consulship, was sent thither to exercise the command. ⁽²⁾ At the same time Cicero, in obedience to the new law on the consular provinces, started, to his great regret, for Cilicia. As he passed through Tarentum, he paid a visit to Pompey, who, after his consulship, had absented himself from Rome, in order to avoid acting decisively. Cicero, with his ordinary want of discernment, went away enchanted with his interview; declared in his letters that Pompey was an excellent citizen, whose foresight, courage, and wisdom were equal to all events, and that he believed him sincerely allied to the cause of the Senate. ⁽³⁾

If we reflect on the danger which then threatened the provinces of the East, we have reason to be surprised at these two appointments. Neither Bibulus nor Cicero had given any proof of military talents; the latter even very frankly avowed it. ⁽⁴⁾ The Parthians were threatening, and, while Pompey had sent into Spain four old legions, remaining himself in Italy with two others, the Eastern frontiers were only

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 10.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. 18.

⁽³⁾ Cicero to Cælius, *Epist. Familiar.*, II. 8.

⁽⁴⁾ "I station myself for some days near Issus, on the very site of the camp of Alexander, who was a rather better general than you and I." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. 20.)—"How ill this mission agrees with my habits, and how just is the saying, Every one to his trade!" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. x. 18.)

guarded by weak armies, ⁽¹⁾ and commanded by two generals who had never seen war.

IV. Marcellus, after he had failed in his project of taking Cæsar away from his army, proposed a measure which displays the true character of the passions which agitated the Republic. Pompey's father had founded in the Cisalpine the colony of *Novum Comum*, and had given it the right of *Latium*, which conferred on the magistrates of the town, after a year's office, the privileges of Roman citizens. ⁽²⁾ Cæsar had sent thither 5,000 colonists, of whom 500 were Greeks, ⁽³⁾ and during his first consulship he had conferred upon them the right of Roman citizens. Now Marcellus strove to cause this right to be withdrawn from them; but not having succeeded in this attempt, and unwilling at any price to acknowledge Cæsar's law, ⁽⁴⁾ he condemned to the rod, it is not known for what offence, an inhabitant of *Novum Comum*. The latter protested, invoking the privileges conferred on his city, but in vain; Marcellus had him flogged, telling him: "Go, show thy shoulders to Cæsar; it is thus I treat the citizens he makes." ⁽⁵⁾ This contempt for the new rights proved clearly the haughty disdain of the aristocratic party, blaming one of the things which had contributed most to the greatness of the Republic, the successive extension of the Roman city to the provinces, and to the vanquished themselves. Confounding, in his blind

⁽¹⁾ Cicero had two legions, but very incomplete.

⁽²⁾ Asconius, *In Pisonem*, 3.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 26.

⁽³⁾ Strabo, V. 177

⁽⁴⁾ Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 28.

⁽⁵⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 26.

reprobation, both the principle of a liberal policy and him who had applied it, he saw not that the persecution exercised towards the Transpadan citizen contributed further to increase Cæsar's greatness, and to legitimise his popularity.

Yet these are the doctrines and acts of those men who are represented as the worthy supports of the Republic! And Marcellus was not the only man who, by denying to the Transpadans the rights they had acquired, showed the perversity of egotistic sentiments; the other principal personages of the aristocratic faction hardly recommended themselves by more moderation and disinterestedness. "Appius Claudius Pulcher," says Cicero, "had treated with fire and sword the province entrusted to his care, and had bled and drained it in every way;" ⁽¹⁾ Faustus, Sylla, Lentulus, Scipio, Libo, and so many others, sought to elevate themselves by civil war, and to recover their fortune by pillage; ⁽²⁾ Brutus, whose conduct was that of a usurer, employed the troops of his country to oppress the allied peoples. Having lent mon-

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VI. 1.

⁽²⁾ In speaking of Pompey's party, Cicero exclaims. "Men who all, with the exception of a very small number, breathed nothing but pillage, and discourses such as made one tremble, the more as victory might convert them into reality: not a person of rank who was not crippled with debts: there was absolutely nothing beautiful except the cause which they served." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VII. 3)—"They all agree, and Crassipes, with them, that yonder there are nothing but imprecations, but threats of hatred to the rich, of war against the municipia (admire their prudence!), but proscriptions in mass; they are nothing but Syllas, and you must see the tone of Lucceius, and all that train of Greeks, and that Theophanes! Yet this is the hope of the Republic! A Scipio, a Faustus, a Libo, with their troops of creditors at their heels, of what enormities are not such people capable? What excesses against their fellow-citizens will such conquerors refuse?" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IX. 11.)

ey to the inhabitants of Salamina, he reckoned on extorting the repayment of the capital and the interest at the usurious rate of four per cent. a month, or forty-eight per cent. a year. To recover his debt, a certain Scaptius, to whom he had made over his claim, had obtained from Appius a troop of cavalry, with which, according to Cicero, "he held the Senate of Salamina besieged so long that five senators died of hunger." Cicero, when he became governor of Cilicia, sought to repair this injustice. Brutus, irritated, wrote him letters full of arrogance, of which Cicero complained to Atticus with vivacity: "If Brutus pretends that I ought to pay Scaptius at the rate of four per cent. a month, in spite of my regulations and edicts which fixed the interest at one per cent., and when the least reasonable usurers are satisfied with that rate; if he takes it ill that I have refused him a place of prefect for a tradesman; if he reproaches me with having withdrawn the cavalry, I regret much to have displeased him, but I regret much more to find him so different from what I had believed!" (¹) There was a law of Gabinius, intended to prevent such abuses; it prohibited the towns from borrowing money at Rome to pay their taxes. But Brutus had obtained a senatus-consultus to free him from this constraint, (²) and he employed even the means of coercion to obtain even two or three times the value of that he had given. Such was the prob-

(¹) Cicero, *Epist ad Atticum*, VI. 1.

(²) "The Salaminians sought to borrow money at Rome to pay their taxes, but, as the law Gabinia prohibited it, the friends of Brutus, who offered to lend it them at four per cent. a month, demanded a senatus-consultus for their safety, which Brutus obtained for them." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. 21.)

ity of a man who has been vaunted for his virtue. It is thus that the aristocratic party understood liberty; the hatred to Cæsar arose especially from the circumstance that he took to heart the cause of the oppressed, and that, during his first consulship, as Appian says, he had done nothing in favour of the nobles. (¹)

The prestige of his victories had bridled the opposition; when the end of his command drew near, all the hostilities were awakened; they waited the time when, returning to every-day life, he would be no longer protected by the prerogatives attached to the *imperium*. "Marcus Cato," says Suetonius, "swore that he would denounce Cæsar to the magistrates as soon as he had disbanded his army; and it was a matter of common talk that, if Cæsar returned as a private individual, he would be obliged, like Milo, to defend himself before judges, surrounded with armed men. Asinius Pollio makes this account very probable; he relates that, at the battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar, casting his eyes on his adversaries vanquished or fugitives, exclaimed: 'They have willed it! After having accomplished so many great things, I, Caius Cæsar, was condemned, if I had not demanded succour of my army.' " (²) Hence Cælius, writing to Cæsar, put the question in its true light when he said, "Cæsar is persuaded that his only hope lies in keeping his army;" (³) and, on another side, as Dio Cassius informs us, Pompey did not dare to submit the differ-

(¹) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 25.

(²) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 30.

(³) Cælius to Cicero, *Epist Familiar.*, VIII 14

ence to the people, knowing well that, if the people were taken for judge, Cæsar would gain the day. ⁽¹⁾

V. It is here the place to examine at what period the power of Cæsar expired, and what The Question of Right between the Senate and Cæsar. was the pretext of the conflict which rose between him and the Senate.

Learned historians have long had this subject under consideration; they have devoted themselves to the most profound researches, and to the most ingenious suppositions, still without arriving at a completely satisfactory result, ⁽²⁾ which ought not to surprise us, inasmuch as Cicero himself found the question obscure. ⁽³⁾

In virtue of a law of C. Sempronius Gracchus,

⁽¹⁾ Dio Cassius, XLI. 6.

⁽²⁾ In our opinion, Professor A. W. Zumpt (*Studia Romana*, Berlin, 1859) is the only one who has cleared up this question, and we shall borrow of him the greatest part of his arguments. As to M. Th. Mommsen, in a special dissertation, entitled *The Question of Right between Cæsar and the Senate*, he proves that we must distinguish in the proconsulship between the *provincia* and the *imperium*. According to him, the *provincia* being given at the same time with the consulship, it could be taken possession of, according to the law Sempronia, only on the Calends of the month of January of the following year; the *imperium*, or military command, was added to it two months later, on the Calends of March. The *provincia* was given by a *senatus-consultus*, and counted from January to January; the *imperium* was given by a *curiate law*, and went from March to March the *imperium* followed the rules of the military service; a year commenced was reputed finished, as for the campaigns of the soldiers, and thus the two first months of 705 might count for a complete year. The learned professor concludes that, if the Senate had the right to deprive Cæsar of his *imperium*, it could not take from him the command of the province before the end of the year 705, and that then Cæsar would find himself in the same position as all the proconsuls who, during the interval between the 1st of January, the commencement of their proconsulship, and the 1st of March, the time when they received the *imperium*, had the *potestas*, and not the military command. This system, we see, rests upon hypotheses which it is difficult to admit.

⁽³⁾ "Erat autem obscuritas quædam." (Cicero, *Pro Marcello*, 10.)

named *lex Sempronia*, it had been decided that the Senate should designate, before the election of the consuls, the provinces they were to administer after quitting office. When Cæsar and Bibulus were elected, instead of provinces, the inspection of the public ways was given to them; but Cæsar, unwilling to suffer this affront, obtained, by a *plebiscitum*, on the motion of Vatinius, the government of Cisalpine Gaul for five years; the Senate added to it Transalpine Gaul, which then formed a separate province independent of the other.⁽¹⁾ In 699, the law Trebonia prolonged, for five more years, Cæsar's command in Gaul. This command was therefore to last ten years; and, since Cæsar only entered upon his proconsular functions at the beginning of the year 696, it seems natural to infer that these ten years should reach to the 1st of January, 706. We, nevertheless, see that, at the end of 704, the Senate regarded Cæsar's power as at an end. We then ask, on what ground that assembly supported the pretence that the ten years devolved to the proconsul were completed at that date. We consider the following to be the explanation:—

(¹) The question became complicated through the difference of origin of the powers given for each of the two Gauls. The Senate had the power of taking away from Cæsar's command Ulterior Gaul, which was given to him by a *senatus-consultus*, but it could not deprive him of Citerior Gaul, given by a *plebiscitum*, and yet it was the contrary opinion that Cicero sustained in 698. In fact, he exclaimed then, in his *Oration on the Consular Provinces*. "He separates the part of the province on which there can be no opposition (because it has been given by a *senatus-consultus*), and does not touch that which can be easily attacked; and, at the same time that he dares not take away that which has been given by the people, he is in haste to take away all, senator as he is, that which has been given by the Senate." (Cicero, *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*, 15.—Velleius Paterculus, II. 44.—Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 20.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 13.—Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 8.)

It was in the month of March that, according to custom, the retiring consuls took possession of the government of provinces. ⁽¹⁾ It is, consequently, very probable that the law of Vatinius, published, as we have seen, in 695, was voted towards the latter days of the month of February in that same year, and that the proconsulship given to Cæsar was to begin from the day of the promulgation of that law. Nothing would have prevented him, indeed, from shortening the time of his magistracy, and seizing, before the termination of his curule functions, the military command or *imperium*, as Crassus did in 699, who started for Syria without waiting for the end of his consulship. Supposing, then, which is not impossible, that the whole year of Cæsar's consulship was included in his proconsulship, ⁽²⁾ the five first years of his command would date from 695, and end on the 1st of January, 700. The oration on the Consular Provinces proves that it was so understood. The time when it was pronounced (July or August, 698) was that of the assignment of the provinces destined for the consuls who were to quit office eighteen months after—that is, in 700—and when the question of su-

⁽¹⁾ The 1st of March was the commencement of the ancient Roman year, the period at which the generals entered into campaign.

⁽²⁾ P. Servilius, who was consul in 675, took possession of his province a short time after he entered upon his duties as consul; he returned in 679. Cicero (*Orat III in Verrem*, 90) says that he held the command during five years. This number can only be explained by admitting that the years 675 and 679 were reckoned as complete. L. Piso, who was consul in 696, quitted Rome at the end of his consulship, and returned thither in the summer of 699. Now, he was considered as having exercised the command during three years. (Cicero, *In Pisonem*, 35, 40.) They must, therefore, have counted as one year of the proconsulship the few months of 695. (See Mommsen, *The Question of Right between Cæsar and the Senate*, p. 28.)

perseding Cæsar was agitated. The first *quinquennium* of his command terminated, therefore, in December, 699, and, consequently, the second in December, 704. Such was the system of the Senate, naturally much inclined to shorten the duration of the proconsulship of Gaul. ⁽¹⁾ Accordingly, Hirtius informs us that, in 703, the Gauls knew that Cæsar had but one summer, that of 704, to pass in Gaul. ⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius says similarly that Cæsar's power was to end with the year 704. ⁽³⁾ According to Appian, the Consul Claudius Marcellus proposed, at the beginning of 704, to name a successor to Cæsar, whose powers were on the eve of expiring. ⁽⁴⁾ On the other hand, Cicero relates in one of his letters that Pompey seemed to be of the same opinion as the Senate, to require the return of the proconsul on the Ides of the November of 704. At the end of that same year, the great orator expresses, in the following terms, his own opinion on the subject of the claim raised by Cæsar to dispensation from coming to Rome to solicit the consulship: "What, then? must we have regard for a man who will keep his army after the day fixed by the law?" ⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ At all times the assemblies have been seen striving to shorten the duration of the powers given by the people to a man whose sympathies were not with them. Here is an example. The Constitution of 1848 decided that the President of the French Republic should be named for four years. The Prince Louis Napoleon was elected on the 10th of December, 1848, and proclaimed on the 20th of the same month. His powers ought to have ended on the 20th of December, 1852. Now, the Constituent Assembly, which foresaw the election of Prince Louis Napoleon, fixed the termination of the presidency to the second Sunday of the month of May, 1852, thus robbing him of seven months.

⁽²⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 39.

⁽³⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 59.

⁽⁴⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 4.

⁽⁵⁾ "Quid ergo? exercitum retinentis, quum legis dies transierit, rationem haberi placet? Mihi vero ne absentis quidem." (*Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 7.)

Some time afterwards, apostrophising Cæsar in a letter to Atticus, ⁽¹⁾ he exclaims: "You have kept, during ten years, a province of which you have procured the continuance, not by the sovereign will of the Senate, but by your intrigues and your acts of violence. You have overpassed the term fixed, by your ambition, and not by the law. . . . You retain your army longer than the people has ordained and than it is the people's will." On another hand, a passage of Suetonius says, in a very formal manner, that Cæsar intended to offer himself as candidate in 705, to exercise the consulship in 706, when he would have completed the time of his proconsulship. ⁽²⁾ Lastly the Senate so evidently regards the beginning of the year 705 as the obligatory termination of Cæsar's command, that, in the month of January, it declares him the enemy of the Republic, because he is still at the head of his soldiers, and decrees extreme measures against him. ⁽³⁾

But the dispute between the Senate and Cæsar did not turn upon the term of his command. Cæsar offered himself to the consular comitia of the year 705. A law, submitted to the people by the ten tribunes, and supported by Pompey and Cicero, had permitted him to solicit this charge, although absent. ⁽⁴⁾ This law would have been without object unless it had implied the authorisation for Cæsar to keep his army

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 9.

⁽²⁾ "Absenti sibi, *quandocumque imperii tempus expleri cepisset.*" (Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 26.—Cicero, *Epist. Famil.*, XIII. 11.) ⁽³⁾ Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 5.

⁽⁴⁾ "I have contended that regard should be had to Cæsar for his absence. It was not to favour him; it is for the honour of a decision of the people, promoted by the consul himself" (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VI. 6)

until the time of the consular elections. Certain authors even think that this right must have been formally reserved in the law. The "Epitome" of Titus Livius says, in fact, that, according to the law, he was to keep his command until the time of his second consulship. ⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, Cicero writes to Atticus that the best argument for refusing Cæsar, in his absence, the power of soliciting the second consulship, is that, by granting it to him, they acknowledge in him, by the same act, the right of keeping his province and his army. ⁽²⁾ This advantage Cæsar calls *beneficium populi*; ⁽³⁾ and when he complained that they were depriving him of six months of his command, he reckoned the time which had to pass between the 1st of January, 705, and the month of July, the period of the consular comitia. ⁽⁴⁾

Nevertheless, Cæsar had a great interest in keeping his army until he was elected to the first magistracy of the Republic, for he would then keep the *imperium* as long as Pompey, whose powers, prolonged in 702, would end on the 1st of January, 707. ⁽⁵⁾ It was evident that he was unwilling to disarm before his rival; now if, according to the combination established by

⁽¹⁾ Titus Livius, *Epitome*, CVIII.

⁽²⁾ "Sed quum id datum est, illud una datum est." (*Epist. ad Atticum*, VII 7.)

⁽³⁾ "Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, erepto semestri imperio in urbem retraheretur." (Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 9)

⁽⁴⁾ See, on the period of the comitia, Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, III 13; *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 4.

⁽⁵⁾ Although all the facts prove that the term of the power was to cease in 707, Plutarch (*Pompey*, 55) reckons four years of prolongation, and Dio Cassius (XL. 44, 46) five, which shows the difference in the estimation of dates. (Zumpt, *Studia Romana*, 85)

law, he remained consul till the 1st of January, 707, his command ended at the same time as that of Pompey, and after that he had nothing more to fear from the plots of his enemies.

In fact, everything was now merging into an open struggle between Cæsar and Pompey. In vain will the former seek all means of conciliation, in vain will the latter strive to escape from the exactions of his party; the force of circumstances will infallibly push them one against the other. And just as we see, in the liquid traversed by an electric current, all the elements it contains moving towards the two opposite poles, so in Roman society in a state of dissolution, all the passions, all the interests, the memories of the past, the hopes of the future, are going to separate violently and divide themselves between the two men who personify the antagonism of two opposite causes.

VI. Let us return to the relation of events. Pompey, all-powerful, though a simple pro-consul, had, as we have said before, retired to Tarentum; he seemed to wish to remain foreign to the intrigues which were at work in Rome; it appears even that he had the intention of going into Spain to govern his province. ⁽¹⁾ At the outset of revolutions, the majority of the people, and even that of the assemblies, incline always towards moderation; but soon, overruled by an excitable and enter-

Intrigues to deprive
Cæsar of his Com-
mand.

⁽¹⁾ "I believe certainly in Pompey's intention of starting for Spain, and it is what I by no means approve. I have easily demonstrated to Theophanes that the best policy was not to go away. I am more uneasy for the Republic since I see by your letters that our friend Pompey is going to Spain." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. 11.)

prising minority, they are drawn by it into extreme courses. It is what happened at this time. Marcellus and his party strove first to carry Pompey, and, when he had once taken his decision, they carried the Senate. At the moment when, in the month of June, Pompey prepared to return to the troops stationed at Ariminum, he was called back to Rome; and when, on the 11th of the Calends of August, the senators assembled in the temple of Apollo to regulate the pay of the troops, he was asked why he had lent a legion to Cæsar. Obligated to give an explanation, he promised to recall it, but not immediately, as he was unwilling to have the appearance of yielding to threats. He was then pressed to give his opinion on the recall of Cæsar; upon which, by one of those evasive phrases which were habitual with him, and which revealed his hesitation, he replied that "everybody ought equally to obey the Senate." (1) Nothing was enacted in regard to the consular powers.

The question of the government of Gaul was to be resumed on the Ides of August; then again, in the month of September; but the Senate never found itself in sufficient numbers to deliberate, so much did it fear to come to a decision. They did not determine on entering upon the question frankly until they were convinced of Pompey's consent to the recall of Cæsar. (2) Then decrees were presented which bound beforehand the consuls nominated for the following

(1) Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 4

(2) "But at last, after several successive adjournments, and the certainty well acquired that Pompey consented to consider the recall of Cæsar on the Calends of March, the *senatus-consultus* was passed which I send you" (Cælius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 8)

year, and imposed upon them a rule of conduct: their hostility to Cæsar had determined their election. On the 11th of the Calends of October, M. Marcellus, who made himself the organ of the passions of the moment, exacted such numerous and unusual guarantees, that we may judge to what point his party had at heart to carry the day. Thus, the consuls recently elected were required to enter into the engagement to put the question on the orders of the day for the Calends of March; until it was settled, the Senate was bound to assemble to deliberate upon it every day, even on those which were called *comitiales*, when any meeting of that body was forbidden, and, to this effect, the senators who should fill the offices of judges were to be sent for into the curia. The Senate was also to declare beforehand that those who had the power of interceding should abstain from exercising it, and that, if they interceded or demanded an adjournment, they should be considered as enemies of the Republic; a report of their conduct should be made, at the same time, to the Senate and to the people. (¹) This motion was adopted and inscribed in the minutes as a *decision* or an *opinion* of the Senate (*senatus auctoritas*). Four tribunes of the people interceded: C. Cœlius, L. Vinucius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius Pansa.

It was not enough to prepare attacks against Cæsar's command; the discontent of the army was also to be feared; and, in order to avert or weaken its effect, M. Marcellus caused to be further inscribed in the minutes of the Senate the following decision: "The

(¹) Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 8.

Senate will take into consideration the situation of those soldiers of the army of Gaul whose time of service is expired, or who shall produce sufficient reasons for being restored to civil life." C. Cœlius and C. Vibius Pansa renewed their opposition. (¹)

Some senators, more impatient, demanded that they should not wait for the time fixed by M. Marcellus to decree upon this subject. Pompey interfered again as moderator, and said that they could not, without injustice, take a decision on the subject of Cæsar's province before the Calends of March, 704, an epoch at which he should find no further inconvenience in it. "What will be done," asked one of the senators, "if the decision of the Senate be opposed?"—"It matters little," replied Pompey, "whether Cæsar refuses to obey this decision, or suborns people to intercede."—"But," said another, "if he seeks to be consul, and keep his army?"—Pompey only replied with great coolness, "If my son would beat me with a staff?" He always, as we see, affected obscurity in his replies. The natural conclusion from this language was to raise the suspicion of secret negotiations with Cæsar, and it was believed that the latter would accept one of these two conditions, either to keep his province without soliciting the consulship, or to quit his army and return to Rome when, though absent, he should be elected consul.

The Senate declared also that, for the province of Cilicia and the eight other prætorian provinces, the governors should be chosen by lot among the prætors who had not yet had a government. Cœlius and

(¹) Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 8

Pansa made opposition to this decree, which left to that assembly the power of giving the provinces at its will. ⁽¹⁾ These different measures revealed sufficiently the thoughts of the Senate, and the prudent politicians saw with uneasiness that it was seeking to precipitate events.

Discord in the interior generally paralyses all national policy on the exterior. Absorbed by the intrigues at home, the aristocratic party was sacrificing the great interests of the Republic. ~~Cicero wrote in vain that his forces were insufficient to resist the Parthians, an invasion by whom appeared imminent: the consuls refused to occupy the Senate with his claims, because they were unwilling either to go themselves to undertake so distant a campaign, or to permit others to go in their place.~~ ⁽²⁾ They were much more anxious to humble Cæsar than to avenge Crassus; and yet the public opinion, moved by the dangers with which Syria was threatened, called for an extraordinary command in the East, either for Pompey or for Cæsar. ⁽³⁾ Fortunately, the Parthians did not at-

⁽¹⁾ Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 8, §§ 3, 4

⁽²⁾ "But the consuls, who fear being obliged, by a decree of the Senate, to leave for the war, and who feel at the same time how disgraceful it will be to them if this commission fall on any other but them, will absolutely not allow the Senate to assemble; they carry it so far as to make people suspect them of want of zeal for the Republic: there is no knowing if it be negligence, or cowardice, or the fear of which I have just spoken; but what is concealed under this appearance of reserve is, that they will not have that province." (Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 10)

⁽³⁾ "With the succour of Dejotarus, the enemies may be held at bay till the arrival of Pompey, who sends me word that they intend him for this war." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VI. 1)—"At this news of the passage of the Euphrates, every one offers to give his advice: this man would have them send Pompey; the other, Cæsar and his army." (Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 10)

tack; Bibulus and Cicero had only to combat bands of plunderers. The latter, on the 3rd of the Ides of October, defeated a party of Cilician mountaineers near Mount Amanus. He carried their camp, besieged their fortress of Pindenissus, which he took, and his soldiers saluted him as *imperator*.⁽¹⁾ From that time he took this title in the subscription of his letters.⁽²⁾

(1) Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. 20.

(2) He kept this title until the moment the civil war broke out.

CHAPTER IX.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.

I. THE year 703 had been employed in intrigues with the object of overthrowing Cæsar, and the aristocratic party believed that, for the success of this sort of plot, it could reckon upon the support of the chief magistrates who were entering upon office in January, 704. Of the two consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, nephew of the preceding consul of the same name, and L. Æmilius Paulus, the first was kinsman, but at the same time enemy, of Cæsar; the second had not yet shown his party, though report gave him the same opinions as his colleague. It was expected that, in concert with C. Scribonius Curio, whose advancement to the tribuneship was due to Pompey, ⁽¹⁾ he would distribute the lands of Campania which had not yet been given out, the consequence of which would be that Cæsar, on his return, could no longer dispose of this property in favour of his veterans. ⁽²⁾ This hope was vain; for already Paulus and Curio had joined the party of the proconsul of Gaul. Well informed of the intrigues of his enemies, Cæsar had long taken care to have always at Rome a consul or tribunes devoted to his interest; in 703 he could reckon on the Consul Sulpi-

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 4

⁽²⁾ Cælius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 10.

cius and the tribunes Pansa and Coelius; in 704, Paulus and Curio were devoted to him. If, subsequently, in 705, the two consuls were opposed to him, he had, at least on his side, that year, the tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.

Curio is called by Velleius Paterculus the wittiest of rogues; ⁽¹⁾ but as long as this tribune remained faithful to the cause of the Senate, Cicero honoured him with his esteem, and paid the greatest compliments to his character and his high qualities. ⁽²⁾ Curio had acquired authority by his eloquence, and by the numbers of his clients. His father had been the declared enemy of Cæsar, against whom he had written a book, ⁽³⁾ and uttered many jokes, cutting or coarse, which were repeated in Rome. ⁽⁴⁾ Inheriting these feelings, Curio had long pursued the conqueror of Gaul with his sarcasms; but nobody forgot insults so easily as Cæsar, and, as he appreciated the political importance of this dangerous adversary, he spared nothing to gain him to his interests.

From his earliest youth, Curio had been bound by close intimacy to Mark Antony. Both ruined by debts, they had led together the most dissolute lives; their friendship had never changed. ⁽⁵⁾ The relationship of Mark Antony with the Julia family, ⁽⁶⁾ his connection with Gabinius, and, above all, his military conduct in Egypt, had gained for him the respect of Cæsar, to whom he withdrew when Gabinius was put on his trial. ⁽⁷⁾ Cæsar employed him first as lieu-

⁽¹⁾ "Ingeniosissime nequam."

⁽²⁾ Cicero to Curio, *Epist. Familias.*, II. 7.

⁽³⁾ Cicero, *Brutus*, lx. 218.

⁽⁴⁾ Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 49.

⁽⁵⁾ Plutarch, *Antony*, 2.—Cicero, *Philippica*, II. xix. 48.

⁽⁶⁾ See his biography in *Appendix D.*

⁽⁷⁾ Cicero, *Philippica*, II. xx. 49.

tenant, and afterwards, in 701, chose him as quæstor. His kindness for Mark Antony probably contributed to soften Curio's temper; his liberality did the rest. He had given him, if we can believe Appian, more than 1,500 talents. ⁽¹⁾ It is true that, at the same time, he bought equally dear the Consul L. Æmilius Paulus, without requiring more than his neutrality. ⁽²⁾ We can hardly understand how Cæsar, while he was paying his army, could support such sacrifices, and meet, at the same time, so many other expenses. To increase by his largesses the number of his partisans in Rome; ⁽³⁾ to cause to be built in the Narbonnese theatres and monuments; near Aricia, in Italy, a magnificent villa; ⁽⁴⁾ to send rich presents to distant towns—such were his burthens. How, to meet them, could he draw money enough from a province exhausted by eight years' war? The immensity of his resources is explained by the circumstance that, independently of the tributes paid by the vanquished, which amounted, for Gaul, to 40,000,000 sesterii a year (more than 7,500,000 francs) [£300,000], the sale of prisoners to Roman traders produced enormous sums. Cicero informs us that he gained 12,000,000 sesterii from the captives sold after the unimportant siege of Pindenissus. If we suppose that ther num-

(1) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 26 —Yet Cicero, who never spared his adversaries, makes no mention of this act of corruption; and Velleius Paterculus (II. 48) expresses himself as follows. "Did Curio, as has been said, sell himself? It is a question we cannot venture to decide".

(2) "Æmilius Paulus built, they say, with this money the famous basilica which bears his name." (Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 26)

(3) "It was said of him that there was no man so low but he thought him worth the trouble of gaining." (Cicero, *Ad Div.*, VIII. 22)

(4) A villa near Aricia. (Cicero, *Epist ad Atticum*, VI. 1)

ber amounted to 12,000, this sum would represent 1,000 sesterii a head. Now, in spite of Cæsar's generosity in often restoring the captives to the conquered peoples, or in making gifts of them to his soldiers, as was the case after the siege of Alesia, we may admit that 500,000 Gauls, Germans, or Britons were sold as slaves during the eight years of the war in Gaul, which must have produced a sum of about 500,000,000 sesterii, or about 95,000,000 francs [£3,800,000]. It was thus Roman money, given by the slave-dealers, which formed the greatest part of the booty, in the same manner as in modern times, when, in distant expeditions, the European nations take possession of the foreign custom-houses to pay the costs of the war, it is still European money which forms the advance for the costs.

The reconciliation of Curio with Cæsar^r was at first kept secret; but, whether in order to contrive a pretext for changing his party, the new tribune had moved laws which had no chance of being adopted, or because he felt offended at the rejection of his propositions, towards the beginning of the year 704 he declared for Cæsar, or, which was the same thing, as Cœlius said, he ranged himself on the side of the people. Whatever might be the motive of his conduct, the following are the circumstances in the sequel of which his attitude became modified. He had proposed the intercalation of a month in the current year, in order, probably, to retard the period for the decision of the question which agitated the Senate and the town. ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ "Curio, in his ill humour at not having obtained the intercalation, has thrown himself, with unequalled levity, into the party of the people, and began to speak on Cæsar's side." (Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 6)

His character of pontiff rendered his motion perfectly legal: in spite of its incontestable utility, ⁽¹⁾ it was ill received. He expected this, but he appeared to take the matter to heart, and to look upon the Senate's refusal as an offence. From that moment he began a systematic opposition. ⁽²⁾ Towards the same time he presented two laws, one concerning the alim-entation of the people, with which he proposed to charge the ædiles; ⁽³⁾ the other, on the repair of the roads, of which he asked for the direction during five years. ⁽⁴⁾ He seems to have intended to make the travellers pay according to the number and nature of their means of transport; or, in a word, to establish a tax upon the rich, and thus increase his popularity. ⁽⁵⁾ These last two projects were as ill received as the first, and this double check completed his reconciliation with those against whom he had hitherto contended.

The nomination of the censors, which took place at this period, brought new complications. One, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, accepted the office only with regret, and showed an extreme indulgence; the other, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been consul in 700, a fiery partisan of the nobles, thought he served their cause by displaying excessive severity.

⁽¹⁾ See *Appendix A*.

⁽²⁾ DIO CASSIUS, XL 62.

⁽³⁾ Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, VIII. 6

⁽⁴⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VI. 1; *Ad Div.*, VIII. vi. 5. — Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 27.

⁽⁵⁾ The following letter explains the nature of this tax: "This man of importance (P. Vedius) met me with two chariots, a chaise, a litter, and so great a number of valets, that, if Curio's law passes, Vedius will surely be taxed at 100,000 sesterii. He had, moreover, a cynocephalus in one of his chariots, and wild asses in his equipage. I never saw a man so ridiculous." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VI i. 22.)

He expelled from the Senate all the freedmen, and several of the most illustrious nobles, among others the historian Sallust, a man of mind and talent, who immediately repaired to the Cisalpine, where Cæsar received him with eagerness. ⁽¹⁾

Appius had no moderation in his harshness. Cicero says of him that, to efface a mere stain, he cut open veins and entrails. ⁽²⁾ Instead of remedying the evil, he only envenomed it; he threw into the ranks of the opposite party all whom he excluded, without giving greater consideration to those whom he kept. There are times when severity is a bad adviser, and is not calculated to restore to a government the moral force it has lost.

II. Cæsar passed the whole of the winter, 704, at Nemetocenna (*Arras*). "At the beginning of the following year, he started in haste for Italy, in order," says Hirtius, "to recommend to the municipal towns and colonies his quæstor, Mark Antony, who solicited the priesthood. Supporting him with his credit, he not only sought to serve a faithful friend whom he had himself persuaded to seek that office, but to strive against a faction which wished to defeat him, in order to shake Cæsar's power at the moment when his government was on the eve of expiring. On his way, before he reached Italy, he received intelligence of the election of Antony to the office of augur; he considered it none the less his duty to visit the municipal towns and colonies, to thank them for their favourable feeling towards

Cæsar repairs to the
Cisalpine.

⁽¹⁾ DIO Cassius, XL. 63.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 14.

Antony. He sought also to secure their support next year (705), for his enemies insolently boasted that they had, on one hand, named to the consulship L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus, who would strip Cæsar of his offices and dignities; and, on the other, that they had deprived Servius Galba of the consulship, in spite of his credit and the number of his votes, for the sole reason that he was Cæsar's friend and lieutenant.

"Cæsar was received by the municipal towns and colonies with incredible marks of respect and affection; it was the first time he appeared among them since the general insurrection of Gaul. They omitted nothing that could be imagined in adorning the gates, roads, and places on his passage; women and children all rushed in crowds to the public places and into the temples; everywhere they immolated victims and spread tables. The rich displayed their magnificence, the poor rivalled each other in zeal." Cæsar tasted beforehand the pleasures of a triumph earnestly desired. (')

After having thus visited Citerior Gaul, he quickly rejoined the army at Nemetocenna. In the prospect of his approaching departure, he wished to strike the minds of the Germans and Gauls by a grand agglomeration of forces, and show himself once more to his assembled troops. The legions, who had withdrawn to their quarters, were sent into the country of the Treviri; Cæsar went there also, and passed the army in review. This solemnity was necessarily grand. He saw before him his old cohorts, with whom he had fought so many battles, and of which the youn-

gest soldiers reckoned eight campaigns. No doubt he reminded them that, general or consul, he owed everything to the people and to the army, and that the glory they had acquired formed between them indissoluble ties. Until the end of the summer he remained in the north of Gaul, "only moving the troops as much as was necessary to preserve the soldiers' health. T. Labienus received afterwards the command of Citerior Gaul, in the aim of securing more votes for Cæsar's approaching candidateship for the office of consul. Although the latter was not ignorant of the manœuvres of his enemies to detach Labienus from him, and of their intrigues to cause the Senate to deprive him of a part of his army, he could not be prevailed upon either to doubt Labienus, or to attempt anything against the authority of the Senate. He knew that, if the votes were free, the conscript fathers would do him justice." (¹) In fact, whenever the Senate was not under the dominion of a factious minority, the majority pronounced in favour of Cæsar.

It had been decided, in the preceding month of October, that the question of the consular provinces should be brought under consideration on the 1st of March, 704, the period at which Pompey had declared that he would throw no obstacle in the way of the discussion. It was opened then, as appears from a letter of Cicero, and the Senate showed an inclination to recall Cæsar for the Ides of November, 704. Nevertheless, there was no decisive result. People were afraid yet to engage in a struggle for life:

(¹) *De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 52.

Curio, singly, made the Senate tremble by his opposition. ⁽¹⁾

When, in the bosom of that assembly, C. Marcellus was declaiming against Cæsar, Curio began to speak, praised the consul's prudence, approved much of the proposal that the conqueror of Gaul should be summoned to disband his army; but he insinuated that it would not be less desirable to see Pompey disband his. "Those great generals," said he, "were objects of suspicion to him, and there would be no tranquillity for the Republic until both of them should become private men." ⁽²⁾ This speech pleased the people, who, moreover, began to lose much of their esteem for Pompey since the time that, by his law on bribery, a great number of citizens were condemned to exile. On all sides they praised Curio; they admired his courage in braving two such powerful men, and on several occasions an immense crowd escorted him to his house, throwing flowers over him "like an athlete," says Appian, "who had just sustained a severe and dangerous combat." ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ "Pompey appears to agree with the Senate in requiring absolutely the return of Cæsar on the Ides of November. Curio is decided to do everything rather than suffer this. the rest he cares little about. Our party—you know them well—do not dare to undertake a deadly combat. This is how things stand now. Pompey, who, without attacking Cæsar, will accord nothing to him but what is just, accuses Curio of being an agent of discord. At the bottom, he will not allow that Cæsar be designated consul before he has given up his army and his province, and his great fear is that that may happen. He is by no means spared by Curio, who throws continually his second consulate in his teeth. I will tell you what will come to pass; if they do not use discretion with Curio, Cæsar will gain a defender in him. With the fear which they show of the opposition of a tribune, they will do so much that Cæsar will remain indefinitely master in Gaul." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Familian.*, VIII. 11.)

⁽²⁾ Dio Cassius, XL. 41.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 27.

⁽³⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 27.

The clever manœuvres of Cicero had such success that, when Marcellus proposed to concert with the tribunes of the people on the means of opposing the candidature of Cæsar, the majority of the Senate gave their opinion to the contrary. On this subject, M. Cœlius wrote to Cæsar: "The opinions have changed so much that now they are ready to reckon as a candidate for the consulship a man who will give up neither his army nor his province."⁽¹⁾ Pompey gave no sign of life, and let the Senate have its way.

He always seemed to disdain what he desired most. Thus, at this time, he affected an entire carelessness, and retrenched himself in his legality, taking care to avoid all appearance of personal hostility towards Cæsar. At the same time, either in order to avoid being pressed too soon, or to appear indifferent to the question which agitated the Republic, he left his gardens near Rome to visit Campania. Thence he sent a letter to the Senate, in which, while he praised Cæsar and himself, he reminded them that he never had solicited a third consulship, nor yet the command of the armies; that he had received it in spite of himself, in order to save the Republic, and that he was ready to renounce it without waiting the term fixed by the law.⁽²⁾ This letter, studied and artful, was intended to bring out the contrast between his disinterested conduct and that of Cæsar, who refused to surrender his government; but Curio baffled this manœuvre. "If Pompey were sincere," he said, "he

⁽¹⁾ Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 13

⁽²⁾ "It is his custom to speak in one way and to think in another; but he has not head enough to prevent people from seeing through him." (Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. ad Familiar.*, VIII. 1)

⁽³⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 28.

ought not to promise to give his resignation, but to give it at once; so long as he should not have retired into private life, the command could not be taken from Cæsar. Besides, the interest of the State required the presence of two rivals constantly opposed to each other; and, in his eyes, it was Pompey who openly aspired to absolute power.”⁽¹⁾ This accusation was not without ground; for during the last nineteen years—that is to say, since 684, the time of his first consulship—Pompey had nearly always been in possession of the *imperium*, either as consul, or as general in the wars against the pirates and against Mithridates, or, finally, as charged with the victualing of Italy. “To take Cæsar’s army from him,” says Plutarch, “and to leave his army to Pompey, was, by accusing the one of aspiring to the tyranny, to give the other the means of obtaining it.”⁽²⁾

III. About this time Pompey fell dangerously ill,

Pompey receives Ova-
tions, and asks Cæsar
to return his Two Le-
gions.

and on his recovery the Neapolitans and the peoples of all Italy showed such joy, that “every town, great or small,” says Plutarch, “celebrated festivals for several days. When he returned to Rome, there was no place spacious enough to contain the crowd which came to meet him; the roads, the villages, and the ports were full of people offering sacrifices and making banquets, in order to show their joy at his recovery. A great number of citizens, crowned with leaves, went to receive him with torches, and threw flowers on him as they accompanied him; the procession which followed

⁽¹⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 28

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 34.

him in his progress offered the most agreeable and most magnificent spectacle." (¹) Although these ovations had given Pompey an exaggerated opinion of his influence, on his return to Rome he observed in public the same reserve, though in secret he supported the measures calculated to diminish Cæsar's power. Thus, taking for pretext the demands for reinforcements renewed incessantly by Bibulus and Cicero, proconsuls of Syria and Cilicia, who sought to place their provinces in safety against an invasion of the Parthians, he represented that the levies ordered by the Senate were insufficient, and that it was necessary to send experienced troops to the East. It was thereupon decided that Pompey and Cæsar, who were at the head of considerable armies, should each of them detach one legion for the defence of the threatened provinces. A *senatus-consultus* at once summoned Cæsar to send his legion, and ordered him, besides, to return the legion which Pompey had lent him shortly after the conference of Lucca. Perhaps they hoped for resistance on his part, for this last legion had been raised, like all those of his army, in Cisalpine Gaul; but he obeyed without hesitation, so that he alone had to furnish the reinforcements required for the East. Before parting with his soldiers, who had so long fought under his orders, he caused 250 drachmas (225 francs) to be distributed to each legionary. (²)

Appius Claudius, nephew of the censor of the same name, who had left Rome with the mission of bring-

(¹) Plutarch, *Pompey*, 61.

(²) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 29.—Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 32.

ing those troops from the Cisalpine into Italy, reported on his return that the soldiers of Cæsar, weary of their long campaigns, sighed for repose, and that it would be impossible to draw them into a civil war; he pretended even that the legions in winter quarters in Transalpine Gaul would no sooner have passed the Alps than they would rally to Pompey's flag. (¹) Events in the sequel proved the falsity of this information, for not only, as will appear hereafter, did the troops which had remained under Cæsar's command continue faithful to him, but those which had been withdrawn from him preserved the remembrance of their ancient general. In fact, Pompey himself had not the least confidence in the two legions he had received, and his letter to Domitius, proconsul at the commencement of the civil war, explains his inaction by the danger of bringing them into the presence of the army of Cæsar, so much he fears to see them pass over to the opposite camp. (²) At Rome, nevertheless, they believed in the reports which flattered the pretensions of Pompey, although they were contra-

(¹) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 29.—This officer (Appius) affected to undervalue the exploits which had been accomplished in that country (Gaul), and to spread rumours injurious to Cæsar. "Pompey," said he, "must have known very little his strength and reputation, otherwise would he, in order to measure himself with Cæsar, seek other troops than those which were at his disposal? He would conquer him with the very legions of his enemy, as soon as he appeared, so much did the soldiers hate Cæsar, and desire to see Pompey again." (Plutarch, *Pompey*, 61)

(²) "I should like to come nearer to you; but, I regret to say, I dare not trust myself to the two legions. . . . The two legions must not be exposed in the presence of Cæsar without the cohorts from Picenum." (*Letter from Pompey to Domitius, Proconsul*.—Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VIII. 12.)—"All my resources are reduced to two legions, which Pompey has retained in an odious manner, and of which he is no more sure than of foreigners." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 13.)

dicted by other more certain information, which showed Italy, the Cisalpine provinces, and Gaul itself, equally devoted to Cæsar. Pompey, deaf to these last warnings, affected the greatest contempt for the forces of which his adversary could dispose. According to him, Cæsar was ruining himself, and had no other chance of safety but in a prompt and complete submission. When he was asked with what troops he would resist the conqueror of Gaul, in case he were to march upon Rome, he replied, with an air of confidence, that he had only to strike the soil of Italy with his foot to make legions start up out of it. ⁽¹⁾

It was natural that his vanity should make him interpret favourably all that was passing under his eyes. At Rome, the greatest personages were devoted to him. Italy had shuddered at the news of his illness, and celebrated his recovery as if it had been a triumph. The army of Gaul, it was said, was ready to answer to his call.

With less blindness, Pompey might have discerned the true reason of the enthusiasm of which he had been the object. He would have understood that this enthusiasm was much less addressed to his person than to the depositary of an authority which alone then seemed capable of saving the Republic: he would have understood that, the day another general should appear under the same conditions of fame and power as himself, the people, with its admirable discernment, would at once side with him who should best identify himself with their interests.

To understand the public opinion correctly, he

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 61.

ought not, though this might have been a difficult thing to the chief of the aristocratic cause, to have confined himself solely to the judgment of the official world, but he should have interrogated the sentiments of those whose position brought them nearest to the people. Instead of believing the reports of Appius Claudius, and reckoning on the discontent of certain of Cæsar's lieutenants, who, like Labienus, already showed hostile tendencies, Pompey ought to have meditated upon that exclamation of a centurion, who, placed at the door of the Senate, when that assembly rejected the just reclamations of the conqueror of Gaul, exclaimed, putting his hand to his sword, "This will give him what he asks." ⁽¹⁾

The fact is that, in civil commotions, each class of society divines, as by instinct, the cause which responds to its aspirations, and feels itself attracted to it by a secret affinity. Men born in the superior classes, or brought to their level by honours and riches, are always drawn towards the aristocracy, whilst men kept by fortune in the inferior ranks remain the firm supports of the popular cause. Thus, at the return from the isle of Elba, most of the generals of the Emperor Napoleon, loaded with wealth like the lieutenants of Cæsar, ⁽²⁾ marched openly against him; but in the army all up to the rank of colonel said, after the example of the Roman centurion, pointing to their weapons, "This will place him on the throne again!"

⁽¹⁾ Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 33.

⁽²⁾ "Do you approve that Labienus and Mamurra should have amassed immense riches?" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 7.)

IV. An attentive examination of the correspondence between M. Cœlius and Cicero, as well as the relations of the various authors, leads to the conviction that at that period it required great efforts on the part of the turbulent fraction of the aristocratic party to drag the Senate into hostility towards Cæsar. The censor Appius, reviewing the list of that body, *noted* Curio, that is, wished to strike him from the list; but at the instances of his colleague and of the Consul Paulus, he confined himself to expressing a formal reproof, and his regret that he could not do justice. On hearing him, Curio tore his toga, and protested with the utmost passion against a disloyal attack. The Consul Marcellus, who suspected the good understanding between Curio and Cæsar, and who reckoned on the feelings of the Senate, which were very unfavourable to both, brought the conduct of the tribune under discussion. While he protested against this illegal proceeding, Curio accepted the debate, and declared that, strong in his conscience, and certain of having always acted in the interests of the Republic, he placed with confidence his honour and his life in the hands of the Senate. This scene could have no other result but an honourable vote for Curio; ⁽¹⁾ but this incident was soon left, and the discussion passed to the political situation. Marcellus proposed at first this question: *Ought Cæsar to be superseded in his province?* He urged the Senate to a vote. The senators having formed themselves into two groups in the curia, an immense majority declared for the af-

The Senate votes
impartially.

(1) Dio Cassius, XL 63, 64.

firmative. The same majority pronounced for the negative on a second question of Marcellus. *Ought Pompey to be superseded?* But Curio, resuming the arguments which he had used so many times on the danger of favouring Pompey at the expense of Cæsar, demanded a vote upon a third question: *Ought Pompey and Cæsar both to disarm?* To the surprise of the consul, this unexpected motion passed by a majority of 370 against 22. Then Marcellus dismissed the Senate, saying with bitterness, "You carry the day! you will have Cæsar for master."⁽¹⁾ He did not imagine that he foretold the future so well. Thus the almost unanimity of the assembly had, by its vote, justified Curio, who, in this instance, was only the representative of Cæsar; and if Pompey and his party had submitted to this decision, there would no longer have been a pretext for the struggle which honest men feared: Cæsar and Pompey would have resumed their place in ordinary life, each with his partisans and his renown, but without army, and consequently without the means of disturbing the Republic.

V. This was not what these restless men wanted, who masked their petty passions under the great words of public safety and liberty. In order to destroy the effect of this vote of the Senate, the rumour was spread in Rome that Cæsar had entered Italy; Marcellus demanded that troops should be raised, and that the two legions destined for the war in the East should be brought from

Violent Measures
adopted against Cæ-
sar

(1) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 30.—Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VIII. 4.

Capua, where they were in garrison. Curio protested against the falsehood of this news, and interceded, in his quality of tribune, to oppose all extraordinary arming. Then Marcellus exclaimed, "Since I can do nothing here with the consent of all, I alone take charge of the public welfare on my own responsibility!" He then hurried to the suburb where Pompey had his quarters, and, presenting him with a sword, addressed him in these words: "I summon you to take the command of the troops which are at Capua, to raise others, and to take the measures necessary for the safety of the Republic." Pompey accepted this mission, but with reserves: he said that he would obey the orders of the consuls, "if, at least, there was nothing better to do." This prudent reflection, at a moment so critical, pictures the character of the man. (¹) M. Marcellus understood all the irregularity of his conduct, and brought with him the consuls nominated for the following year (705); even before they entered upon office, (²) which was to take place in a few days, they had the right to render edicts which indicated the principles upon which they intended to act during the time of their magistracy. They were L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius Marcellus, the last a kinsman of the preceding consul of the same name, both enemies to Cæsar. They entered into an engagement with Pompey to support with all their efforts the measure which their predecessor had taken at his own risk and peril. We see, they are the consuls and Pompey who revolt against the decisions of the Senate.

(¹) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 31 — Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VI. 9; VII. 1

Curio could not oppose these measures regularly, the tribunes not having the right of exercising their powers outside Rome; but he attacked before the people what had just been done, and recommended them not to obey the levy of troops which had been ordered by Pompey, in contempt of the law. (¹)

VI. The following letter from M. Cœlius to Cicero shows what was the judgment of impartial Romans upon the public situation in September, 704:—

State of Public
Opinion.

“The nearer we approach the inevitable struggle, the more we are struck with the greatness of the danger. This is the ground on which the two men of power of the day are going to encounter each other. Cn. Pompey is decided not to suffer Cæsar to be consul until he has resigned his army and his provinces, and Cæsar is convinced that there is no safety for him unless he keep his army; he consents, nevertheless, if the condition of giving up the commandment be reciprocal. Thus those effusions of tenderness and this so dreaded alliance will end, not in hidden animosity, but in open war. As far as I am concerned, I do not know which side to take in this conjuncture, and I doubt not but this perplexity is common to us. In one of the parties, I have obligations of gratitude and friendship; in the other, it is the cause, not the men, I hate. My principles, which no doubt you share, are these: in domestic dissensions, so long as things pass between unarmed citizens, to prefer the most honest party; but when war breaks out, and two

(¹) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 31.

camps are in presence, to side with the strongest, and seek reason where there is safety. Now, what do I see here? On one side, Pompey, with the Senate and the magistracy; on the other, Cæsar, with all who have anything to fear or to covet. No comparison possible, as far as the armies are concerned. May it please the gods to give us time to weigh the respective forces, and to make our choice." (¹) Cœlius was not long in making his; he embraced the party of Cæsar. (²)

This appreciation of a contemporary was certainly shared by a great number of persons, who, without well-defined convictions, were ready to side with the strongest. Cicero, who was returning to Italy, (³) had the same tendency, yet he felt an extreme embarrassment. Not only was he on friendly terms with the two adversaries, but Cæsar had lent him a considerable sum, and this debt weighed upon him like a remorse. (⁴) After having ardently desired to leave his command for fear of the war against the Parthians, he fell into the midst of preparations for a civil war

(¹) Cœlius to Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII 14

(²) Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII 3.

(³) Cicero landed at Brundisium on the 7th of the Calends of December, 704 (*Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 2)

(⁴) "I receive flattering letters from Cæsar; Balbus writes me as many in his name. I am firmly determined not to flinch a finger's length from the road of honour; but you know how much I am under obligation to Cæsar. Do you think that I have not to fear that they will reproach me my debt, if I vote even quietly in his favour, and, if I speak strongly, that they will ask it loudly from me? What am I to do? Pay it, you will say. Well! I will borrow from Cœlius. But think of it, I beg of you, for I expect, if I happen to speak firmly in the Senate, your good friend from Taressus will at once tell me. You, pay what you owe!" (Year 704, 9th December. Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII 3.)

which presented a much greater danger. Hence, when on his arrival in Greece he believed, on false reports, that Cæsar had sent four legions into Piacenza, his first thought was to shut himself up in the citadel of Athens. ⁽¹⁾ When at last he had returned to Italy, he congratulated himself on being in a condition to obtain the honours of a triumph, because then the obligation of remaining outside Rome dispensed him from declaring for either of the two rivals.

He wished above all for the triumph, and in his letters he pressed the influential personages to prevail upon the Senate to consent to it; but Cato considered, like many others, that the exploits of the proconsul in Cilicia did not deserve so much honour, and he refused to give him his support, whilst, at the same time, he greatly praised his character. Cæsar, less rigid on principles, forgetting nothing which could flatter the self-love of important men, had written to Cicero to promise him his assistance, and blame Cato's severity. ⁽²⁾

Meanwhile, the celebrated orator did not deceive

⁽¹⁾ "What will become of us? I have a good mind to shut myself up in the citadel of Athens, whence I write you this note." (Year 704 *Epist. ad Atticum*, VI. 9.)—"Consequently, leaving to the fools the initiative of speech, I think that I shall do well to endeavour to obtain this triumph, were it only to have a reason not to be in Rome; but they are sure to find a means to come to wiest my opinion from me. You will laugh at me. How I wish I had remained in my province!" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 1.)

⁽²⁾ "He has borne witness, which I did not ask him, to my integrity, my equity, and my kindness, and he has refused me what I expected from him. You should see how Cæsar, in the letter in which he congratulates me and promises me everything, knows how to make the most of this abominable ingratitude of Cato! But this same Cato has caused twenty days to be granted to Bibulus. You must excuse me being spiteful; but this is a thing which I cannot bear, and which I will never forgive him." (Year 704, November. Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 2.)

himself as to the resources of the two parties. When he talked with Pompey, the assurance of that warrior tranquillised him; but when abandoned to his own meditations, he saw well that all the chances were on the side of Cæsar.

"To-day," he wrote, "Cæsar is at the head of eleven legions (he forgot the two legions given to Pompey), without counting the cavalry, of which he can have as many as he likes; he has in his favour the Transpadan towns, the populace of Rome, the entire order of the knights, nearly all the tribunes, all the disorderly youth, the ascendant of his glorious name, and his extreme boldness. This is the man they have to combat. (¹) This party only wants a good cause; the rest they have in abundance. Consequently, there is nothing which they must not do rather than come to war; the result of which is always uncertain, and how much the more is it not to be feared for us!" (²)

As for his own party, he defined it in the following manner: "What do you mean by these men of the good side? I know none that I could name. I know some, if we mean to speak of the whole class of honest men; for individually, in the true sense of the word, they are rare; but in civil strife you must seek the cause of honourable men where it is. Is it the Senate which is that good party; the Senate, which leaves provinces without governors? Curio would never have resisted if they had made up their minds to oppose him; but the Senate has done nothing of

(¹) Year 704, December. Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 7.—The words *entire order of the knights* are not in the text, but they result from what Cæsar says in the same letter

(²) Year 704, December. Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 3.

the kind, and they have not been able to give Cæsar a successor. Is it the knights who have never shown a very firm patriotism, and who now are entirely devoted to Cæsar? Are they the merchants or the country people who only ask to live in repose? Shall we believe that they fear much to see one single man in power, they who are content with any government, so long as they are quiet?"⁽¹⁾

The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a visit.⁽²⁾ The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been generally blamed,⁽³⁾ but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.

"I have seen Pompey," wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the Calends of December. "We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone from two o'clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of agreement. As far as I have been able to judge

⁽¹⁾ Year 704, December. Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 7.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 4

⁽³⁾ "The situation of the Republic inspires me every day with more uneasiness. Honest people do not agree so well as is thought. How many Roman knights, how many senators, have I not heard inveighing against Pompey, particularly on account of this unfortunate journey! What we want is peace. All victory will be fatal, and cause a tyrant to rise up. Yes, I am one of those who think that it is better to grant all he (Cæsar) asks than to appeal to arms. It is now too late to resist him, when for the last ten years we have done nothing else but to give him strength against us." (Year 704, December. Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 5.)

from what he told me in a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it. He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is, moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, *Mars has equal chances for everybody*, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands; he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, 'What will Cæsar not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner?' In short, far from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is, that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful to remain the debtor of a political adversary." (1) By this declaration Cicero proves in the most positive manner that

(1) Year 704, December Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 8.

Pompey desired war, and rejected all reconciliation ; he repeats it elsewhere with still more precision.

Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar's just demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil war.

He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling, and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703, when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the day, ⁽¹⁾ and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt ; after many hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed ; passions become inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes intercede : their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without obtaining a *senatus-consultus*, without appealing to the people, the consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.

(1) "*Senatus frequens in alia transit.*" (*Le Bello Gallico*, VIII. 43)

CHAPTER X.

EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.

I. IN the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival, for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel. ⁽¹⁾ In the winter between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul, presided there, according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at Ravenna, the last town in his command. ⁽²⁾ He had only the 13th legion at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry; ⁽³⁾ nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy. ⁽⁴⁾

It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in December, 704, ⁽⁵⁾ hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms, thanked

⁽¹⁾ "Neque senatu interveniente." (*De Bello Gallico*, VIII 4)

⁽²⁾ Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 30

⁽³⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 22.—Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 41, *Pompey*, 85.

⁽⁴⁾ *De Bello Gallico*, VIII 54

⁽⁵⁾ It ended before the consular year.

him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come to an understanding. He engaged his friends⁽¹⁾ at Rome to propose a plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero, and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions, until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion.⁽²⁾ "He made the greatest efforts," says Velleius Paterculus,⁽³⁾ "to maintain peace: the friends of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals." "The appearance of justice," says Plutarch, "was on the side of Cæsar." When the negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to Cicero;⁽⁴⁾ well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to draw the multitude to Cæsar's side.⁽⁵⁾

Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days, re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them, according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear that they should not communicate it;

⁽¹⁾ Drumann is of opinion that the "Commentaries" are in error in mentioning Fabius. ⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 59 — Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 32.

⁽³⁾ Velleius Paterculus, II. 49.

⁽⁴⁾ Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 9

⁽⁵⁾ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 63.

and, indeed, at first they opposed the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse. (¹)

Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic, justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression, which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in the Senate. "It is war he declares," they exclaimed, and the irritation rose to the greatest height. (²) No deliberation could be obtained on any of his propositions.

II. The Consul L. Lentulus, in a violent oration, engaged the Senate to show more courage and firmness :

(¹) Plutarch (*Pompey*, 59) pretends even that they read it before the people

(²) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 32.

Lentulus carries the
Senate against Cæ-
sar.

he promised to support it, and defend the Republic: "If, on the contrary, the assembly, in this critical moment, was wanting in energy—if, as in the past, it meant to spare Cæsar and to conciliate his good graces, there would be an end of its authority: as far as he was concerned, he should hasten to withdraw from it, and should in future consult only himself. After all, he also might gain the friendship and favour of Cæsar." Scipio spoke in the same spirit: "Pompey," said he, "will not fail the Republic, if he is followed by the Senate; but if they hesitate, if they act with weakness, the Senate will henceforth invoke his aid in vain." This language of Scipio seemed to be the expression of the thoughts of Pompey, who was at the gates of the town with his army. More moderate opinions were also offered. M. Marcellus demanded that, before coming to any decision, the Senate should assemble troops from the different parts of Italy in order to ensure the independence of their deliberations; M. Calidius proposed that Pompey should retire to his province, in order to avoid all motive for a war; for Cæsar might justly fear to see used against him the two legions taken away from his command, and retained under the walls of Rome. M. Rufus gave his opinion nearly in the same terms. Lentulus immediately burst out into violent reproaches against the latter speakers; he upbraided them with their defection, and refused to put the proposal of Calidius to a vote. Marcellus, terrified, withdrew his motion. Then there happened one of those strange and sudden changes, so common in revolutionary assemblies: the violent apostrophes of

Lentulus, the threats uttered by the partisans of Pompey, the terror inspired by the presence of an army under the walls of Rome, exerted an irresistible pressure upon the minds of the senators, who, in spite of themselves, adopted the motion of Scipio, and decreed that "if Cæsar did not disband his army on the day prescribed, he should be declared an enemy of the Republic." (¹)

Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, oppose this decree. (²) A report is immediately made of their opposition, invoking the decision taken by the Senate the year before; grave measures are proposed: the more violent they are, the more the enemies of Cæsar applaud. In the evening, after the sitting, Pompey convokes the senators in his gardens: he distributes praise and blame amongst them, encourages some, intimidates others. At the same time, he recalls from all parts a great number of his veterans, promising them rewards and promotion. He addressed himself even to the soldiers of the two legions who had formed part of Cæsar's army. (³)

The town is in a state of extreme agitation. The tribune Curio claims the right of the comitia which had been set aside. The friends of the consuls, the adherents of Pompey, all who nourished old rancours against Cæsar, hurry towards the Senate, which is again assembled. Their clamours and threats deprive that assembly of all liberty of decision. The most varied proposals follow each other. The censor L. Piso and the prætor Roscius offer to go to Cæsar, to

(¹) Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 1.

(²) Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, VIII. 8.

(³) Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 3.

inform him of what is going on; they only ask a delay of six days. Others desire that deputies be charged to go to make him acquainted with the will of the Senate.

All these motions are rejected. Cato, Lentulus, and Scipio redouble in violence. Cato is animated by old enmities and the mortification of his recent check in the consular elections. Lentulus, overwhelmed with debts, hopes for honours and riches; he boasts among his party that he will become a second Sylla, and be master of the empire.⁽¹⁾ Scipio flatters himself with an ambition equally chimerical. Lastly, Pompey, who will have no equal, desires war, the only way to get over the folly of his conduct,⁽²⁾ and this prop of the Republic assumes the title, like Agamemnon, of king of kings.⁽³⁾

The consuls propose to the Senate to assume public mourning, in order to strike the imagination of the people, and to show them that the country is in danger. Mark Antony and his colleague Cassius intercede; but no attention is paid to their opposition. The Senate assembles in mourning attire, decided beforehand on rigorous measures. The tribunes, on the other hand, announce that they intend to make use of their right of veto. In the midst of this general excitement, their obstinacy is no longer considered as a right of their office, but as a proof of their complicity; and, first of all, measures are brought under deliberation to be taken against their opposition. Mark

⁽¹⁾ The Sibylline books had predicted the empire of Rome to three Cornelii: L. Cornelius Cinna had been consul; Sylla, dictator; Corneliuſ Lentuluſ was in hopes of being the third.

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XVI. 12.

⁽³⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 34.

Antony is the most audacious; the Consul Lentulus interrupts him with anger, and orders him to leave the curia, "where," he says, "his sacred character will not preserve him any longer from the punishment merited by his spirit of hostility towards the Republic." Mark Antony thereupon, rising impetuously, takes the gods to witness that the privileges of the tribune's power are violated in his person. "We are insulted," exclaims he; "we are treated like murderers. You want proscriptions, massacres, conflagrations. May all those evils which you have drawn down fall upon your own heads!" Then, pronouncing the forms of execration, which had always the power of impressing superstitious minds, he leaves the curia, followed by Q. Cassius, Curio, and M. Coelius. ⁽¹⁾ It was time: the curia was on the point of being surrounded by a detachment of troops, which were already approaching. ⁽²⁾ All four left Rome in the night between the 6th and 7th of January, in the disguise of slaves, in an ordinary chariot, and reached Cæsar's quarters. ⁽³⁾

The following days the Senate meets outside the town. Pompey repeats there what he had employed Scipio to say. He applauds the courage and firmness of the assembly; he enumerates his forces, boasts of having ten legions—six in Spain, and four in Italy. ⁽⁴⁾ According to his conviction, the army is not devoted to Cæsar, and will not follow him in his rash undertakings. Besides, would he dare, with one single le-

⁽¹⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XVI. 2.—*Philippica*, II. 21, 22.

⁽²⁾ Plutarch, *Antony*, 7.—Dio Cassius, XLI. 2, 3.

⁽³⁾ Plutarch, *Antony*, 7.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 33.

⁽⁴⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XVI. 12.

gion, to face the forces of the Senate? Before he will have had time to summon his troops, which are on the other side of the Alps, Pompey will have assembled a formidable army. ⁽¹⁾ Then the Senate declares the country in danger (it was the 18th of the Ides of January), an extreme measure reserved for great public calamities; and the care to watch that the Republic receive no harm is confided to the consuls, the proconsuls, the prætors, and the tribunes of the people. Immediately, all his party, whose violence has driven Pompey and the Senate into civil war, fall upon the dignities, the honours, the governments of provinces, as so many objects of prey. Italy is divided into great commands, ⁽²⁾ which the principal chiefs divide amongst themselves. Cicero, always prudent, chooses Campania as being more distant from the scene of war. Scribonius Libo is sent to Etruria, ⁽³⁾ P. Lentulus Spinther to the coast of Picenum, ⁽⁴⁾ P. Attius Varus to Auximum and Cingulum, ⁽⁵⁾ and Q. Minucius Thermus to Umbria. ⁽⁶⁾ By a false interpretation of the law which allows proconsuls to be chosen among the magistrates who have resigned their functions within five years, the consular and prætorian provinces are shared arbitrarily: Syria is given to Metellus Scipio, Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius Nonianus, Sicily to Cato, Sardinia to M. Aurelius Cotta,

⁽¹⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II 34

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XVI 11.

⁽³⁾ Florus, IV 11.

⁽⁴⁾ Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 15.—Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII 23

⁽⁵⁾ Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 7.—Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 13.

⁽⁶⁾ Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 12.—Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 3.—Lucan, *Pharsalia*, II, line 463.

Africa to L. Ælius Tuberno, and Cilicia to P. Sextus. ⁽¹⁾ The obligation of a curiate law to legitimate their power is regarded as useless. Their names are not drawn by lot; they do not wait, according to the established practice, till the people has ratified their election, and till they have put on the dress of war, after having pronounced the usual vows. The consuls, contrary to custom, leave the town; men, till then strangers to all high office, cause lictors to go before them in Rome and in the Capitol. It is proposed to declare King Juba friend and ally of the Roman people. What matters whether he be devoted or not to the Roman domination, provided he become a useful auxiliary for the civil war? A levy of 130,000 men in Italy is decreed. All the resources of the public treasure are placed at the disposal of Pompey; the money preserved in the temples is taken; and if that be not sufficient, the property of private persons themselves shall be employed for the pay of the troops. In the midst of this sudden commotion, rights divine and human are equally trampled under foot. ⁽²⁾ And yet a few days had scarcely passed "when the Senate," says Appian, "regretted not having accepted the conditions of Cæsar, the justice of which they felt at a moment when fear brought them back from the excitement of party spirit to the counsels of wisdom." ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 6, 30. — Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, V. 20, XVI. 12; *Epist. ad Atticum*, X. 16. — Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 34

⁽²⁾ Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XV. 11. — Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 34 — Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 7

⁽³⁾ Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 36.

III. Whilst at Rome all was confusion, and Pompey, nominal chief of his party, under-
Cæsar harangues his
Troops went its various exigencies and impulses, Cæsar, master of himself and free in his resolutions, waited quietly at Ravenna until the thoughtless impetuosity of his enemies should break itself against his firmness and the justice of his cause. The tribunes of the people, Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, accompanied by Curio and M. Cœlius, hasten to him. (¹) At the news of the events in Rome, he sends couriers to the other side of the Alps, in order to unite his army; but, without waiting for it, he assembles the 13th legion, the only one which had crossed the Alps; he reminds his soldiers in a few words of the ancient insults and the recent injustices of which he is the victim.

“The people had authorised him, although absent, to solicit a new consulship, and, as soon as he thought that he ought to avail himself of this favour, it was opposed. He has been asked, for the interest of his country, to deprive himself of two legions, and, after he has made the sacrifice, it is against him they are employed. The decrees of the Senate and the people, legally rendered, have been disregarded, and other decrees have been sanctioned, notwithstanding the opposition of the tribunes. The right of intercession, which Sylla himself had respected, has been set at naught, and it is under the garb of slaves that the representatives of the Roman people come to seek a

(¹) The “Commentaries,” it is true, say that the tribunes of the people rejoined Cæsar at Rimini; but it was more probably at Ravenna, as reported by Appian (II 33), or in his camp between Ravenna and Rimini.

refuge in his camp. All his proposals of conciliation have been rejected. What has been refused to him has been granted to Pompey, who, prompted by envious malignity, has broken the ties of an old friendship. Lastly, what pretext is there for declaring the country in danger, and calling the Roman people to arms? Are they in presence of a popular revolt, or a violence of the tribunes, as in the time of the Gracchi, or an invasion of the barbarians, as in the time of Marius? Besides, no law has been promulgated, no motion has been submitted for the sanction of the people; *all which has been done without the sanction of the people is unlawful.* (1) Let the soldiers, then, defend the general under whom, for nine years, they have served the Republic with so much success, gained so many battles, subdued the whole of Gaul, overcome the Germans and the Britons; for his enemies are theirs, and his elevation, as well as his glory, is their work."

Unanimous acclamations respond to this speech of Cæsar. The soldiers of the 13th legion declare that they are ready to make the greatest sacrifices; they will revenge their general and the tribunes of the people for all these outrages; as a proof of his devotion, each centurion offers to entertain a horseman at his expense; each soldier, to serve gratuitously, the richer ones providing for the poorer ones; and during the whole civil war, Suetonius affirms, not one of them failed in this engagement. (2) Such was the devotedness of the army; Labienus alone, whom Cæsar loved

(1) The words of the proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon on landing in the gulf of Juan in 1815.

(2) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 68.

especially, whom he had loaded with favours, deserted the cause of the conqueror of Gaul, and passed over to Pompey. (¹) Cicero and his party thought that this deserter would bring a great addition to their strength. But Labienus, (²) though an able general under Cæsar, was only an indifferent one in the opposite camp. Desertions have never made any man great.

IV. The moment for action had arrived. Cæsar was reduced to the alternative of maintaining himself at the head of his army, in spite of the Senate, or surrendering himself to his enemies, who would have reserved for him the fate of the accomplices of Catiline, who had been condemned to death, if he were not, like the Gracchi, Saturninus, and so many others, killed in a popular tumult. Here the question naturally offers itself: Ought not Cæsar, who had so often faced death on the battle-fields, have gone to Rome to face it under another form, and to have renounced his command, rather than engage in a struggle which must throw the Republic into all the horrors of a civil war? Yes, if by his abnegation he could save Rome from anarchy, corruption, and tyranny. No, if this abnegation would endanger what he had most at heart, the regeneration of the Republic. Cæsar, like men of his temper, cared little

Cæsar is driven to Civil War.

(¹) Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 12.

(²) "Cæsar has received a terrible blow: T Labienus, who had so much influence in his army, has refused to become his accomplice: he has left him and has joined us. This example will have numerous imitators" (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XVI 12)—"Labienus considers Cæsar as utterly unable to maintain the struggle." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 16.)

for life, and still less for power for the sake of power; but, as chief of the popular party, he felt a great cause rise behind him; it urged him forward, and obliged him to conquer in despite of legality, the imprecations of his adversaries, and the uncertain judgment of posterity. Roman society, in a state of dissolution, asked for a master; oppressed Italy, for a representative of its rights; the world, bowed under the yoke, for a saviour. Ought he, by deserting his mission, disappoint so many legitimate hopes, so many noble aspirations? What! Cæsar, who owed all his dignities to the people, and confining himself within his right, should he have retired before Pompey, who, having become the docile tool of a factious minority of the Senate, was trampling right and justice under foot; before Pompey, who, according to the admission of Cicero himself, would have been, after victory, a cruel and vindictive despot, and would have allowed the world to be plundered for the benefit of a few families, incapable, moreover, of arresting the decay of the Republic, and founding an order of things sufficiently firm to retard the invasion of barbarians for many centuries! He would have retreated before a party which reckoned it a crime to repair the evils caused by the violence of Sylla, and the severity of Pompey, by recalling the exiles; (¹) to give rights to the peoples of Italy; to distribute lands among the poor and the veterans; and, by an equitable administration, to ensure the prosperity of the provinces! It would have been madness.

(¹) "Is that honourable. . . . (in Cæsar) to think of nothing but abolition of debts, calling back exiles, and so many other outrages?" (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 11)

The question had not the mean proportions of a quarrel between two generals who contended for power: it was the decisive conflict between two hostile causes, between the privileged classes and the people; it was the continuation of the formidable struggle between Marius and Sylla! (¹)

There are imperious circumstances which condemn public men either to abnegation or to perseverance. To cling to power when one is no longer able to do good, and when, as a representative of the past, one has, as it were, no partisans but among those who live upon abuses, is a deplorable obstinacy; to abandon it when one is the representative of a new era, and the hope of a better future, is a cowardly act and a crime.

V. Cæsar has taken his resolution. He began the conquest of Gaul with four legions; he is going to commence that of the world with one only. He must first of all, by a surprise, take possession of Ariminum (*Rimini*), the first important fortress of Italy on the side of Cisalpine Gaul. For this purpose, he sends before him a detachment composed of trusty soldiers and centurions, commanded by Q. Hortensius; he places a part of his cavalry in *échelon* on the road. (²) When evening arrives, pretending an indisposition, he leaves his officers, who were at table, enters a chariot with a few friends, and joins his vanguard. When he arrives at the Rubi-

Cæsar crosses the
Rubicon

(¹) "A power after the manner of Sylla, that is what Pompey desires, and what all those wish who surround him." (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VIII. 11.)

(²) Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 35.—Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 35.

con, a stream which formed the limit of his government, and which the laws forbad him to cross, he halts for a moment as though struck with terror; he communicates his apprehensions to Asinius Pollio and those who surround him. A comet has appeared in the sky; ⁽¹⁾ he foresees the misfortunes which are on the point of befalling Italy, and recollects the dream which the night before had oppressed his mind: he had dreamt that he violated his mother. Was not his country, in fact, his mother; and, notwithstanding the justness of his cause and the greatness of his designs, was not his enterprise an outrage upon her? But the augurs, those flattering interpreters of the future, affirm that this dream promises him the empire of the world; this woman whom he has seen extended on the ground is no other than the earth, the common mother of all mortals. ⁽²⁾ Then suddenly an apparition, it is said, strikes the eyes of Cæsar: it is a man of tall stature, blowing martial airs on a trumpet, and calling him to the other bank. All hesitation ceases; he hurries onward and crosses the Rubicon, exclaiming, "The die is cast! Let us go where I am called by the prodigies of the gods and the iniquity of my enemies." ⁽³⁾ Soon he arrived at Ariminum, of which he takes possession without striking a blow. The civil war has commenced!

"The true author of war," says Montesquieu, "is not he who declares it, but he who renders it necessary." It is not granted to man, notwithstanding his

(1) Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I, line 526.

(2) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 7 —Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 37

(3) Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 32

genius and power, to raise at will the popular waves; yet, when, elected by the public voice, he appears in the midst of the storm which endangers the vessel of the state, then he alone can direct its course and bring it to the harbour. Cæsar was not, therefore, the instigator of this profound perturbation of Roman society: he had become the indispensable pilot. Had it been otherwise, when he disappeared all would have returned to order; on the contrary, his death gave up the whole universe to all the horrors of war. Europe, Asia, Africa, were the theatre of sanguinary struggles between the past and the future, and the Roman world did not find peace until the heir of his name had made his cause triumph. But it was no longer possible for Augustus to renew the work of Cæsar; fourteen years of civil war had exhausted the strength of the nation and used up the characters; the men imbued with the great principles of the past were dead; the survivors had alternately served all parties; to succeed, Augustus himself had made peace with the murderers of his adoptive father; the convictions were extinct, and the world, longing for rest, no longer contained the elements which would have permitted Cæsar, as was his intention, to re-establish the Republic in its ancient splendour and its ancient forms, but on new principles.

NAPOLEON.

The Tuileries, March 20, 1866.

APPENDIX A.

CONCORDANCE OF DATES

OF THE

ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE JULIAN STYLE,
FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709.

Bases on which the Tables of Concordance are Founded.

BEFORE the Julian reform, the Roman year comprised 355 days, divided into twelve months, namely: Januarius, 29 days; Februarius, 28; Martius, 31; Aprilis, 29; Maius, 31; Junius, 29; Quintilis, 31; Sextilis, 29; September, 29; October, 31; November, 29; December, 29.

Every other year, an intercalation of 22 or 23 days alternately was to be added after the 23rd day of February.

The mean year being thus too long by one day, 24 days were to be subtracted in the last eight years of a period of 24 years. We shall not here have to take this correction into consideration.

The intercalation appears to have been regularly followed from A.U.C. 691 (that of Cicero's consulship) until 702, when it was of 23 days. In the middle of the troubles, the intercalation was omitted in the years 704, 706, and 708.

Towards the end of the year 708, Cæsar remedied the disorder by placing extraordinarily between November and December 67 days, and by introducing a new mode of intercalation.

The year 708 is the last of the *confusion*.

The year 709 is the first of the Julian style.

Historical Data which the Concordance must Satisfy.

Cicero relates that at the beginning of his consulship the planet Jupiter lighted the whole sky. (*De Divin.*, I. 11.) Cicero entered on office on the Calends of January in the year of Rome

691; that is, on the 14th of December, 64 B.C. Jupiter had reached opposition eleven days before, on the 3rd of December. ⁽¹⁾

In the year 691, on the 5th of the Ides of November, Cicero, in his *Second Oration against Catiline*, 10, asks how the effeminate companions of Catiline will support the frosts of the Apennine, especially in these nights *already* long (*his præsertim jam noctibus*). ⁽²⁾ We are, in fact, on the 15th of October, 63 B.C. Later, in his *Oration for Sextius*, speaking of the defeat of Catiline at the beginning of January, 62 (the middle of December, 63 B.C.), Cicero asserts that the result is due to Sextius, without whose activity the winter would have been allowed to intervene (*datus illo in bello esset hiemi locus*).

In the year 696 of Rome (58 B.C.), the Helvetii appoint their rendezvous at Geneva for a day fixed: "is dies erat a. d. v. Kal. Aprilis." (Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, I. 6.) This date corresponds with the Julian 24th of March, the day on which the spring equinox fell. The Helvetii had taken this natural period; Cæsar has referred it to the Roman calendar. ⁽³⁾

In the year 700 of Rome (54 B.C.), Cæsar, after his second campaign in Britain, re-embarks his troops "quod æquinoctium suberat." (*De Bello Gallico*, V. 23.) He informs Cicero of it on the 6th of the Calends of October, the Julian 21st of September. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 17.) The equinox fell on the 26th of September. ⁽⁴⁾

In the year 702, on the 13th of the Calends of February (that is, on the 30th of December, 53 B.C.), Clodius is slain by Milo.

⁽¹⁾ De la Nauze refers this opposition to the 17th of April following (*Académie des Inscriptions*, tom. XXVI. 244). His calculation is incorrect.

⁽²⁾ De la Nauze, influenced by his wrong calculation of the opposition of Jupiter, insists that these events took place at the approach of spring. He overlooks the particle *jam*. Ideler suppresses it from the German text.

⁽³⁾ According to the system of Ideler, the Helvetii only started on the Julian 16th of April. On that reckoning, we cannot find room for the numerous events which occurred before the wheat was ripe. (Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, I. 16.)

⁽⁴⁾ The system of Ideler (see Korb, in Orelli, *Onomasticum Tullianum*, tom. I., p. 170), according to whom the 6th of the Calends of October fell on the Julian 30th of August, is manifestly in the wrong. Cæsar, who, in the preceding year, saw no objection to pass into Britain at the end of August, would not have troubled himself about the equinox when it was still 27 days' distant.

(Cicero, *Orat. pro Milone*, 10.) Pompey is created consul for the third time on the 5th of the Calends of March, *in the intercalary month*. (Asconius.)

In the year 703, Cicero writes to Atticus (V. 13): "I have arrived at Ephesus on the 11th of the Calends of Sextilis (12th of July, 51 B.C.), 560 days after the battle of Bovillæ;" an exact computation, if we count the day of the murder of Clodius, and reckon 23 days for the intercalation of 702. ⁽¹⁾

In the year 704 the intercalation is omitted. Cæsar's partisans demanded it in vain. (Dio Cassius, XL. 61, 62.)

In 705, Cicero, who hesitates in joining Pompey, writes to Atticus: "a. d. xvii Kal. Junii: Nunc quidem æquinoctium nos moratur, quod valde perturbatum erat." It was the 16th of April; the equinox was passed 21 days before, and the atmospheric disturbances might still last. Or was it anything else than an excuse on the part of Cicero?

Cæsar embarks at Brundisium on the eve of the Nones of January, 706. (*De Bello Civili*, III. 6.) It is the 28th of November, 49 B.C. "Gravis autumnus in Apulio circumque Brundisium. . . . omnem exercitum valetudine tentaverat." (*De Bello Civili*, III. 2, 6.)—"Bibulus gravissima hieme in navibus excubabat." (*De Bello Civili*, III. 8.)—"Jamque hiems appropinquabat." (*De Bello Civili*, III. 9.)

After his arrival at Rome towards the end of the year 707, Cæsar started again for the African war. It was only on his return towards the middle of the year 708, that he could devote himself to the re-organisation of the Republic and the reform of the calendar. According to Dio Cassius (XLIII. 26), "as the days of the years did not concord well together, Cæsar introduced the present manner of reckoning, by intercalating 67 days necessary to restore the concordance. Some authors have pretended that he intercalated more; but this is the truth." ⁽²⁾ .

⁽¹⁾ General de Gœler has sought to raise a new system founded on the assumption that the Roman year had only 354 days. According to him, this reduction would have been necessary to find the 560 days of which Cicero speaks. The author commits more than one error; among others, he ascribes, by inattention, 29 days instead of the 27, to the month of February in the year 703 (De Gœler, p. 91.)

⁽²⁾ Suetonius had written: "Cæsar placed, for this time, two other months between November and December, so that the year had fifteen months, in-

What concordance was it that required to be established thus? The 67 days *necessary* were exactly what required to be added that, in the secular year of Rome 700, the Julian month of March should coincide with the ancient Roman month of March. The month of March of the year 700 of Rome is the true starting-point of the Julian style.

cluding the one to be intercalated, which, following the usage, had fallen in this same year." Censorinus, adopting this view, finds that Cæsar intercalated 90 days in the year 708. But Suetonius has bequeathed us other errors. Dio Cassius, consul for the second time in the year 229 after Christ, had drawn from authentic sources; it is better to hold to his system, which restores the astronomical concordance for the equinox in the year 700, whereas, with the system of Censorinus, it has been sought in vain what Cæsar's intention could have been.

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 64 BEFORE CHRIST.			
	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.			
	690	690	690	690—691
1	XVI Kal. Oct.	XVII Kal. Nov.	XV Kal. Dec.	XIV Kal. Jan.
2	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
3	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
4	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
5	XII	XIII	XI	X
6	XI	XII	X	IX
7	X	XI	IX	VIII
8	IX	X	VIII	VII
9	VIII	IX	VII	VI
10	VII	VIII	VI	V
11	VI	VII	V	IV
12	V	VI	IV	III
13	IV	V	III	Pridie
14	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
15	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
16	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
17	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
18	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
19	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
20	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
21	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
22	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
23	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
24	VII	VI	IV	III
25	VI	V	III	Pridie
26	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
27	IV	III	Idus	XVII Kal. Feb.
28	III	Pridie	XVII Kal. Jan.	XVI
29	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
30	Idus	XVII Kal. Dec.	XV	XIV
31		XVI		XIII

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	691	691	691	691	691	691
1	XII K. Feb.	IX K. Mar.	XII K. Apr.	X Kal. Mai	XI Kal. Ju.	IX K. Quin.
2	XI	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
3	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
4	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
5	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
6	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
7	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
8	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
9	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
10	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAI	Pridie	VI Nonas
11	Pridie	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
12	KAL. FEB.	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
13	IV Nonas	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
14	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
15	Pridie	Nonæ	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
16	Nonæ	VIII Idus	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
17	VIII Idus	VII	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
18	VII	VI	VII	VII	VI	VI
19	VI	V	VI	VI	V	V
20	V	IV	V	V	IV	IV
21	IV	III	IV	IV	III	III
22	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
23	Pridie	Idus	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
24	Idus	XVII K. Ap.	Idus	Idus	XVII Kal.	XVII K. Sex.
25	XVI K. Mr.	XVI	XVII Kal.	XVII K. Jun.	XVI [Quin	XVI
26	XV	XV	XVI	XVI	XV	XV
27	XIV	XIV	XV	XV	XIV	XIV
28	XIII	XIII	XIV	XIV	XIII	XIII
29	XII		XIII	XIII	XII	XII
30	XI		XII	XII	XI	XI
31	X		XI		X	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	691	691	691	691	691	691—692
1	X Kal Sex.	VIII K. Sep.	VI Kal. Oct.	VII K. Nov.	V Kal. Dec.	IV Kal Jan
2	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
3	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
4	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
5	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
6	V	III	KAL. OCT. VI Nonas	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
7	IV	Pridie		KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
8	III	KAL. SEP. IV Nonas	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
9	Pridie	III	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
10	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
11	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
12	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
13	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
14	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
15	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
16	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
17	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K.Fb.
18	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K.Jn.	XVI
19	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
20	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K.Dc.	XV	XIV
21	Pridie	XVII K.Oct	XVII K.Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
22	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
23	XVII K.Sep	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
24	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
25	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
26	XIV	XII	XII	XI	IX	VIII
27	XIII	XI	XI	X	VIII	VII
28	XII	X	X	IX	VII	VI
29	XI	IX	IX	VIII	VI	V
30	X	VIII	VIII	VII	V	IV
31	IX	VII		VI		III

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	692	692	692	692	692	692
1	Pr. K. Feb	VI Id. int.	VII Id. Mar.	V Id. Apl.	VI Id. Mai	IV Id. Jun.
2	KAL. FEB.	V	VI	IV	V	III
3	IV Nonas	IV	V	III	IV	Pridie
4	III	III	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
5	Pridie	Pridie	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Qu.
6	Nonæ	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. M.	Idus	XVI
7	VIII Idus	XV K. Mar.	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
8	VII	XIV	XVII K. Ap.	XV	XVI	XIV
9	VI	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
10	V	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
11	IV	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
12	III	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
13	Pridie	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
14	Idus	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
15	XI Kal. int.	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
16	X	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
17	IX	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
18	VIII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
19	VII	III	VI	IV	V	III
20	VI	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
21	V	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
22	IV	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAI	Pridie	VI Nonas
23	III	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
24	Pridie	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
25	KAL. INT.	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
26	IV Nonas	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
27	III	Nonæ	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
28	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
29	Nonæ		VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
30	VIII Idus		VII	VII	VI	VI
31	VII		VI		V	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	692	692	692	692	692	692—693
1	V Id. Quin.	III Id. Sex.	Idus Sept.	Pr Id. Oct	XVII K. Dec	XVI K Jan
2	IV	Pridie	XVII K. Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
3	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Nv.	XV	XIV
4	Pridie	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
5	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
6	XVII K. Sex.	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
7	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
8	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
9	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
10	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
11	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
12	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
13	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
14	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
15	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
16	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
17	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
18	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
19	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
20	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
21	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
22	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
23	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
24	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
25	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
26	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
27	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
28	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
29	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K. Fb.
30	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K. Jan.	XVI
31	IV	Pridie		Idus		XV

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 61 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	693	693	693	693	693	693
1	XIV K. Feb.	XI K. Mar.	XIII K. Ap	XI K. Maii	XII K. Jun.	X Kal. Qu
2	XIII	X	XII	X	XI	IX
3	XII	IX	XI	IX	X	VIII
4	XI	VIII	X	VIII	IX	VII
5	X	VII	IX	VII	VIII	VI
6	IX	VI	VIII	VI	VII	V
7	VIII	V	VII	V	VI	IV
8	VII	IV	VI	IV	V	III
9	VI	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
10	V	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
11	IV	KAL. MAR.	III	KAL. MAII.	Pridie	VI Nonas
12	III	VI Nonas	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
13	Pridie	V	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
14	KAL. FEB.	IV	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
15	IV Nonas	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
16	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
17	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
18	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
19	VIII Idus	VII	VII	VII	VI	VI
20	VII	VI	VI	VI	V	V
21	VI	V	V	V	IV	IV
22	V	IV	IV	IV	III	III
23	IV	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
24	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
25	Pridie	Idus	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Qu.	XVII K. Sex
26	Idus	XVII K. Ap.	XVII K. M.	XVII K. Jn.	XVI	XVI
27	XVI K. Mr.	XVI	XVI	XVI	XV	XV
28	XV	XV	XV.	XV	XIV	XIV
29	XIV	XIV	XIV	XIV	XIII	XIII
30	XIII		XIII	XIII	XII	XII
31	XII		XII		XI	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 61 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JULY.	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME					
	693	693	693	693	693	693—694
1	XI K. Sex	IX K. Sep.	VII K. Oct.	VIII K. Nv.	VI K. Dec.	V Kal. Jan
2	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
3	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
4	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
5	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
6	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
7	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
8	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
9	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
10	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
11	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
12	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
13	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
14	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
15	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
16	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
17	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
18	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K. Fb.
19	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K. Jan.	XVI
20	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
21	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Dec.	XV	XIV
22	Pridie	XVII K. Oct.	XVII K Nv	XVI	XIV	XIII
23	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
24	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
25	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
26	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
27	XIV	XII	XII	XI	IX	VIII
28	XIII	XI	XI	X	VIII	VII
29	XII	X	X	IX	VII	VI
30	XI	IX	IX	VIII	VI	V
31	X	VIII		VII		IV

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 60 BEFORE CHRIST					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	694	694	694	694	694	694
1	III K. Feb	VII Id. int	Nonæ Mart.	VIII d. Ap.	VIII Id. Ma.	VI Id. Jun.
2	Pridie	VI	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
3	KAL. FEB.	V	VII	V	VI	IV
4	IV Nonas	IV	VI	IV	V	III
5	III	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
6	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
7	Nonæ	Idus	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Qu.
8	VIII Idus	XVI K. Mar	Pridie	XVII K. M	Idus	XVI
9	VII	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
10	VI	XIV	XVII K. Ap	XV	XVI	XIV
11	V	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
12	IV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
13	III	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
14	Pridie	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
15	Idus	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
16	XI Kal. int	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
17	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
18	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
19	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
20	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
21	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
22	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
23	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
24	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAII	Pridie	VI Nonas
25	Pridie	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
26	KAL. INT.	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
27	IV Nonas	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
28	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
29	Pridie	.	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
30	Nonæ		Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
31	VIII Idus		VIII Idus		VII	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 60 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	694	694	694	694	694	694—695
1	VII Id. Qu.	V Id. Sext.	III Id. Sep	IV Id. Oct.	Pr. Id. Nov.	Idus Dec.
2	VI	IV	Pridie	III	Idus	XVII K.Jn
3	V	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.Dc.	XVI
4	IV	Pridie	XVII K.Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
5	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K.Nv	XV	XIV
6	Pridie	XVII K.Sep.	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
7	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
8	XVII K.Sex.	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
9	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
10	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
11	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
12	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
13	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
14	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
15	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
16	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
17	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
18	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
19	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
20	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
21	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
22	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
23	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
24	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
25	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
26	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
27	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
28	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
29	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
30	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
31	VI	IV		III		XVII K.Fb

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 59 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	695	695	695	695	695	695
1	XVI K. Feb.	XIII K. Mr.	XVI K. Ap.	XIV K. Mai	XV K. Jun.	XIII K. Qu.
2	XV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
3	XIV	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
4	XIII	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
5	XII	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
6	XI	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
7	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
8	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
9	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
10	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
11	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
12	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
13	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
14	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAII	Pridie	VI Nonas
15	Pridie	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
16	KAL. FEB.	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
17	IV Nonas	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
18	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
19	Pridie	Nonæ	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
20	Nonæ	VIII Idus	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
21	VIII Idus	VII	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
22	VII	VI	VII	VII	VI	VI
23	VI	V	VI	VI	V	V
24	V	IV	V	V	IV	IV
25	IV	III	IV	IV	III	III
26	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
27	Pridie	Idus	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
28	Idus	XVII K. Ap	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Qu.	XVII K. Sex.
29	XVI K. Mr.		XVII K. M.	XVII K. Ju.	XVI	XVI
30	XV		XVI	XVI	XV	XV
31	XIV		XV		XIV	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 59 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	695	695	695	695	695	695—696
1	XIV K. Sex.	XII K. Sep.	X Kal. Oct.	XI K. Nov.	IX K. Dec.	VIII K. Jan
2	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
3	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
4	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
5	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
6	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
7	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
8	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
9	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
10	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
11	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
12	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
13	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
14	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
15	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
16	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
17	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
18	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
19	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
20	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
21	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K. Fb
22	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K. Jan.	XVI
23	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
24	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Dec	XV	XIV
25	Pridie	XVII K. Oct.	XVII K. Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
26	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
27	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
28	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
29	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
30	XIV	XII	XII	XI	IX	VIII
31	XIII	XI		X		VII

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 58 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY,	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	696	696	696	696	696	696
1	VI K. Feb.	Pr. Non int	III Non.Mr.	Nonæ Ap.	Pr.Non Ma.	VIII Id. Ju.
2	V	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII
3	IV	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI
4	III	VII	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
5	Pridie	VI	VII	V	VI	IV
6	KAL. FEB.	V	VI	IV	V	III
7	IV Nonas	IV	V	III	IV	Pridie
8	III	III	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
9	Pridie	Pridie	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.Qu.
10	Nonæ	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. M	Idus	XVI
11	VIII Idus	XV K. Mar	Idus	XVI	XVII K.Ju.	XV
12	VII	XIV	XVII K.Ap	XV	XVI	XIV
13	VI	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
14	V	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
15	IV	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
16	III	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
17	Pridie	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
18	Idus	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
19	XI Kal. int	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
20	X	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
21	IX	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
22	VIII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
23	VII	III	VI	IV	V	III
24	VI	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
25	V	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
26	IV	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAII	Pridie	VI Nonas
27	III	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
28	Pridie	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
29	KAL. INT.		IV Nonas	IV	III	III
30	IV Nonas		III	III	Pridie	Pridie
31	III		Pridie		Nonæ	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 58 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	696	696	696	696	696	696—697
1	Nonæ Qu	VII Id. Sex.	V Id. Sept.	VI Id. Oct.	IV. Id. Nov.	III Id. Dec
2	VIII Idus	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
3	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	Idus
4	VI	IV	Pridie	III	Idus	XVII K.Jn
5	V	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.De.	XVI
6	IV	Pridie	XVII K.Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
7	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K.Nv.	XV	XIV
8	Pridie	XVII K.Sep.	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
9	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
10	XVII K.Sex	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
11	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
12	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
13	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
14	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII.	VII
15	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
16	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
17	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
18	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
19	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
20	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
21	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
22	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
23	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
24	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
25	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
26	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
27	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
28	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
29	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
30	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
31	*VIII Idus	VI		V		Pridie

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 57 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	697	697	697	697	697	697
1	Idus Jan.	XV K. Mar.	XVII K. Ap	XV K. Mai	XVI K. Jun.	XIV K. Qu.
2	XVII K. Fb	XIV	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
3	XVI	XIII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
4	XV	XII	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
5	XIV	XI	XIII	XI	XII	X
6	XIII	X	XII	X	XI	IX
7	XII	IX	XI	IX	X	VIII
8	XI	VIII	X	VIII	IX	VII
9	X	VII	IX	VII	VIII	VI
10	IX	VI	VIII	VI	VII	V
11	VIII	V	VII	V	VI	IV
12	VII	IV	VI	IV	V	III
13	VI	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
14	V	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
15	IV	KAL. MAR.	III	KAL. MAI	Pridie	VI Nonas
16	III	VI Nonas	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
17	Pridie	V	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
18	KAL. FEB.	IV	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
19	IV Nonas	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
20	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
21	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
22	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
23	VIII Idus	VII	VII	VII	VI	VI
24	VII	VI	VI	VI	V	V
25	VI	V	V	V	IV	IV
26	V	IV	IV	IV	III	III
27	IV	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
28	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
29	Pridie	Idus	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Qu.	XVII K. Sex
30	Idus		XVII K. M.	XVII K. Jn.	XVI	XVI
31	XVI K. Mr.		XVI		XV	

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 57 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	697	697	697	697	697	697—698
1	XV K Sex	XIII K.Sep	XI Kal.Oct.	XII K. Nov.	X Kal. Dec.	IX Kal. Jan.
2	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
3	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
4	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
5	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
6	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
7	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
8	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
9	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
10	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
11	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
12	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
13	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
14	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
15	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
16	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
17	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
18	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
19	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
20	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
21	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
22	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K.Fb.
23	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K. Jan.	XVI
24	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
25	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Dec.	XV	XIV
26	Pridie	XVII K. Oct.	XVII K. Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
27	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
28	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
29	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
30	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
31	XIV	XII		XI		VIII

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 56 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	698	698	698	698	698	698
1	VII K. Feb.	III Non. int.	V Non. Mr.	III Non. Ap.	IV Non. Ma.	PI. Non. Ju.
2	VI	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	Nonæ
3	V	Nonæ	III	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus
4	IV	VIII Idus	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII
5	III	VII	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI
6	Pridie	VI	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
7	KAL. FEB.	V	VII	V	VI	IV
8	IV Nonas	IV	VI	IV	V	III
9	III	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
10	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
11	Nonæ	Idus	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Qu.
12	VIII Idus	XVI K. Mar.	Pridie	XVII K. M	Idus	XVI
13	VII	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
14	VI	XIV	XVII K. Ap	XV	XVI	XIV
15	V	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
16	IV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
17	III	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
18	Pridie	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
19	Idus	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
20	XI Kal. int.	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
21	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
22	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
23	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
24	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
25	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
26	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
27	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
28	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAII	Pridie	VI Nonas
29	Pridie		Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
30	KAL. INT.		KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
31	IV Nonas		IV Nonas		III	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 56 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	698	698	698	698	698	698—699
1	III Non. Qu.	Nonæ Sext.	VII Id. Sep.	VIII Id. Oct.	VI Id. Nov.	V Idus Dec.
2	Pridie	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V	IV
3	Nonæ	VII	V	VI	IV	III
4	VIII Idus	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
5	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	Idus
6	VI	IV	Pridie	III	Idus	XVII K. Jn.
7	V	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Dc	XVI
8	IV	Pridie	XVII K. Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
9	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Nv	XV	XIV
10	Pridie	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
11	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
12	XVII K. Sex.	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
13	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
14	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
15	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
16	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
17	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
18	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
19	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
20	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
21	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
22	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
23	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
24	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
25	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
26	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
27	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
28	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
29	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
30	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
31	Pridie	VIII Idus		VII		IV

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 55 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	699	699	699	699	699	699
1	III Id. Jan.	Idus Feb.	III Id Mar.	Idus Apr	Pr. Id. Ma.	XVII K Qu.
2	Pridie	XVI K. Mr.	Pridie	XVII K. Mr	Idus	XVI
3	Idus	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
4	XVII K. Fb.	XIV	XVII K. Ap.	XV	XVI	XIV
5	XVI	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
6	XV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
7	XIV	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
8	XIII	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
9	XII	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
10	XI	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
11	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
12	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
13	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
14	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
15	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
16	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
17	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
18	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAII	Pridie	VI Nonas
19	Pridie	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
20	KAL. FEB.	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
21	IV Nonas	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
22	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
23	Pridie	Nonæ	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
24	Nonæ	VIII Idus	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
25	VIII Idus	VII	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
26	VII	VI	VII	VII	VI	VI
27	VI	V	VI	VI	V	V
28	V	IV	V	V	IV	IV
29	IV		IV	IV	III	III
30	III		III	III	Pridie	Pridie
31	Pridie		Pridie		Idus	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 55 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	699	699	699	699	699	699—700
1	Idus Qu	XVI K. Sep.	XIV K Oct.	XV K. Nov.	XIII K. Dec.	XII K. Jan.
2	XVIII K. Sex.	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
3	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
4	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
5	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
6	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
7	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
8	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
9	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
10	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
11	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
12	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
13	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
14	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
15	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
16	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
17	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
18	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
19	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
20	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
21	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
22	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
23	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
24	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
25	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K. Fb.
26	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K. Jan.	XVI
27	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
28	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Dec	XV	XIV
29	Pridie	XVII K Oct	XVII K. Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
30	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
31	XVIII K. Sep	XV		XIV		XI

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 54 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	700	700	700	700	700	700
1	X Kal. Feb	Pr Kal. int	KAL. MAR.	KAL. APR.	VINon.Ma.	IV Non Ju.
2	IX	KAL. INT.	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	V	III
3	VIII	IV Nonas	V	III	IV	Pridie
4	VII	III	IV	Pridie	III	Nonæ
5	VI	Pridie	III	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus
6	V	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII
7	IV	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI
8	III	VII	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
9	Pridie	VI	VII	V	VI	IV
10	KAL. FEB.	V	VI	IV	V	III
11	IV Nonas	IV	V	III	IV	Pridie
12	III	III	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
13	Pridie	Pridie	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.Qu.
14	Nonæ	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. M	Idus	XVI
15	VIII Idus	XV K. Mar	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
16	VII	XIV	XVII K Ap	XV	XVI	XIV
17	VI	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
18	V	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
19	IV	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
20	III	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
21	Pridie	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
22	Idus	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
23	XI Kal. int	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
24	X	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
25	IX	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
26	VIII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
27	VII	III	VI	IV	V	III
28	VI	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
29	V		IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
30	IV		III	KAL. MAI	Pridie	VI Nonas
31	III		Pridie		KAL. JUN.	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 54 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	700	700	700	700	700	700—701
1	V Non. Qu.	III Non.Sex.	Nonæ Sept.	Pr.Non.Oct.	VIII Id.No.	VII Id.Dec.
2	IV	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII	VI
3	III	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI	V
4	Pridie	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V	IV
5	Nonæ	VII	V	VI	IV	III
6	VIII Idus	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
7	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	Idus
8	VI	IV	Pridie	III	Idus	XVII K.Jn.
9	V	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.Dc.	XVI
10	IV	Pridie	XVII K Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
11	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K.Nv	XV	XIV
12	Pridie	XVII K.Sep.	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
13	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
14	XVII K.Sex.	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
15	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
16	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
17	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
18	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
19	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
20	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
21	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
22	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
23	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
24	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
25	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
26	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
27	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
28	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
29	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
30	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
31	IV Nonas	Pridie		Nonæ		VI

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 53 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	701	701	701	701	701	701
1	V Idus Jan.	III Id. Feb.	IV Id. Mar.	Pr. Id. Apr.	III Id. Mai	Idus Jun
2	IV	Pridie	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K Qu.
3	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. M	Idus	XVI
4	Pridie	XVI K Mr	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
5	Idus	XV	XVII K. Ap.	XV	XVI	XIV
6	XVII K. Fb	XIV	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
7	XVI	XIII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
8	XV	XII	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
9	XIV	XI	XIII	XI	XII	X
10	XIII	X	XII	X	XI	IX
11	XII	IX	XI	IX	X	VIII
12	XI	VIII	X	VIII	IX	VII
13	X	VII	IX	VII	VIII	VI
14	IX	VI	VIII	VI	VII	V
15	VIII	V	VII	V	VI	IV
16	VII	IV	VI	IV	V	III
17	VI	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
18	V	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
19	IV	KAL. MAR.	III	KAL. MAI	Pridie	VI Nonas
20	III	VI Nonas	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
21	Pridie	V	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
22	KAL. FEB.	IV	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
23	IV Nonas	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
24	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
25	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
26	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
27	VIII Idus	VII	VII	VII	VI	VI
28	VII	VI	VI	VI	V	V
29	VI	V	V	V	IV	IV
30	V		IV	IV	III	III
31	IV		III		Pridie	

Days of the Julian Months.	JULIAN YEAR 53 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	701	701	701	701	701	701—702
1	Pr. Id. Qun	XVII K.Sep	XV K. Oct.	XVI K.Nov.	XIV K.Dec.	XIII K.Jan.
2	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
3	XVII K.Sex	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
4	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
5	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
6	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
7	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
8	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
9	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
10	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
11	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
12	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
13	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
14	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
15	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
16	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
17	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
18	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
19	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
20	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
21	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
22	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
23	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
24	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
25	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
26	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K.Fb.
27	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K.Jan.	XVI
28	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
29	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K.Dec.	XV	XIV
30	Pridie	XVII K.Oct.	XVII K.Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
31	Idus	XVI		XV		XII

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 52 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	702	702	702	702	702	702
1	XI K. Feb.	III Kal int	III K Mar	III K. Apr	Pr K. Mai	Pr K. Jun
2	X	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	KAL. MAI	KAL. JUN.
3	IX	KAL. INT.	KAL. MAR.	KAL. APR.	VI Nonas	IV Nonas
4	VIII	IV Nonas	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	V	III
5	VII	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
6	VI	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	Nonæ
7	V	Nonæ	III	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus
8	IV	VIII Idus	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII
9	III	VII	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI
10	Pridie	VI	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
11	KAL. FEB.	V	VII	V	VI	IV
12	IV Nonas	IV	VI	IV	V	III
13	III	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
14	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
15	Nonæ	Idus	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Qu.
16	VIII Idus	XVI K Mar.	Pridie	XVII K. M	Idus	XVI
17	VII	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
18	VI	XIV	XVII K. Ap	XV	XVI	XIV
19	V	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
20	IV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
21	III	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
22	Pridie	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
23	Idus	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
24	XI Kal. int.	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
25	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
26	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
27	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
28	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
29	VI		VI	IV	V	III
30	V		V	III	IV	Pridie
31	IV		IV		III	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 52 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	702	702	702	702	702	702—703
1	KAL. QUIN.	KAL. SEX.	III Non.Sep	IV Non.Oct.	Pr. Non Nv.	Nonæ Dec.
2	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	Pridie	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
3	V	III	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
4	IV	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII	VI
5	III	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI	V
6	Pridie	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V	IV
7	Nonæ	VII	V	VI	IV	III
8	VIII Idus	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
9	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	Idus
10	VI	IV	Pridie	III	Idus	XVII K.Jn.
11	V	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.Dc.	XVI
12	IV	Pridie	XVII K.Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
13	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K.Nv.	XV	XIV
14	Pridie	XVII K Sep	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
15	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
16	XVII K Sex	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
17	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
18	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
19	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
20	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
21	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
22	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
23	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
24	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
25	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
26	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
27	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
28	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
29	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
30	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
31	Pridie	IV Nonas		III		VIII Idus

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 51 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	703	703	703	703	703	703
1	VII Id. Jan	V Id. Feb.	VII Id. Mar.	V Idus Api.	VI Id. Mai	IV Id Jun
2	VI	IV	VI	IV	V	III
3	V	III	V	III	IV	Pridie
4	IV	Pridie	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
5	III	Idus	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Qu.
6	Pridie	XVI K. Mr	Pridie	XVII K. Mr	Idus	XVI
7	Idus	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Ju.	XV
8	XVII K. Fb	XIV	XVII K. Ap	XV	XVI	XIV
9	XVI	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
10	XV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
11	XIV	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
12	XIII	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
13	XII	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
14	XI	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
15	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
16	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
17	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
18	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
19	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
20	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
21	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
22	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MAI	Pridie	VI Nonas
23	Pridie	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
24	KAL. FEB.	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
25	IV Nonas	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
26	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
27	Pridie	Nonæ	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
28	Nonæ	VIII Idus	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
29	VIII Idus		VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
30	VII		VII	VII	VI	VI
31	VI		VI		V	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 51 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	703	703	703	703	703	703—704
1	V Id. Quin.	III Id. Sex	Idus Sept	Pr. Id Oct	XVII K Dec	XVI K. Jan.
2	IV	Prīdie	XVII K. Oct	Idus	XVI	XV
3	III	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Nv.	XV	XIV
4	Prīdie	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XVI	XIV	XIII
5	Idus	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII	XII
6	XVII K. Sex.	XV	XIII	XIV	XII	XI
7	XVI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI	X
8	XV	XIII	XI	XII	X	IX
9	XIV	XII	X	XI	IX	VIII
10	XIII	XI	IX	X	VIII	VII
11	XII	X	VIII	IX	VII	VI
12	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
13	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
14	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
15	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Prīdie
16	VII	V	III	IV	Prīdie	KAL. JAN.
17	VI	IV	Prīdie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
18	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Prīdie	IV Nonas	III
19	IV	Prīdie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Prīdie
20	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Prīdie	Nonæ
21	Prīdie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
22	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Prīdie	VIII Idus	VII
23	IV Nonas	Prīdie	Prīdie	Nonæ	VII	VI
24	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
25	Prīdie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
26	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
27	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Prīdie
28	VII	V	V	IV	Prīdie	Idus
29	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K. Fb.
30	V	III	III	Prīdie	XVII K Jan.	XVI
31	IV	Prīdie		Idus		XV

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 50 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	704	704	704	704	704	704
1	XIV K.Feb.	XI K. Mar.	XIV K. Ap ¹ .	XII K. Ma ¹¹	XIII K. Ju	XI K. Quin.
2	XIII	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
3	XII	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
4	XI	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
5	X	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
6	IX	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
7	VIII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
8	VII	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
9	VI	III	VI	IV	V	III
10	V	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
11	IV	KAL. MAR.	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. QUIN.
12	III	VI Nonas	III	KAL. MA ¹¹	Pridie	VI Nonas
13	Pridie	V	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
14	KAL. FEB.	IV	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
15	IV Nonas	III	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
16	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
17	Pridie	Nonæ	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
18	Nonæ	VIII Idus	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
19	VIII Idus	VII	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
20	VII	VI	VII	VII	VI	VI
21	VI	V	VI	VI	V	V
22	V	IV	V	V	IV	IV
23	IV	III	IV	IV	III	III
24	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
25	Pridie	Idus	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
26	Idus	XVII K.Ap.	Idus	Idus	XVII K.Qu.	XVIII K.Sex.
27	XVI K. Mr	XVI	XVII K.Ma ¹	XVII K.Ju.	XVI	XVI
28	XV	XV	XVI	XVI	XV	XV
29	XIV		XV	XV	XIV	XIV
30	XIII		XIV	XIV	XIII	XIII
31	XII		XIII		XII	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 50 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	704	704	704	704	704	704—705
1	XII K Sext	X Kal.Sept.	VIII K Oct.	IX K Nov	VII K. Dec.	VI K. Jan.
2	XI	IX	VII	VIII	VI	V
3	X	VIII	VI	VII	V	IV
4	IX	VII	V	VI	IV	III
5	VIII	VI	IV	V	III	Pridie
6	VII	V	III	IV	Pridie	KAL. JAN.
7	VI	IV	Pridie	III	KAL. DEC.	IV Nonas
8	V	III	KAL. OCT.	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
9	IV	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie
10	III	KAL. SEP.	V	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
11	Pridie	IV Nonas	IV	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
12	KAL. SEX.	III	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
13	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
14	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
15	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
16	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
17	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
18	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
19	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K.Fb.
20	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K.Jan.	XVI
21	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
22	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K.Dec	XV	XIV
23	Pridie	XVII K.Oct.	XVII K.Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
24	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
25	XVII K Sep.	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
26	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
27	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
28	XIV	XII	XII	XI	IX	VIII
29	XIII	XI	XI	X	VIII	VII
30	XII	X	X	IX	VII	VI
31	XI	IX		VIII		V

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 49 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	705	705	705	705	705	705
1	IV K Feb.	KAL. MAR.	III Kal. Ap	KAL. MAI	Pr Kal Jun.	VI N. Quin
2	III	VI Nonas	Pridie	VI Nonas	KAL. JUN.	V
3	Pridie	V	KAL. APR.	V	IV Nonas	IV
4	KAL. FEB.	IV	IV Nonas	IV	III	III
5	IV Nonas	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
6	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ
7	Pridie	Nonæ	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
8	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	VII
9	VIII Idus	VII	VII	VII	VI	VI
10	VII	VI	VI	VI	V	V
11	VI	V	V	V	IV	IV
12	V	IV	IV	IV	III	III
13	IV	III	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
14	III	Pridie	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
15	Pridie	Idus	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Qu	XVII K. Sex.
16	Idus	XVII K. Ap	XVII K M	XVII K. Ju.	XVI	XVI
17	XVI K. Mr	XVI	XVI	XVI	XV	XV
18	XV	XV	XV	XV	XIV	XIV
19	XIV	XIV	XIV	XIV	XIII	XIII
20	XIII	XIII	XIII	XIII	XII	XII
21	XII	XII	XII	XII	XI	XI
22	XI	XI	XI	XI	X	X
23	X	X	X	X	IX	IX
24	IX	IX	IX	IX	VIII	VIII
25	VIII	VIII	VIII	VIII	VII	VII
26	VII	VII	VII	VII	VI	VI
27	VI	VI	VI	VI	V	V
28	V	V	V	V	IV	IV
29	IV	IV	IV	IV	III	III
30	III		III	III	Pridie	Pridie
31	Pridie		Pridie		KAL. QUIN.	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 49 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JULY	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	705	705	705	705	705—706	706
1	KAL. SEX.	III N. Sep.	III N. Oct.	Pr. N. Nov.	VIII Id. Dec.	VII Id. Jan.
2	IV Nonas	Pridie	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
3	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
4	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
5	Nonæ	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
6	VIII Idus	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
7	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
8	VI	IV	IV	III	Idus	XVII K. Fb.
9	V	III	III	Pridie	XVII K. Jan.	XVI
10	IV	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XV
11	III	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Dec.	XV	XIV
12	Pridie	XVII K. Oct.	XVII K. Nov.	XVI	XIV	XIII
13	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
14	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
15	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
16	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
17	XIV	XII	XII	XI	IX	VIII
18	XIII	XI	XI	X	VIII	VII
19	XII	X	X	IX	VII	VI
20	XI	IX	IX	VIII	VI	V
21	X	VIII	VIII	VII	V	IV
22	IX	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
23	VIII	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
24	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	KAL. FEB. IV Nonas
25	VI	IV	IV	III	KAL. JAN.	
26	V	III	III	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
27	IV	Pridie	Pridie	KAL. DEC.	III	Pridie
28	III	KAL. OCT.	KAL. NOV.	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
29	Pridie	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
30	KAL. SEP.	V	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
31	IV Nonas	IV		Nonæ		VI

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 48 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	706	706	706	706	706	706
1	V Idus Feb.	IV Id. Mar.	V Idus Apr	V Id. Mai	IV Id. Jun.	IV Id. Quin.
2	IV	III	IV *	IV	III	III
3	III	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
4	Pridie	Idus	Pridie	Pridie	Idus	Idus
5	Idus	XVII K. Ap.	Idus	Idus	XVII K. Qu.	XVII K. Sex
6	XVI K. M.	XVI	XVII K. Mr.	XVII K. Ju.	XVI	XVI
7	XV	XV	XVI	XVI	XV	XV
8	XIV	XIV	XV	XV	XIV	XIV
9	XIII	XIII	XIV	XIV	XIII	XIII
10	XII	XII	XIII	XIII	XII	XII
11	XI	XI	XII	XII	XI	XI
12	X	X	XI	XI	X	X
13	IX	IX	X	X	IX	IX
14	VIII	VIII	IX	IX	VIII	VIII
15	VII	VII	VIII	VIII	VII	VII
16	VI	VI	VII	VII	VI	VI
17	V	V	VI	VI	V	V
18	IV	IV	V	V	IV	IV
19	III	III	IV	IV	III	III
20	Pridie	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
21	KAL. MAR.	KAL. APR.	Pridie	Pridie	KAL. QUIN.	KAL. SEX.
22	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	KAL. MAI	KAL. JUN.	VI Nonas	IV Nonas
23	V	III	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	V	III
24	IV	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
25	III	Nonas	IV	Pridie	III	Nonas
26	Pridie	VIII Idus	III	Nonas	Pridie	VIII Idus
27	Nonas	VII	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonas	VII
28	VIII Idus	VI	Nonas	VII	VIII Idus	VI
29	VII		VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
30	VI		VII	V	VI	IV
31	V		VI		V	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 48 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	706	706	706	706	706—707	707
1	III Id. Sex.	Idus Sept.	Idus Oct.	XVII K. Dec	XV K. Jan.	XIV K. Feb.
2	Pridie	XVII K. Oct.	XVII K. Nv.	XVI	XIV	XIII
3	Idus	XVI	XVI	XV	XIII	XII
4	XVII K. Sep.	XV	XV	XIV	XII	XI
5	XVI	XIV	XIV	XIII	XI	X
6	XV	XIII	XIII	XII	X	IX
7	XIV	XII	XII	XI	IX	VIII
8	XIII	XI	XI	X	VIII	VII
9	XII	X	X	IX	VII	VI
10	XI	IX	IX	VIII	VI	V
11	X	VIII	VIII	VII	V	IV
12	IX	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
13	VIII	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
14	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	KAL. FEB. IV Nonas
15	VI	IV	IV	III	KAL. JAN.	
16	V	III	III	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
17	IV	Pridie	Pridie	KAL. DEC.	III	Pridie
18	III	KAL. OCT. VI Nonas	KAL. NOV. IV Nonas	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
19	Pridie			III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
20	KAL. SEP.	V	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
21	IV Nonas	IV	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
22	III	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
23	Pridie	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
24	Nonæ	Nonæ	VII	VI	IV	III
25	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VI	V	III	Pridie
26	VII	VII	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
27	VI	VI	IV	III	Idus	XVI K. Mr.
28	V	V	III	Pridie	XVII K. Fb.	XV
29	IV	IV	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XIV
30	III	III	Idus	XVII K. Jan.	XV	XIII
31	Pridie	Pridie		XVI		XII

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 47 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY	MARCH.	APRIL.	MAY	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	707	707	707	707	707	707
1	XI K. Mar	XI Kal Ap.	XII K Ma.	XII K Jun.	XI K Quin.	XI Kal Sex.
2	X	X	XI	XI	X	X
3	IX	IX	X	X	IX	IX
4	VIII	VIII	IX	IX	VIII	VIII
5	VII	VII	VIII	VIII	VII	VII
6	VI	VI	VII	VII	VI	VI
7	V	V	VI	VI	V	V
8	IV	IV	V	V	IV	IV
9	III	III	IV	IV	III	III
10	Pridie	Pridie	III	III	Pridie	Pridie
11	KAL. MAR.	KAL. APR.	Pridie	Pridie	KAL. QUIN.	KAL. SEX.
12	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	KAL. MAII	KAL. JUN.	VI Nonas	IV Nonas
13	V	III	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	V	III
14	IV	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
15	III	Nonæ	IV	Pridie	III	Nonæ
16	Pridie	VIII Idus	III	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus
17	Nonæ	VII	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII
18	VIII Idus	VI	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI
19	VII	V	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
20	VI	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
21	V	III	VI	IV	V	III
22	IV	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
23	III	Idus	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
24	Pridie	XVII K M	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K.Sep.
25	Idus	XVI	Pridie	XVII K.Qu.	Idus	XVI
26	XVII K.Ap	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K.Sex.	XV
27	XVI	XIV	XVII K Ju.	XV	XVI	XIV
28	XV	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
29	XIV		XV	XIII	XIV	XII
30	XIII		XIV	XII	XIII	XI
31	XII		XIII		XII	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 47 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	707	707	707	707	707—708	708
1	X Kal. Sep.	VIII K. Oct	VIII K Nv.	VII K. Dec	V Kal Jan	IV Kal. Feb
2	IX	VII	VII	VI	IV	III
3	VIII	VI	VI	V	III	Pridie
4	VII	V	V	IV	Pridie	KAL. FEB.
5	VI	IV	IV	III	KAL. JAN.	IV Nonas
6	V	III	III	Pridie	IV Nonas	III
7	IV	Pridie	Pridie	KAL. DEC.	III	Pridie
8	III	KAL. OCT.	KAL. NOV.	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ
9	Pridie	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus
10	KAL. SEP.	V	III	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII
11	IV Nonas	IV	Pridie	Nonæ	VII	VI
12	III	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI	V
13	Pridie	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII	V	IV
14	Nonæ	Nonæ	VII	VI	IV	III
15	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VI	V	III	Pridie
16	VII	VII	V	IV	Pridie	Idus
17	VI	VI	IV	III	Idus	XVI K. Mar.
18	V	V	III	Pridie	XVII K. Fb	XV
19	IV	IV	Pridie	Idus	XVI	XIV
20	III	III	Idus	XVII K Jn	XV	XIII
21	Pridie	Pridie	XVII K. Dc.	XVI	XIV	XII
22	Idus	Idus	XVI	XV	XIII	XI
23	XVII K. Oct.	XVII K. Nv.	XV	XIV	XII	X
24	XVI	XVI	XIV	XIII	XI	IX
25	XV	XV	XIII	XII	X	VIII
26	XIV	XIV	XII	XI	IX	VII
27	XIII	XIII	XI	X	VIII	VI
28	XII	XII	X	IX	VII	V
29	XI	XI	IX	VIII	VI	IV
30	X	X	VIII	VII	V	III
31	IX	IX		VI		Pridie

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 46 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JANUARY.	FEBRUARY.	MARCH.	APRIL	MAY	JUNE
	YEAR OF ROME					
	708	708	708	708	708	708
1	KAL. MAR.	KAL. APR.	P1 K. Mai	P1 K Junii	KAL. QUIN.	KAL. SEX.
2	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	KAL. MAII	KAL. JUN.	VI Nonas	IV Nonas
3	V	III	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	V	III
4	IV	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
5	III	Nonæ	IV	Pridie	III	Nonæ
6	Pridie	VIII Idus	III	Nonæ	Pridie	VIII Idus
7	Nonæ	VII	Pridie	VIII Idus	Nonæ	VII
8	VIII Idus	VI	Nonæ	VII	VIII Idus	VI
9	VII	V	VIII Idus	VI	VII	V
10	VI	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
11	V	III	VI	IV	V	III
12	IV	Pridie	V	III	IV	Pridie
13	III	Idus	IV	Pridie	III	Idus
14	Pridie	XVII K. M.	III	Idus	Pridie	XVII K. Sep.
15	Idus	XVI	Pridie	XVII K. Qu.	Idus	XVI
16	XVII K. Ap	XV	Idus	XVI	XVII K. Sex.	XV
17	XVI	XIV	XVII K. Ju.	XV	XVI	XIV
18	XV	XIII	XVI	XIV	XV	XIII
19	XIV	XII	XV	XIII	XIV	XII
20	XIII	XI	XIV	XII	XIII	XI
21	XII	X	XIII	XI	XII	X
22	XI	IX	XII	X	XI	IX
23	X	VIII	XI	IX	X	VIII
24	IX	VII	X	VIII	IX	VII
25	VIII	VI	IX	VII	VIII	VI
26	VII	V	VIII	VI	VII	V
27	VI	IV	VII	V	VI	IV
28	V	III	VI	IV	V	III
29	IV		V	III	IV	Pridie
30	III		IV	Pridie	III	.
31	Pridie		III		Pridie	KAL. SEP.

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 46 BEFORE CHRIST.					
	JULY.	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER.	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	708	708	708	708	708	708
1	IV Non.Sep.	IV Non Oct.	P1. Non.Nv.	Non.int. pr.	VII Id int	III Kal.Dec
2	III	III	Nonæ	VIII Idus	VI [post.	Pridie
3	Pridie	Pridie	VIII Idus	VII	V	KAL. DEC.
4	Nonæ	Nonæ	VII	VI	IV	IV Nonas
5	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	VI	V	III	III
6	VII	VII	V	IV	Pridie	Pridie
7	VI	VI	IV	III	Idus	Nonæ
8	V	V	III	Pridie	XXVI Kal	VIII Idus
9	IV	IV	Pridie	Idus	XXV [Dec.	VII
10	III	III	Idus	XVII K.int	XXIV	VI
				[post.		
11	Pridie	Pridie	XVII K int	XVI	XXIII	V
12	Idus	Idus	XVI [pr	XV	XXII	IV
13	XVII K.Oct.	XVII K.Nv.	XV	XIV	XXI	III
14	XVI	XVI	XIV	XIII	XX	Pridie
15	XV	XV	XIII	XII	XIX	Idus
16	XIV	XIV	XII	XI	XVIII	XVII K Jn.
17	XIII	XIII	XI	X	XVII	XVI
18	XII	XII	X	IX	XVI	XV
19	XI	XI	IX	VIII	XV	XIV
20	X	X	VIII	VII	XIV	XIII
21	IX	IX	VII	VI	XIII	XII
22	VIII	VIII	VI	V	XII	XI
23	VII	VII	V	IV	XI	X
24	VI	VI	IV	III	X	IX
25	V	V	III	Pridie	IX	VIII
26	IV	IV	Pridie	K.INT.POST.	VIII	VII
27	III	III	K. INT. PR.	IV Nonas	VII	VI
28	Pridie	Pridie	IV Nonas	III	VI	V
29	KAL. OCT.	KAL. NOV.	III	Pridie	V	IV
30	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	Pridie	Nonæ	IV	III
31	V	III		VIII Idus		Pridie

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 45 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JANUARY	FEBRUARY.	MARCH	APRIL.	MAY.	JUNE.
	YEAR OF ROME					
	709	709	709	709	709	709
1	KAL. JAN.	KAL. FEB.	KAL. MAR.	KAL. APR.	KAL. MAI	KAL. JUN.
2	IV Nonas	IV Nonas	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	VI Nonas	IV Nonas
3	III	III	V	III	V	III
4	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	IV	Pridie
5	Nonæ	Nonæ	III	Nonæ	III	Nonæ
6	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	Pridie	VIII Idus	Pridie	VIII Idus
7	VII	VII	Nonæ	VII	Nonæ	VII
8	VI	VI	VIII Idus	VI	VIII Idus	VI
9	V	V	VII	V	VII	V
10	IV	IV	VI	IV	VI	IV
11	III	III	V	III	V	III
12	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	IV	Pridie
13	Idus	Idus	III	Idus	III	Idus
14	XIX K.Feb	XVI K. M.	Pridie	XVIII K.M	Pridie	XVIII K.Q.
15	XVIII	XV	Idus	XVII	Idus	XVII
16	XVII	XIV	XVII K Ap.	XVI	XVII K.Ju.	XVI
17	XVI	XIII	XVI	XV	XVI	XV
18	XV	XII	XV	XIV	XV	XIV
19	XIV	XI	XIV	XIII	XIV	XIII
20	XIII	X	XIII	XII	XIII	XII
21	XII	IX	XII	XI	XII	XI
22	XI	VIII	XI	X	XI	X
23	X	VII	X	IX	X	IX
24	IX	Bissext.	IX	VIII	IX	VIII
25	VIII	VI	VIII	VII	VIII	VII
26	VII	V	VII	VI	VII	VI
27	VI	IV	VI	V	VI	V
28	V	III	V	IV	V	IV
29	IV	Pridie	IV	III	IV	III
30	III		III	Pridie	III	Pridie
31	Pridie		Pridie		Pridie	

Days of the Julian Months	JULIAN YEAR 45 BEFORE CHRIST. (BISSEXTILE)					
	JULY	AUGUST.	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER.	NOVEMBER.	DECEMBER.
	YEAR OF ROME.					
	709	709	709	709	709	709
1	KAL. QUIN.	KAL. SEX.	KAL. SEP.	KAL. OCT.	KAL. NOV.	KAL. DEC.
2	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	IV Nonas	VI Nonas	IV Nonas	IV Nonas
3	V	III	III	V	III	III
4	IV	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	Pridie
5	III	Nonæ	Nonæ	III	Nonæ	Nonæ
6	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus	Pridie	VIII Idus	VIII Idus
7	Nonæ	VII	VII	Nonæ	VII	VII
8	VIII Idus	VI	VI	VIII Idus	VI	VI
9	VII	V	V	VII	V	V
10	VI	IV	IV	VI	IV	IV
11	V	III	III	V	III	III
12	IV	Pridie	Pridie	IV	Pridie	Pridie
13	III	Idus	Idus	III	Idus	Idus
14	Pridie	XIX K.Sep.	XVIII Kal.	Pridie	XVIII K.Dc.	XIX K. Jan.
15	Idus	XVIII	XVII [Oct	Idus	XVII	XVIII
16	XVII K.Sex	XVII	XVI	XVII K.Nv.	XVI	XVII
17	XVI	XVI	XV	XVI	XV	XVI
18	XV	XV	XIV	XV	XIV	XV
19	XIV	XIV	XIII	XIV	XIII	XIV
20	XIII	XIII	XII	XIII	XII	XIII
21	XII	XII	XI	XII	XI	XII
22	XI	XI	X	XI	X	XI
23	X	X	IX	X	IX	X
24	IX	IX	VIII	IX	VIII	IX
25	VIII	VIII	VII	VIII	VII	VIII
26	VII	VII	VI	VII	VI	VII
27	VI	VI	V	VI	V	VI
28	V	V	IV	V	IV	V
29	IV	IV	III	IV	III	IV
30	III	III	Pridie	III	Pridie	III
31	Pridie	Pridie		Pridie		Pridie

APPENDIX B.

CONCORDANCE OF ROMAN AND MODERN HOURS, FOR THE YEAR OF ROME 699 (55 B.C.) AND FOR THE LATITUDE OF PARIS.

Spring Equinox	March 23,	5 o'clock, p m.
Summer Solstice.	June 25,	5 o'clock, p.m.
Autumnal Equinox	September 26,	3 o'clock, a m.
Winter Solstice	December 23,	7 o'clock, p m.

The dates are referred to the Julian style.

The Roman hours are reckoned from sunset and sunrise.

The modern hours are given in true solar time.

The Roman hours are given at the head of the columns, in Roman numerals. The modern hours are in ordinary numerals. Two examples will explain the use of the Table.

Division of the Night on the 16th of August.—To obtain it, we seek the date in the indicating column on the left, entitled NIGHTS. We conclude from the line opposite: at 7h. 11m., sunset, beginning of the first hour and of the first watch; at 9h. 36m., end of the first watch and beginning of the second; at 12h. 0m. it is midnight, the second watch ends, the third begins; at 2h. 24m., end of the third watch, beginning of the fourth; at 4h. 49m. the sun rises, and the fourth watch ends.

Division of the Day on the 16th of August.—We seek the date in the indicating column to the right, entitled DAYS. We conclude from the line opposite: at 4h. 49m., sunrise, beginning of the first hour; the third hour ends at 8h. 25m.; the sixth hour at noon; the ninth at 3h. 35m.; at 7h. 11m. the sun sets.

At the summer solstice, each watch embraces two of our hours; in the winter solstice, it embraces four.

NIGHTS.	1ST WATCH.												2ND WATCH.						3RD WATCH.						4TH WATCH.						DAYS.						
	I.			II			III			IV			V			VI.			VII.			VIII.			IX			X.				XI.			XII		
	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S	H	M	S		H	M	S			
June 25.	8	1	8	41	9	20	10	0	10	40	11	20	12	0	0	40	1	20	2	0	2	40	3	19	3	59									December 23		
July 5 June 15	7	58	8	89	9	19	9	59	10	40	11	20	12	0	0	40	1	20	2	1	2	41	3	21	4	2									Jan. 1 Dec 14		
July 16 June 4	7	51	8	33	9	14	9	56	10	37	11	19	12	0	0	41	1	23	2	4	2	46	3	27	4	9								Jan. 11 Dec. 4			
July 26 May 25	7	41	8	24	9	7	9	51	10	34	11	17	12	0	0	43	1	26	2	9	2	53	3	36	4	19								Jan 21 Nov 25			
Aug 5 May 15	7	28	8	13	8	59	9	44	10	29	11	15	12	0	0	45	1	31	2	16	3	1	3	47	4	32								Jan. 31 Nov. 15			
Aug 16 May 4	7	11	8	0	8	48	9	36	10	24	11	12	12	0	0	48	1	36	2	24	3	12	4	0	4	49								Feb. 10 Nov. 5			
Aug. 26 April 24	6	55	7	46	8	37	9	27	10	18	11	9	12	0	0	51	1	42	2	33	3	23	4	14	5	5								Feb 20 Oct. 26			
Sept. 5 April 13	6	37	7	31	8	25	9	19	10	13	11	6	12	0	0	54	1	47	2	41	3	35	4	29	5	23								Mar. 2 Oct 16			
Sept 16 April 2	6	18	7	15	8	12	9	9	10	6	11	3	12	0	0	57	1	54	2	51	3	48	4	45	5	42								Mar. 13 Oct 6			
Sept 26 Mar 23	6	0	7	0	8	0	9	0	10	0	11	0	12	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	4	0	5	0	6	0								Mar. 28 Sept. 26			
Oct 6 Mar. 12	5	42	6	45	7	48	8	51	9	54	10	57	12	0	1	3	2	6	3	9	4	12	5	15	6	18								April 2 Sept 16			
Oct 16 Mar 2	5	23	6	29	7	35	8	41	9	47	10	54	12	0	1	6	2	18	3	19	4	25	5	31	6	37								April 13 Sept 5			
Oct. 25 Feb 21	5	6	6	15	7	24	8	33	9	42	10	51	12	0	1	9	2	18	3	27	4	36	5	45	6	54								April 23 Aug 26			
Nov. 4 Feb 11	4	49	5	1	7	13	8	25	9	36	10	48	12	0	1	12	2	24	3	35	4	47	5	59	7	11								May 3 Aug 16			
Nov 14 Feb 1	4	33	5	48	7	2	8	17	9	31	10	46	12	0	1	14	2	29	3	43	4	58	6	12	7	27								May 14 Aug. 6			
Nov. 24 Jan. 22	4	19	5	36	6	53	8	10	9	27	10	43	12	0	1	17	2	33	3	50	5	7	6	24	7	41								May 24 July 27			
Dec. 3 Jan. 12	4	9	5	28	6	46	8	5	9	23	10	42	12	0	1	18	2	37	3	55	5	14	6	32	7	51								June 3 July 17			
Dec. 13 Jan. 2	4	2	5	23	6	41	8	1	9	21	10	40	12	0	1	20	2	39	3	59	5	19	6	38	7	58								June 14 July 6			
December 23.	3	59	5	20	6	40	8	0	9	20	10	40	12	0	1	20	2	40	4	0	5	20	6	40	8	1								June 25			
NIGHTS	I.	II	III	IV	V	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX	X.	XI	XII.	DAYS.																								

APPENDIX C.

NOTE ON THE ANCIENT COINS COLLECTED IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.

THE result of the excavations made round Alise-Sainte-Reine would be sufficient to establish the identity of that locality with the *Alesia* of Cæsar; but the abundance of proofs can do no injury to the argument, and there is one the value of which cannot be disputed: we mean that furnished by the ancient coins found in the fosses of Camp D. (*See Plate 23.*) Lost in a combat, and falling into a fosse full of water, they thus escaped discovery in the immediate search made usually on a battle-field.

To establish the date of an event which has occasioned the burial of certain coins, we must first show that these coins have been struck at a period anterior to that event. Thus the coins lost at Alesia must naturally belong to a period anterior to the siege of that town.

The coins collected are in number 619; they may be divided into two distinct groups: some bear the impression of the Roman Mint, others are of the Gaulish Mint.

Thus being understood, let us examine separately the age of the two groups. M. le Comte de Salis and M. de Sauley have kindly undertaken the classification.

All the Roman coins, without exception, have been struck by order and under the direction of the monetary magistrates, appointed by the government of the Republic: they belong to the republican period, and appertain to the class of coins called *consular*. Thanks to the labours of men like Morell, Borghesi, Cavedoni, Cohen, Mommsen, and, above all, the Comte de Salis, the age of the coins of this class is now pretty clearly determ-

ined. On the date of their emission, in general, it would be, so to say, impossible to commit an error of several years. The series of denarii and quinarii offers us the names of eighty-two magistrates, and the club, the symbol of an eighty-third; four of these denarii present neither name nor symbol; it is the same case with an as in copper, of the type of Janus with the prow of a ship, which has probably borne no other legend but the word ROMA. The most recent of these coins belong to the year 700 of Rome, or 54 B.C. The year in which the siege of Alesia took place was 702. This fact alone would serve, if needed, to demonstrate that Alise and Alesia are the same place.

The examination of the coins of Gaulish fabrication is equally important. They belong to twenty-four *civitates*, or different tribes. Military contingents, assembled from all parts of the Gaulish territory, have therefore taken part in the war in which these coins were lost and scattered in the soil. But the decisive fact is, that in this number we find 103 which are incontestably of Arvernian origin; one of them bears, distinctly inscribed, the name of Vercingetorix. Of 487 Gaulish coins, 103 belong to the Arverni.

We may add that, among the latter, 61 bear the name of Epasnactus, who became, after the capitulation of Alesia, a faithful ally of the Romans, and the chief of Arvernia. (*De Bello Gallico*, VIII. 44.) Now the coins of Epasnactus have been long well known; they may be subdivided into two classes: some, anterior to the submission of that personage, present pure Gaulish types; others, of later date, offer only Romanised types, if we may use the expression. In the fosses of Camp D have been found only coins of Epasnactus of the primitive type. The battle in which these coins were lost by the Arverni before Alise was, therefore, anterior to the year 51 B.C., the year of the submission of Epasnactus.

II.—S s

LIST OF ANCIENT COINS
FOUND IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.

COINS STRUCK IN THE MINT AT ROME.

Number of each.	Names or Symbols of the Magistrates inscribed on the Coins	Probable Dates A.U.C.	Numbers of the Plates in Cohen's Work
1	Anonymous.	485—537	Pl. XLIII. <i>Uncertain</i> 1 (The word ROMA is not in incuse letters)
1	Anonymous.	558—579	Pl. XLIII. <i>Uncertain</i> 2 (The word ROMA is in a rectangle)
1	M. ATILI. SARAN.	580—588	Pl. VII Atilia 2.
1	NAT	589—595	Pl. XXXI Pinaria 2
1	L. CVP.	602—605	Pl. XVI Cupiennia.
1	M. IVNI.	602—605	Pl. XXXIII Junia 2
1	C. RENI.	606—609	Pl. XXXVI Renia.
1	P. PAETVS.	606—609	Pl. I Ælia 1.
1	CN. LVCR. TRIO.	624—627	Pl. XXV Lucretia 1.
1	M. MARC	640—643	Pl. XXVI Marcia 3
1	M. PORC. LAECA.	644—647	Pl. XXXIV Porcia 2.
1	Q. METE	648—651	Pl. VIII Cæcilia 3.
1	M. VARG	652	Pl. XL Vargunteia
1	T. CLOVLI. (a quinarius)	653	Pl. XII Cloulia 2.
1	Q. PILIPVS.	658	Pl. XXVI Marcia 4
1	L. LIC. CN. DOM. L. PORCI. LICI.	662	Pl. XXXIV Porcia 1.
1	M. HERENNI.	663	Pl. XIX Herennia
2	L. IVLI. L. F. CAESAR.	664	Pl. XX Julia 4.
1	C. COIL. CALD.	664	Pl. XIII Cœlia 2.
1	CALD.	664	Pl. XIII Cœlia 3.
1	Q. THERM. M. F.	664	Pl. XXVIII Minucia 5.
1	L. THORIVS BALBVS	664	Pl. XXXIX Thoria.
1	P. SERVILI M. F. RVLLI.	665	Pl. XXXVIII Servilia 6
1	C. ALLI. BALA	665	Pl. I Aelia 3.
1	L. PISO FRVGI (a quinarius)	666	Pl. IX Calpurnia 5.
2	L. PISO FRVGI.	666	Pl. IX Calpurnia 10
1	Q. TITI.	667	Pl. XXXIX Titia 1.
4	Q. TITI.	667	Pl. XXXIX Titia 2.
4	C. VIBIVS C. F. PANSA	667	Pl. XLI Vibia 4.
1	L. TITVRI. SABIN.	667	Pl. XXXIX Tituria 4
2	L. TITVRI. SABIN	667	Pl. XXXIX Tituria 5.
1	C. CENSO	668	Pl. XXVI Marcia 7.
3	CN. LENTVL.	668	Pl. XIV Cornelia 7.
1	L. RVBRI. DOSSEN.	668	Pl. XXXVI Rubria 1.
3	L. C. MEMIES L. F. GAL.	668	Pl. XXVII Memmia 3.
1	MN. FONTEI C. F	669	Pl. XVIII Fonteia 4

Number of each	Names or Symbols of the Magistrates inscribed on the Coins.	Probable Dates A.U.C.	Numbers of the Plates in Cohen's Work.
1	CAR OGV.L. VER.	670	Pl. XI Carvilia 3.
2	C. LIMETA P. CREPVSI. I CENSORIN.	671	Pl. XXVI Marcia 10.
1	L. CENSOR.	671	Pl. XXVI Marcia 9.
2	P. CREPVSI.	671	Pl. XVI Crepusia.
4	C. MAMIL. LIMETAN	671	Pl. XXV Mamilia.
1	C. ANNI. T. F. T. N. L. FABI. L. F.	672	Pl. II Annia 2.
1	C. NAE. BALB.	672	Pl. XXIX Nævia.
1	L. PAPI.	673	Pl. XXX Papia 1.
2	TI. CLAVD. TI. F. AP. N.	673	Pl. XII Claudia 3.
1	C. MARI. C. F. CAPIT.	674	Pl. XXVI Maria 3.
1	L. PROCILI. F.	675	Pl. XXXV Proclia 1.
2	L. PROCILI. F.	675	Pl. XXXV Proclia 2
1	P. SATRIENVS	676	Pl. XXXVI Satriena.
1	L. RVTILI. FLAC	676	Pl. XXXVI Rutlia.
1	L. LVCRETI. TRIO	677	Pl. XXV Lucretia 2.
1	MN. AQVIL. MN. F. MN. N.	682	Pl. VI Aquillia 2.
2	PAVLLVS LEPIDVS	683	Pl. I Æmilia 9.
6	PAVLLVS LEPIDVS LIBO	683	Pl. I Æmilia 10.
2	LIBO	683	Pl. XXXVI Scibonia 2
2	C. HOSIDI. C. F. GETA	683	Pl. XIX Hosidia 1.
1	C. HOSIDI. C. F. GETA	683	Pl. XIX Hosidia 2.
1	P. GALB.	683	Pl. XXXVIII Sulpicia 2.
2	L. ROSCI FABATI	684	Pl. XXXVI Roscia.
1	M. PLAETORI. CEST.	686	Pl. XXXII Plætoria 3.
1	M. PLAETORIVS M. F. CESTIANVS	686	Pl. XXXII Plætoria 9.
1	C. PISO L. F. FRVGI.	690	Pl. IX Calpurnia 15.
1	C. PISO L. F. FRVGI.	690	Pl. IX Calpurnia 16.
1	Q. CASSIVS	695	Pl. XI Cassia 6.
5	M. SCAVR. P. HYPSE.	696	Pl. I Æmilia 1.
2	Q. POMPEI. RVF.	697	Pl. XV Cornelia 20. (This coin ought to be classed with the Pompeia.)
1	PHILIPPVS	698	Pl. XXVI Marcia 8
1	P. CRASSVS M. F. (incuse)	699	Pl. XXIV Licinia 2.
1	FAVSTVS (in a monogram)	700	Pl. XV Cornelia 23.
1	A. PLAVTIVS	700	Pl. XXXIII Plautia 6

The coins of the social war (664—665), of the time of Marius and Sylla (666—674), and of the last two years of the war of Spartacus (682—683), are extremely common, and mostly of very rude work.

COINS STRUCK IN SOUTHERN ITALY.

Number of each	Names or Symbols of the Magistrates inscribed on the Coins	Probable Dates A U C	Numbers of the Plates in Cohen's Work.
1	A club.	485—537	This coin is not found in Cohen.
1	Anonymous.	538—557	Pl. XLIII uncertain 2. (The name on the exergue is written ROMA.)
1	Anonymous.	558—579	Pl. XLIII uncertain 2. (The name on the exergue is written ROMA.)
3	Q. FABI. LABEO	653	Pl. XVII Fabia 2.
1	M. TVLLI.	653	Pl. XXXIX Tulla.
1	M. SERGI	655	Pl. XXXVII Sergia.
3	L. FLAMINI. CILO	656	Pl. XVIII Flaminia 1.
1	M. CIPRI M. F. (incuse)	658	Pl. XII Cipia.
1	P. NERVA	659	Pl. XXXVIII Silia
1	L. PHILIPPVVS.	660	Pl. XXVI Marcia 5.
2	M. FOVRI L. F. PHILI	662	Pl. XIX Furia 3
1	MN. AEMILIO LEP.	663	Pl. I Æmia 3
1	CN. BLASIO CN. F.	663	Pl. XIV Cornelia 4.
1	L. CAESI.	663	Pl. VIII Cæsia
1	Q. LVTATI	664	Pl. XXV Lutatia 2.
3	L. MEMMI.	664	Pl. XXVII Memmia 1.
1	L VALERI FLACCI	664	Pl. XL Valeria 3.
1	M. CATO	664	Pl. XXXV Porcia 6
1	A ALBINVS S. F.	665	Pl. XXXV Postumia 2

This series ends with the social war in 665.

COINS STRUCK OUT OF ITALY.

Number of each	Names or Symbols of the Magistrates inscribed on the Coins	Probable Dates A U C	Numbers of the Plates in Cohen's Work
2	CN. LEN Q.	678—682	Pl. XIV Cornelia 10
2	LENT. CVR. ✕ FL	678—682	Pl. XIV Cornelia 11

These coins were struck in Spain during the war of Sertorius. No provincial coins were struck during the interval between the two civil wars from 682 to 704.

GAULISH COINS (FROM CAMP D, ON THE BANKS OF
THE OSE).

ARVERNI.

ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.	Number of each
Electrum. Staters with the types of Vercingetorix... ..	3
Electrum. Stater with an effigy adorned with a singular head- dress	1
Silver Thick and ancient dena- ri of various types	13
Silver. A thick and ancient den- arius, with a bud under the horse.....	1
Silver. A thick and ancient den- arius, of the type of the sta- ters of Vercingetorix	1

COINS WITH NAMES OF CHIEFS.

VERCINGETORIXS. This coin appears to be of copper, and yet may be only a stater of very debased electrum	1
Æ. CVNVANOS.....	5
Æ. CALIIDV	7
Æ A. behind the effigy . . .	2
Æ. PICTILOS.....	8
Æ. EPAD. Epasnactus, be- fore his submission... ..	3
Æ. IPAD·R·CICIIDV·BRI. Epasnactus.	59

NOTE.—Three of these latter coins are
stuck together.

AULERCI-EBUROVICES.

Æ. CAMBIL. (Camulogenus?)	5
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BITURIGES.

ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.

Electrum. Staters with a pea- cock placed above the horse .	2
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Number
of each

Æ. Head. R. horse and boar	1
Æ. Head dressed with long locks of hair	1
Æ. The same type. A branch above the horse.....	1
Æ. The same type. A sword and pentagram....	1

COINS WITH LEGENDS.

Electrum. ABVDOS. A stater	1
Æ. The same legend	9
Æ. The same type. OSNAII	1
Æ. The same type. ISVNIS	1
Electrum. SOLIMA A stater	1
Æ. The same legend	6
Æ. DIASVLOS	7
Æ. The same type. YNO.	4
Æ. The same type. ÆIOV.	1
Æ. Under the horse. OEN...	1
Æ. Under the horse. CAM (Cambolectres?).	1

BUCIOS.

Æ. An unknown coin, at pres- ent unique....	1
--	---

CADURCI.

Æ. Anepigraphic. Types of the coins of Lucterius	1
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CARNUTES.

ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.

Brass	7
Æ. Head R. An eagle and serpent	4
Æ Head. R. Eagle and young eagle .. .	1

COINS WITH LEGENDS.	Number of each
Æ. VANDILIOS	19
Æ. CALIAGIIS.	12
Æ. TASGITIOS. Tasgetius	1

ÆDUI.

ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.

Æ. Old denari	27
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COINS WITH LEGENDS

Æ. KAΛ—ΕΔΟV. (Celts- Ædui)	2
Æ. ANORBO-DVBNOREX. (Dumnorix)	14
Æ. DVBNOREX-DVBNO- COV. (Dumnorix)	4
Æ. DVBNOREX-DVBNO- COV. (Dumnorix) The chief holds in his hand a man's head cut off	1
Æ. LITA. Litavicus	12

HELVII?

Æ. EPOMID. A lion. R. Two heads embracing	4
--	---

LEMOVICES.

Æ. A human head above the horse	5
--	---

LEUCI.

Brass, with the boar.	1
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LEAGUE AGAINST THE
GERMANS.

Æ. Quinari with the horse- man	2
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MANDUBII (OR LINGONES)?

Brass	32
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MASSALIETES.

	Number of each
Æ. Obol with the wheel ...	2

PETROCORII

Æ. With the boar lying down	4
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PICTONES.

Electrum. A stater with the hand	1
Æ. Anepigraphic	1

COINS WITH NAMES OF CHIEFS.

Æ. VIROTAL A warrior standing.	10
Æ. VIROTAL. A lion ..	1

REMI.

Æ. With three heads joined together	2
--	---

SANTONES.

Electrum. A stater. Under the horse SA	1
---	---

SENONES.

Brass, anepigraphic. Animals facing each other	1
Æ. YLLYCCI.	6

SEQUANI.

Brass, anepigraphic	12
Æ. SEQVANOIOTVOS. . .	16
Æ. TOGIRIX	72
Æ. Q·DOCI SAM·F... ..	18

SUESSIONES.

Æ. Divitiacus ΔΕΙΟVICIA- COS	1
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TREVIRI.		Number of each
Æ. Anepigraphic	1	
—		
TRICASSES (OR LINGONES)?		
Brass...	2	
—		
VELIOCASSES.		
Æ. A figure kneeling	1	
—		
VOLCÆ-ARECOMICI.		
Æ.	1	
—		
VOLCÆ-TECTOSAGES.		
Æ.	3	

VOLCÆ-TECTOSAGES.		Number of each
EMIGRANTS FROM GERMANY.		
Æ.	1	
—		
UNCERTAIN FROM THE SOUTH.		
Æ. A horse drinking in a vase	3	
—		
UNDETERMINABLE.		
Æ.	1	
Æ. and brass	14	

APPENDIX D.

NOTICE ON CÆSAR'S LIEUTENANTS.

IN his campaign against Ariovistus, Cæsar had six legions; he put at the head of each either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor. (*De Bello Gallico*, I. 52.) His principal officers, then, were at that period six in number, namely, T. Labienus, bearing the title of *legatus pro prætore* (I. 21), Publius Crassus, L. Arunculeius Cotta, Q. Titurius Sabinus, Q. Pedius, and C. Sulpicius Galba.

1. T. ATTIUS LABIENUS.

T. Attius Labienus had been tribune of the people in 691, and had, in this quality, been the accuser of C. Rabirius. He served Cæsar with zeal during eight years in Gaul. Although he had been loaded with his favours, and had, thanks to him, amassed a great fortune (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, VII. 7.—Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 15), he deserted his cause as soon as the civil war broke out, and in 706 became Pompey's lieutenant in Greece. After the battle of Pharsalia, he went, with Afranius, to rejoin Cato at Corcyra, and passed afterwards into Africa. When Scipio was vanquished, Labienus repaired to Spain, to Cn. Pompey. He was slain at the battle of Munda. Cæsar caused a public funeral to be given to the man who had repaid his benefits by so much ingratitude. (Florus, IV. 2. — Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 105 — Dio Cassius, XLIII. 30, 38.)

2. PUBLIUS LICINIUS CRASSUS.

Publius Licinius Crassus Dives, youngest son of the celebrated triumvir, started with Cæsar for the war in Gaul, made the conquest of Aquitaine, and was employed to conduct to Rome the soldiers who were to vote in favour of Pompey and Crassus. He quitted Cæsar's army in 698, or at the beginning of 699. Taken by his father into Syria, he perished, in 701, in the war against the Parthians, still very young, for Cicero, attached to him by an intimate friendship (*Epist. Familiar.*, V. 8), speaks of him as *adolescens* in a letter to Quintus (II. 9), written in May, 699. He was, nevertheless, already augur, and the great orator succeeded him in that dignity. (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XV. 4.—Plutarch, *Cicero*, 47.)

3. L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA.

The biography of Arunculeius Cotta, before his arrival in Gaul, is not known. His name leads us to suppose that he was descended from a family of clients or freedmen of the *gens Aurelia*, in which the name of *Cotta* was hereditary. The mother of Cæsar was an Aurelia.

4. QUINTUS TITURIUS SABINUS.

The antecedents of Quintus Titurius Sabinus are no more known than those of Arunculeius Cotta, whose melancholy fate he shared. His name shows that he descended from the family of Sabine origin of the Titurii, which had given different magistrates to the Republic. The name of Titurius is found on several consular medals, it is also found in some inscriptions posterior to the time of Cæsar.

5. Q. PEDIUS

Q. Pedius was the son of a sister of Cæsar. (Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 83.) Elected ædile in the year 700 (Cicero, *Orat. pro Plancio*, 7), he must have quitted the army of Gaul at the latest in 699. When the civil war broke out, he remained one of the firmest adherents of his uncle, whose interests he sustained, in 705, at Capua (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IX. 14.) He was prætor when he was besieged in Cosa, by Milo, a partisan of Pompey. He was sent into Spain with Q. Fabius. (Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, III. 22; *De Bello Hispan*, 2.—Dio Cassius, XLIII. 31.) Made by Cæsar's will the heir of one-eighth of his wealth, he gave up what was left to him to Octavius. (Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 83.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 94.) It was at the motion of Q. Pedius, then consul, that the law was passed which has received its name from him, and which was directed against the murderers of the Dictator. (Velleius Paterculus, II. 65.—Suetonius, *Nero*, 3.) Q. Pedius remained faithful to Octavius, yet he proposed the retractation of the declaration of war launched against Antony and Lepidus. He was admitted to the secret of the triumvirate, which was on the point of being concluded, and died suddenly before the end of the year 711. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 52.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, IV. 6.)

6. SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA.

Servius Sulpicius Galba, whom the Emperor Galba reckoned among his ancestors, was of the illustrious family of the Sulpicii; he descended from Sulpicius Galba, consul in 610, who had left the reputation of a great orator. S. Sulpicius Galba, Cæsar's lieutenant in Gaul, had already served in the war in that country under C. Pomptinus, in 693 (Dio Cassius, XXXVII. 48), which explains the choice made of him by the future Dictator. He must have quitted Cæsar's army at latest in 699, for he was, at his recommendation, elected prætor in 700. (Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 65.) He solicited the consulship in vain in 705. Pressed by the creditors of Pompey, for whom he had made himself surety, he was relieved from his difficulties by Cæsar, who paid his debts. (Valerius Maximus, V. 2, § 11.) Finding himself finally deceived in his hope

of arriving at the consulship, S. Galba joined the conspiracy against his old chief (Suetonius, *Galba*, 3.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 113.) He served in the war against Antony, under the Consul Hirtius. We have a letter from him to Cicero, written from the camp of Modena. (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, X. 30.) Prosecuted, in virtue of the law Pedia, as a murderer of Cæsar (Suetonius, *Galba*, 3), he was condemned, and died probably in exile.

The Senate granted Cæsar, in 698, ten lieutenants: Labienus, Arunculeius Cotta, Titurius Sabinus, already in Gaul, Decimus Brutus, P. Sulpicius Rufus, Munatius Plancus, M. Crassus, C. Fabius, L. Roscius, and T. Sextius. As to Sulpicius Galba, P. Crassus, and Q. Pedius, they had returned to Italy.

7 DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS.

Decimus Junius Brutus, belonging to the family of the *Junii*, was son of Decimus Junius Brutus, elected consul in the year 677, and of Sempronia, who performed so celebrated a part in Catiline's conspiracy. He was adopted by A. Postumius Albinus, consul in 655, and took, for this reason, the surname of Albinus, by which we find him sometimes designated. When Cæsar took him into Gaul, he was still very young; the "Commentaries" apply to him the epithet *adolescens*. He must have returned to Rome in January, 704, since a letter of Cicero mentions his presence there at that period. (*Epist. Familiar*, VIII. 7.) The year following he commanded Cæsar's fleet before Marseilles (Cæsar, *De Bello Civil*, I. 36.—Dio Cassius, XLI. 19.) He gained, although with unequal forces, a naval victory over L. Domitius (Cæsar, *De Bello Civil*, II. 5.) Having received from Cæsar, in 706, the government of Transalpine Gaul, he repressed, in 708, an insurrection of the Bellovaci (Titus Livius, *Epitome*, CXIV.) An object of the special favours of his old general, who felt for him a warm affection, D. Brutus, along with Antony and Octavius, was associated in the triumph which Cæsar celebrated in 709, on his return from Spain, and mounted with them on the car. (Plutarch, *Antony*, 13.) By his will of the Ides of September, the Dictator named him one of the guardians of Octavius, and made him one of his second heirs (Dio Cassius, XLIV. 35.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 143.—Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 88); he caused to be given him, for the year 712, the government of Cisalpine Gaul. In spite of this friendship, of which Cæsar had given him so many proofs, and which the latter believed to be paid by a requital, Brutus, who had remained faithful to his benefactor in the civil war, lent his ear to the proposals of the conspirators, and yielded to the seductions of M. Brutus, his kinsman. He not only went to the Senate to assist in striking the victim, but he accepted the mission of going to persuade the Dictator, who was hesitating, to repair to the curia. (Dio Cassius, XLIV. 14, 18.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 115.—Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 70.) Exposed to public hatred (Cicero, *Philippic*, X. 7), and intimidated by the threats of Antony, he left Rome to go and take possession of the province

which Cæsar had caused to be assigned to him. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, XIV. 13.)

He appears, however, to have acted but feebly in favour of the party he had embraced. Antony, having obtained from the people, in exchange for Macedonia, the province commanded by Brutus (Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 30), the latter refused to abandon his government, and, supported by Cicero, he obtained from the Senate an edict maintaining him in it (Cicero, *Philippic*, III. 4.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 45), which led to an armed contest between the two competitors. Pursued by his rival, Brutus threw himself into Modena, and there sustained a long siege (Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 49.—Titus Livius, *Epitome*, CXVII), which had for its final result the celebrated battle in which Antony was defeated. D Brutus, overlooked among new actors in this sanguinary drama, remained in it almost a mere spectator. (Dio Cassius, XLVI 40) He then ranged himself on the side of Octavius, yet without the existence of any very close or very sincere intimacy between these two men. He continued to exercise an important command during the war, but fortune was not long in turning against him. Pressed by Antony, who had united with Lepidus, and threatened personally by the prosecutions which Octavius, armed with the law Pedia, was directing against the murderers of Cæsar (Titus Livius, *Epitome*, CXX —Dio Cassius, XLVI. 53), he found himself deserted by his troops, and, after a vain attempt to cross into Macedonia, he directed his steps with a small escort towards Aquileia; but a Gaulish chief, named Camillus, betrayed towards him the rites of hospitality, kept him prisoner, and sent information of what he had done to Antony. The old lieutenant of Cæsar immediately sent Furius with a party of cavalry, who slew Brutus, and carried away his head. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 97, 98.—Velleius Paterculus, II 63, 64.) Brutus was one of the correspondents of Cicero, who gives him praise, especially for his constancy in friendship, of which he was certainly little worthy.

8 PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS.

Publius Sulpicius Rufus, who belonged to the same family as S Sulpicius Galba, served, in 705, the cause of Cæsar in Spain (Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I 74); he commanded in the following year, with the title of prætor, the fleet which was cruising at Vibo, on the coast of Bruttium (Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, III. 101); subsequently he obtained the government of Illyria, a country where he had served in the ranks of the Cæsarians, and consequently succeeded Q. Cornificius (Cæsar, *De Bello Afric.*, 10; *De Bello Alexandrin.*, 42). A letter of Cicero, addressed to him (*Epist. Familiar.*, XIII. 77), shows that he was still in that province in 709. We know nothing certain relating to his actions. It has been supposed with probability that he is the same with a P. Sulpicius, censor under the triumvirate, and mentioned in a Latin inscription (*Tabula Collatina*), to which Drumann refers (tom. i, p. 528).

9. LUCIUS MUNATIUS PLANCUS.

Lucius Munatius Plancus, whose name is found in several inscriptions and on a rather great number of medals (see especially Orelli, *Inscriptiones*, N. 591), belonged to an illustrious plebeian family. Intimate at first with Cato, he subsequently gained the entire affection of Cæsar (Plutarch, *Cato of Utica*, 42. — Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, X. 24), and remained faithful to him to the last. After having served in Gaul, he became, in 705, one of his most active lieutenants in Spain (Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 40), and afterwards in Africa. (Cæsar, *De Bello Afr.*, 4.) Cæsar caused to be given to him, for the year 710, the government of Transalpine Gaul, without the Narbonnese and Belgic Gaul (Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 46 — Cicero, *Philipp*, III. 15), and named him, with P. Brutus, for the consulship in 712 (Velleius Paterculus, II. 63 — Dio Cassius, XLVI. 53), he was then in great favour with the Dictator: Cicero made his approaches through him to obtain Cæsar's favour (*Epist. Familiar.*, X. 3. XIII. 29.)

After the murder of Cæsar, Plancus, who no doubt, like Antony, feared the vengeance of the party of the conspirators, proposed an amnesty, in concert with him and Cicero (Plutarch, *Brutus*, 22), and hastened to go into the province which had been assigned to him. In Gaul he founded the colonies of Lugdunum and Raurica (Orelli, *Inscriptiones*, No. 590. — Dio Cassius, XLVI. 50), subsequently, gained by Antony, he abandoned to his vengeance, during the proscription, Plotius, his own brother. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, IV. 12. — Valerius Maximus, VI. 8, § 5.) In 712, Plancus took, with Lepidus, on the 1st of January, the consulship which Cæsar had destined for him. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 53; LXVII. 16.) In the war of Perusia, he commanded the troops of Antony, who sent him, in 714, into Asia. In 719 he still governed Syria for that triumvir, and he has been accused of the death of Sextus Pompey. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, V. 144.) He proceeded to Egypt with Antony, to the court of Cleopatra. (Velleius Paterculus, II. 83.) Foreseeing the ruin of Antony, of whom he has been reproached with being the base flatterer, he did not wait for the defeat of Actium to embrace the party of Octavius: he returned to Rome, and attacked his former friend bitterly in the Senate. (Velleius Paterculus, II. 83.) Dio Cassius (L. 3) accuses him of having revealed Antony's will. From this time devoted to Octavius, he proposed, in 727, to confer upon him the title of Augustus. (Suetonius, *Octavius*, 7. — Velleius Paterculus, II. 91.) In 732, he held the office of censor. (Dio Cassius, LIV. 2.) The inscriptions and medals show that he was also invested with other dignities. The date of his death is unknown. Horace addressed to him one of his odes. (Book I., Ode 7.)

10. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS.

Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives was the elder brother of young Crassus, whose place he had taken as Cæsar's lieutenant in Gaul. Little is known of his life. Cicero, less intimate with him than with his younger brother, has

mentioned him but slightly. (*Epist. Familiar.*, V 8) He ranged himself on Cæsar's side at the time of the civil war, and became, in 705, governor of Citerior Gaul. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 41.—Justin, XLII. 4.) The time of his death is unknown.

11. CAIUS FABIVS.

It is not known what Caius Fabius had been before the campaign of Gaul. When the civil war broke out, he remained faithful to Cæsar, who sent him orders to proceed from Narbonnese Gaul to Spain. With his usual rapidity, he moved by forced marches to Herda (*Herida*), near which town Afranius was encamped. He distinguished himself in the whole of this campaign, in which the army of Cæsar, which had joined him, was for a moment in danger.

No further mention is made of C. Fabius. His name does not occur either in the campaigns of Greece, Alexandria, or Africa, or in that of the second Spanish war, or elsewhere.

12. L. ROSCIUS.

L Roscius, who only played a secondary part in the war of Gaul, appears to be the same as a personage to whom Cicero gives the name of *L. Fabatus*, and who fell in the battle of Modena in 711. (*Epist. Familiar.*, X. 33.) He was prætor in 705, and Pompey, who knew the friendship which Cæsar had for Roscius, deputed him to him at Ariminum with proposals of peace. (Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 8, 10.—Dio Cassius, XLI. 5.) It is believed that it is his name which, followed by the surname Fabatus, figures on the Roman denarii which bear the image of Juno Lanuvina. It is also believed to occur in a Latin inscription.

13. TITUS SEXTIVS.

Titus Sextius, whose history before his arrival in Gaul is not known, became, in 710, governor of Numidia. (Dio Cassius, XLVIII 21.) According to Appian (*Civil Wars*, IV. 53), he took the side of Octavius; according to Dio Cassius (XLVIII 21), that of Antony. He made war against Q Cornificius, who sought to keep the ancient province of Africa, which the Senate had given him. Sextius aspired to the same government, and prepared to exercise it for Octavius, to whom Africa had been assigned in the partition of the triumvirs. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, IV. 53.) The defeat and death of Cornificius allowed him to realise his projects, and he remained in possession of his province until 713. Appian and Dio Cassius have told differently the events which forced Sextius, after the battle of Philippi, to abandon Numidia, where Octavius had sent a new governor. Nothing else is known of his biography.

In the year 700 two new lieutenants make their appearance, Q. Tullius Cicero and C. Trebonius, who came to replace Arunculeius Cotta and Titurius Sabinus, slain by the Gauls at Tongres.

14. Q. TULLIUS CICERO.

Quintus Tullius Cicero, younger brother of the great orator, was born in 652, and went with him to Athens, in order to perfect himself in literature, which he cultivated with success. The correspondence of the two brothers which has been preserved is a proof of this, and we know, from other sources, that Quintus had composed divers works which are lost. Quintus had married, before the year 686, Pomponia, sister of Atticus (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, I 5, 6), with whom he lived on bad terms, and from whom he finally separated. He was ædile in 688, the year of his brother's prætorship; and in 691, when his brother was consul, he lent him in the affair of Catiline his intelligent support, and shared the same dangers. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, I. 1; *Catilinaria Quarta*, 2, 3.) However, he did not share in his opinion in the judgment of the conspirators, when he voted, with Cæsar, against the punishment of death. (Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 14.) He became prætor in 692, defeated in Brutium the bands of the Catilinarian Marcellus (Orosius, VI. 6), and presided over the tribunal which judged Archias. (*Scholast of Bobbio on the Oration for Archias*, p. 354, edit Orelli.) In March of the year 693, he proceeded to the province of Asia, of which he had obtained the government (Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 14); he administered that province with as much equity as talent, seconded by able lieutenants. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, I 1.) They had, however, to reproach him with frequent fits of anger, which drew upon him the remonstrances of his brother. At the end of April, 696, Quintus left Asia in order to proceed direct to Rome, without taking time to visit at Thessalonica M. Cicero, who was still under the weight of his condemnation to exile. The fact was, he feared an accusation of extortion, which his enemies, and those of his brother, endeavoured to prepare against him. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, III. 9; *Epist. ad Quintum*, I 3; *Oratio pro Domo sua*, 36.) He employed himself actively in favour of his brother, and narrowly escaped being killed in the riot raised by Clodius, on the 8th of the Calends of February, 697, on the occasion of the proposition of the tribune Fabricius. (Cicero, *Oratio pro Sextio*, 35.—Plutarch, *Cicero*, 44.) When this same Clodius opposed the re-building of the house of M. Cicero, Quintus saw his own, which was next to that of his brother, burnt by the partisans of that turbulent demagogue (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, IV. 3.) Towards the end of the same year, Quintus was one of the fifteen lieutenants given to Pompey in order to direct the supplying of victuals, and in that quality he proceeded to Sardinia. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Quintum*, II. 2.) He started for Gaul in the beginning of 700, and it appears from a passage in the *Oratio pro Milone* that he was still there in 702. He left Cæsar's army in 703, and joined, in the quality of legate, his brother, who had been made proconsul of Cilicia, and to whom he lent the indispensable support of his experience and ability in matters of war. (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XV. 4; *Epist. ad Atticum*, V. 20.) During the civil war, Quintus took the side of Pompey, but he imitated his brother's circumspection, and, after the battle of Pharsalia, he made every effort to clear himself in the eyes of

Cæsar, to whom he sent as his deputy in Asia his own son, and thus obtained his pardon. After the death of Cæsar, Quintus pronounced energetically, like M. Cicero, against Antony, an opposition which turned out equally fatal to him, for, like his brother, he was comprised in the proscription. Having vainly attempted with him to reach Macedonia, he returned to Rome accompanied by his son, and both were delivered up by slaves to the executioner. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, IV. 20.—Plutarch, *Cicero*, 62.)

15. CAIUS TREBONIUS.

Caius Trebonius was the son of a Roman knight, of whom Cicero speaks in his *Philippica* (XIII. 10). Being quæstor in 694, he opposed the law Herennia, which authorised the adoption of Clodius by a plebeian; as tribune of the people in 699, he proposed the celebrated laws which gave to Pompey and Cæsar important provinces, and continued for five years Cæsar's command in Gaul. Having been called by Cæsar the year after in quality of legate, he remained in Gaul until the commencement of the civil war. He was afterwards sent to Spain against Afanius, and next charged with the siege of Marseilles by land. (Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, I. 36.—Dio Cassius, XLI. 19.) In 706, he became prætor urbanus (Dio Cassius, XLII. 20); a year later he succeeded Cassius Longinus in the government of one of the two Spains. (Cæsar, *De Bello Alexandrino*, 64; *De Bello Hispano*, 7.—Dio Cassius, XLIII. 29.) Compelled to leave the Peninsula, after some checks, he returned to Rome, where Cæsar caused him to be named consul in October, 709, and with the province of Asia, on quitting office. (Dio Cassius, XLIII. 46.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 2.) All these acts of kindness, however, could not secure to the dictator the devotedness of his lieutenant: even before Trebonius had taken possession of his proconsulate of Asia, he entered into the conspiracy formed against the life of Cæsar. But, detained by Antony outside the curia, he could not strike him with his own hand. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 117.—Dio Cassius, XLIV. 19.—Cicero, *Philippica*, II. 14; XIII. 10.) After the death of Cæsar, Trebonius started quietly for his government of Asia, and was in May, 710, at Athens. (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XII. 16.) During his proconsulship he supported the party of Brutus and Cassius. In February, 711, Dolabella, who had come to replace him, drew him into a snare at Smyrna, slew him, and threw his head at the foot of a statue of Cæsar, thus revenging his friend who had been so shamefully betrayed. (Cicero, *Philippica*, XIII. 10.—Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 26.—Velleius Paterculus, II. 69.—Dio Cassius, XLVII. 29.) Cicero, whose correspondent Trebonius had been, stigmatises this murder, in which Antony saw the just punishment of a villain and a parricide. It is certain that Trebonius had entered the conspiracy without remorse, since afterwards he wrote to Cicero: "If you compose anything on the murder of Cæsar, do not attribute a small part of it to me." (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar.*, XII. 16.)

During the years 701 to 705 new lieutenants joined Cæsar in Gaul: they were Minucius Basilus, Antistius Reginus, M. Sila-

nus, Caninius Rebilus, Sempronius Rutilus, Marcus Antonius, P. Vatinius, Q. Calenus, and Lucius Cæsar.

16. MINUCIUS BASILUS.

L. Minucius Basilus had taken his name and surname from a rich Roman who had adopted him. Previously his name was L. Satiŭs. Cicero names him thus in one of his treatises (*De Officiis*, III. 18), although elsewhere (*Epist. ad Atticum*, XI. 5) he designates him by his name and surname. He became prætor in 709 (Dio Cassius, XLIII. 47.) Irritated at not having obtained, on leaving office, the province which he coveted, and at having only received money from Cæsar, he entered into the conspiracy formed against the Dictator. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, II. 113.—Dio Cassius, XLIII. 47.) A few months after, he was assassinated by his slaves, who thus took revenge for his having subjected several of them to the punishment of castration. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, III. 98.)

17. C. ANTISTIUS REGINUS.

Nothing is known of the antecedents or the end of this lieutenant of Cæsar. To judge by his name, he must have belonged to the family of the *Antistii*, which produced divers magistrates of the Republic, and several members of which have perpetuated their memory in inscriptions.

18. M. SILANUS.

Marcus Junius Silanus, son of Seivilia, was brother, by the mother's side, to M. Brutus. After the murder of Cæsar, he accompanied his brother-in-law Lepidus in his campaign in the north of Italy, and was sent by him, in 711, to Modena, without precise instructions (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 38); to the great regret of Lepidus, he took the side of Antony. (Cicero, *Epist. Familiar*, X. 30, 34.) After Antony's defeat, Silanus, who had lost the confidence of Lepidus, proceeded to Sicily, to Sext. Pompey, and did not return to Rome until the peace of Misenum had been concluded with the latter, in 715. (Velleius Paterculus, II. 77.) Nothing more is known of his life, except that Augustus, in 729, took him as his colleague in the consulship. (Dio Cassius, LIII. 25.)

19. C. CANINIUS REBILUS

Caius Caninius Rebilus, great-grandson, in all probability, of the person of that name who was prætor in 588, does not appear in history until the war with Gaul. Cæsar sent him, in 705, to Scribonius Libo, to treat of peace with Pompey. (Cæsar, *De Bello Civil*, I. 26.) Rebilus next accompanied Curio into Africa, and escaped only with a small number from the defeat inflicted upon them by King Juba (*De Bello Civil*, II. 24.) In 708 he was still making war in the same province, and took Thapsus after the defeat of Scipio. (Cæsar, *De Bello Africano*, 86, 93.) In 709 he commanded in Spain the garrison of Hispalis. (Cæsar, *De Bello Hispano*, 35.) At the end of the same year, Cæsar caused him to be named consul, in the place of Q. Fabius, who

had died suddenly · it was on the eve of the Calends of January that this event had taken place. Rebilus consequently was only consul for a few hours, and the short period of his office has excited the jokes of Cicero (*Epist. Familiar*, VII 30 —Dio Cassius, XLIII. 46 —Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 63.) No other details are known of the life of this lieutenant of Cæsar.

20 M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILUS.

History is silent on what became of this lieutenant after the war of Gaul.

21. MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY).

The biography of Mark Antony is too well known, and is too much mixed up with the events which followed the war in Gaul, to render it necessary to give a sketch of it here. It is well known that Mark Antony, born in 671, was the son of a Mark Antony who had served in Crete, and grandson of the celebrated orator of the same name. His mother was a Julia, and belonged, consequently, to the family of Cæsar. After having encouraged and supported Cæsar in his projects on Rome, he became his *magister equitum*, when the dictatorship had been conferred upon him. At Pharsalia, he commanded the left wing of Cæsar's army. After the murder of the great man, he was the rival of Octavius, and subsequently, with Lepidus, his colleague in the triumvirate. When disunion arose between the future Augustus and the ancient lieutenant of his uncle, the battle of Actium completed the ruin of Antony, who, having taken refuge in Egypt, slew himself in despair, on the information which Cleopatra, with whom he was violently in love, gave him of her intended suicide.

22. PUBLIUS VATINIUS.

The part played by Publius Vatinius, before he became lieutenant in Gaul, has been told in the course of this work. At the conclusion of his tribuneship, he was employed in the army of Cæsar; but he had already, after his quæstorship, served in Spain in the same quality of lieutenant, under the proconsul C Cosconius. Threatened by the laws Licinia and Junia, Vatinius returned to Rome, and succeeded, thanks to the support of Clodius, in avoiding the trial with which he was threatened. He failed in his candidature for the ædileship, figured as one of the witnesses in the trial of Sextus, in which he showed great animosity against the accused, and against Cicero who defended him. Important events marked his prætorship in 699. As lieutenant of Cæsar in the civil war (Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, III. 19), after the battle of Pharsalia, he defended Brundisium against Lælius. (*De Bello Civili*, III. 100.) In 706 and 707 he continued to serve in the ranks of the partisans of the Dictator, who, in the end of that year, caused the consulship to be conferred upon him for a few days. (Dio Cassius, XLII 55.—Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, II. 3.) In 709 he was sent by Cæsar into Illyria, with the title of proconsul (Appian, *Illyric War*, 13), from which province he sent obliging letters to Cicero. (*Epist. Familiar*, V. 9, 10.) After the murder of the Dictator, when the Dalmatians had revolted and had defeated a considerable corps of his army, Vatinius, who mistrusted

the fidelity of his soldiers, retired to Epidamnus, and delivered his province and his legions to M. Brutus. (Titus Livius, *Epitome*, CXVIII. — Velleius Paterculus, II. 69.—Appian, *Illyric War*, 13.) Nevertheless, he obtained, at the end of that year (711), a triumph for his victories. It is not known what became of him afterwards.

23. Q. FUFIVS CALENVS.

Q. Fufius Calenus, of one of the most illustrious families of Rome, the *gens Fufia*, was tribune of the people in 693, and served at that time actively the interests of Clodius, when the latter was accused of having violated the mysteries of the *Bona Dea*. (Cicero, *Epist. ad Atticum*, I. 14.) As prætor during the consulship of Cæsar and Bibulus, he gave his name to a judiciary law, and served with zeal, during his magistracy, the projects of him whose lieutenant he became in Gaul. He also supported Clodius in the affair of Milo. When the civil war broke out, Fufius Calenus joined Cæsar at Brundisium; he followed him afterwards into Spain, in the character of lieutenant. (*Epist. ad Atticum*, IX. 5.—Cæsar, *De Bello Civil.*, I. 87.) Sent afterwards into Ephesus, he took, before the battle of Pharsalia, the principal towns of Greece. In 707, he became consul with Vatinius (Dio Cassius, XLII. 55); sided, after the death of Cæsar, with Antony, whom he defended against the attacks of Cicero (*Philippica*, VIII. 4.—Dio Cassius, XLVI. 1–28), and was his lieutenant during the struggles which followed. He commanded an army in Transalpine Gaul in 713, when he was carried off by a sudden death, at the moment when he was on the point of encountering the troops of Octavius. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, V. 3, 51.—Dio Cassius, XLVIII. 20.)

24. L. CÆSAR.

L. Julius Cæsar, who appears as lieutenant of the great Cæsar only at the end of the war of Gaul, belonged to the same family as himself; he was a son of L. Julius Cæsar, consul in the time of the war against the Marsi, who was assassinated by Fimbria, and brother of Julia, mother of Mark Antony. He stood for the ædileship without success (Cicero, *Orat. pro Plancio*, 21), was more fortunate in his petition for the consulship, and exercised that high magistracy in 690. (Cicero, *Orat. pro Murena*, 34, *Epist. ad Atticum*, I. 1, 2.—Dio Cassius, XXXVII. 6.) He was, with Cæsar, the year after, one of the judges (*duumvir perduellionis*) in the trial of C. Rabirius. (Dio Cassius, XXXVII. 27.) When the Senate was deliberating on the conspiracy of Catiline, the relationship which united him with P. Lentulus did not prevent him from voting for his condemnation to death. After the war of Gaul, he returned to Rome, and, in the year 707, Mark Antony invested him with the functions of præfect of the town; he was then very aged. (Dio Cassius, XLII. 30.) After Cæsar had been assassinated, L. Cæsar withdrew from the party of Antony, although the latter was his nephew, for which he has been praised by Cicero. (*Epist. Familiær.*, XII. 2.) But his opposition softened down afterwards, and he rejected the proposal to declare war against the ancient lieutenants.

tenant of Cæsar, made by the great orator. (Cicero, *Philippica*, VIII. 1; *Epist Familiar*, X 28.) This was the effect of the influence exercised upon him by his sister Julia, to whom he owed his safety in the proscription which followed the conclusion of the triumvirate. (Appian, *Civil Wars*, IV. 12 — Plutarch, *Cicero*, 61; *Antony*, 20.—Florus, IV. 6. — Velleius Paterculus, II. 67.) Nothing is known concerning his after life

END OF VOL. II.

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